China, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe

From sporadic bilateral exchanges to a comprehensive multilateral platform

從零星的雙邊交流到全面的多邊平臺

Honorary Editor — *Ip Kuai Peng*

Edited by — *Francisco José Leandro, Carlota Beja, Yuqing Lu*

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中國、幾內亞比紹、莫桑比克、聖多美和普林西比

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Cover Photo and Design
Photo Title: Airport Travelers
In line with the title of this book, XXI Century bilateral exchanges between People's Republic of China and several Portuguese-speaking Countries in Africa have evolved to a process of mutual development cooperation, covering not only strict trading matters, but also others regarding to cultural, educational, social, health, or sustainable development projects, just to name a few. Amongst such projects and supporting the cooperation process, the establishment of communication systems, such as the ones within "One Belt, One Road" program, are a key development tool. The cover photo, taken in Beijing Airport, symbolizes the role and importance of communications within the cooperation and development process. Travel and exchange improve levels of mutual understanding and effectiveness of common goals and projects. In a way, wide range of communication may symbolize what mutual development of cooperation should represent between countries.

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Foreword

For a Better Understanding of a New Relational Era…

Carlos Rodrigues
University of Aveiro, Portuguese Republic

To many international observers, the results of the eighth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in November 2021 in Dakar, Senegal, heralded the possibility of China's retrenchment from Africa. If true, the drop in planned activities and, particularly, financing would exacerbate the negative impacts of either COVID-19 or the debt crisis. Notwithstanding, many others denounce the retrenchment thesis, and instead advocate an increase in China-Africa relations. Still acknowledging a significant change, they put forward a shift in priorities, namely from the hitherto predominant infrastructure development to other drivers for intensification. The Dakar Declaration hints upon new or renewed relational drives when highlighting China's role in setting off a healthy, industrialized, interconnected, digital, green, safe, and innovative Africa. Xi Jinping's speech delivered to the FOCAC conference reinforces the idea and seems to look at infrastructure development as the first step marking the beginning of "a thousand-mile journey." This journey, following the Chinese leader, besides the fight against COVID-19 "with solidarity" and the upholding of justice and equity, implies to "expand trade and investment, share experience on poverty reduction, strengthen cooperation on digital economy, and promote entrepreneurship by young Africans and the development of small and medium-sized enterprises," as well as "to advocate green and low-carbon development."

African Portuguese-speaking countries (APSCs) are a relevant part of this "*new relational era*" being outlined for the near future. To add up the variety of "traditional" motivations and interests that has been providing ground to a stable relational status — from oil and gas to infrastructural strategic investments — one can expect significant developments in the years ahead, both in economic and financial terms and substance. The announced

framework conditions bring to the APSCs new opportunities as well as new challenges. Moreover, it calls for a better understanding of the APSCs' development policies, trajectories, barriers, potential, and global interdependencies. Accordingly, those that persist in generating knowledge about the subject, often neglected, deserve recognition. This is the case for City University of Macau, specifically the Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries (IROPC), which endeavours to foster research on a wide range of facets configuring China-APSC relations and the dissemination of their results. The organization of international events such as the annual symposia plays a crucial role in divulging the relevant knowledge being produced.

Relations between China and Timor-Leste or the Portuguese-speaking small island states were under the spotlight in the first two international symposia organized by the Macanese higher education institute. The 2020–2021 Third International Annual Symposium, jointly organized with Joaquim Chissano University, Mozambique, brought together a group of experts focusing on three APSCs, namely Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Guinea-Bissau. The present publication gathers contributions made by a set of researchers who participated in the event. Marked by its diversity in terms of research subjects and perspectives, it sheds light over much relevant facets affecting the bilateral relations between China and the three concerned APSCs and the shift from "sporadic bilateral exchanges to a comprehensive multilateral platform of mutual development cooperation," as recalled in the symposium's call for papers.

The book is organized according to five structuring elements, including a first one dedicated to the three keynote speeches, followed by four thematic parts. The content of the keynote addresses highlights, on the one hand, the crucial importance of history to ensure a full understanding of contemporary China-APSC relations, and, on the other hand, the effect of institutional change and context-specific and circumstantial events on the way those relations evolve over time. The creation of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) in 1996, for instance, is explored as forecourt to discuss a number of challenges raised by the complex Africa–European Union–China diplomatic triangle. The historical overview of Guinea-Bissau–China relations, with their ups and downs and pragmatic stance, contributes to knowing more about the underpinning factors of current Chinese influence in former European colonies in Africa. The analysis of Cabo Delgado's conflict, in Mozambique, shows that, although localized, the turbulence provokes ripple effects upsetting national foreign policy and bilateral agreements, including the framework shaping Chinese interests' course in the country.

The second part pays attention to people-to-people exchanges, which play a fundamental role in the cultural communication and exchanges in the foreign affairs realm through the intervention of non-state actors, i.e., what is generally called public diplomacy. It starts with an approach to the role played by sports diplomacy in international relations, followed by an analysis of internal evolutions concerning, specifically, gender balance issues in Mozambique. This part also comprises a comparative case study exercise, which, based on carnival events organized in Macau and Guinea-Bissau, establishes the relevance of tourism-based cultural communication in enhancing the relations between China and African countries.

The third part addresses the African dimension of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Its first paper forges an interesting argument that BRI is bringing benefits to the parties involved. Yet, at least in the case of China-Mozambique relations, there is not a full win-win outcome, but rather one of a "win-win less" nature, which grounds the possibility of greater geo-economic disadvantages than advantages for the Eastern African country. This is followed by a reasoning that China's interest in small island states such as São Tomé and Príncipe brings a geo-strategic dimension into the BRI debate by pinpointing the "Middle-Kingdom" in the mid-Atlantic Ocean. The two final papers of this second part set forth, respectively, the possibility of extending the BRI dynamics to the whole African continent and seizing the benefits from this extension in terms of the capacity to attain the UN sustainable development goals, and the close relationship between institutional capacity building and the ability to ensure higher socioeconomic development paths, focusing on the particular case of Guinea-Bissau.

The fourth part, dedicated to sustainable development in the APSCs, in overall terms, launches a plea for institutional change, as precondition for implementing sustainable development trajectories in the concerned geography. It entails a paper based on the Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe cases, which prompt the idea of Africa as the continent of the future and, as such, the imperative need to redesign national frontiers. Following an appraisal of the hindering effects of poverty and inequality in decades of development efforts carried out in sub-Saharan Africa in general and the APSCs in particular, this part offers an insight on the high social and economic impact of education in São Tomé and Príncipe. It continues with a study concerning the social and economic impacts of education training on the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe, highlighting the important role of education and staff training and the way in which this process has evolved since independence. Looking at the same geographical context, the two remaining papers of this fourth section provide, firstly, an explanation for the failure of several free-trade zones (FTZs) in São Tomé and Príncipe, highlighting the connection among oil-related sectors and FTZ development as a hampering factor, and, secondly, a review of the (positive) role of media in the country's development process.

Finally, the fifth part consists of an outlook for the APSCs' cooperation with China. Drawing on the specific cases of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, this part opens with a scrutiny of China-APSC economic relations in terms of functionality, scope, and limitations. This is followed by an assessment of how international economic powers, namely Japan and the United States, are reacting to the dynamics of Chinese direct investment in Africa and by a review on the implications brought by the global energy transaction process to China's relations with the APSCs. The last paper of this part sets an outlook of the institutional framework conditions configuring the evolution of bilateral cooperation between Guinea-Bissau and China, which is judged as a carrier of mutual benefits in a variety of domains, including infrastructure, aid, and trade.

To sum up, this book makes sense of a variety of perspectives, thematic fields, and methodological approaches in a way that configures a highly valuable piece of literature to help scholars, independently of their experience and status, in their endeavours to grasp the

complexity of a riveting research subject that is Africa and the APSCs and their burgeoning and far-reaching relations with China. To wrap up this Foreword, I offer a word of praise to the effort undertaken by the book's editing team, who deserve a great deal of recognition for this achievement.

Word of Recognition

Since 2013, City University of Macau, through its Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries (IROPC/CityUM), has been offering highly positive contributions to the Macau society and to the Chinese nation on the relations between the People's Republic of China and the Portuguese-speaking countries (PSCs). In 2019, the Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries published the first edited volume of the collection China-PSC studies entitled *The challenges, development and promise of Timor-Leste*. This seminar proceedings publication, followed by a peer review process, has received encouraging reviews and has been distributed graciously to all City University partners in Macau, mainland China, and Portuguese-speaking countries.

In 2021, following the same academic publication process, and in spite of adverse conditions caused by the global pandemic, the Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries, supported by City University and by the Macao SAR Government, organized its third annual international symposium and published the second volume of the collection China-PSC studies entitled *China and Portuguese-speaking Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), from Sporadic Bilateral Exchanges to a Comprehensive Multilateral Platform.*

In 2022, another step was taken towards the enrichment of the collection China-PSC studies, with the publication of this third volume and the organization of the fourth annual international symposium. This time, both events have been jointly organized by IROPC/CityUM and Joaquim Chissano University (Mozambique). This manuscript is dedicated to China, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

I would like to express gratitude to all scholars from different universities across three continents who voluntarily participated in the preparation of this book and contributed their critical reviews. Particularly, I wish to convey sincere gratitude to Professor José Magode, Rector of our partner, Joaquim Chissano University, as our cooperation is a testament to the fruitful, sincere, and academically advantageous relationship that we share.

I am also grateful to both the English proofreader and the book designer, whose patience, hard work, and professional competence — which have been fundamental to ensuring the envisaged quality of the document — deserve to be publicly acknowledged.

Lastly, I would like to commend the Government of Macau SAR (China) for all their support, City University of Macau for their leadership and unwavering assurance, all contributors for their ability to deliver, as well as all students and administrative personnel involved in the preparation of this book. In addition, I wish to publicly praise the three editors, two of them female Ph.D. students, for their academic resilience, commitment, and vision. They have overcome all challenges — particularly those induced by the COVID-19 pandemic — to deliver a noteworthy contribution, working as an extended but united family. They stand as an example of positive cooperation between universities, professors, and students. Such is a lesson to be learned by us all: As the old Chinese proverb goes, "All things change, and we change with them" (與時偕行), hopefully for the better.

Professor Ip Kuai Peng (Honorary Editor)
Pro-rector, City University of Macau

答謝致辭

自2013年以來，澳門城市大學通過葡語國家研究院 (IROPC/CityUM) 在中國和葡語國家關係發展方面，為澳門社會和中華民族作出了積極貢獻。

2019年，葡語國家研究院出版了《中國—葡語國家研究文集》第一卷，題為 "東帝汶的挑戰、發展與願景"。在研討會後，相關論文集結出版，隨後經過同行評審，獲得了令人鼓舞的評論，並已呈送給澳門、中國內地和葡語國家的所有澳門城市大學的合作夥伴。

2021年，在同樣的學術出版過程中，克服全球疫情帶來的不利條件，在澳門城市大學和澳門特區政府的支持下，葡語國家研究院舉辦了第三屆年度國際研討會，並出版了《中國—葡語國家研究文集》第二卷，題為 "中國與葡語小島嶼發展中國家：從零星的雙邊交流到全面的多邊平臺。"

最後，在 2022 年，隨著《中國—葡語國家研究文集》第三卷的出版和第四屆年度國際研討會的舉行，中國與葡語國家研究的文獻收藏得到進一步豐富。本卷"致力於研究中國與葡語國家幾內亞比紹、莫桑比克及聖多美和普林西比"，其出版和研討會的召開由澳門城市大學的葡語國家研究院和莫桑比克的若阿金·希薩諾大學 (Joaquim Chissano University, Mozambique) 聯合組織。

此外，我要感謝來自三大洲不同大學的所有學者，他們自願參與本書的編寫，並提供了他們的批判性評論。我要特別感謝我們的合作夥伴若阿金·希薩諾大學 (Joaquim Chissano University, Mozambique) 的校長 José Magode 教授，我們的合作卓有成效、真誠互助，並有利於學術發展。

同樣，我也要感謝本書的英文校對和設計師們，他們的耐心、努力和專業能力是確保稿件達到預期學術品質的基礎，值得公眾的認可。最後，我要感謝澳門特區政府的支持、澳門城市大學領導層的恒久信任、所有撰稿人的及時交稿，以及參與編寫本書工作的學生和行政人員。

另外，我要公開表揚三位編輯的學術韌性和遠見，其中兩位是女博士生，他們在疫情大流行危機造成的孤立下克服了重重困難，就像一個龐大而團結的家庭，為編輯和出版該書做出了顯著的貢獻。這是大學、教授和學生之間積極合作的典範，值得我們所有人學習。

正如中國古語所說："與時偕行。"我們希望一切會越來越好。

葉桂平教授 (名譽編輯)
澳門城市大學協理副校長

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IROPC, Photographer | City University of Macau, People's Republic of China

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Presentation 5
Win-Win Less Cooperation: Geo-economic Implications of the Sino-Mozambican Relations in the Context of the Belt One Road Initiative | Frederico Congolo
(Universidade Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique)
11H15 - ONLINE Panel 3B – Outlook for the PSCs and their cooperation with China
Presentation 12
Economic Structures diversity, Scope and Limits of Functional Cooperation | José Magode
(Universidade Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique)
Presentation 13
Chinese FDI in Africa: How Japan and the U.S. approach Sino-Africa Relations? | Paulo Tembe
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(*A Faixa e Rota Chinesa: a convergência entre terra e mar*, 2017) as well as of a book (*Metamorfoses no Poder: Rumo à Hegemonia do Dragão?*) with foreword and presentation by current President of Portugal, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (2014). He is often invited to cooperate with national and International media on BRI-related issues, and he is a weekly political analyst at Mozambique's TV programme *Observatório Internacional*. Most recent publications: Duarte, P. (2021). "The Soft Power of China and the European Union in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative and Global Strategy." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, with Ferreira-Pereira; and Duarte, P. (2021) "China and the Belt and Road Initiative in Europe: The case of Portugal" In Ntousas and Minas (eds). *The European Union and China's Belt and Road Impact, Engagement and Competition*. Routledge (co-authored with Ferreira-Pereira, L.).

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Introduction

Every book has a story and a purpose, and every research is a collective discovery and commitment designed to capitalize on our ability to share. This manuscript is no exception; it is a collective purposeful attempt to contribute and stimulate advancement, while being mindful of the risk of error looming behind the pages.

This volume particularly addresses the relations between the People's Republic of China and the African Portuguese-speaking countries (APSCs), focusing its discussions on the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the Republic of Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe. Further, the book aims to contemplate topics of sporadic bilateral exchanges and comprehensive exchanges as part of a multilateral platform of mutual development. Indeed, as the third installment of a series of studies on Portuguese-speaking countries, the volume comprises proceedings from a conference organized and hosted by the Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries. These proceedings as well as this manuscript itself have been the result of the joint effort between City University of Macau (China) and Joaquim Chissano University (Mozambique). At the same time, this book is the outcome of an international symposium that took place at City University of Macau on July 16, 2021, hosted with support from the Macau SAR Government– Higher Education Fund (Governo da RAEM – Fundo do Ensino Superior). This day-long international symposium had a hybrid format: in-person and online participation.

The book is organized into five parts that correspond to the visions of the symposium organizers. Part 1 — Keynote Chapters — has collected three research pieces authored by four distinguished scholars from Portugal and from the Macau Special Administrative Region (China). This part addresses the general modern challenges of bilateral cooperation contextualized to the specific cases of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. This initial chapter offered by Nuno Canas Mendes, is the tangible result of excellent institutional collaboration, between our academic units. Indeed, it stands as a token international academic cooperation between universities. It is particularly relevant because (to quote Nuno Canas Mendes):

> Despite the old historical relationship with China, Portuguese foreign policy is constrained by belonging to the European Union […]. Nevertheless, the Lusophone link remains very important in the connection with China, whose interests in the Global South clearly include the Portuguese language countries.

Part 1 puts forth some food for thought in relation to trilateral cooperation: China, Macau, and the APSCs, as well as current challenges facing Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. In Chapter 2, Priscilla Roberts calls our attention to a very important fact:

> After Guinea-Bissau decided to desert Taiwan, China opened an embassy in the country. Educational scholarship programmes and medical exchanges rapidly resumed, and in the first decade of the twenty-first century, Chinese grants provided funding to rebuild and re-equip a hospital and reconstruct Guinea-Bissau's electricity network, and also additional budgetary support for the government.

To conclude Part 1, Ana Margarida Sousa Santos and Cátia Miriam Costa shed light on the current insurgency in Cabo Delgado (Mozambique) which has led to serious local uncertainties and has impacted not only local lives but also foreign investment. They assert that, while much has been written about the internal dynamics of the conflict and the ongoing humanitarian crisis at the local level, as well as the ways in which national policies have impacted the local responses, less has been revealed regarding the ways in which these events have affected bilateral relations with China.

Part 2 is devoted to people-to-people exchanges, which is an important characteristic embedded in a collectivist culture. As Westwood & Leung (1999)[1] asserts, people-to-people exchanges is critical to cultivate friendly relationships and interactions in order to succeed in the workplace, as so much of the finer aspects of work and the workplace are unwritten, unprescribed by formal hierarchies, rules, or regimes. As Qin suggests, "Culture plays a significant role in knowledge production" (2018, p. 416).[2] Culture will therefore have an impact on people's world and life views across generations, in turn affecting people-to-people exchanges. Part 2 shows how sports, gender, and mega-events have paved the way to a better mutual understanding between societal divisions and to foster meaningful relational human bonds: Firstly, Bernardo Mendia and Miguel Pereira suggest that sports diplomacy "can, and should, be used by all nations to achieve results that go way beyond sports or culture, and truly contribute to the understanding of people and nations." Yuqing Lu then offers an important piece of research regarding gender and political representation in Mozambique. Lu explains that female parliamentarians "serve as role models for other women, encourage young girls to actively participate in political activities, and raise awareness of female empowerment at all levels of society," and contemplates the question of introducing gender quotas into Mozambique's national parliament. Part 2 concludes with Jingwen Meng, Wenzhong Wu and Auricelio André Có's presentation of a unique study on tourism in Guinea-Bissau. These authors are using the Guinea-Bissau Carnival as a potential major promotor of tourism growth, which, as the authors explain, is a window to display the image of the Guinea-Bissau capital city. This festival is seen as channel for various information exchanges, a bridge connecting domestic and foreign markets, and a platform for attracting investment.

Part 3 focuses on the Belt and Road Initiative and the African Portuguese-speaking countries, and as such, addresses the case of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, the small Portuguese archipelagos of Africa. The content of this part has been specially designed to induce discussions and new ideas to improve this extraordinary Chinese initiative. Firstly, Frederico Congolo discusses how "APSC participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) helps to diversify sources of financing for large infrastructure projects and it contributes to the insertion of the national economies in the Sino-centric value chain." Secondly, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte, Jorge Tavares da Silva and Rui Pereira asserted that "(…) although the Middle Atlantic is a faraway Ocean from China, the cases of Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe highlight the weight of geo-economics and geopolitics underlying China's growing incursions in these remote areas." Thirdly, another important idea, presented by Pedro das Neves, is the linkage between the BRI — the largest development programme ever created by mankind — and the UN's Sustainable Development Goals, as a global development language and to scale it up by integrating the whole African continent. Finally, Paulo Gonçalves and Francisco Leandro offer a geopolitical study on Guinea-Bissau that emphasizes the importance of the Guinea-Bissau's authorities to establish democratic control of its armed forces, to create partnership agreements to increase the sovereign control of its exclusive economic zone, as well as implementing effective domestic anti-corruption and anti-narcotrafficking control.

[1] Westwood, R., & Leung, A. (1999). Women in Management in Hong Kong and Beijing: Between Pragmatism and Patriarchy. In Fosh P., Chan A., Chow W., Snape E., & Westwood R. (eds.). Hong Kong Management and Labour. London, Routledge.

[2] Qin, Y. (2018). A Multiverse of Knowledge: Cultures and IR Theories. The Chinese Journal of International Politics. Vol. 11, Issue 4.

Part 4 is dedicated to an indispensable topic — sustainable development for the common good. It covers the general aspects of sustainable development, as well as inequality, poverty, education, free trade zone projects, and communication and the media. Firstly, as André Ngueho explains, poverty and inequality are particularly endemic in Sub-Saharan Africa, constituting binding constraints to decades of development efforts. With the exception for Cabo Verde, which features a low poverty rate, estimated at 7% of the population, the other Lusophone countries show endemic poverty, with 33% of the population in Angola, 38% Guinea-Bissau, 70% Mozambique, and 45% São Tomé and Príncipe. Secondly, Samuel Igbatayo explains that "Poverty and inequality have undermined development efforts across Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly over the past several decades. […] Lusophone countries also feature high levels of poverty and inequality among the population. While poverty and inequality are critical issues undermining development efforts in both Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, the prevalence vary, but is triggered by instability and fueled by recurrent military coups and a prolonged civil war." Thirdly, Lúcio Lima Viegas Pinto analyzes how the post-colonial policies brought socioeconomic changes in the archipelago of São Tomé and Príncipe, emphasizing that the impacts of public policies on education and training in the country are very evident, especially the policies for higher education of national staff, initially abroad, and later in the country with the creation of endogenous institutions. Fourthly, Osiris de Jesus Costa presents another important analysis of the Free Trade Zone Projects in São Tomé and Príncipe, asserting that "[…] it appears that there are still no effective conditions in STP to facilitate private investments towards regional economic integration. Furthermore, the GOV-STP instability and lack of institutional articulation have been a real inconvenience for the attraction and dynamization of private investments for STP." Finally, José Manuel Simões offers a study about the media contribution in São Tomé and Príncipe to the country development, saying that "[…] the regional, community radios and the digital media can have the more effective and important role to contribute to the country development by strengthening social cohesion, internal and external credibility and promoting inclusive, sustainable growth and resilience."

Part 5 focuses the lens on the cooperation between China and the African Portuguese-speaking countries across four chapters, covering in particular Mozambique's point of view, the energy perspective, and the Chinese standpoint. Firstly, Magode bluntly concludes by reflecting on China-PSC cooperation that

> […] cooperation between the PRC and the PSCs, of which the cases of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique are the illustration that suggests changing the framework of action in international cooperation, to the detriment of the reproduction of dependency, promoting relational frameworks based on interdependence to correct the classic model of core-periphery cooperation in the 21st century.

Secondly, Paulo Tembe, along the same line of reasoning, calls our attention to the fact that

> The ongoing Chinese project 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI) in progress, is currently, one of the biggest projects that put a good part of the countries of the world interconnected. However, as discussed in this chapter, good cooperation means mutual gains, although not balanced. The lack of negotiating capacity for many African countries, allows them, to submit to the individualistic interests of their partners. Africa is lacking capital, a situation that leads to subjection and acceptance of the type of cooperation intended, of absolute advantage either of China, Japan or the United States of America.

Thirdly, Paulo Figueiredo and João Simões assert that in the context of China's pathway to decarbonize, its energy transitions can impact its foreign policy priorities and the strategic importance of the southern African Portuguese-speaking countries. They put forward a main conclusion, which is that Angola is on track to lose relevance as a major supplier of fossil fuels to China, while Mozambique could become an important supplier of natural gas. To conclude this part, Daoboin Chen asserts that Guinea-Bissau's Terra Ranka national development plan has yet to deliver any significant contribution, but the country should continue to implement the economic hubs in the context of China's African strategies and cooperation frameworks.

The collection of chapters and resources presented here offer diverse perspectives on three particular African Portuguese-speaking countries — the *Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the Republic of Mozambique*, and *the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe*. were prepared to facilitate further research on this topic, and following the previous editions of this collection, Priscilla Roberts suggests a well prepared pool of references of online academic sources on Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.

As a peer reviewed publication, this volume has been prepared over 18 months, from January to July, 2021, in five phases: (1) Call for papers; (2) Selection of proposals and academic committee suggestions; (4) International symposium

— Chapters public presentations; (4) Peer review, academic suggestions, proofreading, and editing; (5) Book design and printing. Therefore, the editors are particularly grateful to Professor Carlos Rodrigues from the University of Aveiro (Portugal) for his eloquent foreword; to the reviewers for their accurate academic suggestions: Professor José Magode – Rector Joaquim Chissano University (Portuguese of Mozambique); Professor Kuai Peng Ip - Pro-Rector City University Macau (China); Associate Professor Priscilla Roberts - City University Macau (China); Invited Assistant Professor Jorge Tavares da Silva from University of Aveiro (Portuguese Republic); Invited Assistant Professor Cátia Miriam Costa - University Institute of Lisbon (Portuguese Republic); Invited Assistant Professor Enrique Galan – ISEG – University of Lisbon, (Portuguese Republic); Associate Professor Alexandre Lobo – University of Saint Joseph, Macau (China); Invited Assistant Professor Paulo Afonso B. Duarte from Minho University (Portuguese Republic); Dr. Carlos Branco – IPRI, Lisbon (Portuguese Republic) and Dr. Paulo Gonçalves – Independent Researcher, Lisbon, (Portuguese Republic); and to Professor Gershom Tse (Canada) for his editorial recommendations and English proofreading. By the same token, the editors wish to express gratitude to Professor Kuai Peng Ip, Pro-Rector of City University Macau, for his outstanding academic support; to the MSAR Higher Education Fund for the financial resources; to Professor José Magode, Rector of Joaquim Chissano University, for his vision and support in the preparation of the symposium and for ensuring academic quality of this publication; to all assistant editors and symposium logistics officers for their availability and project commitment; to all City University Information and Technology personnel; to the book graphic designer Jimmy Vong for his immense patience and singular skills; to Architect Francisco Ricarte, that presented us with a beautiful image taken in Beijing Airport, which symbolizes the importance of communication in the development of cooperation between countries, to be included in the front cover; and to all Ph.D. and Master students at the Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries for their presence and support.

Finally, the editors, would like to quote Carlos Rodrigues, from the University of Aveiro, Portugal, in saying that "African Portuguese-speaking countries are a relevant part of the 'new relational era' (between China and the African Portuguese-speaking Countries) being outlined for the near future." This idea encapsulates the very nature of this book collection, to which this manuscript will be a part of.

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Part 1

Keynote Chapters

People's Republic of China, MSAR and Portuguese-Speaking Countries: Intersections, convergences, and difficulties

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Punching Above Its Weight? Guinea-Bissau's Quest for Independence and Great Power Diplomacy

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The conflict in Cabo Delgado: impact in Mozambique foreign affairs and the reshaping of the bilateral agreements

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People's Republic of China, MSAR and Portuguese-Speaking Countries: Intersections, convergences, and difficulties

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China, Macau, Portugal, CPLP, Portuguese foreign policy

Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview and analysis of the relations between China, Portugal, and the Portuguese Speaking Countries through the Portuguese foreign policy lens. Bearing in mind the role of Macau (MSAR), the chapter offers the author's view on the historical roots of the Portuguese Language Countries Community (CPLP), of the main directions of Portuguese Foreign Policy and then describes the involvement of China in Africa and Lusophone Africa, Brazil, and Timor-Leste. The main assumption of the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Augusto Santos Silva, qualifying this relationship as a "virtuous triangle" seems to leave the diplomatic and political onus on the Portuguese side, challenging its international strategy and alignments with the European Union and the United States.

1. Introduction

Do the People's Republic of China, the Macau SAR, and Portuguese-speaking countries indeed form a "virtuous triangle"?

This chapter wants to explore the intersections, convergences, and difficulties of what the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister Augusto Santos Silva describes as a "virtuous" triangle comprising China, the Macau SAR, and Portuguese-speaking countries. Context is needed for discussing this triangulation - i.e., an analysis of Portuguese foreign policy history and axes, and the formation of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP). In the same framework, China's interests in Lusophone Africa, Brazil, and Timor-Leste are at stake, and converge in Macau through one element of intersection for business and exchange — the Portuguese language.

2. Literature review

The present text is a result of a lecture given by the author in May 2021 to undergraduate and graduate students of the City University of Macau. Neither intending to be exhaustive nor innovative, the presentation made a broad reflection on the so-called "triangle." The topic of Macau as a bridge between China and Portuguese-speaking countries has been much discussed by a number of authors (Mendes, 2013; Leandro; 2019, Costa, 2021) and in a broader perspective, through the lens of Chinese strategies towards the South and the Portuguese-speaking world (Alves, 2008, Vogt, 2017; Santos & Lobo 2020; Gaspar & Rodrigues, 2021; Prinsloo, 2021). Regarding Portuguese-speaking countries, some generic studies do ask for both a broader (Gaspar & Rodrigues, 2021) and a monographic (Madeira, 2017; Martin, 2018; Trinkunas, 2020; Mendes, 2021) review. Portuguese foreign policies as a whole, both in terms of historical evolution and contemporary features, lack in-depth analysis (Sá, 2015), especially those directed towards Asia (Jesus, 2013).

3. CPLP historical roots: the Portuguese Colonial Empire

Founded in the 15th century, the Portuguese colonial empire would go on to span five centuries. The main goal of the Portuguese rulers when founding the empire was to access India and to control the spice trade (15th to 16th centuries)—those were the reasons at the very beginning that served to justify Portuguese interests in Eastern Asia. What ensued was great networking, acculturation, diplomatic efforts, and Church action, lasting until the very end of the 20th century. In its twilight, the Portuguese empire comprised Goa, Macau, and Timor-Leste. In many ways, however, the empire could be considered an outstanding project, characterized by its fragility and sense of survival. The empire in fact started and ended in Asia––in Macau and Timor, whose decolonization and political statuses were only closed in 1999. On the Atlantic space, Brazil was under Portuguese control between the 16th and 19th centuries, and became independent in 1822, after Napoleon invaded the Iberian Peninsula and as a consequence the displacement of King João VI to Rio de Janeiro and the power transfer from the metropolis to a colony. During the 17th and 18th centuries, sugar cane production dominated, and then gold and diamonds were discovered, that explaining the priority that the Portuguese crown gave then to Brazil, disfavoring the interest for Asian possessions. During the "scramble for Africa" process, Portugal was not absent from the competition and managed to safeguard the colonial rule over five territories: Angola, Mozambique, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Africa used to be the source of slaves who worked in sugar plantations in Brazil, but after the Berlin Conference (1885), Angola and Mozambique acquired stable borders. Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and even Guinea-Bissau were less important than Angola and Mozambique, mainly because of their sizes and resources. Since then there have been two regime changes: after the fall of the Monarchy in 1910 and the implantation of a republic, a dictatorship was established by Salazar. Being head of the government for almost five decades, Salazar resisted admitting the auto-determination principle after World War II and, because of that, a colonial war was fought between 1961 and

1974. Colonies became then euphemistically called "overseas provinces" so that the empire could be maintained against several wills and in a counter cycle, without the supervision of the United Nations.

The decolonization of Brazil, which had started in 1822, was inevitable after 1945, and despite Salazar's resistance, the fall of "Portuguese India" took place in 1961, followed by the independence of African territories from Portuguese rule in 1974–75, Macau's handover to China in 1999, and Timor-Leste's independence in 2002. Heritage and cultural links influenced the project of creating a community of Portuguese speakers which was born in 1996, with shy political and economic dimensions. The project with non-negligible magnitude highlighted not only the linguistic potential of Portuguese, spoken by about 250 million people across the world but until now lack of cohesion and bilateral approach have prevailed between the Portuguese-speaking countries. The idea of a "community," despite its potential, has produced limited results. An "esprit de corps" is lacking. The CPLP is merely a promise of goodwill and not really a consistent project, economically or politically. Among other criticisms, Brazil's commitment to the CPLP is not clear, and bilateral dialogue overlaps multilateral ones within the organization. In addition, the "cultural link" and the Portuguese language are not maximized, not even being a "universal feature" within the community––e.g., Timor-Leste or Equatorial Guinea.

4. Portuguese foreign policy axes and Portuguese Foreign Policy for Eastern Asia

Since 1974 and after the Constitution's approval in 1976 and independence of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, there has been a shift in foreign policy that underlined a new strategy: Portugal should participate in the Economic European Community and the two main political parties agreed on the European priority. Nevertheless, links to the OTAN, alliance with the United States, connections with other Portuguese-speaking countries, and the Portuguese diaspora were part of the equation that characterizes Portuguese external activities (Sá, 2015). Despite Portugal's historical ties with Eastern Asia, and Eastern Asia's own growing importance in international relations since the last two decades of the 20th century, political and economic elites in Portugal have thus far paid little attention to that region, apart from having negotiations with the PRC regarding Macau's status, and playing a role in Timor-Leste's referendum and state-building (Jesus, 2013). The transition into the 21st century confirmed the centrality of Eastern Asia driven by China's preeminence though with no proportionate reaction of Portuguese foreign policy.

Let us focus on present times: In a merely superficial approach to the main assets of bilateral relations with Asian countries, the evolution is shy. To support this assumption, some examples should be given. One general remark is the under-representation of Portuguese diplomatic missions in Asia: China, India, South Korea, Japan, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Timor-Leste. Following a tendency to pay increasing attention to India, a promising competitor to China in the region, Portugal wants to build a closer relationship with it through trade, investment, and research, and vaguely expressed its interest in the

Indo-Pacific as for the European Union. With Timor-Leste, a former colony, there is a sense of "mission accomplished": Portugal has provided aid to the new country, through cooperation in the fields of justice, education, economy, administration, and the use of the Portuguese language. As far as Japan or Thailand are concerned, historic links mainly explain the continuity which should result in a diversification of activities. China is of course at the center of Portuguese priorities and concerns regarding the region.

In the last decade, the financial crisis significantly reinforced Portugal's dependence on foreign capital. Then, Portuguese authorities warmly welcomed Chinese investments. As a result, massive Chinese capital fluxed into important sectors of the Portuguese economy, such as electric (EDP and Ren), financial (BCP), transportation (TAP Air Portugal), insurance (Fidelidade), and health sectors (Luz Hospital). Capital came from both state-owned enterprises and private Chinese investors. At the same time, the Portuguese Immigration and Investment Program, known as the Golden Visa Program, attracted a significant number of Chinese investors to the Portuguese real estate market. In 2005, a strategic partnership between the two countries was signed. In 2019, a strategic dialogue was established through signing a memorandum of understanding. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Augusto Santos Silva summarized the very nature of the need for deepening relationships: "In equal conditions, differentiation, and mutual respect, the relation with China is unavoidable and can be advantageous. In the three areas that make sense: 1) political and diplomatic, in the multilateral and European plans and looking towards Asia, Africa, and Latin America; 2) education and culture, bearing in mind the Portuguese language cultures; 3) economy, with balance, reciprocal openness, respect for the concurrence and agreements and a commitment with sustainability" (Silva, 2019).[1] And then he felt the need to clarify the partnership that was being built up, while insisting on the triangulation:

> "The signature of the MoU on the 29th April that improves the politico-diplomatic interaction between the two countries to the 'strategic dialogue' level has a precise meaning. It places us at the highest level, the one where Germany, Canada, France, or the United Kingdom are. It establishes annual consultations between Foreign Affairs ministers on all the relevant topics of international politics. There is no such thing as ambiguity. We are partners, not allies […] Additionally, Chinese and Portuguese can be partners in Africa and Latin America, where our enterprises show proximity, a piece of knowledge, and a capacity of adaptation to the institutions, values, and local behavior patterns that the Chinese still don't have. The triangulation between China, Portugal and Portuguese Speaking countries in those continents (as well as with Timor-Leste) is not only political will or even rhetoric, but it corresponds to real possibilities and needs of action." (Silva, 2019)

5. China's engagement in Africa

China's engagement in Africa is not new, nor is it what this text sets out to outline. Nevertheless, when relations with China and Portuguese-speaking countries are taken into account, one should bear in mind that over the past two decades, such engagement has

substantially grown in scale and complexity (Prinsloo, 2021). The approach, based on a win-win logic is different from the one used during the Cold War and is now much more comprehensive and multidimensional: "To achieve these benefits, governments will need to look beyond traditional infrastructure financing models to enable the free flow of goods, services, capital, and people across the continent. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is thus an essential part of this equation" (Prinsloo, 2021). The new approach shall include other dimensions such as climate change, the fourth Industrial Revolution, and even the fight against the coronavirus pandemic, which has had tremendous economic impact. Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa has increased, with FDI flow to Africa reaching $4.11 billion in 2017. At the 2018 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit, President Xi Jinping established a goal of $10 billion in FDI in Africa between 2018 and 2021, with focuses placed on economic cooperation, infrastructure financing (transports, energy, telecommunications), and development.

In 2018, Chinese commitments to building infrastructure in Africa surpassed $25.6 billion, an amount that guaranteed top position in financing African states. China's BRI includes partnerships with 40 African countries, and it is an opportunity for these countries to reduce their infrastructure (e.g., the Mombasa-Nairobi railway and the Addis Ababa light railway line)–induced financial deficits. Chinese funding under the BRI fills a major financing gap for African countries, especially since other financiers' pools of funds tend to orient towards social infrastructure, and private capital markets remain expensive. One of the main criticisms for such action of the Chinese is what the experts call a "debt trap."[2] Nevertheless, though China's share of African debt remains significant, at $57.65 billion (20.7% of the total), some measures have been taken to soften the effects of this unbalanced relationship: in 2020, China joined the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI––G20's debt relief agreement), signed debt suspension agreements between the Exim Bank of China and African countries, and waived interest-free loans due to mature at the end of 2020 for 15 African countries. In January 2020, following his predecessors' annual tradition, Minister for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi visited five African countries: Egypt, Djibouti, Eritrea, Burundi, and Zimbabwe. From March 2020, China assumed an important role in South-to-South cooperation facing a new and major challenge: fighting Covid-19 in 43 African countries.

Today, being the main trade partner of Africa, China absorbs the majority of its exports and furnishes a significant part of its imports. China is also one of the greatest investors in Africa, with a diversified portfolio, with prominence in mining, infrastructures, telecommunications, media, retail, and banking. Additionally, it is a provider of financial aid to development, eclipsing such traditional partners as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the U.S., and the European Union (including Portugal).

[1] Author's translation.

[2] The fall of commodities prices since 2014 and more recently the impact of the pandemic in African economies, revealed some weaknesses of the partnership with China, namely the sustainability of the debt and a trade balance which has been favourable to China since 2014.

5.1 China in Lusophone Africa

China's interest in Lusophone Africa dates back to the Portuguese colonization period. After the Bandung Conference (1955), China began to exert its influence on Africa, on opposite sides, namely through the support to the nationalist movements who fought Portuguese colonial rule: The União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), in Angola, whose leader, Jonas Savimbi, studied in China in the middle of the 60s and became a fan of the Maoist guerrilla (James, 2018).

Peking also tried, without success, to co-opt the other two nationalist movements in Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA; and Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, FNLA) during the colonial period. In Mozambique, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) received Chinese support during the 60s. Except for Angola (1983), all the other Portuguese-speaking countries established diplomatic relations with China after their independence (São Tomé and Príncipe then began diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1997, lasting until 2016). After all, the reason why the MPLA did not approach the Beijing regime was that it supported the UNITA. During the 80s the main features of the relations between China and Lusophone Africa were: cooperation, mutually beneficial agreements, joint ventures, trade agreements, and investment. A distance between Portugal and African Lusophone countries was felt, mainly because of the recent decolonization and internal instability (civil wars in Angola and Mozambique). As said before, in Portugal, democratic consolidation and European integration took priority in terms of foreign policy (Alves, 2008).
During the Cold War, relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States for Portuguese-speaking Africa were a privilege. At the same time, Beijing and Lisbon established diplomatic relations in 1979 and started to hold negotiations on Macau's handover. The dialogue became regular, culminating in the signing of the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macau in 1987 (UN, 1988; Mendes, 2013). After 1989's Tiananmen crisis, China was condemned by several Western countries with the imposition of several economic and military sanctions. In this period, Taiwan launched a diplomatic offensive known as "checkbook diplomacy" with various African countries, including Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé e Principe, who at the same time cut ties with Beijing. In the 90s, the triangle becomes more harmonious from all three sides: The CPLP was created in 1996, and the agreement between China and Portugal concerning Macau's transition was defined and closed. Additionally, the Cold War was over and so were the prevailing bipolar alignments of the African Portuguese-speaking countries. Mutual trust developed during these negotiations between China and Portugal created leverage to the foundation of the Macau Forum in 2003, as the epicenter of this triangle, China becoming again a major partner in Africa, through loans and investment as described above (Mendes, 2013; Leandro, 2019; Costa, 2021). China gained a very good international image through supporting the constraints of the developing world. At that time, Macau appeared as a platform of dialogue for Portuguese-speaking countries where convergences should be discovered (Santos & Lobo, 2020).

For Angola and China, an analysis of the links between them allows us to underline two main objectives of Chinese intervention in Angola. From an economic point of view, it is possible to conclude that the Chinese government seeks to increase the market share of Chinese companies in the Angolan market, as well as to guarantee access to Angolan natural resources, most notably oil. Regarding Mozambique, its natural resources and prime geographic location are the prominent reasons for China's interest:

> A producer of foodstuffs, its output attracts a hungry Chinese economic engine and influences the maintenance of an unequal trade imbalance favoring Beijing. The country is also a valuable source for construction materials relevant to infrastructure development and stands out in this area as a leading exporter of forestry products. (Vogt, 2017)

With the other Portuguese-speaking African countries, China has partnerships directed to trade and investment, namely on infrastructures, agriculture, blue economy and fisheries, mining, human resources, and energy (Madeira, 2017).

6. China in Brazil

Brazil is China's main important partner in South America, as well as a key participant in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) grouping of emerging powers that China "increasingly leads" (Trinkunas, 2020). President Jair Bolsonaro started his mandate as President in January 2019, several changes were introduced in Brazil's international insertion. Bolsonaro adopted a strongly pro-Donald Trump agenda internationally, following the tendency to address criticisms to China.

China and Brazil established a strategic bilateral partnership in 1993, which initially focused on economic and technological cooperation, but then became more comprehensive. Both prioritized relationships with the Global South based on solidarity, non-intervention, and mutual respect. "The partnership is criticized by the Brazilian manufacturing sector, which faces strong competition from Chinese products and lacks reciprocal access to the Chinese market. Agricultural export interests, by contrast, favor a strong relationship with Beijing because China is a major market for their products," namely soy (Trinkunas, 2020). China and Brazil's have developed significant trade and investment relationships. In 2019, bilateral trade reached over $100 billion, making China the main destination for Brazilian exports. Since 2005, when China began to invest abroad, Brazil also became a target for its foreign direct investment, not only in the commodities sector, but also in several infrastructure projects.

7. China in Timor-Leste

Since 2002, the Chinese spectrum of intervention in Timor-Leste has enlarged as an alternative to Australia and other powers' influence. The presence of China through those four "pillars" - trade, infrastructures, aid, and natural resources - has been a constant in

Timor-Leste since 2002, and against this backdrop, a range of actions and initiatives are taking place. In strengthening its links with Timor-Leste, China focuses on at least three advantages: 1) reinforcing and extending its political and economic influence in Southeast Asia and, to a certain extent, in the South Pacific; 2) restraining Taiwan's international position; and 3) obtaining access to East Timorese natural resources, trade, infrastructures, and aid. The Memorandum of Understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative, signed between the two countries in 2017, confirmed this orientation through the usual keywords: "cooperation in connectivity building." For Timor-Leste, being China's partner is a way of diversifying and counterbalancing or reducing its dependency relative to Australia and Indonesia. This is neither new nor original within Chinese foreign policy. Ramos-Horta, the former president, considered the idea of a growing Chinese influence "nonsense." The success of the relationship between China and Timor-Leste, and its win-win nature, depends on the capacity and performance of the latter's political leadership, of its sense of responsibility and the common good, and its main economic and political decisions regarding its vision for the future (Mendes, 2021).

8. Conclusion

Vogt calls Lusophone countries "core targets in an overall international policy strategy that serves to benefit China for continued trade and economic growth, an orientation well aligned to enhance Sino-Lusophone cooperation in the short to medium term" (2017). The potential remaining and Macau Forum as a central institution in the gathering together, it seems that the bilateral approach is prevailing and this sense, like CPLP, the institutionalization of the Lusophone link can be less efficient or dynamic than what should be expected. Despite having a historical relationship with China, Portugal is constrained in its current foreign policies to China due to its membership in the European Union as well as strong commitment to the United States. The Lusophone link therefore is very important part of its connection with China, whose interests in the Global South clearly include Portuguese-language countries.

To what extent can Portugal make a difference? In Africa, Portugal continues to maintain a presence and knowledge that can be useful to China, notwithstanding the asymmetric complementarity. Brazil or Timor-Leste, for different reasons –– the very existence of Brazil for two hundred years and the proximity of Timor-Leste to Indonesia and Australia, cannot be placed in the same basket. Bearing in mind the contemporary power dynamics in international relations and the role that China is playing geo-economically, it is of paramount importance to pay attention to the community or the union of countries who share the Portuguese language. Not intending to discuss more difficult issues, such as the logic or dysfunctions of CPLP, China's government is aware of the convergences and difficulties of acting on such a complex stage.

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Punching Above Its Weight? Guinea-Bissau's Quest for Independence and Great Power Diplomacy

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Guinea-Bissau; Cabo Verde; Amílcar Cabral; Portuguese-speaking countries; West Africa

Abstract

The West African nation of Guinea-Bissau won independence in 1973-1974, the first Portuguese non-island state in continental Africa to achieve this goal. Its success owed much to the able orchestration of the rebels' internal and external strategy by Amílcar Cabral, an internationally well-connected socialist intellectual and revolutionary theorist, whose assassination in January 1973 failed to prevent the insurgents unilaterally declaring then Portuguese Guinea an independent nation the following September, a status that Portugal accepted one year later. When Cabo Verde became independent in 1975, it was expected that ultimately the two nations would become one state, a vision that proved shortlived, as each chose to follow different political trajectories. By the late 1970s, entrenched divisions within Guinea-Bissau between indigenous inhabitants and those—like Cabral—of Cabo Verdean extraction prompted bitter infighting within the ruling elite. Yet despite these faultlines, links between both nations still existed, demonstrated most strongly in times of turmoil, with Cabo Verde repeatedly serving as a mediator as Guinea-Bissau experienced civil war and several military coups, helping to negotiate diplomatic solutions to end violent crises. For decades, moreover, pervasive respect for Cabral's fabled memory offered Guinea-Bissau an extra level of international viability in surviving multiple political crises.

1. Introduction

The West African nation of Guinea-Bissau won its independence in 1973-1974, the first—and by far the smallest in terms of territory, population, and natural resources—of the Portuguese non-island states in continental Africa to achieve this goal. Its success owed much to the favorable alignment of internal and external factors, which were ably orchestrated by its best-known and most prominent insurgent leader, Amílcar Cabral, an internationally well-connected socialist intellectual and revolutionary theorist. Cabral's assassination in January 1973 did little to check the continuing rebellion in what was then Portuguese Guinea. In September 1973, his half-brother and successor Luís Cabral unilaterally proclaimed the

existence of Guinea-Bissau as an independent nation, a status that Portugal accepted one year later. Initially, the new one-party socialist state demonstrated considerable skill in tapping a wide variety of sources of international economic aid. In progressive circles, Guinea-Bissau was heralded as a model leftist society.

When Cabo Verde became independent in July 1975, it was expected that ultimately the two nations would merge into one united state. The vision proved shortlived, as each chose to follow different internal and external paths. By the late 1970s, entrenched divisions within Guinea-Bissau between indigenous inhabitants and those—like the Cabral brothers—of Cabo Verdean extraction prompted bitter infighting within the ruling elite. In November 1980, a coup against foreign mestiços led by the Guinean war hero General Nino Vieira overthrew the government of Luís Cabral. In January 1981, Cabo Verde abandoned all thought of future unification, opting instead for permanent separation, and subsequently restoring multi-party politics in 1990. Yet despite these faultlines, links between the two still existed, demonstrated most strongly in times of turmoil. As Guinea-Bissau descended into civil war in 1998-1999 and experienced several military coups then and later, Cabo Verde offered safe haven to Guinean refugees and repeatedly served as a mediator, helping to negotiate diplomatic solutions to end violent crises. For decades, moreover, pervasive respect for the memory of Amílcar Cabral, the fabled architect and mastermind of its struggle for independence, offered Guinea-Bissau an extra level of international viability in surviving multiple political crises.

2. Guinea-Bissau: The Road to Independence

Until the late 1950s, when anti-colonial independence activists launched an insurgency there, the then colony of Portuguese Guinea had spent a century or more in relative obscurity. Occupied and fortified by the Portuguese in the late fifteenth century, for several centuries thereafter it was a leading center of commerce with Africa in gold, ivory, pepper, and slaves, some of whom were sent to plantations in the Portuguese-held Cabo Verde islands, around 500 miles to the northwest, and others to Brazil and North America. Portuguese control of the area was always somewhat precarious, threatened by resistance from local rulers as well as competition from rival European powers, including the British, French, and Spanish. After the abolition of the slave trade across the British Empire in 1807, the city of Bissau in Portuguese Guinea, founded in 1765, became its last redoubt; in the 1830s Portugal and Brazil formally banned trade in slaves, but shipments continued until the early 1850s (Mendy, 2003, 37-42; Rudebeck, 1974, 3-7; Galli and Jones, 1987, 13-24). Thereafter, the economy of the territory, formally accorded the status of a Portuguese colony in 1879, was primarily agricultural, dependent upon exports of groundnuts, palm kernels, and rubber to finance imports from Europe of cotton textiles, food, and gunpowder (Galli and Jones, 1987, 24-31; Galli, 1987, 79-81; Great Britain Foreign Office, 1920, 28-31; Temudo and Abrantes, 2013, 573-575; Havik et al, 2018, 8-9).

From 1885 to 1915, impelled by the requirement of the 1884-1885 Berlin Convention that divided up control of African territories among various European powers to demonstrate

its "effective occupation" of the area, the Portuguese military waged a lengthy and brutal "pacification" campaign to subjugate Portuguese Guinea. Between 1913 and 1915, African mercenaries from neighboring Senegal finally succeeded in breaking local resistance. Thereafter, indigenous inhabitants were frequently subjected to unpaid forced labor on government construction projects, a policy only abandoned in 1970, or at best employed at low wages in poor working conditions. To finance its operations, the colonial government imposed taxes on huts and later a poll tax, provoking revolts, the burning of huts, and emigration to other jurisdictions or remote areas. The eventual introduction in 1970 of social reforms, especially the provision of better educational and health facilities, together with 550 kilometers of roads and 250 electricity generators, came too late to counter the impact of the armed insurgency that had burgeoned steadily since the late 1950s (Mendy, 2003, 41-49; Rudebeck, 1974, 7-49; Galli and Jones, 1987, 33-52). As all other former European colonies in West Africa gained political independence during the 1960s, one skeptical economic historian writing in 1973 described Portuguese Guinea as the "one exception . . . a tiny possession that continues, so it is claimed, to move slowly (indeed, virtually imperceptibly) towards the realization of the assimilationist ideals which are advertised as the chief motive for the continued presence of West Africa's first colonial power" (Hopkins, 2020, 290).

Guinea-Bissau would not retain its exceptional status much longer. In 1951, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report on Communism in Africa briefly noted: "No information is available on [Communist] political activity in Portuguese or Spanish Guinea."[1] This situation would soon change. Pressure from within, from an increasingly effective armed rebel insurgency that began in the late 1950s and by the early 1970s controlled large portions of the rural areas of Portuguese Guinea, drastically accelerated the glacial speed at which the colonial power still preferred to move. In December 1968, the CIA Directorate of Intelligence produced a 12-page comprehensive and perceptive special report on "The Guerrilla War in Portuguese Guinea." Although the document refrained from speculating which side would ultimately prove victorious, it ended by predicting that the war "will . . . probably continue to drag on with the Portuguese trying to shore up their positions while keeping their losses to an acceptable minimum. The insurgents are likely to continue to improve their capability, provided they continue to receive shipments of increasingly sophisticated arms from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and provided advisers from the Soviet Union and Cuba are obtained."[2]

[1] CIA, Intelligence Memorandum No. 346, "Communism in Africa," January 24, 1951, CIA Crest Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP-79T00935A000100060001-7.pdf, accessed December 21, 2021.

[2] CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, Weekly Summary Special Report, "The Guerrilla War in Portuguese Guinea," December 20, 1968, CIA Crest Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A006800030003-4.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

Table 1 *Size and Population of Former Portuguese Colonies in Continental Africa 1960-2021*

Country	Size (square miles)	Pop'n 1960	Pop'n 1964	Pop'n 1975	Pop'n 1999	Pop'n 2021
Angola	481,400	5,455,000	5,735,000	7,024,000	15,870,000	34,382,665
Guinea-Bissau	13,948	616,409	643,961	786,754	1,221,000	2,035,384
Mozam-bique	309,500	7,185,000	7,857,000	10,170,000	17,240,000	32,541,875

One year later, in December 1969, US officials were more pessimistic. CIA Director Richard Helms told the US National Security Council that in Portuguese Guinea "the black insurgents hold the advantage." Despite the presence of 27,000 Portuguese troops and Vietnam-style attempts by the government to resettle the indigenous population in "fortified hamlets", Helms anticipated "a prolonged insurgency," in which "the balance is now swinging in favor of the PAIGC."[3] By early September 1973, a report to US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger noted that "some [Portuguese] officials privately admit that Portuguese Guinea may soon be a lost cause" and speculated that the insurrectionist Portuguese Guinea African Independence Party (PAIGC) "may declare Portuguese Guinea independent this year."[4]

Two weeks later, on September 24, 1973, PAIGC did indeed unilaterally announce the existence of the independent Republic of Guinea-Bissau. With Rumania first in line, within a few months, over eighty foreign governments including that of China had recognized the self-proclaimed new state (Forrest, 1992, 67-59; Davidson, 2017). Following the April 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal, a coup largely masterminded by young military officers whose service in Guinea-Bissau left them convinced that forcible and extremely costly attempts to coerce their country's African possessions into remaining under Portuguese rule were doomed to failure, the new government in Lisbon entered into negotiations to grant Guinea-Bissau formal independence, a status that Portugal recognized on September 10, 1974. One month earlier, on August 12, 1974, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly had voted in favor of admitting Guinea-Bissau to that body as a member-state (MacQueen, 2006).

The success of tiny Guinea-Bissau in becoming the first of Portugal's colonial possessions in continental Africa to win independence owed much to a favorable alignment of internal

[3] Briefing by Richard Helms for the National Security Council Re: Southern Africa, December 17, 1969, Richard Nixon Presidential Library, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/releases/dec10/dec10/dec10_37.pdf, accessed January 26, 2022.

[4] Harold E. Horan, "Memorandum for Henry Kissinger: Portugal in Africa," September 10, 1973, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-538-2-7-5.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; also Central Intelligence Bulletin, September 1, 1973, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00975A025200010001-0.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

and external factors. Particular credit should go to the astute Amílcar Cabral (Abdel Djassi), Guinea-Bissau's foremost nationalist leader, who proved an especially able strategist. Cabral's family roots were in Cabo Verde, a group of Portuguese-run Atlantic islands several hundred miles distant with longstanding links to Guinea-Bissau and a relatively well-educated population, on which the government of Portuguese Guinea drew when it needed skilled administrators and technical specialists to serve as intermediaries between the Portuguese colonizers and the indigenous population. The charismatic Cabral, a socialist, agronomist, and revolutionary theorist, educated in Cabo Verde and Lisbon, whose own revolutionary thinking was inspired in part by Chinese leader Mao Zedong's writings on guerrilla insurgencies, was first secretary of PAIGC, which he led from its foundation in the late 1950s until his assassination in January 1973, in circumstances that remain disputed even today. In life and later in death, Cabral became something of an iconic figure on the left (Chabal, 2003; Mendy, 2019; Chilcote, 1991; Tomás, 2021). He followed a dual course of pursuing insurgency on the ground while conducting a highly effective international propaganda campaign on the world stage, utilizing the UN and other transnational and non-governmental organizations, and appealing to global public opinion. Charismatic leadership facilitated this strategy, as did Cabral's adept blurring of his movement's early radical propensities.

Cabral's campaign for independence also benefited from the prevailing post-World War II international intellectual currents, a global climate of opinion that became increasingly hostile to the continuation of Western colonial or imperial rule in Africa and Asia. From the 1950s onward, the major communist states, China and the Soviet Union alike, expressed strong support for the anti-colonialist outlook embraced by most Asian and African countries. The Conference of Afro-Asian Countries, held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955, and attended by Premier Zhou Enlai of the People's Republic of China (PRC), a government then less than six years old, and other leaders from 29 African and Asian countries, issued a resounding declaration "that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end", demanding the decolonization of all areas still under external rule (Tang and Acharya, 2008; Lee, 2019; Zhang, 2014, pp. 105-109).

From this point onward, China was one major outside power that became significantly involved in the affairs of the African Portuguese-speaking states, large and small alike. From December 1963 to February 1964, Zhou Enlai made an extended 54-day tour of ten countries in Africa, during which he repeatedly expressed support for the independence of all remaining African colonies. Zhou's visit was the highest level such tour by a top PRC official, but others made similar forays into Africa. Among them were Liu Chang-sheng, chairman of the China-Africa People's Friendship Association, who spent four months in nine African countries from March to July 1961, and Liu Ning-I, Vice-Chairman of the PRC National People's Congress Standing Committee, who toured five African countries in March and April 1965 (Snow, 1988, 74-76; Ogunsanwo, 1974, 123-126; Wei, 1982, 62, 64-65; Adie, 1964).

China itself soon became a frequent port of call for numerous African independence activists, who went there on official visits, attended conferences and meetings of socialist organizations, and made regular appearances at Chinese communist celebratory gatherings around October 1st, May 1st, and at Chinese New Year, their presence recorded in official reports of these events. On September 9, 1960, for example, a PAIGC delegation met with Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi in Beijing.[5] China began providing economic aid to African countries that had already gained independence, and also assistance, both financial and in terms of training and providing weapons to insurgent groups, to independence movements, including those in Portugal's African colonies, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012; Ogunsanwo, 1974; Snow, 1988).[6]

African anti-colonial movements likewise won backing and assistance from the world's other great communist power, the Soviet Union. In a speech he delivered to the fifteenth session of the UN General Assembly in September 1960, during which he banged his shoe dramatically on the podium, Nikita Khrushchev, who became first secretary of the Soviet Union in 1953, endorsed the cause of anti-colonialism and the Bandung declaration and called upon the UN to demand an end to Western colonial rule in Asia and Africa. The Soviet Union and newly decolonized states that had joined the UN, in which the PRC was not at this time a member, pushed for the establishment of a Special UN Committee on Decolonization, established in 1962, that focused intensively upon the Portuguese and Spanish colonies, investigating the situation in these territories and seeking—albeit with little impact upon Portuguese policy before the 1974 Carnation Revolution—to encourage their rapid transition to independent status (Iandolo, 2017; Gaiduk, 2012).

By the early 1960s, the Soviet Union and China, the world's two largest communist powers, were deeply at odds with each other, the result of differences over domestic and international policy, including Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong's condemnation of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West. Each communist giant sought to lead the international communist and socialist movement, and tried to win the loyalties of other communist parties and states around the world, including African and other insurgent movements, the majority of which benefited from assistance of various kinds from both China and the Soviet Union. As a rule, although Chinese support was significant, Soviet technology was more advanced than that provided by China, and Russian pockets were deeper, meaning that activist client groups were reluctant to break ties with either side

[5] "African Groups Continue to Visit China," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Reports: Foreign Broadcasts 183, September 20, 1960, AAA9.

[6] By 1969, the CIA was sufficiently interested to produce a special report covering the military and economic assistance that China provided to various African states and liberation movements. CIA Directorate of Intelligence, "Communist China's Presence in Africa," June 20, 1969, CIA CREST database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A007100070002-7.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021. See also CIA, "Aid and Trade Activities of Communist Countries in Less Developed Areas of the Free World, 1970," April 1971, pp. 25-34, CIA CREST database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00596R000600020006-8.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; CIA Directorate of Intelligence, "China's Role in Africa," February 25, 1972, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040006-2.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

(Müller, 1964; Lowenthal, 1964; Ogunsanwo 1974, chap. 4, Snow, 1988, chaps. 4 and 5). This was indeed only one forum for the broader competition between the two communist powers for power and influence in the Third World, in which their activities in Africa played an important part (Friedman, 2015).

Ultimately, the majority of communist states and parties either backed the Soviet Union in this dispute or remained neutral, meaning that after the 1961 Belgrade conference that established the Non-aligned Movement, it proved impossible to arrange further meetings of Afro-Asian states. By the mid-1960s, both China and the Soviet Union routinely sniped at each other in their respective media outlets, disparaging their rival's good faith in supporting African decolonization, while affirming their own unwavering support for African nationalism and independence movements (Li and Xia, 2018). Other socialist powers, including Cuba and the East European communist bloc, also provided assistance to nationalist insurgencies in Africa and Asia (Westad, 2005; McMahon, 2013).

Anti-colonial African activists therefore on occasion found themselves facing the challenges of trying to keep assorted and sometimes antagonistic patrons happy, without aligning themselves too clearly with one partner or another. This was decidedly the case with Guinea-Bissau. From the early 1960s onward, Cabral found it necessary to maneuver diplomatically and maintain a delicate balance among his various supporters within PAIGC and his external sponsors. The supple Cabral, something of a chameleon, was able to win backing from a wide array of patrons, including the leading socialist powers, the Soviet Union and China, plus Cuba and Czechoslovakia, together with moderate leftists and socialists. Not least, he had to negotiate the difficulties presented by the Sino-Soviet split and the ensuing rivalry between China and the Soviet Union.

During Zhou Enlai's extended African tour, Cabral took the opportunity to offer warm praise of China (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 319). Such utterances were expressions of gratitude for services rendered. Official Chinese media outlets, including the People's Daily and the New China News Agency, regularly featured interviews with African independence activists, Cabral included. Speaking to the New China News Agency in 1960, Cabral condemned Portuguese colonial rule for facilitating US economic exploitation of the (probably non-existent) oil and other resources of Portuguese Guinea.[7] The following year, in 1961, PAIGC fighters began receiving training in China, and the Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity League collected funds to support the struggle. Four delegations from Guinea-Bissau paid visits to China between 1960 and 1962 (Sousa, 2020; Wei, 1982, 148-149).

Yet later in the decade, the relationship soured. The historian Julião Soares Sousa argues that China, determined to weaken the Soviet hold upon radical African loyalties, preferred to keep insurgencies in Guinea-Bissau—and other Portuguese colonies—in existence indefinitely while declining to provide sufficient assistance to assure a conclusive PAIGC

[7] Peking, New China News Agency (NCNA), "Guinea Leader Condemns US, Portugal," July 19, 1960, FBIS Daily Report, July 19, 1960, AAA19-20.

victory. According to recent archival research, Cabral resented and successfully resisted Chinese pressure to reject both Soviet aid and Soviet advice that the rebels should open negotiations with Portugal, refusing to align PAIGC and the Guinea-Bissau independence movement with either major communist power (Sousa, 2020). In so doing, he was emulating North Vietnam, which received massive assistance for its war against South Vietnam and the United States from both China and the Soviet Union, and at one point sought unavailingly to broker a reconciliation between its two patrons (Gaiduk, 1996; also Zhai, 2000; Nguyen, 2012).

In 1968, after PAIGC ignored Chinese demands to break all ties with the Soviets and also with the Cubans, China went so far as unilaterally to suspend further military aid to PAIGC, and likewise to various Soviet-leaning African liberation movement groups, including FRELIMO (Freedom and Liberation Movement of Mozambique) in Mozambique and the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), prompting East European socialist bloc countries to increase their own assistance to these organizations. A contemporary CIA report noted that China had attempted in the early 1960s "to gain control over the insurgent movement, but they appear to have lost out to the Soviets."[8] Pro-Chinese factions and groups, including the Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional da Guiné (FLING), a rival group to which China switched its aid, came under fierce attack from other African nationalists, Cabral included. Indeed, Cabral suggested that the major objective of Chinese assistance was to convert Guinea-Bissau and PAIGC into "their [China's] future lackeys." He preferred to maintain non-alignment and neutrality toward the Sino-Soviet split, while preserving Guinea-Bissau's independence. In 1970, the decline of Cultural Revolution revolutionary fervor, combined with growing Chinese fears of a Soviet threat following major clashes on the Chinese-Soviet border in early 1969, brought a more pragmatic turn in Chinese policy. Aid to liberation movements was resumed, but with a new focus on technical and economic aid for development projects in insurgent-controlled areas, that would benefit these nations once they had gained independence. A Soviet medical mission likewise arrived. In 1972, Cabral once again visited Beijing (Sousa, 2020).

Cabral proved equally adept in his dealings with other socialist patrons. The Soviet Union, despite intellectual reservations over Cabral's unorthodox brand of Marxism, always provided the greatest amount of military aid to PAIGC's insurgency in Guinea-Bissau, efforts that were stepped up in the early 1970s. In great secrecy, from 1966 on, Fidel Castro's Cuba not only trained fighters from Guinea-Bissau and other Portuguese-speaking insurgent movements, but covertly dispatched undercover Cuban guerrillas to join those conflicts. Strained relations between Castro and Soviet leaders in 1966 and 1967 made the coordination of these enterprises more complicated, as Cabral withstood demands from each side to align the PAIGC with the other (Gleijeses, 2002; also Westad, 2005, 211-216; Laranjeiro, 2019). Despite the purported secrecy, in late 1968 the CIA reported:

[8] CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Weekly Summary Special Report, "The Guerrilla War in Portuguese Guinea," December 20, 1968.

> Cuba has actively assisted the Portuguese Guinean insurgents by providing guerrilla warfare instructors and medical personnel to help in the "liberated areas." Present estimates place only about 100 Cuban advisers in either Guinea or Portuguese Guinea, although Lisbon claims there are 300. Some advisers have even accompanied PAIGC forces into combat.[9]

The Soviet Union was believed to maintain a permanent naval presence off the West African coast near Conakry in order to deter any Portuguese maritime intervention against the sanctuaries that rebels from Portuguese Guinea maintained in Guinea-Conakry.[10] Eastern Europe was another significant source of assistance, with East Germany and Czechoslovakia proving particularly generous in terms of arms and supplies. Cabral maintained close personal ties to officials and intelligence operatives in Czechoslovakia, another significant supporter of the Guinea-Bissau independence movement, which provided PAIGC with armaments, funding, and military training scholarships. Even so, the intelligence insights into intra-communist bloc politics that Cabral provided the Czechs seem to have been negligible in value (Telepneva, 2020).

Ever since the early 1960s, Cabral had waged a skilful campaign in the UN and elsewhere, urging Guinea-Bissau's right to independence while emphasizing that Guinea-Bissau and the PAIGC wished to remain non-aligned on the international scene. Most Western nations, especially the United States, Portugal, and their NATO allies, were still suspicious, whereas China, Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other communist powers as well as most African states ostentatiously favored independence for Portuguese Guinea. Cabral's strategy gradually eroded external opposition to PAIGC's demands for an end to Portuguese rule. From 1969 onward, various small European countries, first Sweden, then Denmark and Norway in 1972, followed by Finland and the Netherlands in 1973, began to provide humanitarian assistance to PAIGC. While prepared to accept aid from all parties, including major communist states, Guinea-Bissau's charismatic independence leader made repeated visits to the UN, pleading his country's case, and even addressing the General Assembly in 1972. In June 1970, he was also granted an audience with Pope Paul VI, another symbol of growing international respectability. In 1972, the UN dispatched an investigative mission to the territory, that reported back that the PAIGC was in reality "the sole and authentic representative of the people" of Guinea-Bissau. Shortly afterwards, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution recognizing PAIGC's authority in the territory, and Portugal was requested, albeit unavailingly, to negotiate with the PAIGC and other independence movements in its various colonies (Forrest, 1992, 67-59; Davidson, 2017; MacQueen, 2006; Tomás, 2021, 171-183).

Cabral's diplomatic virtuosity and ability to find common ground with potential supporters across a wide political spectrum, even as guerrilla forces waged ever-shifting war on the

[9] Ibid.

[10] CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, "Soviet Military Policy in the Third World," October 21, 1976, p. 26, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP07S01968R000200450001-2.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

ground in Guinea-Bissau, retreating when necessary into neighboring Senegal or Guinea-Conakry, proved remarkably effective in terms of setting an international climate favoring independence. Yet, despite his sophistication and adeptness on the external front and the assets these represented in the quest for independence, he proved less skilled in countering and winning over potential domestic rivals. According to his biographer, "Cabral's constant absence bred resentment against him and other Cabo Verdeans, and alienated him from the everyday experiences of the freedom fighters" (Tomás, 2021, 5). Military operations on the ground were largely undertaken by indigenous Portuguese Guineans, many of whom begrudged the prominence of Cabo Verdeans within the leadership of the independence movement.

On January 20, 1973, in its headquarters in Conakry, the capital of neighboring Guinea, a disgruntled former associate from PAIGC's own armed militia forces, supported by a group of malcontents who had been subjected to disciplinary action, shot and killed Cabral. It has been suggested that Portuguese officers, including General António de Spínola, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Portuguese Guinea from 1968 to 1973, were implicated in Cabral's assassination. So, many suspected, was Ahmed Sékou Touré, President of Guinea-Conakry from 1958 until his death in 1984, who allowed PAIGC activists to shelter in his territory, but was less than enthusiastic over the prospect of an independent neighboring state headed by a charismatic and internationally prominent figure. External actors may indeed have played a part in facilitating this death, but were probably not the prime movers (Tomás, 2021, 187-198). At the time, a CIA informant "indicated that dissidents within the Portuguese liberation movement (PAIGC) murdered Cabral."[11]

According to his biographer, "ultimately, Cabral had been the only guarantee of the unity between the Cabo Verdeans and Guineans. . . . With the death of Cabral, the party was lost" (Tomás, 2021, 199, 204). Initially, though, it might well have seemed that Cabral's murder made little difference. The obvious suspects were rounded up and executed, while Guinea-Conakry accorded Cabral a state funeral. Shortly before his death, Cabral had persuaded the Soviet Union to supply the Guinea-Bissau rebels with ground-to-air Strela missiles. Once these weapons began arriving in spring 1973, in the first week of April the insurgents shot down four Portuguese military aircraft, a major shift in the balance of forces that greatly boosted guerrilla morale. In July 1973, a party congress held at Madina do Boé appointed Aristide Pereira, another Cabo Verdean, to replace Cabral as first secretary. The meeting also agreed to announce unilaterally in September 1973 that Guinea-Bissau was an independent state, with Cabral's half-brother Luís as president of the republic, while the Guinean war hero João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira would lead the Popular National Assembly and the armed forces. On September 24, PAIGC declared Guinea-Bissau to be an independent state, one that won immediate recognition from over forty foreign governments, a number that had doubled within a few months. Seven months later, major setbacks on the ground in Guinea-Bissau impelled young military officers who had served under

[11] Situation Room, Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, Subject: Additional Information Items, January 23, 1973, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-547-6-20-6.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; also CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Weekly Summary, January 26, 1973, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/reading-room/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A010000060001-6.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

Spínola to mount a military coup in Lisbon, an event later known as the Carnation Revolution. Shortly before, in March 1974, the UN had accorded Guinea-Bissau "observer" status. With encouragement and mediation from UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, on September 10, 1974 Portugal belatedly recognized Guinea-Bissau's independent status (Forrest, 1992, 67-59; Davidson, 2017; MacQueen, 1996, 2006; Tomás, 2021, 196-210).

3. Independence and After

Portugal's April 1974 Carnation Revolution brought a conclusive resolution to the lengthy anti-colonial armed struggle not just in Guinea-Bissau but likewise in Mozambique and Angola, both of which became independent nations in 1975. So, too, did Portugal's African island territories, Cabo Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe, where such anti-colonial movements as had existed had not resorted to violent insurgencies (MacQueen, 1997; Lloyd-Jones and Costa Pinto, 2003). In both Mozambique and Angola, independence proved only the prelude to lengthy and destructive civil wars among the different ethnic and political factions contending for power, conflicts that would persist until 1992 in Mozambique and 2002 in Angola.

At this juncture, Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde, and São Tomé e Príncipe, the three small African states that won independence from Portugal in the mid-1970s, faced slightly less daunting but equally significant challenges: just how to function economically and politically, ideally by finding some kind of niche that they could fill. Obtaining outside economic aid and technological assistance was a major concern. All attempted to perform a balancing act among larger powers that sought—with varying degrees of assiduity—to compete for their allegiance. For many years, demands for their independence had featured regularly, even routinely, in declarations and speeches by officials and governments from the communist bloc and much of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, together with numerous associated groups and gatherings. Once they were recognized as separate nations, their overriding challenge shifted to one of survival in an international system where they could easily find themselves vulnerable in the face of larger neighbors or external great powers. Yet international neglect was another danger. Small and insignificant states might well find that their priorities and wishes carried little weight within the existing power structure.

All three of the small new African nations previously under Portuguese rule initially proclaimed themselves one-party socialist states, with inclinations towards the communist camp (Chabal et al, 2002, chap. 2). All were happy to take advantage of the continuing Sino-Soviet competition to win friends in the Third World, a rivalry that continued until the late 1980s, with lucrative consequences for smaller states. Yet often, they proved to be just as eager recipients of Western bounty as they were of communist generosity, a position foreshadowed in Guinea-Bissau by Cabral's quest to win international support across a broad political spectrum. From the viewpoint of the donors, micro-states possessed the advantage that relatively small investments in such facilities as fishing boats, schools, clinics and hospitals, medical and agricultural training missions, and scholarships for promising students, could bring large returns in terms of impact and influence.

In May 1974, shortly after the coup in Portugal, a CIA memorandum noted: "Despite the substantial military and political assistance they have given to the liberation movements in Africa, Chinese and Soviet influence over the movements is quite limited. In some respects, their assistance has been an extension of their own rivalry in seeking to win support from 'third world' countries." CIA experts nonetheless correctly anticipated that both Soviet and Chinese aid to these movements would continue[12]. In this context, Cabral's sedulous cultivation of left-leaning international elements paid dividends. The new state of Guinea-Bissau, describing itself as a socialist regime, deliberately aligned itself with the broad communist camp. Within global leftist and radical circles, Guinea-Bissau was heralded as a textbook model society, with its achievements in education, health, and economic development hailed as something of a showcase for enlightened progressive policies (Galli and Jones, 1987; Rudebeck, 1974; Borges, 2019; Freire, 1978; Forrest, 1992; Davidson, 2017).

In September 1974, as Guinea-Bissau—"the poorest of the territories" in continental Africa previously under Portuguese rule—became independent, CIA officials rather bleakly assessed its "economic prospects" as "less promising" than those of either Angola or Mozambique:

> Most of its population is engaged in subsistence agriculture, with rice the main crop. Production of cash crops—notably peanuts—has been disrupted by hostilities. Many expatriate traders have left, and commerce will face a further setback with the departure of the colonial armies. Bauxite deposits represent the only known mineral wealth.[13]

Once the last Portuguese troops were withdrawn from Guinea-Bissau in October 1974, officials further noted: "To date, neither the Portuguese nor the Communist countries—major supporters of the long insurgency against Lisbon—have rushed to extend technical and financial assistance to the new government." They nonetheless predicted that "aid probably will be forthcoming in the near future," stating that Guinea-Bissau's greatest needs were for economic assistance to agriculture and "technical aid in the health, education, and welfare sectors."[14]

According to CIA reports, in November 1974, a Soviet general apparently visited Guinea-Bissau, prompting speculation that he did so in order "to assess the military needs of the newly established government."[15] Traffic went in both directions. Soon after gaining

[12] Interagency Memorandum: "Portugal After the Coup," May 8, 1974, CIA Crest Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01495R000600050009-5.pdf, accessed June 15, 2022.

[13] CIA, "Economic Intelligence Weekly," September 25, 1974, CIA Crest Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150042-0.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

[14] Situation Room, Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, "Information Items," October 28, 1974, CIA Crest Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-550-2-53-0.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

[15] CIA, National Intelligence Bulletin, December 12, 1974, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00975A027200010042-3.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

independence, in October 1974 and again in February 1975, the Guinea-Bissau government dispatched high-level delegations to Moscow, where members met with top Soviet officials, including Aleksey Kosygin, chairman of the council of ministers. By the end of 1975, the Soviets had presented Guinea-Bissau with first a fishing boat—with four more to follow—and then a consignment of MIG fighter jets. The following year, a Soviet delegation visited Guinea-Bissau, which sent further specialized civil aviation and transport groups to Moscow. A wide range of economic and technical accords and agreements were signed, a Soviet-Guinea-Bissau friendship society was established, and in late 1976, a Soviet naval vessel paid a visit. In September 1976, the Soviet Union extended its first loan to Guinea-Bissau, US$13 million in interest-free credit, repayable twelve years later, to be used partly for bauxite development. In 1977, the Soviet Union announced that it would build a power station for Guinea-Bissau, and the USSR hosted a trade delegation from the African state.[16]

Limits nonetheless existed to just how close to the Soviet Union Guinea-Bissau would become. Shortly after independence, overfishing off its coast by the Soviet fleet brought "a distinct cooling of relations." Guinea-Bissau also rejected Soviet requests for base facilities on its territory (MacQueen, 1997, 222-223; MacQueen, 2005).[17] By 1989, Guinea-Bissau had nonetheless accrued outstanding debts of 66 million roubles to the Soviet Union, 12.7

[16] See the relevant FBIS reports for 1975-1977; also CIA, "Staff Notes: Middle East, Africa, South Asia," March 10, 1975, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010047-7.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; CIA, Intelligence Handbook, "Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1974", March 1975, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00608R000500170001-9.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; CIA, Intelligence Report, "Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1974," June 1975, p. 22, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200017-8.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; CIA, "Communist Aid and Trade Activities in Less Developed Countries, February 1975," March 1975, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01098A000500010004-7.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; CIA, "Communist Aid and Trade Activities in Less Developed Countries, July 1975," August 1975, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01098A000600030001-7.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; CIA, "Communist Aid and Trade Activities in Less Developed Countries, August 1975," September 1975, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01098A000600080005-8.pdf, accessed December29, 2021; Defense Intelligence Agency, Directorate for Estimates, Analytical Memorandum, "Soviet Support for Wars of Liberation," September 15, 1975, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070011-6.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; CIA, "Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1976," September 1977, pp. 6-7, 12, 24, 54, 56-57, 60, 62, 66, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79B00457A000600020001-5.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

[17] On the fisheries agreement, see CIA, "Soviet Fisheries Agreements with Less Developed Countries", July 1977, p. 9, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79B00457A000600060001-1.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; and CIA, "Communist Aid and Trade Activities in Less Developed Countries, April 1976," June 1976, p. 3, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79S01045A000100060001-5.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; on growing tensions between Guinea-Bissau and its Soviet patron, see National Intelligence Daily Cable, August 25, 1976, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00975A029200010042-1.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

million of which represented overdue deferred repayments, the largest sum any of the small Lusophone states owed the Soviets.[18] The Eastern bloc states were also well to the fore in offering assistance. Hungary, another early donor, signed an economic cooperation agreement in February 1976. Two months later, President Cabral visited Bucharest, where he "signed long-term economic and cooperation agreements with Romanian officials."[19]

Where the Soviet Union and its satellites gave aid, China would not be far behind. Guinea-Bissau accepted some medical assistance from China, with which it signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement in July 1975 (Wei, 1982, 149; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 319). In 1975, China sent 2,000 tons of rice to the new government, while pledging $17 million to support rice cultivation and the purchase of agricultural equipment. Overall, between 1970 and 1987 Guinea-Bissau received US$17.7 million from China, all of it concentrated in the years 1970-1975, plus a loan of $176 million in 1981, maturing in eight years, to construct a stadium and hospital and develop the bamboo industry.[20] The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was another early donor, contributing loans and credits worth US$500,000 in 1974, followed by a further $1 million in 1975 and $1.1 million the next year.[21]

Guinea-Bissau also had other, less radical affiliations. Terence Todman, US ambassador to neighboring Guinea from 1972 to 1974, recalled how before they came to power, he and likeminded American officials discreetly sought to cultivate Cabral and other Guinea-Bissean independence activists based in Conakry, the Guinean capital. "I got authorization,

[18] "Foreign Loans, Aid Figures Published, Explained," Isvestiya, March 2, 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-043, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report Soviet Union, Monday, March 5, 1990, 83-85.

[19] CIA, "Communist Aid and Trade Activities in Less Developed Countries, February 1976," May 1976, p. 7, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79S01045A000100040001-7.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; CIA, "Communist Aid and Trade Activities in Less Developed Countries, April 1976," June 1976, p. 4, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP-79S01045A000100060001-5.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

[20] Caroline Puel Monange, Hélène Deval, and Bénédicte Châtel, "Review of 35 Years of Relations," Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens, March 31, 1989, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report Sub-Saharan Africa: Supplement Africa-China: Review of 35 Years of Relations, FBIS-AFR-89-115S, June 6, 1989, pp. 6, 13. These figures are based on OECD statistics, and do not include debt relief, scholarships, or medical teams. See also CIA Intelligence Report, "The New Chinese Aid Offensive, 1970-75," November 1975, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200022-2.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; CIA, "Communist Aid to less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975," July 1976, p. 17, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08S01350R000602020001-7.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

[21] CIA, Memorandum for Mr. Paul Taylor, "LDC Economic and Oil Data," January 20, 1975, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00608R000500240024-6.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; "Trends in OPEC Economic Assistance, 1976," July 1977, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79B00457A000600040001-3.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

quietly, from the State Department, to deal with them. And I got to know Amilcar Cabral well, I also got to know the other leaders and the whole understanding was that nothing was to go public. If anything was ever said, it would be totally denied. But otherwise, we'd maintain contacts." This provoked "an enormous run-in with [then secretary of state Henry] Kissinger, because he was all for the Portuguese. And I was sending him messages saying that's a dying thing." Following Cabral's murder, Ambassador Todman recalled that he contacted his widow, telling her: "'Take some comfort in knowing that the principles for which he fought and died are those that are going to prevail." According to Todman: "The consequence of our contacts was when independence came to the Cabo Verde Islands and to Guinea-Bissau, the United States was able to be the first country in there. Excellent relations right from the start, because there had been this history of cooperation with them, understanding for them during their very difficult period" (Todman, 1995). Significantly, the US Congress introduced amendments in the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act mandating assistance for the newly independent former Portuguese colonies.[22]

After winning independence, Guinea-Bissau continued Amílcar Cabral's policy of highlighting its non-aligned position, and sought to establish and maintain good relations with countries of all ideological outlooks. It received significant technical and economic assistance from the United States and other Western powers, notably Portugal, as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. As a small state surrounded by larger francophone neighbors, with which it often had difficult relations, Guinea-Bissau became an enthusiastic advocate of continued links among the five Lusophone African states and their former colonial overlord. Before independence, their liberation movements had since 1961 been joined in the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies. The smaller states, Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde, and São Tomé e Príncipe, were particularly eager to establish such arrangements, backing the establishment in 1983 of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP). Even earlier, in 1978, they also lobbied in support of Portugal's election to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Far from coincidentally, in this context, Portugal often served as a convenient conduit for aid to its former colonies from international organizations and Western states alike (Galli, 1990, 62-66; Forrest, 1992, 69-70; Davidson, 2017, 165-171; MacQueen, 1997, 222-223; MacQueen, 2005).

Yet despite some shared concerns, interests, and international strategies, Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde soon came to a parting of the ways. Paradoxically, according to Cabral's biographer, "Guinea's descent into one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world started right after independence" (Tomás, 2021, 3). From this perspective, "Cabo Verdeans

[22] Excerpt from U.S. Congressional Record-Senate, October 1, 1974, S17973-S17976, CIA CREST Database, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00957A000100030044-9.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021; 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Conference Report on Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, December 17, 1974 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), 51, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00957A000100010011-6.pdf, accessed December 29, 2021.

and Guineans, pushed apart by colonialism, were culturally irreconcilable" (Tómas, 2021, 201). Luís Cabral's government was repressive, and his focus upon developing industry rather than agriculture brought severe food shortages in its train, with Guinea-Bissau importing around 90 percent of its food by the early 1980s (MacQueen, 1997, 223; Galli, 1987, 89-95; Galli, 1990, 55-56). By the late 1970s, entrenched divisions within Guinea-Bissau between indigenous inhabitants and those—like the Cabral brothers—of Cabo Verdean extraction prompted bitter infighting within the ruling elite. In November 1980, a coup against foreign mestizos led by the prime minister, General "Nino" Vieira, overthrew the government of Luís Cabral, who spent the rest of his life in exile, dying in Portugal in 2009. Vieira himself would remain president until driven from office and into exile in 1999, following a civil war that began the previous year; elections returned him to power in 2005, and he headed the country again until falling victim to assassination in 2009 (MacQueen, 2005; Temudo, 2009, 57-62).

After Vieira's 1980 coup, most of the Cabo Verdeans who had been active in Guinea-Bissau's liberation struggle returned to the islands. In January 1981, Cabo Verde abandoned all thought of future unification with Guinea-Bissau, opting instead for permanent separation, and restoring multi-party politics in 1990 (Andrade, 2002; Foy, 1988). Francis Terry McNamara, who served as US ambassador to Cabo Verde from 1989 to 1992, well after its decisive split from Guinea-Bissau, recalled that even after this separation: "The country was governed by a moderate Marxist government. Authoritarian, but not oppressive. There were no political prisoners, for instance, or anything of that sort, but it was authoritarian. They had never had a contested election." According to McNamara, the government was still dominated by Cabo Verdeans who had been prominent in the armed struggle in Guinea-Bissau: "Probably less than a hundred people from Cabo Verde had been in Bissau and participated, in one way or another, in the war. Not all in combat. Some were poets, a few were soldiers. But that's all there were. And these are the guys who came back, took control of the country, and dominated it for those intervening fifteen-odd years" (McNamara, 1993).

The ending of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought a detrimental sea change in the ability of the small Lusophone countries to leverage international rivalries to their own economic advantage. The gradual improvement of Sino-Soviet bilateral relations during the 1980s meant that small states had less scope to play off one great power against the other in their own efforts to extract aid and other benefits (Zhang, 2014, 270-273). The concurrent decline in Soviet-Western tensions likewise precluded moves to use the Cold War as leverage with the United States and its European allies. Cutbacks in Soviet assistance may have been a contributory factor in ending one-party rule in Guinea-Bissau (and likewise in Cabo Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe), and in precipitating in Guinea-Bissau the political instability and disorder that triggered the eruption of civil war at the end of the decade, followed by a series of coups.

For Guinea-Bissau, as elsewhere, the growing international emphasis on free market liberalism also brought economic reforms and structural adjustments, often undertaken at the urging of the IMF and other international lending agencies. By the end of the 1980s,

Guinea-Bissau was producing much of its own food, a reversal of the situation at the beginning of the decade (MacQueen, 1997, 223). This trend continued, with production of rice, the staple food crop, largely grown by smallholders, increasing rapidly and more than doubling between 2005 and 2018. Output of other subsistence crops, notably fruit, also increased. From the late 1990s onward, the cultivation of cashew nuts for sale overseas became increasingly preponderant in commercial agriculture, producing 90 percent of the country's export revenues and 10 percent of GDP by 2018 (Havik et al., 2018, 10-16; also Temudo and Abrantes, 2013, 582-587; Temudo, Figueira, and Abrantes, 2014).

With the spigot of Soviet largesse reduced to a trickle or run dry altogether, Guinea-Bissau was not immune to the appeal of cheque-book diplomacy. For several years, from 1990 to 1998, it chose to switch diplomatic recognition from the People's Republic of China to the Republic of China on Taiwan. Its reasons for doing so were more pragmatic than ideological: Taiwan offered generous assistance programs, a distinct inducement for a micro-state with few indigenous resources or facilities at its disposal. On May 26, 1990, shortly after introducing domestic austerity measures, erstwhile radical Guinea-Bissau became the first Portuguese-speaking state to make this move, a change of allegiance that lasted until 1998, when Guinea-Bissau once more resumed relations with the PRC (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 319).[23] During these years, it repeatedly sponsored resolutions requesting the UN to admit Taiwan to membership.[24]

China's growing economic clout eventually prompted a reconsideration. After Guinea-Bissau decided to desert Taiwan, China opened an embassy in the country. Educational scholarship programmes and medical exchanges rapidly resumed, and in the first decade of the twenty-first century, Chinese grants provided funding to rebuild and re-equip a hospital and reconstruct Guinea-Bissau's electricity network, and also additional budgetary support for the government. During emergencies, China provided food aid and medical assistance. Economic and technological cooperation agreements were likewise reactivated (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 320).

Political turmoil in Guinea-Bissau also brought a rather different relationship with Cabo Verde, as internal conflicts in the former country erupted into civil war in 1998-1999. Together with Portugal, Cabo Verde offered to serve as a mediator, bringing a warming of relations. Meanwhile, refugees from Guinea-Bissau also found shelter in Cabo Verde. The

[23] "Taiwan, Guinea-Bissau Establish Ties," Taipei CNA, May 26, 1990, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report China, May 31, 1990, 72; "Guinea-Bissau Ambassador Presents Credentials," April 18, 1991, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report China, April 23, 1991, 60.

[24] See, e.g., "Taiwan: Officials Say Taiwan Seeking 'Fair Treatment' by UN," Taiwan Central News Agency, July 25, 1996, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report China, July 25, 1996, 93; K. C. Huang and Debbie Kuo, "Taipei: Taiwan's Goal to Rejoin UN Remains Unchanged," July 26, 1996, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report China, July 26, 1996, 74; Lilian Wu, "Taiwan: Foreign Ministry Official Urges Public to Focus on UN Bid," July 26, 1996, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report China, July 29, 1996, 77-78.

ouster of President Vieira, who went into exile in Portugal, failed to resolve problems among other contenders for power, bringing further violence and instability, with the civilian government overthrown in September 2003 in a military coup led by General Verissimo Correia Seabra, who was himself assassinated the following year. Presidential elections held in 2005 returned Vieira to power; once again, Cabo Verde's President Pedro Pires took part in negotiations to resolve violent disputes that threatened to disrupt the voting (MacQueen, 2003, 2005). Further Cabo Verdean mediation efforts took place following Vieira's assassination in 2009 (Mendy and Lobban, 2013). Political unrest continued, with a military coup in 2012 that led five international organizations (the UN, European Union, PCLP, African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States) to dispatch a fact-finding mission headed by José Ramos-Horta, former president of Timor-Leste. New elections were eventually held in 2014, bringing to power José Mário Vaz, the first elected president of Guinea-Bissau to serve out his full five-year term of office (UN Security Council, 2020).

4. Conclusion

From the early 1960s onward, as it waged both guerrilla warfare and a sophisticated global public relations offensive in its quest for independence, the territory that would eventually become Guinea-Bissau commanded high international visibility. In the words of the historian Norrie MacQueen, throughout the years from 1963 to 1974, Portuguese Guinea "commanded an attention in the world out of proportion to its size or economic or strategic significance" (MacQueen, 2005). In large part, this was due to the arresting and visionary leadership of Amílcar Cabral, an articulate revolutionary whose writings and personality alike offered inspiration to socialist, leftist, and progressive elements in almost every country. Protean and adaptable, he appealed to a wide range of backers, giving Marxism a human and relatable face (Mendy, 2019; Tomás, 2021; Chabal, 2002). Even today, close to fifty years after his death, his reputation as a leading socialist theorist stands extremely high, with his works featured on the Marxist Internet Archive (Marxist Internet Archive, n.d.).

Cabral set a pattern for liberation struggles that other independence activists, Nelson Mandela of South Africa, for example, would subsequently follow. Notable among these was the Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor), that launched an ultimately successful struggle to reverse the 1975 Indonesian takeover of another former Portuguese colony, the present-day Asian nation of Timor-Leste. In the late twentieth century Fretilin adopted Cabral's strategy, running an insurgency on the ground that withstood all efforts at suppression while conducting a highly effective international propaganda campaign on the world stage, utilizing the UN and other transnational and non-governmental organizations, and appealing to global public opinion. Charismatic leadership facilitated this strategy, as did Fretilin's adept blurring of its early radical propensities.

The murder of Cabral in January 1973 failed to prevent Guinea-Bissau declaring independence later that year and winning Portuguese recognition of that status in September 1974. One may speculate, but it is impossible to predict whether Cabral, had he lived, would have

succeeded in reconciling the disparate nationalist elements and groups within Guinea-Bissau. Resourceful, unorthodox, and original, he seems to have been uniquely capable of resolving such contradictions, an ability lacking in other prominent politicians—notably his half-brother, Luís Cabral—among Guinea-Bissau's Cabo Verdeans.

Arguably, though, Cabral left one other important legacy to Guinea-Bissau. Once the new state had won formal independence, initially at least, expectations for its future progress and development were perhaps unrealistically high. When problems and internal conflicts arose, bringing violence and civil war in their train, Guinea-Bissau could draw for assistance on a reservoir of international goodwill. Cabo Verde proved particularly willing to help, as did Portugal and indeed East Timor. Whatever the circumstances of Cabral's death, his prominent role in winning its independence meant that as a state, in terms of soft power Guinea-Bissau retained a measure of virtue by association with him. It is impossible to quantify just how much weight the continuing identification of Guinea-Bissau with the legend of Cabral carried in international affairs or how many extra concessions were granted his country thanks to the spell exerted by his powerful memory. What is undeniable is that, decades after his death, both within Guinea-Bissau and on the global stage, Cabral and his teachings remained a potent influence and highly visible presence.

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The conflict in Cabo Delgado: impact in Mozambique foreign affairs and the reshaping of bilateral agreements

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Mozambique; Cabo Delgado conflict; insurgence; foreign direct investment; diplomatic relations

Abstract

The conflict in Cabo Delgado results from the degradation of power relations in the Province of Cabo Delgado. The feeling of abandonment and withdrawal from power by the local population generated social contestation to government decisions. Simultaneously, the Islamic extremist movements approached the Mozambican frontiers and deepened their influence and attraction towards youngsters, exposing them to extremist ideas and training them in military skills. The outcome of this situation was an armed conflict that progressively affected local populations and the economic environment. Cabo Delgado is resource-rich and attracted foreign investment to the region. With the armed conflict situation, international agreements and even foreign policy and bilateral relations were affected. This chapter explores the impact this conflict had in the reshaping of the foreign policy and bilateral relations of Mozambique with other countries, mainly the People's Republic of China, and how it affected the international economic agreements.

Introduction

In October 2017 a group of about 30 young men attacked police stations in Mocímboa da Praia, one of the northern districts of Cabo Delgado Province in Mozambique. Two policemen died in the attack and the group seized arms and ammunition and briefly occupied the town. This attack was the first of many such violent assaults that have terrorized the province, especially the districts of Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade, Palma, Macomia, Quissanga, Muidumbe, and Mueda. The nature and intensity of the attacks, as well as their reach and scope, has changed quite dramatically in the years since the violence began. This chapter will consider the roots of the violence alongside the impact on the local population

and the economic environment, investigating the entanglements between internal strife and foreign policy and bilateral relations with other countries, especially the People's Republic of China, and how it affected the international economic agreements. Cabo Delgado is a resource rich province which has attracted a wealth of foreign investment in the recent past. This investment has been put at considerable risk since the start of the insurgency.

In order to investigate the connections between internal violence, foreign policy and international economic agreements we will take a step back and place Cabo Delgado and its history in national context. By exploring the internal causes of the conflict, we hope to highlight how much local politics and relationships play into larger international economic directions, development, and agreements. In doing so we argue for an analysis that brings together local and global realities to better understand long protracted conflicts and responds to on-going developments that affect local populations.

This chapter takes the first attacks to Mocímboa, on 5 October 2017, as a starting point to explore the current insurgency, but does not begin there. The origins of the violence extend much further back and have a basis in internal and external political dynamics that play out in one of the provinces the furthest away from the Mozambican capital. We will not attempt to disentangle the different layers of political and social causes that relate to the violence but will merely point towards the insufficient nature of existing analyses which either privilege one or the other and fail to take a longer historiographical view.[1]

In terms of methodological approach, we combine long term ethnographic engagement which generated empirical data related to memory and experiences of past violence with a political science and international relations perspective to inquire into the broader impacts of the insurgency in order to attempt to draw as full a picture as possible. Ethnographic fieldwork in Mocímboa da Praia before the start of the conflict serves as the basis to make sense of local politics, fractures, and trajectories towards violence. This included participant observation, semi-structured interviews, later complemented by archival research. Initial fieldwork took place in somewhat challenging circumstances following a short, but intense bout of violence after local elections and an unsettled post-riot period that highlights some of the tensions brought to light by the insurgency. While this does not compare to the current violent insurgency and its terrible consequences, it brought some of the existing fractures into stark relief. We believe an awareness of the endogenous lines of division may be of help in making sense of the current violence not only as it affects local populations but in so far as it impacts international investments and economic interests in the region.

In order to make sense of the internal and external dimensions of the insurgency this chapter proceeds as follows. We will begin by considering the known chronology of the insurgency and the ways in which it has changed since it began in 2017. Following this we will explore the long-standing lines of division in Cabo Delgado that both precede the insurgency and

[1] Recent analyses have pointed out the multiple possible causes of the insurgency and its on-going consequences. For more on this see: Morier-Genoud (2020), Heyen-Dubé and Rands (2022), Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira (2019), Matsinhe and Valoi (2019).

were further reinforced by the violence. We will then expand on the impact the insurgency had at the international level and the ways in which the instability in the province has affected external investment and engagement. In doing so we explore the impact of the insurgency on foreign affairs and the specific changing relationship between Mozambique and China. We finish the chapter by bringing together the internal and external dimensions.

Origins of the conflict

The first attacks took place in Mocímboa da Praia in the early hours of 5 October 2017. A group of around 30 men attached police stations and killed two policemen in Mocímboa, before briefly occupying the town. This was the first salvo of what was to become a long, and tragic insurgency. In the three years that followed the initial attack the violence increased steadily in reach, scope, and destructiveness. While during the first hit the insurgents did not attack the local population, focusing the violence on state institutions, this changed as the insurgency progressed.

It was not altogether surprising that the initial attacks took place in Mocímboa da Praia. A semi-urban centre in the northern coast of Cabo Delgado, Mocímboa has long had a history of contestation to the state and a divided political allegiance. It is one of the towns in the northern districts of Cabo Delgado where for long the political allegiance to FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique – Mozambique Liberation Front) and RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana – Mozambican National Resistance) are equally divided (Santos, 2010) long before the arrival of the current group of insurgents. The existing political, religious, ethnic, and socio-economic divides contribute to an unsettled present and help contextualise the insurgency, if not explain the development and impact of the violence.

The first attack and hold of Mocímboa was short lived[2] and for a time the attackers appeared to have moved towards different targets[3]. Seemingly random attacks on isolated villages, mostly at night, and largely to gather food and supplies followed the initial attack. The destructive nature of these early incursions was much smaller than what we came to expect during the worse days of 2020. However, the violence escalated slowly but steadily. Burnt houses in isolated villages became the norm as did the personal attacks on local authorities. This was followed by news of beheadings and an escalation of the violence throughout 2019. There was, and still is, much lacking with respect to information about funding, training, and support for the insurgents and despite a wealth of research and interest there are many questions that remain unanswered.

The first few months after the initial attacks were rife with confusion and different theories emerged as to who these insurgents were. Called Al-Shabab, or Mashababos, locally they

[2] Retrieved on April 18, 2022, from https://theconversation.com/why-islamist-attack-demands-a-careful-response-from-mozambique-85504

[3] Retrieved on April 18, 2022, from https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087, https://theconversation.com/tracing-the-history-of-mozambiques-mysterious-and-deadly-insurgency-111563

were immediately understood to be distinctive from the Somali Al-Shabab, and at that point they were not considered part of international networks of Jihadi combatants. Some of these assumptions were later revised and amended as the insurgency developed. Although a small group of researchers made it to Mocímboa shortly after the first attacks (Habibe, Forquilha & Pereira 2019), research was difficult if not impossible and very little was known about the origins, aims, funding and training of the insurgents.

By 2020 the attacks became bolder and more destructive[4], and there was a noticeable use of more powerful armament. The units used in the attacks were also better trained. A series of serious attacks in Mocímboa, Palma, Nangade, Macomia, and Muidumbe demonstrated the gravity of the situation and an unprecedented escalation of what had been until then a low-level, local, insurgency. The state security forces, and mercenary groups involved in fighting the insurgents have proven unable to withstand their advances at first. A series of brutal engagements of civilians allegedly by the state security forces at the local level compounded the violence perpetrated by the insurgents creating resentment in the local population.

In early 2020 Mocímboa was again the target of serious military engagement, and the insurgents took the town in August maintaining their hold for close to a year. It was only after the attacks on the Total plant in Palma in April 2021 that there was a more sustained engagement from the state security forces. By then Mocímboa had been under the control of the insurgents for months and large swaths of the countryside were under the control of the insurgents. There were continuous rumours of expansion of the attacks to the southern districts of Cabo Delgado and Nampula. Recently there were some reports of attacks in Niassa, as a response to the increasing push back of insurgents in Cabo Delgado by the Mozambican armed forces and Rwandan troops.

The government's response was initially swift and with forces brought from different districts the insurgents were quickly repelled. However, the government forces were considerably less effective when the attacks began in smaller, isolated villages. The apparently random nature of the attacks, their unpredictability, and slowly growing violence did not meet with a concerted response from the armed forces and state security apparatus. There was continuous criticism of a slow response and growing concern for the development of the insurgency. The then bishop of Pemba, D. Luiz Fernando Lisboa, began a serious campaign to draw attention to the emerging humanitarian crisis and the development of the insurgency. Repeatedly calling to attention the internal dynamics that underlie the insurgency, he offered criticism of the government action and response to the violence. It is to some of these internal dynamics that we now turn.

Growing numbers of internally displaced persons fleeing to Pemba and other urban or semi-urban centres in Cabo Delgado or Niassa created a severe humanitarian crisis compounded by natural disasters like the cyclone Kenneth that battered the province in 2019. The numbers of refugees are believed to be extremely high, with accounts from

[4] Retrieved on April 18, 2022, from https://www.moz24h.co.mz/post/al-shabab-s-terror-in-mozambique

humanitarian organisations suggesting that there are over 700,000 people displaced[5]. Pemba, the provincial capital, located in the southern tip of the province and, so far, free from the direct violence hosted most of the refugees, in the city limits or in refugee camps close by. International organizations flocked to the province looking to offer assistance and assist in ameliorating the humanitarian crisis.

The current insurgency has grown in a province where past experiences of violence have established a template for escape and a continuous reworking of the social geography and population dynamics of the north with continuous and lasting effects. It is to the internal dimensions of the insurgency and its demographic and political dynamics that we now turn.

Internal dimensions

Cabo Delgado has a long history of distant and problematic institutional relations and a course of political domination that has been authoritarian or even violent. The northernmost province of Mozambique is no stranger to violence, with a long history of conflict, wars, and the forms of structural violence that mark severe underdevelopment. One of the least developed provinces of a severely underdeveloped country that had the dubious honour of being the poorest country in the world for long, Cabo Delgado was the last province to be pacified by the Portuguese well into the 20th century (Newitt, 1995). The administration of the province was first fell to the Nyassa company, a chartered company (Vail, 1976) that administered the region that now constitutes Cabo Delgado and Nyassa, and whose repressive and often violent actions were met with resistance from the local population. The charter for the company was revoked in 1929, at the same time as the new state regime was getting its footing in Lisbon. The administration of the province passed onto the Portuguese state, but there were strong continuities in the brutal methods employed and the responses of the local population. Various forms of low-level resistance, what Scott terms 'foot dragging' (1985), were employed, as well as escape to Tanganyika (Kingdon, 2002; West, 2005). The 1960s opened with a violent massacre in Mueda and built the myth of Makonde resistance (Israel, 2020). Shortly after, FRELIMO was formed (1962) in Tanganyika, bringing together three proto-nationalist movements. The liberation struggle started in 1964 and was fought largely in the province.

Some of the current fractures can be traced back to this past and the legacies of colonialism, the liberation struggle, and post-independence policies. While the hinterland of Cabo Delgado was dominated by FRELIMO, and the liberated zones were by and large located there, the coastal districts have a far different history with a longer presence of the Portuguese administration and a more ambiguous political allegiance[6], while on the coast a far more ambiguous history of resistance and collaboration took place. The relations between local power structures and central authorities were always complex and reflected an

[5] Retrieved on April 18, 2022, from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/iom_mozambique-cabo_delgado_crisis_sitrep_18-31may.pdf

[6] This is far more complex than initially believed and Bonate (2009) has done much to shed light on the more nuanced lines of division and political histories of the northern districts.

incomplete integration in the logic of central power vis-à-vis a long tradition of autonomous rule. With independence and FRELIMO's hold on power, the old perceptions of resistance and collaboration found their way to the political developments and the alienation of the autochthonous coastal populations.

After the end of the civil war and the first elections in 1994, Cabo Delgado mirrored the country's election results. FRELIMO has consistently won elections in the province, in some districts with great margins (Mueda and Muidumbe, for example). At the last election FRELIMO was again the most voted party, and its candidate, President Nyusi won with more than 70%. The close alignment between the province and FRELIMO could show that there are some benefits to the province from a FRELIMO government. However, much of this proximity has historical origins in the liberation struggle and the role of FRELIMO in the region.

The preponderance of FRELIMO did not signify development and economic growth. On the contrary, most of the authors see poverty, social exclusion, and social inequalities as one of the consequences of the social unrest in this province (Dias, 2021). The wealth coming from natural resources contrasted with local development, and informal or clandestine economies flourished, including products such as precious stones and drogues. In addition, there is a political split reflecting an ethnical alignment: the Makonde were historically close to FRELIMO and involved in the independence war since its beginning, and the Mwani, not affiliated to FRELIMO after the Independence closer to RENAMO (Santos, 2021). Although the Mwani are concentrated in a small portion of the Cabo Delgado territory, this opposition between these two ethnic groups contributes to creating a pre-conflict frame.

It is upon this history of ambiguity and the multiple layers of history that we think the current violence should be interpreted and made sense of. Much of the current assessments fall prey to the lure of debates around jihadism, and the radicalization of young men at the expense of a deeper analysis of the longer historical dynamics, including the external dimensions, and its interactions with the new realities of vast natural resources in a province that has for long seen little investment in infrastructure and human development. While true, these assessments are nevertheless partial and flawed in their reach and ability to explain the current, deeper divides of northern Cabo Delgado. However, the current analysis would fall short were it not to consider the external dimensions of the conflict and its impact.

Impact on foreign affairs

The long civil war (1976-1992) in Mozambique resulted in postponing the creation of an internal economy and market. With the Independence in 1975, FRELIMO, the movement that conducted the fight against the colonizer, conquered the right to the governance of all natural resources. The national territory, including the land and resources, was considered a communal possession, meaning that land cannot be privatized or commercialized. Since the mid-1980s, Mozambique gradually opened up to outside investors (Nielsen & Bunkenborg 2020), inclusively throughout the creation and adaptation of the existing domestic law and the preparation of public policies to welcome foreign direct investment. As a result, Mozambique

could aspire to attract the attention of different international stakeholders, foreign direct investment, offering stable conditions that bring confidence to investment. Consequently, Mozambique began to move beyond its dependence on external aid for the first time.

The end of the civil war (1992) brought a period of new investments in Mozambique. Initially supported by the International Monetary Fund (FMI), which imposed an economy and political reorientation away from soviet-style socialism. FMI's support entailed the adoption of a political system based on liberal democracy and an economic system based on the free market. The new constitution adopted in 1990 followed these tenets, establishing economic and political liberalism, which would be determinant for the opening up to foreign investment. Simultaneously, there was the acceptance of a good governance agenda proposed by donors. Local elites accepted and tried to turn in their favour, mainly as mediators for international assistance and cooperation (Symons, 2016). A similar situation occurred with foreign direct investment. This mediation position empowered local elites and gave path to creating a specific kind of patrimonial state (Symons, 2016) which partially explains the social unrest that emerged decades later in northern provinces and specifically in Cabo Delgado.

The social and political turbulence might create foreign direct investment enclaves. These foreign companies invest in extractive activities, like the gas exploitation, which are much more connected to the international networks for exports of the product or international value chains than to local communities (Symons, 2016). Consequently, although there was a decrease in poverty in Cabo Delgado, the province remains one of the poorest in the country. Therefore, Mozambique mainly developed relations with foreign investment suppliers through negotiations in the capital, Maputo, and did not involve local communities in attracting and maintaining investment.

The period of internationalization of the Mozambican economy corresponds to a time characterized by a new scramble for Africa based on extractive mega-projects (Symons, 2016). Whereas foreign direct investment positively impacts Mozambican society and economy, it also revealed that some structural problems continued, such as wealth distribution, inequality, clientelism, and local communities' contestation of some projects. In addition, the growing social unrest, and the contestation of some models of resources exploitation made by local communities started to be an element to consider. However, the apparent stable situation in Cabo Delgado before the insurgent conflict and the richness of its resources kept foreign investors' interest.

Mozambique has increasingly opened up its investment landscape beyond well-established global North companies. New stakeholders in international investment including those from the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have risen to prominence in line with Mozambican government strategies toward natural resources and a commodity export boom. Since the beginning of the current century Maputo flourished, promoting new urban projects that symbolized the development. Concurrently, small and medium-size businesses achieved some measure of success (Brooks, 2018). However, Maputo demography and socio-economic setting does not mirror the rest of the country and

consumptions levels are much lower in other provinces, hampering the growth of small and medium-size companies, and the creation of local employment opportunities.

The Mozambican government has for long tried to attract investment to labour-intensive industries. China has become increasingly relevant in diversifying foreign investment, and South Africa keeps her post as the more significant partner in two-way trade. Though sharing the same official language, Brazil is far behind China. India recovered its position as the third largest importer from Mozambique (Brooks, 2018). While there is the internationalization of the Mozambican economy, there is no involvement of local communities, and the domestic situation, yet stable, has started to show signs of dissatisfaction.

When the attacks on Cabo Delgado villages and towns started, the government quickly justified the situation with international interference, calling attention to the presence of foreigners in the guerrilla groups that attacked the civil population. The first targets are local communities and not the critical international economic projects that are usually protected by their security forces. The internationalization of the conflict goes on with the participation of the Armed Forces from Rwanda that started to cooperate with the Mozambican State. Only after the hardening of the attacks did workers of international companies leave Cabo Delgado, but contracts for exploitation continued. The meeting between President Nyussi and President Macron in May 2021 is one of the examples of how diplomacy intervened to assure the continuity of the economic agreements. It is notorious for the Mozambican government's effort to sustain economic diplomacy prevents foreign investors from leaving the region. The upholding of the normalization of bilateral relationships and the international support to fight the radicals behind the armed attacks on the civil population permitted to lower the impact conflict might have on diplomatic relations. However, traditional local stability was affected, and international confidence diminished, which is not having direct consequences on the previous foreign investment but might have on future intentions to invest.

Mozambique and China

China became one of the most relevant economic partners of Mozambique. Nevertheless, the Chinese presence in Mozambique dates back to the 19th century through the migration of skilled and cheaper labour force that competed with other communities. Their presence was notorious in provinces like Maputo and Beira (Proença Garcia, 2020). From the 1950s to the 20th century, they became involved in the small industry and services sector, shifting their traditional role in Mozambican colonial society. In addition to this demographic presence of China, in the 60s of the 20th century with the beginning of the fight for Independence and against colonialism, China starts supporting FRELIMO with military training and some equipment. By that time, China has no diplomatic relations with Portugal. The level of confrontation between representatives of the Chinese ethnic group and the Portuguese authorities in Macau (which was still under Portuguese administration) increases. During this period, China follows a revolutionary approach to her foreign policy. Although China immediately recognized Mozambique's Independence and formalized diplomatic relations

by signing cooperation agreements, Mozambique turned to the Soviet area of influence.

With the beginning of the Civil War, the domestic situation pushed Mozambique's government to more pragmatic management of her closer diplomatic relations. China kept her relevance as ideological support, but Russia became an ally to fight RENAMO, the armed opposition movement. During this period, proximity with China diminishes, and Mozambique aligns with the Soviet Union. However, the ties between Mozambique and China never disappear (Lagerkvist, 2014).

When the negotiations to finish Civil War began, Mozambique's government started to look for international support and began a way to distance Russia smoothly. When the war between FRELIMO and RENAMO finished in 1992, Mozambique was already receiving international assistance from the International Monetary Fund. Since the 1990s Constitution, the country started implementing public policies toward her transformation into a liberal economy and liberal democracy. When Mozambique embraces the liberal bases for economy and politics, Curiously, there is a new rapprochement with China. Now, the ideological ties weakened, but the perspective of deepening economic relations seems a good cement to shape a new kind of diplomatic relations. Despite the new international frame in which Mozambique moves, the common historical past, based on socialism, is not forgotten (Nielsen & Bunkenborg, 2020). This shared history is a pilar to implementing the new relations that shifted in 1997 when China launched a specific fund for Mozambique (Lagerkvist, 2014). China gave up the revolutionary approach to international relations. Mozambique is still highly committed to the Bretton Wood institutions is not an obstacle to developing these relations (Proença Garcia, 2020).

China's rapprochement with Mozambique happens in a particular context. China is launching her Going out Policy. The country grew enough to look for other markets and to need more natural resources /commodities. African countries offer the possibility to trade and explore new partnerships. Mozambique is one of the attractive African countries offering good conditions for investment (Werts-Kanounnikoff, Falcão & Putzel, 2013). The close relationship between the countries during the fight against colonialism helped to find a suitable partnership for both. Some authors defend that China's involvement in Mozambique has been chiefly driven by Chinese private entrepreneurs, without the direct involvement of the highest Chinese representatives (Nielsen & Bunkenborg, 2020). Nevertheless, since 1997 the agreements between both countries were numerous and covered areas such as construction and rehabilitation of infrastructures and rural areas rehabilitation for food production. The agreements generally followed a very pragmatic approach without prevailing on a specific area for cooperation (Lagerkvist, 2014). In 2007, the visit of President Hu Jintao strengthened cooperation and introduced new areas and enlarged the existing ones: agriculture, technology, education, health, economy and natural resources exploitation (Proença Garcia, 2020).

President Hu Jintao's visit to Mozambique signified a high level of political relationship and might be inscribed in the diplomatic approach China was carrying out with some African countries. The foundation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 represents a new Chinese strategy toward African countries adding to solid bilateral relations

a multilateral platform bringing together for discussion China and the African countries, in which Mozambique is also a member. China understood that the anti-colonial fight's legacy could help bring together this part of the global South. Therefore, Mozambique is one of the African countries receiving China's attention and offers very competitive opportunities to China, either in the production industry or in exploring the industry. Nevertheless, FOCAC is not the only multilateral Chinese forum in which Mozambique participates. China also founded the Macao Forum in 2003. After the handover, the objective was to settle a platform for economic cooperation in Macau and deepen ties with the Portuguese-speaking countries. The forum's primary mission was to reinforce the commercial relations between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries, and Mozambique has been a member since its foundation (Costa, 2020). Evidence of the economic diplomacy character of the forum is its dependence on the Ministry of Commerce. Therefore, Mozambique could strengthen her relations with China through multilateral platforms or bilateral diplomacy by being a member of these two forums.

In the case of Mozambique, the pragmatic way of China's diplomacy and the adaptative path that usually is taken did not result in the deepening of high political relations after President Hu Jintao's visit and the participation of Mozambique in the initiatives toward African countries and Portuguese speaking countries. However, the Chinese presence in Mozambique increased, and Mozambican entrepreneurs ranked China as the most relevant investor in the country (Brooks, 2018). The neighbour country, South Africa, and the ancient colonizer, Portugal, were the second and third positions. This ranking means Mozambican economic stakeholders highly notice China's foreign direct investment. Simultaneously, China became the largest creditor of Mozambique. Even with China's annulation of part of this debt, there are still some doubts about its sustainability because part of the debt is based on future returns (Grimm & Hackenesch, 2017). Chinese presence in Mozambique is quite diversified and covers trade, cooperation in diverse sectors, and Official Development Assistance (Proença Garcia, 2020). Consequently, although, since President Mao, there was a principle of solidarity with the global South, the gradual creation of an autonomous development foreign policy in China transformed the relations with developing counties, which include Mozambique (Grimm & Hackenesch, 2017). Therefore, the evolution of the bilateral relationship between China and Mozambique is driven pragmatically by the two states according to their domestic policy and foreign policy at each moment.

Cabo Delgado was also at the center of China's interests in Mozambique. First, because of the exploration of timber (cf. Nielsen and Buckenborg 2020) and later through other investments in natural resources and infrastructure. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has been the world's larger importer of tropical timber and the biggest producer and exporter of processed timber products (Werts-Kanounnikoff, Falcão & Putzel, 2013). So, the forest sector in Cabo Delgado was very attractive to Chinese investors. There was also the tentative to invest in agricultural sectors, but the land concession became difficult to solve (Lagerkvist, 2014). Despite these difficulties, China maintained her investment in the province and enlarged it when the exploitation of gas and oil became economically attractive.

Until recently, Mozambique, including Cabo Delgado, was considered a safe place to invest. The current conflict threatened the stability of the economic relationship between Mozambique and China, but Chinese companies did not express any will to abandon their projects in Cabo Delgado. Similarly, to other prominent investors of diverse nationalities, China endeavoured to keep its previous investments. There is significant doubt as to whether these foreign investors will still be interested in new investments in spite of current uncertainties and the need to involve local communities.

Conclusion

The current insurgency in Cabo Delgado has led to serious local uncertainties and impacted not only local lives but also foreign investment. In this chapter we have attempted to shed light onto the consequences of the violence at the local level by bringing together an analysis of the local causes of the violence and the external dynamics of investment, specifically addressing the transformation of relationships for China. While much has been written about the internal dynamics of the conflict and the ongoing humanitarian crisis at the local level, as well as the ways in which national policies have impacted the local responses, less is known about the ways in which these events have affected bilateral relationships with China.

These bilateral relationships have changed since independence, and especially since the early years of the current century. The increase in investment in natural resource extraction and infrastructure, on par with social and cultural efforts to bring the two countries closer has led to a significant presence of China in Mozambique. The Mozambican government has had an extremely proactive policy to attract investment since the peace agreements that has made it an attractive space for investors. The changes in legislation and establishment of partnerships between Mozambican companies and foreign investors has gone a long way to increase the presence of foreign companies in Mozambique. The uncertainty brought by the insurgency has harmed foreign investment, making the northern districts of Cabo Delgado very insecure and damaging infrastructure.

Missing from the analysis of the international investment environment is an attention to local dynamics of politics and longer histories of alliance and conflict. These should not be discarded but should be considered alongside each other to offer a much more rounded understanding of the on-going violence and its consequences locally and nationally. It is in the confluence of local and global dimensions of the conflict that this chapter stands, and we suggest the need to pay attention to local events and responses when thinking about the wider consequences of violence for investment and the presence of foreign companies in places where the political situation is at present uncertain.

The insurgency has generated great insecurity at the local level and has harmed investment in extractive industries in the northern districts. The inability to travel and transport goods due to the violence has led to a flight from foreign companies. The shift in military action since the middle of 2021 and the decrease in attacks might ameliorate the lowering of investment and, if peace is once again achieved, led to a rise to past levels.

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Part 2

China-Portuguese-speaking Countries People-to-People Exchanges

Sporting Clube de Portugal – 100 Years of Sports Diplomacy

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Implementation and impact of gender quotas in the parliament of Mozambique

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Mega-events Boost Local Tourism and National Brand Image-A Case Study of Guinea-Bissau Carnival

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Sporting Clube de Portugal — 100 Years of Sports Diplomacy

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Sports Diplomacy, Interculturality, Dialogue, Connectivity, Sporting Clube de Portugal (SCP)

Abstract

Rapprochement between countries, economic growth, and prosperity cannot be achieved without dialogue and mutual understanding between their people, since, in a time of cybernetic connectivity, no country can ensure peace or economic stability alone. Everything begins with people and human connections, and sports events, such as tours, are a great way to bring people together. To illustrate this, this chapter reviews the 100+ years of diplomatic history of Sporting Clube de Portugal (SCP) via its tours to the five corners of the world — Brazil (1928), southern African countries (1954), Angola (1979), China and Macau (1978), and Macau (2018). The tours, though different in context, were approached in a singular manner. Each tour was a tremendous success triggered through sports' soft power and completely aligned with the UNESCO International Charter on Physical Education and Sport, which stresses that sporting activities "must seek to promote rapprochement between peoples and individuals, as well as disinterested emulation, solidarity and fraternity, mutual respect and understanding, recognition of integrity and dignity of human beings." Lessons from SCP's 100+ years of sports diplomacy history can, and should, be used by all nations to achieve results that go way beyond sports or culture, and truly contribute to the understanding of people and nations.

1. Introduction

This chapter was developed for the III International Annual Symposium, organized by City University of Macau and Joaquim Chissano University, centred around the transition from sporadic bilateral exchanges to a comprehensive multilateral platform of mutual development cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Portuguese-

speaking African countries. The authors of this chapter are of the firm belief that sports is a gateway to connecting different countries and regions of the world. Hence, the main focus of this chapter is sports diplomacy. Through a multifaceted analysis, the object of the study — the century-old history of diplomacy pertaining to Sporting Clube de Portugal (SCP) — can teach valuable lessons concerning the development of sports diplomacy interconnecting Portugal to the countries that are at the centre of this symposium — the People's Republic of China and the Portuguese-speaking African countries. The main question of this study is: Can connectivity between people and countries be achieved through sports diplomacy? To answer this broad question, the authors have gathered information from three different and yet complementary sources:

1. A literature review regarding cultural diplomacy and sports diplomacy;
2. A brief explanation regarding the characteristics and historical circumstances of the five most relevant tours that SCP made in the last 100 years: Brazil in 1928, southern African countries in 1954, the People's Republic of China and Macau in 1978, Angola in 1979, and Macau in 2018;
3. A collection of testimonies of relevant people with experience and knowledge about sports and diplomacy today.

The conceptual model of this chapter can be defined as deepening, converging from wider into more specific concepts, as shown in Figure 1.

By looking into SCP's history and current testimonies, the authors intend to highlight the advantages of sports diplomacy, as well as to provide guidelines to make efficient use of sports clubs' reputation and goodwill to project political objectives that are otherwise difficult to obtain. The importance of this work therefore lies in the fact that, unlike the academic papers and analyses published up to now, it focuses on the role of a sports club in sports diplomacy and in fostering intercultural dialogue and political advancements. To date, most studies have focused on international sporting events and friendlies between national teams. As such, individual clubs' contribution and role as a representative of their country of origin has been overlooked. The analysis of the historical impact of SCP tours and the impact of the opinion of relevant personalities may reveal important conclusions, and be of great importance in understanding the reach of sports diplomacy. Hence, the authors will review episodes of diplomatic history via SCP's tours to different corners of

Figure 1 *The Chapters' Conceptual Organization*



Source: Authors (2021)

the world across 100 years of SCP's memoir. Each tour, according to different contexts, was approached in a singular manner, but each was also a tremendous success triggered through sports' soft power and completely aligned with the UNESCO International Charter on Physical Education and Sport, which stresses that "Through international co-operation and partnerships, all stakeholders should place physical education, physical activity and sport at the service of development, peace, solidarity and friendship among individuals, communities and nations" (UNESCO, 2015).

This chapter argues that the lessons from SCP's century-old history can, and should, be used by other nations to achieve results that go beyond sports or culture, and truly contribute to the understanding and connectivity of people(s) and nations. As such, in this chapter, the authors will analyze the concepts of *cultural diplomacy* and *sports diplomacy* as an independent chapter within cultural diplomacy. The authors will then focus on the specific cases of the SCP tours to Brazil (1928), the southern African countries (1954), Angola (1979), China and Macau (1978), and Macau (2018). Finally, the collection of valuable testimonies will provide a glance of the current state of sports diplomacy, which will lead to conclusions and contributions for the future.

2. The Concept of Cultural Diplomacy

It all starts within the big umbrella of "culture," understood as social exchanges. First, it is crucial that we define *cultural diplomacy*. Traditionally, it has been "an instrument … and a way of interacting with the outside world" (Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010, p. 11). Concerning its characteristics, in the study *Cultural Diplomacy 2.0: Challenges and Opportunities in Museum International Practices*, the author states that: "Cultural diplomacy implies the use of the art of diplomacy in promoting culture resulting in a potential greater awareness of each other's cultural backgrounds. Such awareness can lead to interaction among various players, states, and individuals" (Grincheva, 2013). Reflecting on how these interactions can be developed, Grincheva states that "These interactions are usually achieved through the organization of

events or a series of cultural activities among countries and employing the instrumentality of 'culture' in promoting a country's interests in economic, political, and strategic fields" (2013). In short, "cultural diplomacy aims to bring people from different countries together so they can learn about each other's cultures and traditions" (Grincheva, 2013).

Cultural diplomacy has been developed in the past decades with, as affirmed by Leadbeater (2010), "significant changes in the global culture of communication, the traditional principles of cultural diplomacy such as image cultivation, propaganda, and marketing-oriented activities (Melissen, 2006, p. 3) have proved to be outdated diplomatic strategies."

In a chapter entitled "Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase" (Cull, 2009), N. J. Cull examines the unique aspects of cultural diplomacy:

> In the course of its discursive expansion, cultural diplomacy has also been yoked to the cause of public diplomacy, advocated as a more citizen-oriented form of diplomacy than the standard model, whose 'targets' are no longer other governments so much as diverse national and global audiences and publics. It is increasingly understood as a trans-national process that can be engaged upon not just by governments and their agencies but by civil society and/or private sector stakeholders as well. (Cull, 2009)

An important part and as well as instrument of cultural diplomacy is sports and its unique characteristics. In fact, according to the UNESCO International Charter of Physical Education and Sport: The virtues of sport, including courage, justice, wisdom and self-achievement, among others, have already been raised many times. For most of the people, a proper education through sport turns into a school of life. Physical education and sport make up an essential part of education and culture, enriching social relations and developing fair-play (UNESCO, 2015). Besides its role in education, sport's "popularity and global attraction to sport enables people to transcend national, cultural, socio-economic and political boundaries (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2008) […] If cultural diplomacy concentrates on cultural exchanges and mutual understanding, sport is definitely part of it. As stated above, the common language provided by physical education and sport facilitates the dialogue between individuals and nations, sometimes even transcending the cultural and traditional differences. […] Sport as a tool for cultural diplomacy has already recorded many successes, both at the regional and international level" (Institute for cultural diplomacy). This connection is ancestral. "Actually, the link between sport and peace may be traced back to the Ancient Olympic Games, when belligerent states would agree a temporary 'Olympic Truce' for the duration of the Games" (Institute for Cultural Diplomacy). Perhaps the most well-known case of sports diplomacy in contemporary history is what is known as "ping pong diplomacy":

> One particularly prominent example of this is the so-called "ping-pong diplomacy" in the early 1970s. At that time, U.S. ping-pong players were sent to Japan to play a competition there, and were then invited by the Chinese delegation to visit the People's Republic. A year later, China's table tennis team came to the United States for a series of matches in ten cities. (2002)

After this marking point in history, the importance of the benefits of sports was legitimated by UNESCO:

> At the international level, UNESCO launched the International Charter of Physical Education and Sport in 1978, calling for the development of fair-play and the enriching of social relations. For its part, the European Commission set up the European Sports Charter shortly after the end of the Cold War (1992). (Institute for Cultural Diplomacy)

Figure 2 *The Central Role of Cultural Diplomacy*



Source: Authors (2021)

To conclude this chapter, it is important to emphasize the contribution of sports in personal development and in intercultural dialogue: "Hence the idea of encouraging more and more people participating in intercultural sport events to show them that sport is open to everyone, and is not a battlefield of races, cultures but a competition ground for teams or individuals has to be a good thing" (Markovits & Rensmann, 2010). The next section will analyze the singularities of sports diplomacy and what distinguishes it from other forms of diplomacy.

3. Singularities of Sports Diplomacy within the Broader Spectrum of Cultural Diplomacy

Broadly speaking, sports diplomacy consists of using sports to overcome linguistic, political, and sociocultural differences to pursue specific political objectives. As a 2016 European Commission report states:

> Although it used to be downgraded, sport is today increasingly and successfully regarded by various countries and governments as a tool to improve their foreign policy and international relations, reach external audiences more deeply, positively and effectively, support external policies and enhance their international image and influence. (Fourneyron et al., 2016)

Indeed, sports have proven to be the most unifying and inspiring development and peace tool in the world. No other social activity brings people together in such great numbers, and with so much passion and enjoyment. Regardless of age, gender or ethnicity, sports are enjoyed by all. Its reach is unrivalled. More importantly, sports promote universal values that transcend language, culture and ideologies. Sports events are a great opportunity for diplomatic exchanges, as Korr and Close explained:

> There are plenty of official meetings and summits for diplomats and heads of state, but few of them are as desirable and entertaining as sport events – nor do they receive as much media attention. […] Sporting events have another special feature. Because most people who watch a competition already know the rules, the events bridge cultural and linguistic gulfs that may exist between the hosting nation and the spectators. […] sports teams, events, and even individual athletes can become sports ambassadors and can provide a face to the nation. A benefit of sport events and individual athletes over official diplomats and politicians is that the negotiations can be seen less as government directed and more as free and spontaneous. (Korr & Close, 2008)

Being a part of culture, sports can have as much potential as art to unite people in the new globalized world:

> Sport events, athletes, and teams can provide a face to a nation and a useful instrument to exert their soft power and showcase their hard power to the world, but only if they are used and leveraged correctly. […] Sport plays an enormous role in our daily lives and, similar to other cultural global phenomena such as popular music, food, and dance, sport entails a universal language that everyone speaks. As Nelson Mandela once stated, 'Sport has the power to change the world, to inspire and to unite people in a way that very little else can.' (Korr & Close, 2008)

Several further examples can be provided: At the Four Countries 4 Peace Football Tournament, an initiative to promote reconciliation and dialogue between young people from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, each team had an equal number of boys and girls, but only the girls were allowed to score goals. In the absence of a referee, the players were responsible for resolving any disagreements. By playing together, these young people were unwittingly learning the universal values of respect, tolerance, and fair play. It was a victory for humankind through sports. Moments like these show that sport has a huge potential to effect social change. Sports and physical activity improve individual health and wellbeing, both physically and mentally, and teach important values and social skills. Moreover, sports do not just empower on an individual basis; it also unites and inspires people collectively, which builds communities, from neighbours to transnational movements. In many countries, however, the opportunities to participate in sports are limited by significant infrastructural, social, and political barriers. Given the personal and social development benefits that sports offer, increasing access and participation is a development goal. For this reason, the United Nations (UN) office on sports for development and peace has been running a youth leadership programme since 2012, with the aim of empowering young leaders from disadvantaged communities to use sports as a tool for progress. The initiative has enjoyed notable successes. In 2014, a young Paralympic athlete, Maclean Dzidzienyo, from Ghana, participated in the Berlin YLP camp.

In August 2013, the UN general assembly adopted a resolution establishing April 6 as the International Day of Sport for Development and Peace. The day offers a natural focal point for the movement, which was buoyed by sports' recognition in the sustainable development agenda adopted by the UN last year. The day encourages people to participate in sports, and aims to raise awareness of sports' potential as a peace and development tool, and to promote grassroots projects and organizations. More recently, a campaign has been launched encouraging people and organizations involved in sports for development and peace to share a picture or video on social media, highlighting the sustainable development goal to which they are contributing. The campaign "Let's Play for the Sustainable Development Goals" has enjoyed significant support from partners and participants alike.

Other celebrated illustrations of sports diplomacy go from the rugby national team "Springboks" that united the white and black communities under Nelson Mandela's visionary leadership to Nixon's rapprochement with China in 1971 through Ping Pong, or Portugal's lead up to the opening of an Embassy in Beijing in 1979 with the contribution of SCP's friendly football matches in China.

But how do these sports events affect diplomacy? The answer is simple, because they are a communication and representation tool, which is essential to diplomacy. As Pigman wrote in his 2010 study:

> The main features of diplomacy have been communication and representation. Diplomacy has long been established as the first step to avoid or resolve conflicts. In addition, it helps with negotiations; protects the citizens and other interests abroad; promotes economic, social, cultural, and scientific exchanges between states; and manages foreign policy decisions. Diplomacy traditionally involves government-to-government contact, but there are other channels of communicating national interest and influencing other countries. After the official diplomatic recognition between states, the dialogue usually continues through other channels of diplomacy, such as educational exchange programs, concerts, or other cultural events. […] While sovereignty has remained key in international negotiations and diplomatic recognitions, it no longer implies that only official diplomats can serve as representatives of a nation's interest and culture. (Pigman, 2010)

This reality has been developing in the past decades:

> Indeed, in the 21st century more nonstate actors such as individuals, teams, and even companies can function as representatives of their nation. This is another reason why today even sports teams or individuals can become the messengers of their nation's diplomatic messages. Famous artists or athletes can act as bridges between nations and can help to resolve national issues via cultural and sport diplomacy. (Pigman, 2010)

Sports personalities play an important role in diplomacy:

> While the athletes usually do not directly participate in the negotiations, the athletic event serves as a great venue for heads of state and diplomats to meet and discuss issues. This influence based on the attraction of countries is also called soft power. […] Sport can play an important role in this process, because of its universal popularity and its ability to serve as common ground between nations. (Chalip, 2006)

It is therefore important to state that sports play "a crucial role in shaping more inclusive collective identities" (Markovits & Rensmann, 2010, p. 2). For instance, continental club competitions attract people and fans from different countries, leading them to admire "foreign" players, or others belonging to ethnic minorities. In this context, sports can be linked to the Robert Putnam's concept of "bridging capital," meaning the power to bring different groups together, beyond their cultural boundaries" (Markovits & Rensmann, 2010).

4. Sporting Clube de Portugal: 100 Years of Sports Diplomacy

Sporting Clube de Portugal, a Portuguese sports club based in Lisbon, was established in 1906 and its strong identity distinguishes it from other clubs. It is based on two major concepts: eclecticism and athletic development. Since 1906, the idea of its main founder, José Alvalade, was to establish a club that developed a great variety of sports in Portugal and that opened up sports practice to everyone — which was fully accomplished. Indeed, SCP is currently represented with more than 10,000 athletes across 54 sports competitions, has participated in 21 Olympic Games and currently boasting over almost 150 Olympic athletes that have brought home nine Olympic medals. However, the club is mostly famous around the world for having one of the best football academies, having formed Luis Figo and Cristiano Ronaldo — two Portuguese players whom were considered the best players in the world. In fact, there are many successful football academies in the world, but only one has created two FIFA World Player of the Year winners.

In 2021, the club celebrated its 115th anniversary while continuing to maintain the two original concepts of its identity. Throughout SCP's history, it has conquered 38 European titles in seven different sports. In football, SCP has won 23 national championships and one European title — the Cup of the Winners' Cup. Regarding the club's diplomatic influence, it is important to evoke the history of Portugal in the context of its 16th century maritime discoveries, as since then the Portuguese language has become the fifth most widely spoken language in the world. This includes countries such as Timor-Leste, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Macau SAR of China, and many other territories spread across the world where Portuguese communities have set roots, with an estimated 280 million Portuguese speakers around the globe. Just like the language, SCP subsidiaries, training academies and social clubs have reached an impressive number of 400 contact points across the five continents. Football is part of the culture of the Lusophone countries and territories, while SCP is one of the largest fan-based clubs. The combination of these factors has made SCP an international powerhouse that has been used by diplomacy to achieve various national interests with mutual benefits. Subsequently, we will defend the importance of the five tours mentioned earlier on within their historical context.

1. Brazil (1928)

Sporting Clube de Portugal made its first major international tour in 1928. The football team embarked on a vessel, reaching the coastline of Brazil after a two-week journey. A truly epic and bold mission that brought the countries closer to each other at a very sensitive time when the world was plunging into an extraordinary crisis, which culminated in the crash of the New York Stock Exchange in 1929, with terrible implications for the Brazilian coffee empire. Simultaneously, Portugal was experiencing deep political turbulence, being in a transition phase between the end of the First Republic and the beginning of the Second Republic. Hence, the trip to Brazil was an instrument for communicating and representing Portugal to overseas nations and the overseas Portuguese as a solid and stable country under the new administration.

This pioneering sports tour was marked by the impact of its arrival in Rio de Janeiro and by the friendship between the delegations and the athletes, as reported by the Brazilian press at the time. In fact, as SCP was crossing the Atlantic, the newspaper Rio Sportivo stated that "Sporting does not come to Rio with the sole purpose of bringing victories to their homeland. It comes to us with much higher feelings because they want to further strengthen the indissoluble bonds that exist between Portugal and Brazil." It is important to highlight the characteristic of one of the most distinguished members of the tour: Salazar Carreira — doctor, journalist, athlete, manager and later President of SCP — known as "Mr. Eclecticism." Salazar Carreira, aware of the historical value of the successful realization, praised it through a detailed report, which was published by the SCP's newspaper Boletim Sporting Club de Portugal over five magnificent editions (Sporting's trip to Brazil, report by Dr. Salazar Carreira, Boletim Sporting 08/20/1929; 10/31/1929; 02/28/1930; 03/31/1930; 03/30/1930, Museu Sporting, Documentation Center). The first impression of Brazil was astonishing, Mr. Salazar Carreira described the huge avenues, the beauty of the landscapes and the different cities visited that, he assured, "there is not one single member of the tour, who is not enchanted by Rio de Janeiro!"

The stadiums and the quality of the local football were described with the same admiration by Salazar and the other members of the tour. The various diplomatic visits were also reported, as well as the evidence of friendship and affection. Salazar Carreira highlighted in his reports several relevant moments during the visit to Brazil: the trophies won, the reactions in the press, and the ceremonies in honor of SCP. Fundamentally, more than sports results, it was the intercultural dialogue and the importance of representing Portugal to the Portuguese community in Brazil and to the international community that mattered the most.

4.2 Southern African Countries (1954)

The historical framework of this trip was totally different from the expedition to Brazil in 1928. In 1954, the Portuguese political regime was going through one of its most delicate periods in history. When SCP arrived in Mozambique, Portuguese territories in India (Dadrá and Nagar-Aveli) were attacked by nationalist groups from the Indian Union, which continued throughout the time that SCP was in Africa. According to reports from SCP's newspaper *Boletim Sporting Club de Portugal*, the arrival in Mozambique took place on July 3, 1954. The trip was described as a mission to strengthen the already close ties between continental Portugal with its overseas provinces and aimed to honor SCP as well as Portugal. However, this trip in particular was not only a sports project, but also a political assignment. One may claim that the task was to bring together the locals in the Portuguese provinces in Africa to continental Portugal through sports. SCP had an apotheotic welcome reception at Mavalane airport in Mozambique. The D.E.T.A. airplane from Johannesburg landed at 11:30am, under immense cheers and applause from local inhabitants. The delegation was received by Board Members of Sporting de Lourenço Marques, a Mozambican subsidiary of SCP. The *Rádio Clube de Moçambique* team recorded the first statements by SCP President Góis de Mota. The President dubbed the mission as "Rota da Saudade," which means the "Nostalgia Tour."

On July 24, the leader of the delegation further declared that "Sporting was invited to go to the United States of America, but instead chose to accept the invite to tour the Portuguese provinces of Africa. If we traveled to America we would have had higher revenues. But the extraordinary overseas fans deserved the preference of Sporting. We came, and from what we saw, the provinces fully deserved Sporting's decision," President Góis de Mota declared.

On August 7, *Boletim Sporting Club de Portugal* described the arrival to Johannesburg. The SCP delegation went to the *Ponta Vermelha Palace* to express to the local General-Governor his complete solidarity with the Portuguese government against the attitude of the Indian Union, which SCP's President classified as an attack on the national honor. Góis da Mota expressed strong disapproval regarding the violence of the Indian Union against the territorial integrity of the Portuguese India.
Luanda, in Angola, represented another apotheotic arrival. In fact, the echo of SCP's journey according to the press of Portugal and the African provinces, was extensively used as an aphorism to publicize the exceptionality of Portuguese colonialism and also the "Portugueseism" present throughout the Portuguese overseas territories.

4.3 China and Macau (1978)

On June 25, 1978, a delegation of 41 people arrived in China. This paper argues that this tour illustrated in quite a formidable way how sports diplomacy was exercised through, and in partnership with, SCP. The Portuguese delegation, led by SCP President João Rocha, also included members of the Democratic Portugal-China Friendship Association (Associação Democrática de Amizade Portugal-China, ADAPC), journalists, reporters, and political members. In fact, the impact of SCP's trip was tremendous, prompting Chinese Vice Prime-Minister Marshal Chen Xilian to claim that the delegation was considered more than sports, as it was, above all, a diplomatic mission. He may also have wanted to emphasize that it was the first official state visit from Portugal to China since the Chinese Revolution of 1949.

Sino-Portuguese accord had in fact begun a few years earlier. The United Nations (UN) was one of the ways used in this initial phase, particularly through Veiga Simão, the Ambassador of Portugal in that organization (May 1974 to June 1975). After contacts with the Chinese counterpart Huanh Hua on January 6, 1975, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MNE) issued a diplomatic note stating that the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was "the only representative of the Chinese people," Taiwan was an "integral part" of Chinese territory, and "Macau could be the subject of negotiations when both governments deemed it appropriate" (Silva, 2020). On the other hand, as Silva explains, "a civil society association had been created to establish informal contacts between the two sides: The Democratic Portugal-China Friendship Association (ADAPC). This association was discreetly created by the PCP-ml (Portuguese Communist Party – Marxist Leninist), under the guidance of Beijing. Carlos Ricardo, first director of ADAPC, traveled to China more than once and it was in these contacts, discreet, that an initial proposal for the movement of a Portuguese football team to the country was born. In 1976, the Governor of Macau, Garcia Leandro, had been informed by an "intermediary" in the PRC that "Beijing would be open to a proposal from Lisbon for a sports exchange." This information was sent to Lisbon, specifically to General Ramalho Eanes, on December 7, 1976. Sometime later, Heduíno Gomes was contacted by a comrade of the PCP-ml who collaborated with Sporting's newspaper. The leader of the PCP-ml informed that the club's president, João Rocha, intended to speak with him. The aim was to prepare an SCP trip to China. Still in 1977, Heduíno Gomes took the message to Hua Guofeng, which would be a confirmation of the initial proposals. The willingness of the Portuguese authorities to advance towards the establishment of diplomatic relations was declared. As "Vilar" is a well-known Sporting fan, the process was even easier. Thus, on June 25, 1978, the Portuguese team left for China. José Faleiro Baltazar, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hang Chang-kang, official of the Xinhua Agency delegation in Portugal and several leaders of the PCP-ml were present. Veiga Simão, João Rocha, and Carlos Ricardo were also part of the delegation (Silva, 2020).

The itinerary in Asia included the cities of Bangkok, Hong Kong, Beijing, Kunming, and Macau, resulting in a total of 28,785 km traveled by the delegation. On arrival to Chinese territory, more precisely to Guangzhou, a local representative of the Chinese Football Association arranged for the first official reception. From there the entourage flew to

Beijing, where it encountered its first surprise of the trip: At Beijing airport, the caravan was welcomed by the players and officials of the Chinese national football team as well as officials of the Chinese Football Association. SCP was subsequently treated to a dinner offered by Chinese sports officials, during which the entire SCP delegation was presented with gifts, showcasing the traditional Chinese hospitality. In fact, "the SCP delegation was received by prominent leaders of the Chinese party and state apparatus, including the deputy prime minister of China and the military governor of Beijing province, Marshal Ten Xie Lie. In a speech given by Lieutenant-General Chen Xilian [Ch'en Hsi-lien], it was pointed out that "Sporting's tour had a much broader meaning than that which was limited to the sports field and constituted the most decisive step undertaken until that time in the relations between the two peoples»" (Silva, 2020). On the other hand, "the President of the Chinese Association of Friendship with Foreign Countries, Wang Bingnan, makes the following statement: "The ping-pong ball is very small and that is why we have only opened a window to the United States. But football uses a very big ball, so let's open the door wide" (Silva, 2020). In fact:

> SCP's tour, which took place between June 27 and July 10, 1978, was one of the most evident "political signs" established between the two countries for the establishment of diplomatic relations. It was also implied that the situation in Macau was implicitly agreed, as revealed by the statements of the members of the CCP. According to news at the time, on this trip, President João Rocha delivered a message from Prime Minister Mário Soares and transmitted a greeting from then President Ramalho Eanes. In turn, Veiga Simão, on a semi-secret mission, also took a letter from Ramalho Eanes to leaders Hua Guofeng or Deng Xiaoping, opening the door to a re-establishment of diplomatic relations. (Silva, 2020).

Indeed, the tour to China with its sports purposes had significant political meaning. As SCP President João Rocha stated:

> For our part, we deem this visit to China of great importance and significance. It's not the first time that sports helped unlock the history books!" concluding with a premonitory vision that "Sporting CP made history. With history stretching beyond merely sporting parameters. In the years to come, soon enough they will show in full the extent of the service provided to our country by Sporting CP.

In fact, a mere couple of months later, Portugal and China would commence formal diplomatic relations with the opening of the Portuguese embassy in Beijing, on February 1979.

4.4 Angola (1979)

In 1979 Sporting Clube de Portugal returned to Africa on, yet again, a very specific occasion — the 4th annual celebration of the independence of the Republic of Angola from Portugal. From 1961 to 1974, Portugal had been at war with the Angolan independence movement,

trying to counter the objective of its then provincial territories to gain independence. At the time of SCP's 1979 trip, Angola had just been guaranteed its independence and was still in the middle of a civil war, and therefore this was the first delegation of a sports club to tour sovereign, independent Angola. The SCP entourage was comprised of 120 athletes from various sports. The objectives were once again not related to sports results or competitions but about people-to-people connectivity and rearranging diplomatic relations with the country that had just gained independence from Portugal. It was a journey that marked a new time and a new type of bilateral relationship, and which found an essential tool to re-establish both formal and informal channels of relationship via sports diplomacy. SCP, a private sports institution, represented Portugal once again and with great success on such a sensitive occasion.

4.5 Macau (2018)

In 2018, SCP's official museum *Museu Sporting* developed a temporary exhibition in order to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Sporting's 1978 tour to China and Macau. The commemorations of the anniversary of this historical trip showed how the historical heritage of the club could become an asset and contribute to the dialogue between Portugal and China. Since 1978, the Tour to China is remembered and retold, but in 2018, its commemoration achieved new historical moments, including articles published in the media channels of SCP, China, and Portugal newspapers, as well as with the exposition of the temporary exhibition in the corporate hall of the club visible to all sky box members and presidential guests to SCP games. The Ambassador of China in Portugal at the time, Cai Run, also visited the exhibition, participated in the launching ceremony in Lisbon, and attended a SCP match in representation of the People's Republic of China. The celebrations ended with the SCP football team touring Macau to play two friendly matches against the Macau Football Association team and SCP's Macau subsidiary, *Sporting Clube de Macau*, both with the presence of the Portuguese General Consul of Portugal in Macau, the president of the Macau Football Association, and the sports authorities in Macau. Complimentary gifts were exchanged between the SCP entourage and the official entities in Macau, thus strengthening the people-to-people connectivity, respect, admiration, and understanding. The following table sums up the main characteristics of the tours mentioned above:

Table 1 *SCP – Summary of Historical Tours*

Destination	Year	Historical Context and Purpose
Brazil	1928	Portugal to show its stability to the Portuguese community overseas
Southern African Countries	1954	Portuguese connectivity and unity to Portuguese-African locals
China and Macau	1978	Establishment of the diplomatic relationship between China and Portugal
Angola	1979	Development of diplomatic relationship to the newly independent country

Table 1 *SCP – Summary of Historical Tours*		
Macau	2018	Commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the 1978 tour to China
		Source: The authors (2021)

5. Collection of Testimonies

The following valuable testimonials given by experienced personnel in the sports and/or diplomatic fields provide a deeper look into cultural diplomacy and its inherent importance.

Table 2 *Testimony 1 (2021)*	
Interviewee and Affiliation	**Key Message**
Eurico Brilhante Dias Secretary of State for Internationalization Foreign Affairs — XXII Government — Portuguese Republic Diplomacy, Sports and SCP	Sports undeniably has this power of approximation: it is representation, but it is also sharing rules and values and, often, admiration. It allows opening a space of sharing, of trust, where other opportunities can flourish.

Table 2 *Testimony 1 (2021)*
Countries — nations — found in diplomacy an instrument of dialogue and conception of solutions, in a continuous dispute of interests, which are not always confluent, but also of shared values. The representation of the state, of its interests as a community, seeks to find dimensions of communication, establishment of links, alignment of interests, which build a relationship that goes beyond trade and investment, or even bilateral logic focused on political issues, within the framework of different forums. Communities incessantly seek other (more) resources, to attend their demand — not always economic –—and therefore open up to the outside, in a continuous balancing act between what they share and what they want others to share. In this openness to the outside, the interaction between institutions and citizens generates a space of trust — of bonding — which allows sharing to find less tradable spaces, a different perception of time, and the creation of long-term relationships, as well as a better understanding of others. The cultural dimension in diplomacy, where the history and promotion of the language are situated, but also the performative activities and sport, is not exclusively instrumental, but it is indeed partly instrumental. Sharing has the immeasurable advantage of bringing people together, promoting understanding, offering a story, a narrative that brings us all closer. Sports undeniably has this power of approximation: it is representation, but it is also sharing rules and values and, often, admiration. It allows opening a space of sharing, of trust, where other opportunities can flourish. Therefore, without prejudice to the way that some, in the past, have used sports as an element of affirmation and not of sharing, the truth is that foreign policy benefits from the spaces that the internationalization of sports opens up for interaction with other groups of people. Not only in Europe, but above all in other regions of the globe where the Portuguese presence, without prejudice to political, historical and cultural ties, also has a sports dimension, and where athletes and institutions forge relationships that allow us to create a space of trust that it has undeniable political, but also economic value. In another dimension, the planetary sporting phenomena — the Olympic Games, the World Football Games, among others — and the great global players in sports, where Cristiano Ronaldo is undoubtedly the most well-known, have this ability to become global brands — distinctive and recognized for their origin — which carry a know-how that has an intrinsic value as a tradable activity, and that remits to the major national sports brands a great exporting potential. SCP is undoubtedly one of the Portuguese brands with the most global prominence, both for the achievements of its football team and the great players who passed through the Alvalade Stadium, from which not only the aforementioned Cristiano Ronaldo stands out, but also Luís Figo and Paulo Futre, as well as for the performance of great athletes like Carlos Lopes and Fernando Mamede. By bringing attention to the country of Portugal and its brand — as happened in the People's Republic of China even before the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries — opportunities for diplomacy are created to use in an instrumental way: creating spaces of trust necessary for the defense of national interests, as well as generating tradable services, in a context in which many sports activities have become global businesses. As a final note — in particular concerning the strategy for the internationalization of the Portuguese economy — I would like to stress that economic diplomacy, and the promotion of Portugal as a source of goods and services with high added value, must use the good examples of qualification and formation of sports activities as an illustration of how the country, as a community, is capable of generating, in the most different areas, a competitive offer. In that space where creativity and organization, but also effort, dedication and devotion, are fundamental to win. Where each goal, each sprint and each jump, when glory is achieved, one may realize that they are the result of persistency and determination to achieve excellence. And that mark SCP already provides us with, and may provide more, as an expression of the community it represents.
Source: Eurico Brilhante Dias

Table 3 *Testimony 2 (2021)*	
Interviewee and Affiliation	**Key Message**
Fernando Gomes President of the Portuguese Football Association (FPF)	For a small and peripheral country like Portugal, sports – and particularly football — have turned into a phenomenon of individual and national pride.
Sports unite people, cross borders, break down prejudices, overcome difficulties. It is a universal phenomenon, capable of reinforcing cultural ties, creating channels of communication and transforming relationships. It also has the ultimate power of promoting peace. By nature, sports have a genuinely diplomatic and pedagogical character. And above all, it has no boundaries of age, gender or race. The possibility of being the best among the best, even if at the outset you have less chance of becoming the best, cultivates the most elementary principles of equality and justice. For a small and peripheral country like Portugal, sports — and particularly football — have turned into a phenomenon of individual and national pride. There are multiple examples of resilience that place Portugal at the top of Europe and the world, but which fundamentally made Europe and the world enormously respect the achievements of Portugal leading to a deep admiration for the country and its people. More than its achievements, and the public recognition that those achievements provide us with, it is important to highlight the value of Portugal inspiring its own people as well as other nations. Just as FPF has always dignified and honoured the national colours in a vibrant way, through its national teams, regardless of results, SCP too has been, like many other national representatives, an ambassador of excellence for our country in the world. Throughout its 115 years of history, SCP has made precious contributions towards strengthening the bridges that bring people together. This is a path that we make together and that should guide us all in order to share the values and principles that sports promote and that, more than ever, society needs to embrace.	
Source: Fernando Gomes	

Table 4 *Testimony 3 (2021)*	
Interviewee and Affiliation	**Key Message**
Frederico Varandas President of Sporting Clube de Portugal	SCP's Historic Pioneering Spirit
Sports has always played a central role in any society. Throughout the 115 years of SCP's history, there have been many contributions made by the club in this regard. SCP's diplomatic and historical visits around the world, which took place in the last century, are a living testimony of its pioneering spirit, strategic vision, entrepreneurial spirit and strength. They made it possible to strengthen diplomatic relations between Portugal and countries such as China and South Africa, with SCP being the pioneer club in Portugal, playing an important role in the development of sports and cultural ties between different peoples. These are moments that are part of SCP's historical and cultural heritage, in addition to being a relevant contributor to the history of sports worldwide. SCP was, and will always be, an example to praise, and above all, an example to follow.	
Source: Frederico Varandas	

Table 5 *Testimony 4 (2021)*	
Interviewee and Affiliation	**Key Message**
Isabel Victor Director of the Sporting Museum	SCP Trips as Heritage, Memory, and Future
The traditional role of heritage and museums has been reinvented. Contemporary museums tend to become effective instruments of dialogue. Through their greatest asset, which are people, stories and memories, museums circumvent death, arouse curiosity and the desire to create something new. Stephen Hawking wrote "If time travel existed, our time would be filled with tourists from the future." The museum, by providing these time travels, albeit at the metaphorical level, is captivating these travelers of the future and contributing through them to the economy of culture and knowledge. This is the main reason that leads the Sporting Museum to consider the historical legacy of the trips that SCP made at different times in its history — to Brazil, Africa and Asia — as a very rich heritage to preserve, analyze and relaunch. This is also a way of traveling back in time and contributing to a better future.	
Source: Isabel Victor	

Table 6 *Testimony 5 (2021)*	
Interviewee and Affiliation	**Key Message**
José Augusto Duarte Current Ambassador of Portugal to China	The Importance of Sports for Diplomacyt
The ability of sports to bring people together, regardless of their nationality, religion or ethnicity, has long been established. Although people tend to rally behind their national teams, the sportsmanship of players and their fans has shown that such divisions can be overcome, allowing people of different countries and cultures to come together and celebrate over the common love and enthusiasm for a given sport. If sport fans and clubs have realized as much throughout various matches, competitions and leagues, so have States, which have resorted to sports and its depoliticized environment to improve, mend, develop or even kick-start political relations. China offers a good example of that. Before establishing diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China, the United States Government developed a series of unofficial and official contacts with the Chinese leaders that were soon followed by an attempt to bring both countries' peoples together. The chosen instrument to achieve that was sports and so emerged the so-called "ping-pong diplomacy." Portugal is no stranger to this approach, as, in 1978, one year before the formal resumption of diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China, the team of "Sporting Clube de Portugal" came to China, where it was greeted, cheered and praised not only for its ability to play football, but also for what its journey meant for the relations between both countries. These two examples display the importance and benefits of "sports diplomacy", which, however, goes beyond officially sponsored events. As the case of Portugal so pointedly demonstrates, the ability and recognition of its players in a given area can be one of the most powerful catalysts for a country's image and influence. Portuguese football players, for instance, have made an enormous contribution to our country's name, self-esteem and international recognition. As the Ambassador of Portugal to China I greatly benefit from their contribution. In short, "sports diplomacy" is a multi-layered and diversified reality, which allows for stronger people-to-people contacts that in turn have a positive impact in State-to-State relations. The possibility of resorting to sports as a tool in foreign policy is not something all countries can aspire to. Which is why those, such as Portugal, that have that possibility should be fully aware of its potential and far-reaching consequences.	
Source: José Augusto Duarte	

Table 7 *Testimony 6 (2021)*	
Interviewee and Affiliation	**Key Message**
José Manuel Trindade Morgado President of Sporting Clube de Macau	When the Name Sporting Brings West and East Together
In China, the name of Sporting Clube de Portugal is associated with that of the first European football team to visit the Asian giant, which first took place in June of 1978. This SCP tour was promoted by the Portugal-China Democratic Friendship Association. At the time, a senior Chinese official compared SCP to the American ping-pong team that visited Beijing in 1971, paving the way for President Richard Nixon's trip to China in February 1972, stating: "The Americans, who played with a small ball, opened a small door; the Portuguese played with a large ball and opened a large door." This historic visit made by SCP to China 42 years ago also included a meaningful visit to Macau, and to the "lions" local branch: Sporting Clube de Macau. This association was so relevant that, in 2018, within the scope of the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the visit that brought SCP to China to play games in Beijing (2), Kunming (1) and Macau (1), the SCP headquarters in Lisbon contacted Sporting de Macau to join the celebrations. SCP B team (under-23) arrived Macau in May 2018. SCP B held a game at Estádio da Taipa with the Macau team, visited the new project of the local Sporting Academy, where players had the opportunity to connect with the youngest and exchange souvenirs. The delegation also participated in a dinner with Sporting Clube de Macau team and officials. In addition to the official dinner, there was also a private dinner between the SCM management committee and Mr. Virgílio Lopes, director of the Alcochete Academy and head of the SCP delegation. There was also a joint training between SCP and Sporting de Macau teams, at Estádio da Taipa. It should be noted that the invitation for SCP to return to China, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the first visit, was made official in Lisbon by the Chinese Ambassador to Portugal. It should also be noted that the trip of more than 40 years ago took place even before the two countries had officially reestablished their diplomatic relations, which only happened in February 1979.	
Source: José Manuel Trindade Morgado	

Table 8 *Testimony 7 (2021)*	
Interviewee and Affiliation	**Key Message**
Lingling Liu Co-founder of Guo Chuan Racing and Managing Director of China Sport Business	Sport has the power to change the world

Table 8 *Testimony 7 (2021)*
This year marks the 50th anniversary of ping-pong diplomacy between People's Republic of China (PRC) and United States (US). Ping-pong diplomacy (Chinese: 乒乓外交) refers to the exchange of table tennis players between the US and PRC in the early 1970s, that began during the 1971 World Table Tennis Championships in Nagoya, Japan as a result of an encounter between players Glen Cowan (of the US) and Zhuang Zedong (of the PRC). The event marked a thaw in Sino-American relations that paved the way to a visit to Beijing by President Richard Nixon in 1972. The event has been seen as a key turning point in relations, and the policy approach has since been carried out elsewhere. We now live in a different era. As Nelson Mandela said, sport has the power to change the world. In the past few years, the sports projects that I have been working with also reflected the change era. Peace becomes extremely important and I think sports can definitely play a big part in it. In 2012, Guo Chuan, the Chinese skipper became the Peace Champion, and first Chinese ambassador for Peace and Sport Organization. In 2015, our world record challenge sailing project sailing through Northeast Passage in the Arctic Ocean in the name of Peace and Sport has managed to unite sailors from France, Germany, Russia and China and made a world record. Guo Chuan continued his world record journey by challenging the trans-Pacific journey single-handed in October 2016 when he disappeared on the sea. However, his spirit will continue and his love for peace will also become the legacy of his brilliant adventures; Peace and Sport organization has set up a special award in the name of Guo Chuan to be attributed each year during the annual Peace and Sport Awards to celebrate those who excel themselves in sport and promote peace. Let's hope for world peace in the name of sport and people's love of adventures.
Source: Lingling Liu

Table 9 *Testimony 8 (2021)*	
Interviewee and Affiliation	**Key Message**
Tim Vieira CEO of Special Edition (Africa) and Bravegeneration (Europe)	Sport an Effective Weapon of Mass Change
I come from a country where I saw firsthand the power of sport and what it can do to transform a whole nation by giving it hope of a better future for all. Sport can be used to breakthrough differences more effectively than treaties or missiles. Sport and the spirit that comes with it can unite and bring a common belief to people of all colors and religions. I will never forget Nelson Mandela, someone who spent 27 years in jail during Apartheid South Africa wearing the number 6 jersey of our Afrikaans captain Francois Pienaar. Former natural enemies which in 1995 had a common purpose to win the World Cup and together provide a future for a nation brought together by a Rugby ball instead of bullets. Sport can unite by drawing on sweat rather than by the spilling of blood by using honor, value and sportsmanship as the rules of engagement. In the end we all admire and cherish the toughest players, games and matches that we encountered and although some will win medals and trophies the truth is that we all become better and more equal humans because of Sport. Sport should be used to unite and never to separate, it should not be a political tool but rather be a form of equal in which all contenders or participants play by the same rules no matter their color, religion or sex. I look forward to enhancing the diplomacy of sport as it's the ultimate weapon!!!	
Source: Tim Vieira	

6. Conclusion

Everywhere in the world sports play an important role in society. It is capable of conveying basic rules and essential values of peaceful coexistence — such as tolerance, team spirit, loyalty, and fair play as well as establish bridges otherwise unreachable. In addition, sports are especially suitable for forming character skills, which are important for a fulfilling and happy life, because sports also provide the value of discipline, endurance, courage, and self-motivation. By conveying the ethics of sports, it also lays the foundations for a more peaceful and emphatic world. It is possible to conclude that sports diplomacy is a central part of cultural diplomacy and that its potential has not yet been fully explored and studied. We saw through SCP's historical tours that it is possible to develop bilateral relations and dialogue between peoples through sports and, in this specific case, through a sports club. The testimonies collected were an extremely rich source that indicate that SCP left a legacy that remains today, demonstrating that the tours had not only an immediate impact, but influenced international relations to this day.

The answer to the main question of the study is clear: Yes, it is possible to guarantee connectivity between countries and peoples through sports diplomacy. We conclude this chapter with the hope of having contributed to the future, and with the example of SCP tours as a way of developing sporadic bilateral exchanges to foster intercultural dialogue as well as to create opportunities for mutual political advancement. An example to praise, but above all, for the political authorities and sports clubs of the People's Republic of China and the Portuguese-speaking African countries to eventually follow.

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Implementation and impact of gender quotas in the parliament of Mozambique

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Gender quota, Mozambique, Parliament, Early marriage, International aid.

Abstract

A gender quota system is a mechanism put in place to address the imbalance between men and women representation in a business, an institution, or the government. This chapter focuses on the gender quota system in the Mozambican national parliament. Mozambique has garnered worldwide accolades for its gender quota and inclusion over the years on two aspects: first, Mozambique inaugurated its gender quota system in their multi-partisan parliamentary election back in 1994; second, in 2019, its 41.2% proportion of women participation in parliament ranked as high as 18th in the world. However, the leading political party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique, has been gradually retracting gender concerns from its policies. In this chapter, the author examines how, despite the positive results that the gender quota system has brought to the Parliament of Mozambique, the system has yet to be fully effective as it faces pressure from a number of factors ranging from implementation to balance of power between the ruling party and various other actors in society. The chapter draws its conclusions via relevant literature, a qualitative analysis, and non-participatory observations.

1. Introduction

First introduced in the Scandinavian countries in the 1980s, gender quotas as a way to increase the proportion of women in political structures has since become more prevalent worldwide (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019), and has found its way into Mozambique in Africa. A report by the United Nations (UN) shows that, as of February 1, 2019, Mozambique ranked 18th in the world in terms of female representation in both the lower/single and upper houses, with women taking up 99 out of 250 seats (or 41.2% representation). By contrast, Portugal

ranked 32nd, with women holding 82 out of 230 total seats, or a 35.7% representation (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019). Generally speaking, a gender quota system has stronger influences on a proportional representation system than a majority representation system. A gender quota system, also known as a minimum proportion system, stipulates that in an institution such as a parliament, a committee within the assembly, the government, an internal institution of a political party, or another political institution, women must reach a certain, artificially set proportion. The core idea of ensuring such a proportion of women participation is to "prevent political activities from becoming the patent of men only" (Qu, 2012), at the same time resolving any inequalities that might have been caused by laws or cultural traditions. Gender equality is a priority on the global development agenda and the UN's fifth Sustainable Development Goal (SDG), which aims to "[a]chieve gender equality and empower all women and girls." To ensure women's right to participate in parliament, there are two common methods to impose gender quotas in the world: to formulate and implement a quota system either through the constitution or national laws, or through the political parties.

Mozambique has been working towards achieving significant female representation in its government at decision-making levels as a key part of its commitment to reaching gender equality. In 2015, two decades after a gender quota was first imposed on Mozambique's parliament, women held 39.6% of the seats. This figure far surpassed the benchmark of 30% suggested as the threshold over which a minority representation sheds its token status and begins to have meaningful impact. The figure continued to rise, reaching 41.2% in 2019 and 42.8% in 2020, putting Mozambique into 18th place globally.

Figure 1 *Mozambique: Women in Parliament*



Mozambique: Women in parliament (percent) from 1997 to 2020: The average value for Mozambique during that period was 35.56 percent with a minimum of 25.2 percent in 1997 and a maximum of 42.4 percent in 2020. The latest value from 2020 is 42.4 percent. For comparison, the world average in 2020 based on 185 countries is 23.80 percent.

Source: https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Mozambique/Women_in_parliament/

Nevertheless, success has not been linear, so the key questions that this chapter asks and addresses are: Why did Mozambique introduce a gender quota system to its parliament in the first place? What have been the main considerations? Was there ever a decline in the proportion of women in the parliament and why? Has FRELIMO, the ruling party of Mozambique, encountered any resistance against it support towards gender equity?

Section 2 of this chapter reviews and lays out the political environment in Mozambique since the war of independence. Section 3 analyzes FRELIMO's relations with the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM), the main opposition party (Mozambican National Resistance, RENAMO), the forces of tribal chiefs, and civil social organizations (CSOs) in order to understand how it sees the gender quota in the Mozambican parliament. Section 4 in turn evaluates how those organizations view the gender quota system in the parliament. Section 5 discusses the opposing views in Mozambique on gender quotas in parliament, before Section 6 concludes the chapter.

2. Post-war Mozambique

Mozambique has experienced multiple wars since the 1960s as it fought first the Portuguese administration and then itself. These conflicts included: (a) the War of Independence against Portugal which began in 1964 and ended in 1975; (b) the civil war between the Marxist FRELIMO government and the non-communist RENAMO insurgents; (c) a relatively low intensity RENAMO insurgency between 2013 and 2019; and (d) increasing Islamist insurgency from 2015 to the present, with increasing violence in Cabo Delgado province that, to put it in perspective, affected 172,000 people by April 2020, but over 732,000 by May 2021 (OCHA, 2021). There were further attacks in 2021 involving maritime security (The Conversation, 2021). Although Mozambique was able to attain some peace through international mediation in 1992, its recovery has shown signs of stagnation, and current Islamic radicalism has drawn attention from China, the EU, and the U.S., with Rwanda and South Africa sending security personnel.

3. Gender quotas in the Mozambican Parliament as seen by the ruling party

The current Mozambique President Filipe Nyusi, who belongs to the FRELIMO party, feels that the women's movement is an indispensable part of national development. From its establishment to the colonial liberation war, FRELIMO has adopted a pragmatic and compatible attitude. For example, in 1992, in order to end the civil war, FRELIMO made concessions to resistance organizations supported by the West, abandoning socialism to implement a multi-party democracy. However, "There are no constitutional or legal provisions for quotas to ensure adequate representation of women in publicly elected bodies in Mozambique. The Constitution (1990, Articles 66, 67) recognizes formal equality between men and women before the law in respect of rights and duties and in all spheres of life and outlaws and makes punishable actions that generate privilege or discrimination on the basis of gender (amongst other things; Article 69)" (EISA, 2008).

According to Mozambique's Constitution (1990, Article 57), the question of women in quotas notes that: "The State shall promote and support the emancipation of women, and shall provide incentives to increase the role of women in society… The State recognizes the value of, and shall encourage, the participation of women in the defense of the country and in all spheres of the country's political, economic, social and cultural activity" (EISA, 2008). Essentially, women's rights groups have struck a bargain with the dominant parties, particularly with the ruling FRELIMO party. In fact, it was the FRELIMO that in 1994 adopted a policy to ensure that 30% of the candidates for the National Assembly and local government would be women, raising the quota level to 35% and then to 40% for the 2004 election. Moreover, women candidates were distributed throughout proportional representation lists and not merely appended to the bottom where they had slight chance of success… In 1994 women formed 37.2% of FRELIMO's members of the National Assembly, in 1999 38.3% and in 2004 43.12% (EISA, 2008).

By contrast, the second largest political party, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) opposes quotas for women, arguing that, "they would hinder the party in its work since unqualified women would be advanced by them" (EISA, 2008). In 1994, 12.5% of its deputies to the National Assembly were women. The figure rose to 19.4% in 1999 and 22.2% in 2004. While this represents women at the highest levels of office, more studies are needed to assess how this looks at the grassroots levels. Are they disproportionate?

Regardless, Mozambique's legal quota system serves as a noteworthy development model in Southern Africa. By 1994, "with the first multi-party elections, women's representation in the National Assembly reached 25.2% and has continued to climb with 29.2% attained in 1999 and 35.6% in 2004. This level is unmatched in Southern Africa, and only South Africa at 32.75% comes close" (EISA, 2008). Such pragmatism has had enduring power from 1994 to today, as reflected in OMM's subsequent cooperation strategies with various organizations and forces. In fact, the OMM was brought back with concessions over early marriage of girls in a key 2019 vote — it was a compromise with the tribal chiefs which saw the OMM give up some of their seats, but this strategy still requires much more primary research to affirm and understand.

4. Gender quota in the Mozambican Parliament: The view from women's organizations, the opposition party, tribal chiefs, and civil society organizations

Nevertheless, despite having adopted a gender quota system, Mozambique has continued to face many obstacles hindering women from obtaining more seats in the male-dominated parliament. FRELIMO, as the ruling party, faced a complex political environment during Mozambique's post-war reconstruction. While maintaining its support for equal rights for women, it had to maintain a balance with all armed forces in order to consolidate political power. This has resulted in the gender quota system having to make concessions particularly in recent years, under pressure from three areas: the RENAMO opposition party, the traditional power of tribal chiefs, and women's CSOs.

Women's organizations

OMM was a member of FRELIMO before the war. The two fought alongside each other and won victory of national independence together. After the war, during the period of socialist construction from 1965 to 1992, OMM continued to be FRELIMO's aide, drafting many laws and regulations conducive to women's rights and equality. In 1992, FRELIMO decided to abandon socialism and adopt multi-party democracy in face of pressure from the West, resistance from oppositions, and hostility from some African countries. FRELIMO was no longer the only legitimate political party in Mozambique, while OMM, as a subordinate women's organization of FRELIMO, faced the problem of how to serve women all over the country. In 1990, OMM broke away from FRELIMO and declared itself an independent organization. However, the move proved difficult and, a few years later, OMM came back into the fold.

Main opposition party

In 1994, RENAMO officially announced that it would transform from a military organization into a political party, and, within the same year, was legally approved as a political party. In Mozambique's first multi-party general election held in October 1994, RENAMO won 37.78% of the votes and 112 parliamentary seats, becoming the second largest party in Mozambique. In October 2019, however, RENAMO suffered a setback: there were allegations of votes being rigged, while RENAMO presidential candidate and leader Ossufo Momade received only 22% of the votes. FRELIMO won all provincial assemblies across the country's 10 provinces — this was a major blow to RENAMO's confidence, since, in the previous election, they had won majorities in three provinces.

Tribal chiefs

In Mozambique's parliament, the main contradiction between FRELIMO and tribal chieftain forces focused on the early marriage system, which, prior to 2019, saw 50% of girls marrying before they turned 18, with one in ten girls in wedlock before the age of 15. In response, the government unanimously voted to raise the marriage age to 18 in 2019 (OHCA, 2019). Human Rights Watch reported on Mozambique's 2016 launch of the National Strategy on Prevention and Fight against Child Marriage, but called the impact of the strategy "unclear" (HRW, 2019). The report continued to state, during the course of negotiations between women's rights groups and FRELIMO, that:

> In December 2018, Mozambique revoked a discriminatory 2003 decree that forced pregnant girls to take classes at night school. Education officials should now monitor schools to ensure that pregnant girls are going to school during the day. They should ensure Mozambique's new education strategy addresses the educational needs of all girls, including pregnant and married girls and young mothers. The government should also address other barriers to their education such as stigma and lack of finances. By passing this law, the national assembly has recognized Mozambique's international obligation to uphold the rights of girls. With the president's signature,

children in Mozambique will finally have a new law to protect them. (HRW, 2019)

Beyond government promulgation, the strategy also received widespread local media coverage. For example, one publication detailed that:

> An adult citizen in Mozambique, regardless of his or her marital status, who marries a child under the age of 18, will be punishable with a sentence ranging from eight to 12 years in prison, and a fine of up to two years. Such is the measure foreseen in the proposal for a Law to Prevent and Combat Premature Marriage approved yesterday by a consensus of the Assembly of the Republic at the beginning of the work of the IX Ordinary Session of the VIII Legislature.
>
> The legal instrument is aimed at prohibiting, preventing, mitigating and penalising premature unions, as well as establishing mechanisms to protect children in these unions. The law establishes that the union between two persons, formed with the future or immediate purpose of constituting a family, will only be allowed to those who have reached the age of 18 at the date of its constitution. In addition to penalising the perpetrators of marriage before this age, the law sanctions public servants who celebrate or authorise the celebration of marriages between an adult and anyone under the age of 18 with possible sentences of two to eight years in prison. (Club of Mozambique, 2019)

The law also clearly spells out that it, likewise,

> threatens figures of traditional or religious authority who, in the exercise of their functions, knowingly authorize any marriage in which either or both the partners is a child with up to two years' imprisonment and a fine. Citizens who deliver up children for marriage in exchange for goods, or for payment or guarantee of debt, or in fulfillment of a promise, or as a gift or for any other purpose contrary to the law, may also be sanctioned. Any father, mother, parental guardian, stepmother, stepfather or any relative of direct descent or even of third degree, or person who exercises some power over the child and authorizes the marriage of a child, or instigates it, entices it or fails to prevent it, will be liable to two to eight years' imprisonment. In addition, the new law prohibits union between children, adopts measures to end existing premature unions, sets criteria for the protection of rights enjoyed by the child in a premature union, and refers to the Council of Ministers the task of adopting mechanisms to mitigate the negative effects of this phenomenon. (Club of Mozambique, 2019)

Politically speaking it was:

> Submitted by the Assembly's Commission on Social Affairs, Gender, Technology and Communication in partnership with civil society organisations working in women's and children's rights, the approved proposal is modelled on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) model law on the eradication of premarital marriages and child protection. The proposal was approved by consensus by all three Mozambican parliamentary groups, namely FRELIMO, RENAMO and the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM).

Even before it had been fully passed, civil society organizations (CSOs) like Girls Not Brides Mozambique cautioned, "While firm action is needed from all ministries — in particular the ministries of Gender, Education, Health and Justice – the central Government will not be able to implement the strategy alone. Success will require a strong coordinated action by everyone involved in compiling the strategy - Government, International Agencies, Donor Partners and Civil Society. Those on the frontlines - district and provincial government officials, media, parents, teachers, leaders, girls themselves and community, religious and traditional leaders — must also be closely engaged as they have a central role in changing attitudes to child marriage and getting girls the services they need" (GirlsNotBrides, 2016). Questions of grassroots enforcement with this legislation still face resistance from certain local chiefs and in Islamic areas. Moreover, COVID-19 has compounded priorities with society responding to the "new normal" of combating the virus while fighting Islamic insurgency and trying to restore economic order.

Civil Society Organizations

Civil society organizations already hold an important role in the gender equality movement. They also have the potential to drive and push for future developments (Karberg, 2015). Possible interventions and activities which could be supported by CSOs for gender empowerment include the following courses of action: i) supporting a participatory budgeting process at the municipal level; ii) educating citizens on good governance; iii) supporting the development of a gender-sensitive curriculum and teacher training, and strengthen citizen training in schools; iv) conducting public campaigns to raise awareness; v) facilitating a link between decision-making positions and counseling (EGM, 2007).

5. Gender quotas in the Mozambican Parliament: Opposing views

Empowering women in government with gender inclusion laws and development policies has had a positive impact on Mozambique. The literature generally "perceives an increasing number of women in parliament and political decision-making positions as an effective tool to achieve gender equality and a greater empowerment of women overall" (Karberg, 2015). Still, there are no universal, foolproof models, and specific case studies and deeper attention are required.

6. Conclusion

While Mozambique may be an overall success story, it has been pointed out that "there are contradictory and opposing views, with studies from different countries like the UK, Rwanda, Botswana, and others, demonstrating that female political participation alone

does not automatically lead to better socio-economic development for women overall" (Karberg, 2015). There are also elements of governance, democracy, aid, as well as external pressure pertaining to gender quotas that need deeper research. For example, during the 2009 Mozambique general election, a number of donors "threatened to withhold previously pledged budget support unless the government addressed problems of transparency and governance, including electoral administration" (Stewart, 2014). However, if the quota system can actually benefit from external aid for African countries and their women, then I would suggest that there is nothing wrong with it. Quite the contrary, this seems to indicate that the system is, in fact, effective, as demonstrated by the Mozambique case. Even with political friction between the two dominant parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO, the OMM has made clear contributions to gender inclusiveness.

The passage of the 2019 Mozambique marriage age law also represents a marked improvement for women, youth and children, and families. Ultimately, delaying marriage allows women access to better schooling, leading to stronger economic opportunities for them, both individually and for their families. Having greater overall female political representation, despite fluctuations in recent years, has proved to be a positive force for mobilizing women in Mozambique. Thanks to the OMM and other SCOs, dominant parties have also been held in check to varying degrees, as they may lose votes by not involving (more) women. The quota system therefore clearly plays a role in the dynamics of Mozambique's overall gender empowerment. Emerging from the COVID-19 crisis, these will be tested as the pandemic has seen spikes in gender-based violence (GBV) globally. The pandemic has, indeed, induced "economic pressure, loss of livelihoods and disruption in access to health, social and protection services" on women and girls in Mozambique (Neves, 2020). To put this into a much larger context, according to the UN's Africa Renewal information project:

> In pre-pandemic Mozambique, one in three women suffered violence during their lives. But in the past two years, extreme weather events such as recurring cyclones, droughts and uneven rains have compounded the situation and led to loss of livelihoods, placing an additional burden on women and girls. (UN, 2021)

In fact, the Coalition for the Elimination of Premature Marriages (CECAP, Coligação para a Eliminação dos Casamentos Prematuros) warned in an April-May 2021 report that:

> Mozambique should be applauded for enacting a law against child marriages titled Lei de Prevenção e Combate as Uniões Prematuras. However, we note with concern that the National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Child Marriages (2016–2019) has become outdated as the period of implementation of the policy ended in 2019. The lapse on the implementation period means that there is risk that the work of the Platform tasked with the Evaluation and Monitoring of the Implementation of the child marriages Strategy will be rendered futile. (United Nations Human Rights, 2021)

The report advises that:

> There is, thus, an urgent need for the Government of Mozambique to put in place a new strategy which should promote/build upon the gains achieved under the previous policy combating child marriages. The strategy should be complemented with resourcing for its implementation. Moreover, reports show that there is little knowledge among boys and girls about the existence of a law that protects them against child marriages. In this regard, a recent study highlighted that less than 50% of children interviewed in 6 districts (in the North, South, and Central parts of the country) knew about the Child Marriages Act. We also have fears that those who should enforce the laws (judicial institutions), protect victims (police), and those who promote and support early marriages (community leaders, adults — parents, guardians) have little knowledge, if any at all about the law and the negative consequences of child marriages. It calls for the urgent need for government to disseminate the law and to provide training on the implementation of the law for all concerned stakeholders and community members. (United Nations Human Rights, 2021)

To summarize, much work remains to be done to further sustain quotas in Mozambique's government with female parliamentarians. They serve as role models for other women, encourage young girls to actively participate in political activities, and raise awareness of female empowerment at all levels of society. They also lend credence to inclusive programs to support boys and men and girls and women for community resiliency. In the face of coming climate change challenges, food security risks, and the rise of Islamic extremism currently being unleashed with the present "Afghanistan moment," it is important to deepen women's inclusivity in governance for the overall stability of Mozambique. Their accomplishments and the way they successfully address these challenges might very well serve as development models; despite some cases which suggest that generalized models of women's quotas are not enough by themselves to empower women. One may therefore contend that, even if this is simply a beginning, a renewed public and government focus on the empowerment of women has the potential to change Mozambican politics, society and culture for the better in the short, near, and long term.

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Mega-events Boost Local Tourism — A Case Study of the Guinea-Bissau Carnival

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Mega-events, Tourism, Cultural Heritage, Guinea-Bissau, Carnival.

Abstract

China and Guinea-Bissau share a good historical relationship while each maintain splendid cultural heritage, greatly attesting to how much they have witnessed the origin and development of human civilization. The Guinea-Bissau Carnival (hereafter GB Carnival) is a large-scale festival that aims to attract public participation and celebrate cultural manifestations through assorted resources, including culture, history, economy, trade, and natural landscapes. These commemorations have obvious regional, periodic, and experiential characteristics. The GB Carnival is based on inherent natural conditions and accumulated history. If local folklore and intangible cultural heritage can be transformed into a brand, these celebrations could have a hugely positive effect on the national economy, society, and culture, which, in turn, could influence Guinea-Bissau's political decisions. This chapter uses the GB Carnival as a case study, focusing on its historical development process and characteristics, to assess ways that it may contribute to solving the problems and inadequacies in Guinea-Bissau's tourist industry, attracting international visitors, and promoting a positive national image. The study employs perspectives from cultural communication, the Destination Life Cycle (DLC), and Integrated Marketing Communications (IMC) to explore and strengthen the channels of promoting Guinea-Bissau's image and cultural exchanges through mega-events in tourism.

Introduction

With changing times, festivals and activities, as a product of social and economic construction, have emerged and developed rapidly. All kinds of festivals and celebrations are bound to become important features of tourist destinations. If organizers and managers take local festivities as an opportunity to mobilize and integrate all the resources (human, financial, and material, including hardware and software) available at the destination, the performance of the venue will be significantly improved. Therefore, the quality and efficiency of festivals would achieve good results in attracting the public and would improve

the national image. At the same time, the beautiful, natural environments each complement the cultural landscape, creating a solid foundation for the sustainable operation of festival activities. The purpose of holding festivals is to attract public participation.

This chapter attempts to analyze the potential and deficiencies of Guinea-Bissau's Carnival (GB Carnival), to solve the problems of Guinea-Bissau tourism and describe how the GB Carnival may help to improve tourism in the future. The GB Carnival began in 1974 after Guinea-Bissau's independence, and has since become the space for popular creativity in Guinea-Bissau's society. Taking place every February, the carnival is one of the most amazing cultural spectacles in Guinea-Bissau. This event sponsors the cultural and artistic expressions of different ethnic groups of the country displayed at the highest level, in a demonstration that takes place over four consecutive days, with art exhibitions, linguistic expressions, dances, sculptures, and diverse music, open to the public from children to elderly. Parade competitions in the GB Carnival were held in eight regions,[1] with the foremost and main parade hosted in the capital Bissau, where winners from each region gathered for an ultimate performance, competing to win the year's GB Carnival's championship (Focna & Gabarra, 2019, pp. 124–130).

Literature Review

2.1 Mega-event

Mega-events (also termed festival activities) are a kind of advantageous tourism resource. They are especially attractive to a certain group of tourists and destination residents. Various festivals and celebrations can be developed into effective tourism-themed consumer products (Zhuang & Zhao, 2000, pp. 27–29). Festival activities include a range of events — festivals, celebrations, local specialty product fairs, trade fairs, expositions, and other special events (Liao & He, 2008, p. 222). Festival activities differ from celebrations: a celebration pays greater attention to inducing joy via public festivities, while festivals have more comprehensive scopes (Ma, 2009, pp. 21–25). Festival activities include competitions, event tours, festivals, folk culture, and leisure activities. The connotation comes from multiple attributes, such as the purpose, content, form, function, and materials of festival activities (Dan, 2012, p. 215). These can be divided into traditional and modern festivals. Traditional festivals derive mostly from folk customs, while modern festivals refer to spontaneous and periodic celebrations in a region with its unique resources or events as its theme (Shen, 2013, p. 154). Dai (2001, p. 10) has analyzed research on festivals, celebrations, and other activities, and distinguishes planned events in eight types:

- **Cultural celebrations:** local festivals, religious festivals, large-scale performances, historical and cultural commemorative events;
- **Entertainment activities:** concerts, musical and cultural performances, competition award ceremonies;

[1] The eight regions that hold small parades in the GB Carnival are: Batata, Biombo, Bolama, Cacheu, Gabu, Oio, Quinara, Tombali.

- **MICE Activities:** meetings, incentives, conferences and exhibitions;
- **Sports Events:** professional sports competitions, amateur sports competitions and commercial sports activities;
- **Educational Activities:** seminars, thematic academic conferences;
- **Political events and government activities:** official inauguration ceremony, chairman authorization ceremony, Very Important Person, mass demonstrations;
- **Private Activities:** anniversary celebrations, public holidays, friendship parties, social dances.

John Allen (1990, pp. 12–13) classified festivals into four major categories according to the scale and specifications of events:

- **Mega-events:** The Olympics, World Expo, Football World Cup;
- **Major-events:** International Sports Championships, Australian Open Games, Women's Rugby World Cup 2021, New Zealand Masters Games 2017, World of Wearable Art;
- **Iconic Events:** Australian Tropfest Film Festival, Cannes Film Festival;
- **Regional Events:** WOMAD, Art Deco Weekend, Queenstown Marathon, Provincial Rugby Games, Cuba Dupa.

A survey of the literature to understand how festivals impact tourism will show that there is no unified view on the conception and classification of festivals. The meaning and classification of these concepts are closely related to natural resources, human geography, local customs, and folk culture. Therefore, the concept of festivals covers regional festivals, exhibitions, and special activities. From a traditional point of view, whether or not a tourist destination is competitive depends on the economic development of the tourism industry in the region and its contribution to the development of the destination. Thanks to the overall social progress, the essential level and composition of tourism competition are quite different from those in the past (Tyson, 1996, p. 204). Competitions between tourist destinations are not only a manifestation of new economic forms, but also a phenomenon of industrial upgrading with broader connotations (Asch & Wolfe, 2001, p. 239). Ritchie and Geoffrey believe that it is necessary for tourism to continuously develop resources that can lead decision-makers to choose among competing resources (2006, pp. 197–198). Porter points out that for a tourist destination to adapt to the competitive reality of a new type, it must continuously add new ideas and creativity to the destination's constituent elements (1998, p. 108). As for the development mode and strategy of major festivals, Yu et al. (2005, p. 58) pointed out that the operation modes of festivals are mainly divided into four types:

- Government-Sponsored;
- Administrative Department Sponsored;
- Government Guidance and Enterprise Undertaking Together;
- Market Operation.

Liao and He illustrated the development and management of festival activities from the

three operational strategies of marketization, branding, and systematization (2008, p. 222).

2.2 Theoretical Basis of Research

Destination Life Cycle (DLC) and Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC) are theories based on competitive socio-economic development, which can help competitors to make full use of market resources and better cope with fierce market competition. Applying these two theories to the development of festival activities in tourism destinations will not only make the competition full of vitality, but also contribute to the sustainable utilization of resources.

The Destination Life Cycle (DLC), proposed by Butler (1980), is also known as the "tourism destination life cycle theory." DLC reflects the entire process of the formation, development, saturation, and decline of a tourist destination. Butler believes that the development of a local tourism industry cannot always remain at the same level, and that tourist destinations will evolve. He uses an S-shaped curve to illustrate the changes in the development status of a tourist destination, classifying the different stages into six periods: exploration; involvement; development (participation); stagnation; consolidation; and recession (rejuvenation). The main characteristic of the exploration stage is that there are only a few scattered tourists in the destination, and the natural environment and socio-economic status of the destination have not changed because of tourism. The main characteristics of the participation stage are the increasing number of tourists and the appearance of facilities and advertisements. Research on the DLC is of great significance to grasp the characteristics of different stages in the destination, in order to develop and to prolong festival activities in the national image. Schultz first put forward the concept of Integrated Marketing Communication in the 1990s, on the basis of traditional marketing, starting a new era of revolution in marketing. Kitchen classified integrated marketing into two different levels (Kitchen & Schultz, 1999):

- **Marketing Functions Coordinated:** promotion activities, advertising investment, after-sales products, services and consumer market research;
- **Marketing Actors Coordinated:** regional government and enterprises in related industries need to ensure the coordination and unification of marketing activities.

It can be seen that holding festivals has a strong stimulating effect on increasing the growth demand of tourism destinations. Introducing DLC into festival activities from a commercial point of view enables planners and organizers to innovate their tourism products and achieve the purpose of prolonging the prosperity cycle of tourism destination. At the same time, it can also enhance its ability to maintain the prosperous period, and promote the in-depth development of the festival market. Festival activities focus on displaying the rich resources of tourism destinations, and provide destination publicity through the participants. This is not only a cultural phenomenon but also an economic transfer. The large flow of people during festivals will not only increase the income of the service industries, but also activate transportation, trade, finance, communications, and other industries to realize the comprehensive purpose of festivals: culture, entertainment, and marketing.

3. Guinea-Bissau Carnival

3.1 Overall Situation and Regional Characteristics

This section draws on geography, climate, demography, economy, and natural resources (fauna and flora) to briefly introduce Guinea-Bissau. The Republic of Guinea-Bissau is rich in natural and historical resources, with a great variety of unique folk culture and traditional customs. Located in Western Africa between Senegal (north), Guinea (east and south), and the Atlantic Ocean (west), Guinea-Bissau has a tropical climate with maritime characteristics (Benzinho & Rosa, 2018, p. 19). In July 2021, its total population totalled 1,976,187 (CIA, 2021).

Figure 1 *Guinea-Bissau Map*



Source: Umaizi (2020)

Guinea-Bissau's most exciting festival is "the Carnival," which is defined as the largest cultural event in the country. This the venue where the cultural and artistic expressions of different ethnic groups of the country are elevated to the highest level of national culture (Focna & Gabarra, 2019, p. 120). Therefore, the intangible cultural heritage, enhance by excellent people's hospitality, and broad prospects such as festival celebrations provide favorable conditions for the development of tourism. The nature reserves (i.e., wildlife sanctuary and biosphere conservation areas) are rich in protected fauna[2] (Benzinho & Rosa, 2018, p. 23). Fauna displays are an essential element of the Carnival, where various ethnic groups represent these animals, wearing skins or something similar, and imitating its screams or roars, as well as its movements.

[2] The fauna of GB includes about 374 species of birds in all. There are around 230 species of fish, crustaceans, and molluscs, 10 species of bats, and about 85 different reptiles, including the crocodile (Crocodylus niloticus), the dwarf crocodile (Osteolaemus tetraspis), 46 types of snakes, and several sea turtles: the green sea turtle (Chelonia mydas), hawksbill sea turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata), the olive ridley turtle (Lepidochelys olivacea), the common turtle (Caretta caretta) and the leatherback sea turtle (Dermochelys coriacea) (Benzinho & Rosa, 2018, p. 23).

Figure 2 *Mask Parade in Bissau's Main Avenue*

Source: Guinea-Bissau Turismo (2018)

The diversity of flora[3] cannot not be ignored when it comes to the Carnival. It plays an especially important role not only due to its natural connotations, but also because of its significance to Guinea-Bissau's population where many find various benefits from flora, such as clothing, tools, gastronomy, and other fantastic decorations.

Figure 3 *Young Woman Dressed in a Primitive Way*

Source: Kidd (2015)

[3] Arid and semi-arid forests in north-central and south-central areas of the country have shrubs, lianas, and trees between 20 and 30 meters high. Scientific works point to almost 900 different plants in Guinea-Bissau, of which about 128 are used in traditional remedies, 76 are consumed by man, and 86 are used for grazing and handicrafts (Benzinho & Rosa, 2018, pp. 23–24).

Protected Areas

A strong point in favour of international tourism is the existence of national (protected) parks. Indeed, Guinea-Bissau is home to diverse terrestrial and marine flora and fauna, with seven resourceful and fantastic protected areas spread across the country. Among these areas, we would like to mention the following:

Figure 4 *Guinea-Bissau National Parks*



Source: https://ghpp.de/en/news/news-detail/news/field-mission-to-the-cantanhez-national-park-in-guinea-bissau/

Cantanhez National Park - is a national park located in southern Guinea-Bissau. The park encompasses an area of 1,067.67 km^2 and features a wide variety of habitats including mangroves, savanna, and forests, as well as more than 30 species of mammals, 207 plant species, and around 40 species of fish. The Mata de Cantanhez is considered the last patch of sub-humid forest in the country with the greatest floristic and faunal diversity (IBAP, 2019a). According to the Koch Institute (RKI[4]), this National Park is a mosaic of settlements, agricultural fields, subhumid forest, secondary forest, mangrove and savannah. The CNP covers an area of 1,067km^2, with an approximate population of 22,505 people of different ethnic origin living in 110 villages inside the park. Furthermore, the park is home to a variety of endangered primate species such as western chimpanzees, red colobus, king colobus and Guinea baboons. Deforestation for agriculture and bush meat hunting are a main threat to the primate population and present a notable risk of disease transmission between humans and wildlife.

Cufada Lagoons Natural Park - is located in southern Guinea-Bissau, with a total area estimated at 89,000 ha (890 km^2). It houses the largest freshwater lagoon in the country. The park is very important for the great biodiversity of flora, fauna, and avifauna. With

[4] Retrieved in June 2022, from https://ghpp.de/en/news/news-detail/news/field-mission-to-the-cantanhez-national-park-in-guinea-bissau/

the existence of large mammals, such as hippopotamuses, spotted gazelles, wild boars, and several species of monkeys. Also notable is the concentration of migratory and native birds, essentially flamingos (IBAP, 2019c).

João Vieira-Poilão Islands Marine National Park - is located in the southeast part of the Bijagós Archipelago. The park has an area of ad 495 km^2 and features sub-humid forests, mangroves, beaches, and sandbanks. The protected area is home to diverse flora and fauna. Several species of turtles, sea mammals, as well as species of seabirds, sharks, dolphins, and other fish. The fauna of the park is also rich and diverse (IBAP, 2019b).

Cacheu River Mangroves Natural Park - is located in the northwest of the country, covering an area of 886 km^2, and is divided into two ecologically and culturally distinct zones. Mangrove forests cover 68% of the park, making it the greatest compact mangrove setting in West Africa. The park contains numerous types of birds, crocodiles, hippopotamuses, humpback dolphins, bushbuck, and green monkeys (IBAP, 2019d).

Bolama Bijagós Archipelago Biosphere Reserve - is located between 11°–12°N and 15°30'–16°30' W on the West African coast. The archipelago is made up of 88 islands and islets with a total area of 10,000 km^2 and is located at the confluence of coastal corridors coming from the north and the south. The total population of the archipelago is 27,000 inhabitants, spread over 185 villages on 21 inhabited islands. About 90% of the population of the archipelago belongs to the Bijagós ethnic group. The archipelago is home to a great diversity of mammals, birds, reptiles, and fish. This area is recognized as the most important breeding site for green turtles (Chelonia mydas) on the Atlantic coast of Africa. Promoted to Biosphere Reserve status by UNESCO in 1996, the reserve also hosts a variety of activities, such as hunting, fishing, bike riding, and hiking. (IBAP, 2019e).

These above natural attractions represent great potential and powerful levers to motivate visit and enhance tourist experience on ecological tourism based on contemplating the landscape, enjoying the vegetations, observing wildlife, rural tourism, other tourism sports, and much more.

3.2 Carnival in Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau has a rich and diverse cultural heritage, with a multitude of rhythms, musical instruments, dances, and cultural events. Bissau-Guinean folklore varies widely between ethnic groups, not only in body language but also in costumes, sounds, and instruments that accompany significant cultural manifestations which form an intrinsic part of the daily life in the country, such as festive days, funerals, and initiation ceremonies (Benzinho & Rosa, 2015, p. 28). Carnival is the main festivity in Guinea-Bissau, an incredible mix of African and Portuguese traditions. Colourful costumes from different areas and neighborhoods make their parade: sacred traditional costumes, warriors dressed in a crocodile skin and armed with arrows, modern masks made of paper-mâché, all surrounded by girls wearing only strings of glass beads around their waist (TransAfrica, 2020).

The first day of the GB Carnival is dedicated to the opening ceremony. The first parade of masks, accompanied by drumming, is a display of both traditional and contemporary masks pertaining to different ethnic groups from various regions (UNWTO, 2019). The following days are devoted to parade floats, dance performances, and traditional music concerts. Following custom, locals prepare masks and floats months in advance. Everything is so meticulously crafted that many of these decorations can be considered true works of art (UNWTO, 2019). The entire process is combined with a range of gastronomic and musical exhibitions on platforms and in tents set up in different parts of the capital. The festival remains active until Easter. With such a rich multi-ethnic representation, the Carnival becomes a singularly characteristic and fantastic event, with the potential to attract a considerable number of tourists. Therefore, it can result in possible growth of the tourism industry and economic sector, with the obvious benefits for businesses, local citizens, and the country.

Figure 5 *Carnival Parade in the main avenue*

Source: TransAfrica (2020)

The Guinea-Bissau Carnival – a Cultural Strategy

Guinea-Bissau Carnival is an engine for the country's development, due to its uniqueness and power, which can be used as a national brand image. A single event where diversified ethnic groups with their own cultures and languages represent the country's culture, including tangible and intangible characteristic — the Carnival — as a major platform of cultural exhibitions with its own identity, enables the creation of a distinctive national image. In this context to increase the promotion of festival activities from the overall arrangement to the implementation details, there is a need to formulate a practical and feasible plan, and establish a coordinated, efficient, and orderly working mechanism. Event organization committees, composed of relevant departments and units, should be established for major festivals. Each member unit of the organizing committee should implement a leadership responsibility system and a responsibility system for contacting special personnel. Tasks are divided into departments, and responsibilities are assigned to individuals, so as to ensure the smooth development of activities. As a cultural event, the Guinea-Bissau Carnival is an effective means of winning publicity, stimulating the

formation of national images, and strengthening national positioning as a tourist destination. Cultural event exhibitions that represent the full range of the country's culture are also the best way to promote and increase awareness of the values and traditions of cultural aspects.

3.3 Folk Styles in Integrated Marketing Communication

According to integrated marketing communication, different marketing functions, such as promotional activities, advertising investment, after-sales product services, and consumer market research festival activities based on traditional marketing theory must be coordinated. The Carnival parade features group activities and performances, offering great folk diversity, experiences and core products, which can be used in the event promotional strategy. Involving local community members in the festival and informing and educating them about its importance to tourism can bring social, economic, and political benefits.

Folk Music - Music is part of everyday life in Guinea-Bissau, very much present in the key times for crops, in leisure times, and in ceremonies such as marriages, initiations, baptisms, or funerals. The best-known kind of melody in Guinea-Bissau is Gumbé, a mixture of different musical styles (Benzinho & Rosa, 2018, p. 28). In a country with a broad cultural heritage and distinctive folk culture characteristics, it is possible to enjoy the different styles of music of various groups during the Carnival. Most of the musical instruments used in Guinea-Bissau are locally manufactured, in other words man-made, resulting in a vibrant variety, including Kora,[5] Balafon,[6] Tina,[7] Cutil,[8] Dundun,[9] Toncoron,[10] Bombolom,[11] At

[5] **Kora** a Mandinga musical instrument, consisting of a gourd adapted with a guitar, with the open side lined with goatskin, crossed from side to side by a round stick that forms the main arm of the instrument, providing 21 vertically arranged cords (Benzinho & Rosa, 2018, p. 28).

[6] **Balafon** xylophone with wooden slats arranged in parallel on four 29 bamboo cane supports (Benzinho & Rosa, 2018, p. 28).

[7] **Tina** a cylindrical container with water where a hollow gourd is placed face down to float), which is also known as the water drum, and used in Guinean music (Benzinho & Rosa, 2018, p. 29).

[8] **Cutil** is a bowl-shaped drum made of wood, coated with goatskin, the medium drum of the so-called traditional Guinea-Bissau "Mandinga drum". The Mandinga drum, a musical instrument used by the Mandinga, Fula, and Biafada ethnic groups, and consists of three drums of different sizes, each with its name but different sound (Da Silva, 2021a).

[9] **"Dundun"** also known as "dunun", "doundoun" or "djun djun" — designates a family of cylindrical membranophones of traditional Western African percussion. The largest of the drums is called "doundounba"; the medium "sangban" and the smallest "kenkeni" (Da Silva, 2021b).

[10] **"Toncoron"** also known as wodo, is a three-stringed bow cordophone, originating from the Fula ethnic group. It is used in parties to accompany the storytelling (Da Silva, 2021c).

[11] **"Bombolom"** is a traditional direct percussion idiophone from Guinea-Bissau. It is a slit drum made from a tree trunk (bissilon) excavated lengthwise. There are bombolons with several sizes, and it can be over 1.5 meters long. The instrument is ensnared with wooden drumming and can be played by one or two performers simultaneously (Da Silva, 2021d).

musical exhibitions on platforms spread across different parts of the Capital, tourists can enjoy different styles of music and other artistic expressions. On the other hand, as an important characteristic component of the Carnival, music can be used in the promotional activity marketing plan as a cultural leisure product to highlight the uniqueness of this wonderful festival and culture.

Folk Arts - Art in Guinea-Bissau is very important because of the role it plays in religion and animist rituals, with a close relationship with the supernatural, because it allows communication with the irãs (gods) and tribal ancestors. The most valuable and rarest Bissau-Guinean artistic expression is the art of Bijagós. However, the Nalu, Papel, and Manjaco ethnic groups are also known for their sculptures (Benzinho & Rosa, 2018, p. 28). Like every cultural resource, the art of different ethnic groups showcased during the Carnival can be used as a marketing instrument to showcase the country's culture, and promote the Carnival festival. Dance is one of the elements that make the Carnival celebration a rich and fantastic event. Its unique characteristics can be a core product attracting tourists to the festival.

3.4 GB Conditions in Destination Life Cycle

The Destination Life Cycle (DLC) theory reflects the entire development process of the formation, development, saturation, and decline of tourist destinations. Butler's (1980) Tourism Area Life Cycle (TALC) is a widely used model to study the evolution of a particular tourism destination. The model suggests that a tourism area evolves through six predictable different stages, namely, exploration, involvement, development, consolidation, stagnation and decline or rejuvenation. In each stage of the life cycle, the destination undergoes a series of changes.

Figure 6 *Butler's Tourism Life Cycle Model*



Source: Butler (1980, p. 7)

According to this theory, the GB Carnival is in the exploration stage, because the festival attracts many visitors from different parts of the country and relatively few overseas tourists and presents a poor transportation system and accessibility, with deficient tourist infrastructures and a weak promotion campaign. Promoting the intangible cultural heritage of the Carnival and biodiversity by increasing advertisements and improving infrastructures will attract more tourists and investors, while strong participation from the local community enhances national pride and community spirit.

Significance of transportation

Whether by air, road, or sea, the transportation system and infrastructure are in poor conditions, because of inadequate infrastructure (e.g., bridges), connecting services, and maintenance. Some roads in Guinea-Bissau are paved for all-weather use, but most of the country is unpaved (Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d.). Osvaldo Vieira International Airport is the country's main airport located in Bissau. The country does not have a national air transport company, and so it relies on international carriers such as TAP (Transportes Aéreos Portugueses, which operate flights to Portugal) and TACV (Cabo Verde Airlines, operating flights to Cabo Verde), as well as other companies such as Ethiopian Airlines, Royal Air Maroc, and Asky Airlines; direct flights between Guinea-Bissau and other countries are few. Roads with low quality of the paving (Embalo et al., 2020). Therefore, the area of transport, and in particular with regard to air transport, has changed significantly in recent years in the panorama of international tourism. The growing liberalization of air transport and the expansion of low-cost airlines led to a significant decrease in the cost of air travel, a factor that boosted the increase in short-breaks and changed consumption patterns (Cabral, 2019).

Guinea-Bissau visa and entry requirements - Types and method of obtaining visas: Travelers who do not benefit from a visa waiver in relation to their nationality can obtain their visa in three different ways: online, at the embassy or upon arrival at Bissau airport.

Online visas: Travelers wishing to visit Guinea-Bissau can now obtain their visa online at the dedicated website. Payment and issuance of the visa are thus secured and automated.
Visa on arrival: The Border Police can issue visas to travelers who have not been able to take it online or at a diplomatic representation. Travelers must provide two photos and the visa value in CFA francs, or in small denominations of euros or dollars.
Embassy visas: Travelers residing in a country with a consulate or embassy of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau can obtain different types of visa from them.

Nationalities concerned

Visa-free nationalities: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.
Nationalities requiring visas: nationals of all other countries must obtain a visa at an embassy, online, or upon arrival at Osvaldo Vieira Airport in Bissau-Bissalanca (Aeroporto Internacional Osvaldo Vieira de Bissau, 2017).

Accommodations

In Guinea-Bissau, the situation of hotel establishments has limited reception. According to the Secretary of State for Tourism, 40% of hotels are located in the capital Bissau, and those of international standard (between three to five stars)[12] are only found in the five main cities in the country: Bissau, Mansoa, Bafatá, Quinhamel, and Bijagós (Embalo et al., 2020). According to data from some travel agencies, there is a difference in the total number of hotels available in Guinea-Bissau, given in Table 1 below.

Table 1 *Hotel Properties in Guinea-Bissau*

Travel agencies	Hotel Properties
Hotelscombined	39
Travelmyth	36
Cozycozy	32
Tripadvisor	26
Agoda	19
Booking.com	17

Source: Personal authorship, based on data from Travel Agencies' websites

Table 1 shows that there is an oscillation related to the total number of hotels available in Guinea-Bissau due to the lack of specific statistical data which makes it difficult to determine how many hotels exist in the country. These hotels spread all over the country, and have played an important role in shaping the destination and motivating visits.

Figure 7 *Ledger Plaza Bissau Hotel 5-star hotel*

Source: Trivago (n.d.)

[12] Source: (ArtChiado, n.d.)

Healthcare

The standards for patient care and medical services in Guinea-Bissau may differ from other countries. Guinea-Bissau has a public healthcare system, but the quality of care does not meet international standards. Healthcare services are available in the capital city of Bissau, but care is extremely limited throughout the rest of the country. Essential medicines and equipment are often in short supply. Hospitals and private practitioners in Guinea-Bissau typically require an upfront payment (International Association for Medical Assistance to Travelers, n.d.). There are large differences in access to health care between urban and rural areas. It is estimated that 66% of the population lives more than 5 km from the nearest health facility. The national average is one health center for more than 13,500 inhabitants (UNICEF, 2020). Having accessible funds, it's required to cover upfront fees and adequate travel health insurance, including evacuation. Before departing, check with the insurer about the extent of their coverage in Guinea-Bissau (International Association for Medical Assistance to Travelers, n.d.).

Safety

The level of crime in the city of Bissau is lower than in other major African cities or capitals in the world. Basic safety rules should be observed, such as avoiding walking at night, especially given the lack of public lighting. It is also unwise to walk with valuables including cameras or mobile phones, particularly in the Bandim market. In Bissau, the police are very active during the day, but the large majority are traffic patrol officers. Nevertheless, there are several police stations in the city which are marked should you encounter any problems. Burglaries, abductions, and other crimes are uncommon in Bissau. In the rest of the country, crime is rare and people are rather hospitable and solicitous with tourists. Traveling outside Bissau should be undertaken mainly by daylight, as the roads and villages have no electricity, and assistance will be extremely limited (Benzinho & Rosa, 2018, p. 150).

Gastronomy

Traditional Guinean cuisine is impressive thanks to the pallet of flavours, aromas, colours, and ingredients. A simple but surprising cuisine, resulting from the combination of African ancestral culinary culture — with only local produce with a touch of the traditional Portuguese cooking. Oysters are abundant in Guinea-Bissau and are a pretext for gathering a group of friends under the corral. Farim shrimps are another delicacy that must be savoured. Lime, chili, palm oil, or mancarra broth are all present in the Guinean cuisine, which is known for its intense, spicy flavours. To accompany the Mafe — made of seafood or fish sauces and broths — we invariably find rice. Fish such as Bica are greatly appreciated and are usually grilled and topped with a salsa of onion, lemon, and chili. And of course, rice!

The most characteristic dishes are: Chabéu broth (made with palm oil, okra, meat or fish), the Mancarra broth (peanut broth with meat or fish), Siga (made with okra, meat or fish, and shrimp), Oyster shea (oyster rice), Cafriela (local chicken or grilled lamb with lemon

sauce, chilis and onions) and stewed or grilled goat. Some ethnic groups eat monkey, which represents a real threat for some and the Papel peoples also eat dog (Benzinho & Rosa, 2018, p. 26). During the Carnival, at booths for food and beverages in different parts of the country, people can taste and enjoy the varied flavours of the simple but surprising Guinea-Bissau cuisine.

Figure 8 *Siga is a combination of palm oil, okra, meat, or fish*

Siga:

400 grams of okra, 1 dl of palm oil (citi), 1 kg of peeled shrimp, salt, one onion, 200 grams of jagatu, chili peppers.

Source: Nascimento (2014a)

Figure 9 *Caldo de Peixe "fish sauces and broths"*

Caldo de peixe:

600 g of various fish, two garlic cloves, two onions, 1.5 L of water, salt, chili peppers.

Source: Nascimento (2014b)

Pure, natural juices are also very famous here, including: calabash juice (made with the fruit from the baobab tree), onjo juice (made with bagitche leaves), veludo juice (made with a red fruit known to have some medicinal properties), fole juice (from the fruit green monkey orange), farroba juice (fruit from the farroba tree), mandiple juice (made with a yellow fruit from a shrub of the same name) and papaya, guava, or mango juices. These juices are often too sweet, so we suggest that a little sugar is added (Benzinho & Rosa, 2018, p. 26).

Figure 10 *Fole juice obtained through rubbery climbing tree with acidic fruits*

Source: Claudia (2009)

Palm wine

Indeed, Guinea has wine — the Vinho de Palma, a typical drink of the region extracted right from coconut trees on the island. The beverage is derived from the sap of the palm and can be taken as soon as it is removed, when it is still sweet and has no alcohol content, or after some time, when it undergoes fermentation to become alcoholic. The longer the fermentation time, the stronger the flavor (Meus Roteiros, 2018).

Figure 11 *Palm wine extraction*

Source: Alan (2012)

Clothing

Guinea-Bissau has a long heritage of ancestral cultural expressions in the form of clothing and traditional costumes, varying among different ethnic groups according to their beliefs, origins, and faith.

Figure 12 *A dancer in traditional dress*

Source: Meana (2019)

The figure 12 shows a young man dressed in a traditional costume, with yarns made from tree bark, bulls' horns, and colourful bands. Clothing incorporates products and materials from the local fauna and flora (e.g., skins, bark, shells, bones, bands, beads, ribbons, and colourful yarns), which are used to decorate the body from head to toe with many colours. During the carnival, representative ethnic groups wear distinct costumes, serving to give each group a characteristic visual identity, manifestations that make the Carnival an authentic fashion show. We also have notice that, tourist audience, it can be divided into three groups: internal; external 1, and external 2:

Internal — Those who come from different regions of Guinea-Bissau to attend festivals or for business purpose in the country's capital of Bissau.
External 1 — African tourists that the country receives, mostly from Senegal, Guinea, Nigeria, Gambia, Cabo Verde, and Mali.
External 2 — Audiences from other countries of origin: Portugal, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Germany, and others.

Why choosing Guinea-Bissau instead of another destination?

From the tourists' perspective, Guinea-Bissau has diverse attractions to offer to visitors who visit Guinea-Bissau. It is only a few countries around the world where one can relax on pristine sandy beaches and be able to see wildlife in all forms within a short distance. Guinea-Bissau has several National Parks and Reserves all with abundant wildlife, an example of which are elephants in migration coming from Guinea-Conakry and crossing into Guinea-Bissau. The scenery of Guinea-Bissau is unique; the great beaches and wildlife on the islands are breathtaking. There are myriads of activities that visitors can enjoy, including bird- and animal-watching as well as other adventures. Guinea-Bissau is also endowed with cultural

diversity and pleasant sunny weather all year round.

Guinea-Bissau's diverse tourism products further include ecotourism, sports and water-based tourism, conference tourism, and homestay tourism, etc. The northern part of the country is one of the cradles of humankind, therefore giving Guinea-Bissau a unique opportunity to develop into a leading destination of heritage tourism. Guinea-Bissau therefore the ultimate destination offering an unparalleled variety of travel and holiday experiences. It is indeed a magical destination (guinebissaurepublic, n.d.). Therefore, visitors are not only able to enjoy the carnival, but can also enhance their experience by enjoying the beauty of the country's diversity, vibrant culture, natural resources, rich and unique gastronomy offers organic foods and beverages, and not to mention a friendly and hospitable people.

From an investment perspective, there are several investment opportunities in Guinea-Bissau. According to Catarina Taborda, Secretary of State for Tourism of Guinea-Bissau, the government has large ambitions to attract more visitors to the country. In an interview with Stanilas Ndayishimiye, Taborda states that the country has only 3,000 tourists annually, but the government has ambitions to increase the number significantly in the next three years to one million or two million tourists annually (Branco, 2019). This was reinforced by a statement from Fernando Vaz, Minister of Tourism:

> The creation of infrastructure is fundamental for the promotion of tourism in Guinea-Bissau. The country needs hospitals, roads, ports, and airports infrastructures, among others. Therefore, a welcome to all who intend to invest in Guinea-Bissau with the aim of boosting this sector.

Vaz went on to state that the country needs all kinds of partnerships to boost tourism in Guinea-Bissau in the post-pandemic period (Jorge, 2021). With these above statements, the government has shown a commitment to attracting more visitors and investors to the country mainly through establishing the Minister of Tourism, thereby answering a very important question: What tangible steps should the government adopt to carry out the ambition of attracting two million visitors? In order to achieve such goals, Guinea-Bissau will need to improve certain deficient areas that are hindering development of tourism, through new investments, which, in turn, in addition to improving tourism, will also create new job opportunities and boost the country's economy. In this context, at the national level, investment operations in Guinea-Bissau are governed by the Investment Code, established by Law No. 13/2011, of July 6. In this code, foreign investment is defined as any investment made by an investor with resources not originating in the country, a natural or legal person, of any nationality, in economic activities in the territory of Guinea-Bissau. From the scope of application of the Investment Code, investments in the areas of mining, oil, and forestry exploration, as well as those carried out in duty-free zones and shops, which are governed by specific legislation or by investment contracts, are, however, excluded (ANEME, 2018).

Foreign investors enjoy equal treatment with the national investor and are allowed to transfer dividends and/or distributed profits abroad, and to repatriate capital as well as

proceeds from the assignment, sale, or liquidation of the investment made, including the most capital gains, after payment of taxes due. The State guarantees the security of the assets and rights resulting from the investments made, benefiting the protection projects against the nationalization, expropriation or requisition of their assets, except for reasons of public interest or utility (ANEME, 2018). In this context, Guinea-Bissau has joined and ratified several treaties and international conventions, highlighting the adhesion to the Multilateral Guarantee Agency of Investments ("MIGA"), the World Bank, and the African Guarantee Fund and Economic Cooperation ("FAGACE"). MIGA aims to facilitate access to credit and/or more favourable interest rates. In terms of the Investment Code, approved by Law no. 13/2011, of 6 July, the government of Guinea-Bissau can obtain from MIGA, FAGACE, and other multilateral entities or similar bilateral any additional guarantees that may prove necessary or that may help promote investment in the country (Câmara de Comércio e Indústria Portugal Guiné-Bissau, 2017).

4. Recommendations for the Guinea-Bissau Carnival

4.1 Enhancing uniqueness and attractiveness with cultural connotations

Festival activities should be refined and innovative, and should thematically conform to Guinea-Bissau's national image and be positioned as a whole. Due to the differences characteristics in natural conditions, cultural resources, and tourism destinations. The organizers must promote festival activities with sufficient cultural connotations and highlight the unique cultural colours. Festival activities strengthen the characteristics of the community and its culture by establishing a strong bond in a community (Gursoy, Kim, & Uysal, 2004, pp. 171–181). The concentrated festival activities have a certain function of social integration. At the tourism destination, festival activities provide a social platform, strengthen regional cultural ties, and promote unity through diversity.

4.2 Boosting propaganda with innovative methods

Festivals are an important element of exchanges and combinations. The relevant departments of tourism destinations have widely recognized the intrinsic role of festival activities in communication with specific target audiences. Therefore, those agents are starting to develop festivals more creatively, so as to achieve an optimized operation of festival activities in tourism destinations (Hu & Pan, 2011, pp. 95–96). The branding of festival activities — an important management function — has four positive effects in tourism destinations and markets (Getz, 2005, pp. 414–415): it provides new impetus for development, enhancing the brand awareness of tourist destinations; it makes festival activities representative of the image of the region, boosting the prestige of the city; it enriches the original system and portfolio of tourism products; and it can catalyze the overall promotion of tourist destinations, encouraging the construction of local public infrastructure and services.

4.3 Improving local infrastructures and languages

If Guinea-Bissau truly aspires to developing into a tourist destination, it needs good infrastructure. Guinea-Bissau has in fact been able to support some infrastructure improvements despite being relatively weak economically. However, it still needs a great deal more, and it can take advantage of good diplomatic relations with China to be integrated into the Belt and Road Initiative, thereby upgrading its infrastructure including airports, roads and bridges, and seaports. Linguistic abilities are important to any tourism destination. The country should educate people and encourage them to improve their language skills, as well as training local tourist guides to communicate with visitors in different languages.

Conclusion

Using the Guinea-Bissau Carnival as basis, this chapter has analyzed its potential as a major promotor of tourism growth in Guinea-Bissau. Starting from the status quo and problems pertaining to the event. the paper has then proceeded to analyze and demonstrate the country's current development strategy of building a tourist destination upon festivals. The research findings can be summarized as follows:

First, we should determine reasonable themes of festival activities in accordance with local cultural and natural resources and the development status and availability of local infrastructure conditions. In doing so, the venue planners should focus on promoting the optimization and upgrading of industrial structures and economic and social development. Through careful studies, it should determine the thematic orientation of various city festivals, and effectively integrate festivals with local history, culture, and folk customs. By combining local conditions and customs, natural resources, and industrial characteristics, we will actively create bright spots, hotspots, and selling points to develop festivals into a festival economy and create brand benefits for festivals. Finally, to ensure that festival brand activities are economically viable, and will therefore drive investment growth and consumer demand, the country needs to focus on the economy, culture, and publicity, with the extensive implementation of various economic and trade activities, including information consultation, encouraging trade and commerce, tourism promotion, and negotiating investment. Special attention should target exploring the local culture, natural condition, sports, and tourism resources, in order to showcase the unique combination of history and culture and modern civilization with vibrant activities, so that festivals have distinctive themes and unique local characteristics, thereby enhancing the attractiveness and influence of the festivals.

Guinea-Bissau needs to actively create a cultural atmosphere for festival activities, winning participation and attention from the general public, while striving to make festival activities lively and colourful. Through various channels, we will vigorously encourage domestic and foreign businesspeople and well-known figures in the industry to become involved and give festivals a window to showcase the country, a channel for various information exchanges, a bridge connecting domestic and foreign markets, and a platform for attracting investment.

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Part 3

Belt and Road Initiative: New trends for Portuguese-speaking Countries

"Win-win less" cooperation: Geoeconomics implications of the Chinese *Belt and Road* Initiative for Mozambique

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The Middle Kingdom in the Middle Atlantic: China in the Small Portuguese Island States

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Enhancing the Belt and Road Initiative with the SDGs: A Portuguese Silk Road Integrating Africa and the BRI

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The Geopolitical Idiosyncrasies of Guinea-Bissau

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"Win-win less" Cooperation: Geoeconomics Implications of the Chinese *Belt and Road* Initiative for Mozambique

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Geoeconomics, Global value chain, "Win-win less", Belt and Road Initiative.

Abstract

Sino-Mozambican cooperation in the context of the *Belt and Road* initiative (BRI) has provided gains for both countries but it perpetuates the peripheral position of the Mozambican economy in the global value chain. Using a combination of Putnam's Two-Level Game Model and Keohane and Nye's Asymmetric Interdependence Theory, this article argues that Sino-Mozambican cooperation in the context of the BRI can be designated as a "win-win less" cooperation due to the asymmetric nature of its interdependence. The research relies on a literature review and an analysis of statistical data related to the bilateral trade balance. The chapter argues that the BRI is a defensive and reactive initiative, implemented by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to break out of the geo-strategic encirclement that the United States has been putting in place for decades; also, the BRI aims to mitigate domestic challenges such as the overproduction of steel and cement, and it helps to meet the security challenges on China's western borders. Mozambique's participation in the BRI helps to diversify sources of financing for large infrastructure projects and contributes to the insertion of the national economy into the Sinocentric value chain. It also allows the importation of goods at competitive prices. However, evidence has found prove that, for Mozambique, the geo-economic disadvantages of this cooperation are greater than its positive effects.

1. Introduction

In the context of Contemporary International Relations (CIR), the rise of China emerges as one of the most important global phenomena (Ikenberry, 2008). More than just an emerging power, China has the particularity of representing "the others"; from a civilizational point of view, China represents an identity that differs from Western civilization, the cradle of the global powers of the last few centuries. As Zakaria (2008, p. 2) points out, this phase can be called the "ascension phase of the rest." In addition to China, there are other countries, such as India, Russia, and South Africa, whose strategic position in the International System (IS)

coincides with the relative loss of primacy of the Western powers, traditionally dominant in the dynamics of global governance.

Mozambique is the ninth least developed country in the world, out of 189 countries ranked by the United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI) (UNHDR, 2020). The country's economy is dominated by agriculture. In 2019, GDP was USD 15 billion (World Bank, 2020a). The primary sectors remain very relevant; data from the second quarter of 2020 indicates that, together, agriculture, livestock, hunting, and forestry had greater participation in the economy, with a combined weight of 26.03% in GDP (INE, 2020). Agriculture is the most dominant economic activity in the country, occupying 80% of the working population, 60% of which are female. Small farms, or private farms, occupy 95% of the area in production. Small and medium-sized commercial enterprises are an important source of employment, supplying domestic markets, agri-food industries, and international markets. Agricultural export products are cotton, cashew nuts, sugar cane, tobacco, and tea. Therefore, it is an extraction industry, and the transformation levels are extremely low. Except for some cases of multinationals, overall, the national industrial sector is rudimentary, with recourse to low technologies, low capital investment, and a low specialized workforce.

The People's Republic of China (PRC)'s gross domestic product (GDP) increased by more than tenfold over the 1978–2004 period, with an average annual growth of 9.6%. At the end of 2014, China was the world's largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity, and second largest in current market values. Its GDP was estimated at USD 14.3 trillion in 2019 (World Bank, 2020b). China has become the world largest country in industrial and agricultural production, as well as the largest exporter and importer of goods in the world. It is also the world's largest consumers of steel, aluminium, copper, zinc, and nickel (Dicken, 2015).

During his trip to China, 22–27 April 2019, President of the Republic of Mozambique Filipe Nyusi signed five cooperation agreements with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping, covering various areas of cooperation for development. One of the agreements related to the joint promotion of the "Belt and Road" initiative, and another on the implementation of cooperation measures announced to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the situation of mutual advantage. Speaking during this visit, the Mozambican President stated that his country intended to play an active role in the construction of the Chinese "Belt and Road" initiative, calling the Chinese project "very important" for Mozambique and for the African continent and "beneficial" for sustainable development and the growth of the world economy. Because local political leadership adhered to the BRI while there is little public discussion of the contours of the country's acceptance of this initiative, this chapter envisages to provide a better understanding of the bilateral cooperation between Mozambique and China. In this perspective, the chapter focusses on questioning what are the geo-economic implications of the BRI initiative for Mozambique?

Because the BRI is a multidimensional initiative and a single theoretical model would hardly provide a profound interpretation of the facts, the chapter relied on the combination of two theoretical approaches, namely: Putnam's Two-Level Game Model (Putnam, 2010) and

Keohane and Nye's Asymmetric Interdependence Theory (Keohane & Nye, 2012). While Putnam's assumptions make it possible to identify the domestic determinants of the BRI by demonstrating how the Chinese leadership sought to implement in the IS a strategy that, in the first instance, could satisfy its domestic development agenda; the adoption of the Asymmetric Interdependence Theory serves to incorporate a perspective of its effects, particularly in developing countries (BRI takers/receivers) — here represented by Mozambique — which maintain asymmetric interdependence relations with China.

2. Belt and Road Initiative: Genesis, Scope, and Determinants

The BRI is a "model of trans-regional cooperation that connects Asia, Europe and Africa; through its infrastructure, policies, trade, funds/resources and people in the 21st century" (Wang, 2016, p. 22). While the *Belt* focuses on resource-rich Central Asia and the Middle East and consumer Europe, the sea Road focuses on expanding Southeast Asia. For China, foreign policy is subordinate to the domestic objectives of maintaining internal stability and economic growth (De Decker, 2018, p. 8). Some critics denounce what they see as a geopolitical expansion of the "Chinese Empire" in the world. Peter Navarro and Greg Autry, for example, authors of *Death by China: Confronting the Dragon — A Global Call to Action* (2011), belong to this group. Navarro had also produced another work discussing the "Chinese threat." In his book, *The Coming China Wars: Where They Will Be Fought and How They Can Be Won* (2007), he presented a list of some of the main challenges that China was facing. As a result of the acceptance of his arguments among local political elite, Navarro was later appointed as Donald Trump's trade advisor.

On the other hand, there are authors who defend this initiative as being an opportunity for peaceful global development. One of the most prominent voices in this group is Wang Yiwei. Wang (2017) argues that, using this initiative, China hopes to provide an alternative to Western globalization to the world, different from the model implemented by the U.S., which excludes a considerable part of humanity from the gains of capitalism. According to him, the *New Maritime Silk Road* rejects the path previously taken by Western powers, based on expansion, conflict, and colonization, in favour of a new type of maritime civilization characterized by the integration of men and seas, with harmonious existence and sustainable development. In this approach, the global public goods that China can best make available to the world are economic, while the U.S. is more inclined to provide security-related global public goods (Monan, 2017).

To better understand the nature of the BRI, this chapter enlists both domestic and external determinants for the implementation of this initiative. On domestic determinants, the chapter identifies the following: Economic Integration of the Western Region of China with the Rest of the Country; Ensuring Access to Central Asian Energy Resources; and Responding to Secessionism promoted by its autonomous regions located in the westside of its territory (Xinjiang and Tibet). The external determinants encompass Obama's 2011 "Pivot to Asia" Initiative; the need to secure Chinese maritime trade and oil import lines

on the Western Pacific[1]; and to export Chinese industrial overproduction (Congolo, 2021).

Firstly, it is about domestic economic balance. China's central and western provinces occupy 29% and 56% of the national territory, respectively, against only 15% of the eastern coastal provinces. In contrast, in terms of population concentration, the eastern coastal provinces are home to 41% of the entire Chinese population, which reveals the strong appetite that economic opportunities create among the inhabitants of rural Chinese areas (Ma et al., 2018). The central government's strong focus on the eastern provinces during twenty years of economic reform has caused China to develop unevenly. The western region's economy and infrastructure is poor, backward and underdeveloped, leading to wide disparities in income and living standards and a myriad of social, political and security problems (Congressional Research Service, 2001, p. 11). In 2000, the Western region represented only 24.3% of the country's land used for transportation purposes. In the context of the Chinese economic slowdown after the 2008 financial crisis, the country is looking for a new engine of economic growth. In particular, the government is looking for a way to reduce the imbalance in the development of the regional economy, one of the negative legacies left by Deng Xiaoping's reforms (Sun, 2013). Therefore, the need to implement the BRI.

The second domestic determinant is related to imports of energy resources from Central Asia. China had become the world's largest net importer (imports minus exports) of total oil and other liquid fuels in 2013. The refinery's new capacity and strategic stock of reserves, combined with declining domestic oil production, were the main factors contributing to the recent increase in China's oil imports (Barron, 2018). As a result of the increase in oil demand, the trade between China and the five Central Asian countries rose from USD 527 million in 1992 to USD 40 billion in 2011. In Central Asia, China sought to establish a regional free trade zone, partly to tap the region's vast energy resources (Fazilov & Chen, 2013, p. 40).

Chinese energy companies are operating and investing in Kazakhstan. The discovery of the giant Kashagan oil field in Kazakhstan, considered "the biggest oil discovery in the world in the last 20 years," has led China to reconsider its position regarding the viability of the Kazakhstan-China pipeline. As a result, the easternmost part of the pipeline, running 988 km from Atasu in Kazakhstan to Alashankou on the Chinese border, was completed in late 2005 and began operation in May 2006, with a total investment of USD 700 million (Fazilov & Chen, 2013, p. 40). Another relevant partner of China in Central Asia is Turkmenistan. During a visit to Beijing on November 23, 2009, President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Mälikgulyýewiç Berdimuhammedow stated that Turkmenistan would increase its gas exports to a volume of 65 billion m^3 per year. According to China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) Turkmenistan transported more than 30 billion m^3 to China in more than 900 days, using the Central Asia-China pipeline, an amount that represents a fifth of the

[1] In 2016, around 80% of China's crude imports passed through the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait to the South China Sea. In 2019, 43 countries supplied China with crude oil. Approximately half (44.8%) of the crude oil imported by China that year came from nine countries in the Middle East (Workman, 2020).

gas that China used in 2012. Of the 30 billion m^3, out of 10, 7 billion m^3 came from CNPC (Turkmenistan) Amu Darya River Gas Co., and Natural Gas Konzern from Turkmenistan provided the remaining 19.3 billion m^3 (Fazilov & Chen, 2013, p. 40). Uzbekistan is another important energy partner of China in the region. According to the Oil and Gas Journal, Uzbekistan holds 65 trillion ft^3 of proven natural gas reserves as of 2012, ranking it as the fourth country with the highest reserves in the Eurasia region and the nineteenth in the world. To gain access to this rich gas reserve, China made major economic inroads into Uzbekistan, where it created more than 380 enterprises with Chinese investment as well as representative offices for 65 major Chinese companies; among them, CITIC, CNPC and China Machinery (Fazilov & Chen, 2013, p. 43).

Secondly, China has increasingly engaged the Central Asian region in the field of security to combat the development of terrorism, failed states, government-sponsored organized crime, direct or indirect support for separatism in China, and at least ensure the trade and transit (Swanström, 2007, pp. 2–4). Eighty-three percent of Xinjiang's total trade is with Central Asian states, and 80% of China's total trade with Central Asia passes through Xinjiang. This means that Xinjiang's economy and its stability are largely dependent on the security and economic development of the Central Asian region. Trade barriers from Xinjiang to Central Asia would have a direct impact on Chinese national security and social stability in its western provinces. The main thrust of China's security interest in Central Asia is still mainly related to domestic security issues, and the increase in unrest in the western provinces. Nevertheless, China has increasingly engaged the Central Asian region in the field of security to combat the development of terrorism, failed states, government-sponsored organized crime, direct or indirect support for separatism in China, and at least ensure the trade and transit (Swanström, 2007, pp. 2–4).

Swanström (2007, p. 3) reiterates that China's western region is characterized by insecurity with an arc of instability that ranges from Pakistan to Kyrgyzstan, with states in the region becoming a focus of extremism and political radicalization. This problem is compounded by the fact that China's western border is vulnerable, with its own separatist groups and political-religious radicalization, criminal groups that could collaborate with governments and other groups in Central Asia and that can easily cross the Chinese border. Following the same perspective, the People's Daily Online (2013) states that the situation in Xinjiang and Central Asia was one of the factors behind the Chinese concept of "three evils," namely separatism, terrorism and religious extremism "三股势力" (*sangu shili*); organized crime could also be added as a fourth evil. The links between internal and external security became increasingly apparent, and China subsequently increased its cooperation with Central Asian states. Outside the borders, there are evidences showing that there are some external determinants which also justify the adoption of the BRI by Chinese authorities. Over the last decade, China has expanded its global investments, particularly in international maritime infrastructure. Chinese companies have invested billions of dollars in seaport development and side projects throughout the Indo-Pacific region since China announced a strategy to increase global trade connectivity through BRI (Thorne & Spevack, 2017). The Indo-Pacific region is extremely important to ensure the sustainability of the Chinese economy. This

region is the main route for importing energy resources to China and, at the same time, the main route for the outflow of Chinese exports. The South China Sea is an important trade route for crude oil and, in 2016, more than 30% of the global maritime crude oil trade, or about 15 million barrels per day (b/d), passed through the area. More than 90% of crude oil volumes flowing through the South China Sea in 2016 transited the Strait of Malacca, the shortest sea route between suppliers in Africa and the Persian Gulf and markets in Asia, making it a major bottleneck of the world's oil transit.

The maritime component of the Chinese initiative is vital to understanding the context of China's maritime investments in the Indo-Pacific. Seven of the 15 port projects examined by Thorne and Spevack (2017) started in 2013 or later. The five remaining port projects were revived or expanded after BRI's announcement. In Gwadar (Pakistan), Chittagong (Bangladesh), and Colombo (Sri Lanka), port agreements were expanded to include economic and industrial zones; and, in 2015, China announced its intention to lease land near Djibouti to a military logistics base. Finally, all 15 port projects fall under the "China-Indian Ocean-Africa-Mediterranean Blue Economic Gateway" or "China-Ocean-South Pacific Blue Economic Gateway," which aims to link land economic corridors through international routes. Thus, the characteristics of ports and the behaviour of their Chinese developers must be consistent with the objectives outlined in the policy of the BRI initiative. That is, the objective should be to create mutual economic opportunities and increase global connectivity (Thorne & Spevack, 2017, pp. 13–14). Under President George W. Bush (son), the U.S. emphasized strengthening relations with existing allies in Asia, began to move towards a more flexible and sustainable troop presence in the region, concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with South Korea and forged new partnerships with India and Vietnam. But the biggest change was in the military sphere. Since President Obama's inauguration in 2009, the U.S. has given considerable time and emphasis to Southeast Asia and regional multilateral institutions, in what was known as *Pivot to Asia-Pacific.* As part of a plan to expand U.S. presence in the Southwest Pacific and make it more flexible, the Obama administration has announced new deployments or rotations of troops and equipment to Australia and Singapore. U.S. officials also promised that planned and future reductions in defence spending would not extend to Asia-Pacific (or the Middle East) (Manyin, 2012).

To strengthen and extend its strategic presence in South Asia, on September 23, 2019, the U.S. renewed the military pact that guarantees its military presence in the region. In the agreement signed between Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and U.S. President Donald Trump, the amendment to the original 1990 memorandum of understanding on the use of military installations at Lion City Base in Singapore was renewed to grant U.S. forces access through 2035, underscoring the importance of this chock point for America's strategy in Asia. This second renewal agreement follows another, signed in 2005, which granted the U.S. access to naval facilities in Singapore by 2020 (Sim, 2020). In addition to aggressively patrolling the South China Sea, the U.S. maintains control of the access straits to it, that of Malacca, Malaysia. The Chinese, while establishing an active policy in the South China Sea, are seeking to have alternative routes by land (Mermelstein, 2017). An analysis of Marmelstein's discourse reveals that it presents a reactionary narrative of

China. In other words, by implementing this initiative, China is trying to escape the U.S.-led encirclement. This evidence consolidates the arguments that BRI is a reactive initiative and, therefore, defensive. A pressing challenge for Chinese industry is its excessive capacity to produce goods. China registers overproduction in several items, namely: steel, cement, electrolytic aluminium, chemicals, refining, flat glass, shipbuilding, paper and its derivatives (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2016, p. 15). The nominal capacity of steel production in the world started from 189 million tons (MT) produced in 1950 and, only 54 years later, that is, in 2004, it surpassed the barrier of 1,000 MT, when produced, in total, 1063 Mt. This progressive but slow growth was changed from the 2000s onwards, particularly due to the actions of the PRC. From 2000 to 2014, China accounted for more than 75% of the growth in global steel production capacity. In 2015, China's capacity alone exceeded the combined steel production capacity of the European Union (EU), Japan, the United States, and Russia (United States Trade Representative, 2015, pp. 12–13). Before the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese producers were able to cope with excess capacity by exporting goods when domestic consumption was not absorbing. Exports acted as an "exhaust valve" in a pressure cooker. Chinese exports collapsed in late 2008, because of the dramatic downturn in the European Union and U.S. economies. With that "exhaust valve" no longer functioning, China's excess capacity became impossible to ignore. Even more worrisome, as global demand slowed, China's manufacturing capacity continued to expand. The growing gap between stagnant and low global demand and increasing domestic production capacity has highlighted the problem of overcapacity. The Chinese government's rapid response in November 2008 consisted of a massive fiscal stimulus package, including an unprecedented lending program in 2009. This was aimed at infrastructure investment with government-sponsored lending increases, resulting mainly in expanding capacity production of China State Enterprises (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2016, p. 8).

In 2017, China alone produced more steel than the rest of the world combined. In that year, the rest of the world produced 859 million tons of steel, against 871 million tons of steel tons from China for the same period. In 2018, the rest of the world produced 866 million tons of steel, while China produced 924 million tons (International Energy Agency, 2019). In 2019, data presented by the World Steel Association (WSA) indicate that China produced 996.3 million tons of steel, at a time when the rest of the world produced only 872.5 million tons (World Steel Association, 2020, p. 9). Cement is another product in which China has dominated the global market. In 2014, China had an estimated cement production capacity of 3.1 billion tons annually, while the total production was almost 2.25 billion tons, resulting in a utilization rate of 73%. A year later, in 2015, China was responsible for 57% of the cement produced worldwide, which was equivalent to nine times more than the production of the runner-up, India (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2016, p. 22). Between 2011 and 2013 alone, China used more cement than what the U.S. used in the entire 20th century (Swanson, 2015; Mccarthy, 2014). China's economy has grown at an extraordinary rate and has more than four times the number of people as the U.S. But the 1900s were America's great expansion period, the century when the U.S. built nearly all its roads and bridges, the Interstate System, the Hoover Dam and many of the tallest skyscrapers in the world. China and the U.S. have roughly the same land area, ranking

third and fourth in the world, respectively. However, in relation to the use of cement, all cement consumption in America during the 20th century amounts to 4.4 gigatons (1 gigaton is equivalent to approximately 1 billion tons). By comparison, China used 6.4 gigatons of cement in the three years of 2011, 2012, and 2013. Cement consumption in China between 2010 and 2012 was about 140% of the consumption in the U.S. between 1900 and 1999 (Swanson, 2015).

In 2018, China continued to be the largest cement consuming country in the world, recording 2,363 million tons consumed, which is equivalent to 58% of the world's total volume, or 4,072 Mt (Indexbox, 2020). To respond to the challenges of overcapacity and environmental pollution, Chinese authorities encouraged the dissemination of investment abroad. This resulted in a high volume of Chinese investments abroad between 2014 and 2015. As Putnam's theoretical model argues, by focusing on infrastructure projects, the BRI seeks to satisfy, in the first instance, China's domestic agenda. Infrastructure projects account for 95% of Beijing's financial diplomacy, with just 5% going into the other categories of general budget support, humanitarian assistance and debt relief. At the level, for example, of the Central and South Asia (ACS) region, it is clearly noted that China places the greatest emphasis (85% of the infrastructure category) on new construction projects. Beijing also financed 42 projects to improve, extend or renovate existing infrastructure (eg. upgrading telephone networks, power transmission lines and hospitals). Thirty-seven percent of its infrastructure projects involve the provision of goods or equipment (e.g., tractors, agricultural or medical machinery, medicines, etc.) (Custer et al., 2019, pp. 15–16).

Beijing's "circular loans" (Horn et al., 2019) — attributing their funding to the use of Chinese companies and labour — may help Beijing mitigate risks, but it has also drawn criticism from some Central and South Asian countries that are not seeing benefits for the local economy. One estimate puts the share of Chinese state-owned companies that implement BRI projects at 89% (Hurley et al., 2018). However, it must be assumed that this practice of "tied aid" is not unique to Beijing, but limited transparency in the purchase of BRI projects (Custer & Tierney, 2019) and Beijing's policy of granting its state-owned companies access to finance of low interest allowed Chinese companies to outperform their competitors (China Power Team, 2017; Wuthnow, 2019). Combined with the strategy of promoting the massive production of certain industrial products, this approach ends up resulting in the creation of large Chinese companies that stand out as true global players in their respective sectors (Colvin, 2019).

3. Contemporary Sino-Mozambican Relations in the context of BRI

Liu et al. (2014) state that Zheng He's (Cheng He, 鄭和) "treasure fleet" reached the Mozambican coast of Sofala between 1421 and 1423. The presence of Chinese men was increased during the colonial period, when Portuguese colonial authorities brought several skilled Chinese craftsmen during the XIX century. During the 1960s, China provided military support to FRELIMO's independence struggle. Most of the Chinese aid to FRELIMO was delivered through the OAU Liberation Committee established in 1963 in

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Assistance consisted of small arms and the use of instructors in FRELIMO camps in Tanzania (Chissano, 2019). Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975 and was immediately recognized by the PRC. China granted an interest-free loan of USD 56 million and sent to Mozambique, in 1976, the first in a continuous series of medical teams, in a tradition that continues to this day (Shinn, 2012).

Bilateral relations remained intact during the 1978–1992 civil war but have intensified afterwards. In the late 1990s, Chinese companies were contracted to build the office of the Mozambican Parliament (completed in 2000). During this period, the construction of the Joaquim Chissano International Conference Centre can also be highlighted. China supported an ongoing de-mining program in Mozambique and in 2001 donated equipment worth more than USD 150,000 and trained a group of Mozambican soldiers in de-mining. In that same year, China financed the construction of houses for members of the Mozambican army on the outskirts of Maputo, worth around USD 7 million (Jornal Notícias, 19 July 2001, as cited in Chichava, 2008). The Mozambican Foreign Policy was guided by the *Guebuza Doctrine*, stipulated through the Mozambique Government Gazette, Resolution No. 32/2010, on Foreign Policy, which advocates that Mozambique seeks to "make more friends, promote more partnerships" (Mozambique Government Gazette, Resolution No. 32/2010, p. 2). Consequently, there was the establishment of relationships with mutual benefits or an equal relationship, to the detriment of a relationship of dependence between donors and recipients of foreign aid, which prevailed during the North-South cooperation period. Thus, the Resolution No. 32/2010 (article 7.1, line "e") defends the realization of a strong and proactive Economic Diplomacy, with the objective of identifying and taking advantage of the cooperation and the existing opportunities of multiform partnerships in different regions of the world (Wache, 2020, pp. 92–93). Giving political room to South-South cooperation. Among others, the approach of the Mozambique's Foreign Policy at the time aimed at responding to the objectives of the Government's Five-Year Plan (2005–2009), where the development and provision of basic infrastructures (physical, development, applied technological research, and extension), and institutional consolidation that enables the flourishing of private initiative and investment, national and foreign, on a broad and inclusive basis, in order to create a solid, sustainable and competitive economy in the context normal insertion in the world market. Indeed, infrastructure was assumed to be one of the key areas of government action (Mozambique Government Gazette, Resolution No. 16/2005).

To access the civil construction market in Mozambique, China had to devise an adequate strategy to the local market situation so that its companies could be successful. The Mozambican construction sector is characterized by the presence of Western and South African companies, strongly established on the ground due to a long relationship that dates to the colonial period. The Chinese strategy was based on cultivating influence with the Mozambican government and using China's comparative economic advantages, which allows it to offer highly competitive prices achieved based on low-cost skilled labour, reduction in management costs, cash availability through Chinese state-owned banks and access to raw materials at minimal cost through supply chains from China (Alden & Davies, 2006).

China's embassy in Maputo is actively informing Chinese companies about international tenders for projects in the construction sector. There is also a growing participation of Chinese companies through international tender procedures, more specifically in the rehabilitation of the water supply system in urban areas in the main provincial capitals, namely Maputo (USD 30 million), Beira and Quelimane (totaling USD 15 million) (Bosten, 2016, pp. 4–5). This strategy, it should be noted, is based on the assumptions of the two-level theory presented by Putnam. Assuming that the BRI is, above all, a domestic policy decision that, among other factors, aims to mitigate the scarcity of a market for Chinese industrial overproduction, particularly of cement and steel, two priority products in the infrastructure sector. By imposing the attribution of project execution contracts to Chinese companies, in addition to importing material and equipment from China, Chinese authorities are strengthening the Sino-centric value chain, which privileges Chinese industrialists and transforms others cooperation partners (like Mozambique) in consumers of their final products. By doing so, China is protecting the interests of Chinese businessman, which is seeking to expand its areas of operation, conquering more markets and reduce Chinese overproduction. An analysis of the trade relations between the two States reveals that, in the period 2001–2019, they were marked by a negative balance of payments for Mozambique and a positive one for China.

Figure 1 *China-Mozambique Trade Balance (2001–2019)*



Source: Ministry of Industry and Commerce (as cited in Congolo, 2021)

Except for the year 2012, the trend of bilateral trade has been the same between 2001 and 2019. As shown in Figure 1, the blue line, which shows Mozambican imports from the PRC, is always above the orange line, which concerns Mozambique's exports to the PRC; the difference in space between them represents the differentiated gains that exist in bilateral trade, and has always been in favour of the PRC except in 2012. After registering a negative balance of USD 19.9 million in 2001, resulting from imports of goods valued at USD 21.1 million and exports valued at USD 1.2 million, the trend was growing, reaching a peak of

USD 855.2 million of negative balance for Mozambique in the trade difference, in 2015, when goods valued at USD 986.9 million were imported and valued goods exported at just USD 131.7 million.

Mozambican exports to China are dominated by unprocessed resources, which reinforces the export of currency already in deficit in the country's financial system, in addition to not responding to the need for industrialization. Timber dominates the list of national exports to China, which becomes worrying when one realizes that most of this resource has been exported using tax evasion. After starting with values of approximately USD 1 million in 2001, export volumes have been increasing exponentially, especially from 2004 onwards, when the value rose to USD 18.438 million, and, in 2012, it reached a peak of USD 105.979 million and then it returned to a considerable reduction in the following year, as only timber exports valued at USD 44.187 million were recorded.

Mozambican timber gains relevance in the context of China's strong economic growth and the reduction in its domestic wood extraction activity, especially from the beginning of the 1990s (Correia, 2010, p. 61). Although Chinese demand is boosting Mozambican foreign trade with positive results in terms of global export volume, wood is mainly exported in unprocessed logs. This type of export does not promote local industrial capacities, job creation or the development of rural communities and has little effect in terms of improving the well-being of populations, as it transfers most of the advantages of a smaller economy like it is the case of Mozambique to China, which is a much larger economy and therefore becomes the main beneficiary of this trade. It should be noted that the export of logs is prohibited in Mozambique through the Law number 14/2016 of 30 December. Official data indicate that Mozambique annually loses at least 140 million Euros due to smuggling of wood. According to the WWF report, Mozambican authorities have been trying to combat illegal timber exports, but the country lost around USD 529 million from the trade between 2003 and 2013. China is the world's largest importer of wood, which is purchased, essentially, in its raw state for processing in Chinese industries (construction, furniture, paper, and others) and sale in the Chinese domestic market or for re-export to Europe, U.S., and Japan at low import costs, sustaining China's economic growth dynamics (Canby et al., 2007).

According to the list of Main Products Exported from Mozambique to China (2001–2019), provided by Cláudia Langa (institutional interview, 2020),[2] the second most exported product during the period 2000 to 2019 was seeds and nuts. With zero registration in 2001, exports of seeds and dried fruits registered a timid growth in 2002, with registration of USD 43 thousand. In 2009, the records show that the value of exports of these products was USD 30.378 million, which, as in the case of wood, confirms the Chinese interest in unprocessed primary products. Thus, making this bilateral cooperation case an asymmetrical one since China is focused in importing primary goods without investing on their industrial

[2] Cláudia Correia Langa, Ministry of Industry and Commerce of the Republic of Mozambique — National Directorate of Foreign Trade - Statistical Analysis and Commercial Information Research Department, November 3, 2020.

transformation in Mozambique. On the contrary, the list of Main Products Exported from China to Mozambique (2001–2019) reveals that Mozambique has been importing, fundamentally, manufactured products, with emphasis on electronic machinery and equipment; followed by iron, steel, and their derivatives; automobiles; furniture; rubber and related goods; plastics and their works; textile; and other goods (Cláudia Langa, institutional interview, 2020).

Of all products of Chinese origin, machines and electronics are the two more demanded categories in Mozambique. In 2015, when imports of these products peaked, they were valued at around USD 203 million; in the same year, the second most imported category of products was iron, steel, and their derivatives, but accumulating imports in the order of only USD 80 million. This difference reveals the trend of Mozambican consumption regarding Chinese products: manufactured goods are in a privileged position, largely as a result not only of Mozambican consumption needs but also of the Chinese's interest in finding solutions for exporting their overproduction. The category of iron, steel, and its derivatives are of strategic value in promoting the infrastructure sector, which is very important for the Mozambican economy.

The third category of most imported goods is automobiles, which are also widely used in the execution of large civil construction works. Brands such as Haval, Sinotruk, FAW, JAC, BYD, GWM, and KING LONG have become well known in Mozambique. In some cases, vehicles are even purchased by individuals for personal use, and some of these brands already have subsidiary operations in Mozambique.

Furniture occupies fourth position on the list of the most imported goods category, which opens space for the criticism according to which the wood exported from Mozambique to China returns, already transformed and with added value, to respond to the demand of the Mozambican consumers, but expatriating capital to the Chinese market.

Regarding Mozambique's public debt to China, data provided by Vasco Mabunda[3] (2021) indicate that, for example, between 2015 and 2019, the values registered a recurrent growth. Representing 40% of the country's bilateral public debt, Mozambique owed USD 1,635.3 billion IN 2015; in the following year, 2016, the figure rose slightly to 41.4%, totalling USD 1,698.6 billion. In 2017, growth worsened, reaching USD 1.859 billion, which was equivalent to 44.4% of the debt. The increase was even more considerable in 2018, when Mozambique owed China USD 2,170.9 billion (equivalent to 45.2% of the national bilateral debt). In the last year of registration mentioned here, the value registered a slight reduction, dropping to a total of USD 1,972.1 billion, corresponding to 44% of the national bilateral debt (Vasco Mabunda, 2021).

[3] Vasco Mabunda, Administrative Court of the Republic of Mozambique, institutional interview, September 2021, Maputo.

4. Conclusion

The emergence of the PRC is the greatest example of the weight that geo-economics has in contemporary international politics. After a prolonged dominance of a global production chain centred on the Northern (Western) economies, the reality has recently changed: the PRC has been creating and consolidating a global value chain centred on the emerging economies in general and on itself particularly. Currently, the PRC is the world's largest producer of manufactured goods, the world's largest consumer and importer of energy products, which transforms that economy into the largest market for energy products of strategic value, as well as for various types of raw materials. In turn, Mozambique remains among the least developed countries in the world. Its economy is fundamentally based on the extraction of natural resources, with low levels of industrial transformation and family agriculture making up most of the national workforce. The implementation of the BRI is based on China's both domestic and external determinants. Domestically, China adopts an initiative to consolidate national economic integration (bringing the western region closer to the rest of the country's value chain); while doing so, the BRI initiative has served to mitigate the risks of secessionism on the China's western frontier. Also, the BRI serves to export the large surplus of industrial production that China holds in certain sectors, with a focus on steel, cement, machinery, and infrastructure; high liquidity is also found in this initiative, as BRI helps in the international projection of the Chinese economy, through investments and credit, particularly in infrastructure; finally, BRI still helps to internationalize Chinese technology.

Externally, the BRI helps Chinese authorities avoid a confrontation with the U.S., whose reaction to China's emergency has been hostile. On the external front, BRI also helps to diversify the sources of energy resources and guarantee access to new markets. In diplomatic terms, BRI helps the Chinese government to garner sympathy from other countries, particularly developing countries. By serving as an instrument for boosting commercial exchanges on a global scale, BRI has also managed to consolidate the new global production chain that has China itself in its epicentre. Sino-Mozambican relations date back to the beginning of the 15th century, during Zheng He's voyages with his "treasure fleets." Later, the relations prevailed during the colonial period and during the liberation struggle. In the post-independence period, China immediately recognized the independence of the then People's Republic of Mozambique and provided technical assistance, mainly on the health sector. Later, during the 2000s, after the creation of FOCAC and considering the economic diplomacy now being implemented by the Mozambican authorities, whose focus on the infrastructure sector was considerable, the most intense phase of bilateral cooperation began when several large-scale projects were built in Mozambique with recourse to Chinese financing. In parallel, there was also a considerable increase in the import rate by China of forest resources, with emphasis on precious wood with high economic value. In terms of investments, a more dynamic phase began. At the same time, and in line with the asymmetric interdependence theory, it was possible to demonstrate that the bilateral trade model between Mozambique and China perpetuates the peripheral position of the first country, by not favouring the industrial transformation of raw materials in Mozambique;

thus, validating our main hypothesis.

As can be seen in this chapter, the BRI brings numerous opportunities for the Mozambican economy; at the same time, it presents a high level of threats. As referred to by Keohane and Nye's theory, asymmetric interdependence explains that there are common interests and benefits, but, due to the differentiated nature of vulnerability between the actors (Mozambique and China), the gains tend to be asymmetric. Therefore, we draw the conclusion that it is a "win-win less" cooperative relationship.

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The Middle Kingdom in the Middle Atlantic: China in the Small Portuguese Island States

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China; Cabo Verde; São Tomé and Príncipe; Middle Atlantic; Small Portuguese Island States; Geopolitics

Abstract

In a context of scarcity of resources, which has been prompting China to invest in increasingly distant waters, this chapter aims to analyze Beijing's growing interest in two remote places that academic literature has largely overlooked so far: Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, both being Portuguese-speaking countries located in the Atlantic Ocean. The timing could not be more relevant, as there are no studies concerning China's presence in the Middle Atlantic. Therefore, the "Middle Kingdom in the Middle Atlantic" may open a new era not just in academia, but most interestingly, in geopolitics itself. Drawing on the conceptual lenses of the social evolution theory, which provides an alternative path to realism, liberalism, or constructivism, this chapter aims to shed light on this major claim: however remote the Middle Atlantic may be, it is of growing importance to China's maritime strategy and struggle for resources and gateways in this new century.

1. Introduction

Piracy is the projection of power at sea and the control of supply lines, both of which are contemporarily relevant in that it is by sea that the great majority of world trade circulates (Jacobsen & Larsen, 2019; Lane & Pretes, 2020). The literature offers an insightful overview concerning the protection of the sea lanes of communication in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the Arctic Ocean has raised academic interest in recent years (Zeng et al., 2020; Bennett et al., 2020). The Atlantic, in turn, has sparked less academic interest. In practice,

very little is known about China's interests in the Atlantic Ocean (Abdenur & Neto, 2013; Vreÿ, 2017), which is a gap that we are aware of and wish to respond to.

Given the vastness of the Atlantic Ocean, we will focus on the Middle Atlantic, thus leaving the North and the South Atlantic out of our spatial scope. The reason for this is connected in turn to another neglected topic within the literature of China's incursions in the Middle Atlantic: the Portuguese-speaking countries (PSCs). Literature is indeed more consolidated when it comes to assessing China's relations with Portugal, Brazil, Angola, and Mozambique, leaving out the other PSCs (Begu et al., 2018; Marcondes & Barbosa, 2018). Even exceptions such as Silva and Pereira (2020), Duarte, Ilhéu, and Leandro (2019), and Duarte and Leandro (2020) have not thoroughly examined these important actors as they carried out overall assessments of the PSCs. That is why this chapter aims to further expand the analysis on relations between China and the PSCs. After all, we recognize that both African PSCs and Brazil already provide China with extraordinary commodities imports, which will only grow in the next decades, given, among other reasons, the end of the One-China Policy.

In addition to economics, the Portuguese language is the fifth most spoken in the world, which explains the rising interest of Chinese students in learning Portuguese. This being said, at the convergence of the Atlantic and the PSCs, there is no literature on the geo-strategic and geo-economic importance of the Portuguese-speaking Small Island States (PSSISs) specifically located in the Atlantic — namely, Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe — for China, with the exception of Galán and Leandro's (forthcoming) contribution. This is an important gap, as these countries share three unique characteristics: first, they are Small Island Developing States, and therefore vulnerable, remote, and with limited access to resources; secondly, they have Portuguese as their official language, due to their colonial past; and, thirdly, they obtained independence in 1975 from Portugal (ibidem). What opportunities can the PSCSISs located in the Middle Atlantic provide to Chinese interests? What geopolitical factors justify Chinese presence in these waters? What challenges and opportunities may result from this cooperation framework? These are some of the issues to be analyzed.

To better analyze how the rising power (China) may occupy this strategic vacuum in the Middle Atlantic, we will use a qualitative analysis, based on hermeneutics, i.e., on understanding. The conceptual lenses which best serve our purpose by drawing on the postulates of adaptation, selection, and elimination advocated by the theory of social evolution. We agree thus with Chan, who argues that "social evolution offers an alternative path that is more holistic and comprehensive [than realism, liberalism, and constructivism] in explaining changes and trends over a long period of time" (2016, p. 141). In practice, the theory of social evolution, applied to the study of Chinese incursions in the North Atlantic, helps to understand China's struggle to ensure access to resources in a planet where they are increasingly scarce.

To achieve the above stated goals, this chapter is structured as follows: Firstly, we will draw some considerations on the Atlantic as a fragmented space, albeit of increasing geopolitical relevance. In the second section, we will provide the reader with some background regarding

Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, so that in Section 3 we can focus on the analysis of China's strategic interests in these two remote PSCSISs. The conclusion summarizes the main findings.

2. The Atlantic Pivot: A Geopolitical Point of View

The concentration of naval capabilities by the U.S. Navy in the Atlantic during the 20th century preserved an American hegemony in those waters whilst reacting against any other sea powers. American foreign policy favoured a U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere, after expelling Spain from the Americas (1898) and the United Kingdom's consent to the Monroe Doctrine (1900). However, in the last decade, regional and extra-regional powers have been investing in sponsorship and hedge strategies to avoid U.S. sea power, particularly in the South Atlantic (Duarte & Barros, 2019, p. 2). The "strategic rebirth" (Guedes, 2012, p. 26) of the Middle and South Atlantic is largely justified by the "growing threats, often with an epicentre on African shores [which] present new challenges to overall international maritime security" (Seabra, 2014, p. 332). Notwithstanding, there is at least one more crucial reason which helps to understand the shifting attention towards the Middle and South Atlantic, which is directly connected to its biodiversity as well as mineral and energy resources, in a planet where the exploration of unlikely or "forbidden borders" has been losing favour (Duarte & Xing, 2019, p. 283).

An interesting aspect, which is a weakness of both the Middle and South Atlantic, is, as Richardson et al. (2012, p. 160) underline, due to the existence of a "vacuum in terms both of national maritime governance structures in most littoral states and any overarching system of cooperative governance." Moreover, the Atlantic is a fragmented space: the North Atlantic is essentially the sphere of influence of the U.S. and the European Union (EU) and is within the remit of NATO, while the Middle and South Atlantic is perceived as a strategic, political, cultural, and identity legacy whose sovereignty should exclusively belong to the region's states.

3. Microstates in the Vast Atlantic: Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe Islands

In this section we will provide some background regarding Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, so that in Section 3 we can focus on analyzing China's interests in these two PSCSISs. The archipelago of Cabo Verde consists of 10 great islands and many other islets, and is situated in the middle Atlantic between 475 and 720 km off the coast of Senegal. Between 1455 and 1461, Portuguese sailors settled in it. The uninhabited islands offered an early lesson in –– in today's business jargon –– "location, location, location" (Kronzekk, 2005, p. 142). Along with (from north to south) the Azores, Madeira and Cabo Verde form strategically positioned bases to and from the Atlantic for Portugal. The EU considers Cabo Verde as an example of democracy and stability in Africa, following the introduction of multiparty democracy in the 1990s (European Commission, 2020). Trade and tourism, especially on the island of Sal, are two of the country's main sources of income (about 70% of GDP). Other important areas are the fish canning industry and construction.

The government of Cabo Verde is interested in the integration of the country into the international economic system, through the development of a "circulation economy" located in the Middle Atlantic (Government of Cabo Verde, 2017, 2019). Micro-states and tiny territories are relegated to marginality on the major international political and economic decision platforms, having little opportunity to influence any types of decisions. Usually the need to adapt and conform to the interests of the great powers tends to erode away the micro-states' sovereignty. They exist, but the literature on small/micro-states is not consensual, particularly when it is necessary to establish a division between small and big states. Typically, small states are defined in terms of capabilities, which are related to possession of power resources, population, territory, GDP, military expenditure, among others (Steinmetz & Wivel, 2010). Cabo Verde is trying to capitalize on its location in the Middle Atlantic, maximizing its potential as a platform between the Atlantic continents. São Tomé and Príncipe, on the other hand, is an archipelago located in the Middle Atlantic Ocean, in the Gulf of Guinea, and crossed by the Equator (Bragança, 2019). It is one of the smallest countries in the world and the second smallest in Africa, after the Seychelles, with a total area of 1,001 km2 and a population of about 200,000 inhabitants (ibidem). Its geographical location has a direct impact on the national and international dimensions of the relationship between space and politics in this small archipelagic country (Sanguin, 2014).

Like other Small Island Developing States (SIDSs), São Tomé and Príncipe's economic structure is largely affected by its insular nature (e.g., resource scarcity, poor absorption capacity, and vulnerability to external shocks). Recent estimates (World Bank, 2019) have shown that about one-third of the population lives on less than $1.9 per day, and more than two-thirds is poor, using a poverty line of $3.2 per day. The country is also heavily dependent on official development assistance, as more than 90% serves to finance investment expenses (ibidem). Despite political instability in some countries of the region, the Gulf of Guinea is endowed with considerable natural resources. The region's oil and natural gas deposits are increasingly being sought by large powers and associated companies, as there are huge oil reserves to be explored, with offshore reserves estimated at around 15 billion barrels of oil (Neves, 2017). Geographically, São Tomé and Príncipe is located in the centre of the Gulf of Guinea, enabling it to become a strategic point in the region and a crossing point between the north and the south. Moreover, by being in the middle of the Gulf of Guinea, it plays an integrative role as a connecting platform and a transit and distribution centre for the sub-region (Bragança, 2019).

Arguably, the geographical location of São Tomé and Príncipe has given the country greater geopolitical, geo-strategic, and geo-economic importance (Neves, 2017). Moreover, in theory, considering the low level of piracy attacks and its political stability, it can play the role of regional hub (Plácido dos Santos, 2015). To this end, the Government has prepared a "Transformation Agenda" (2015), with the vision of transforming the country into a logistics platform, a gateway, and a regional hub for maritime, port, and airport services for the Gulf of Guinea. This vision is based on two pillars: the construction of a deep-water tran-shipment port and a large airport (Bragança, 2019), which are considered as essential for creating jobs, improving the business climate, and attracting foreign investment to the country. However, due to difficulties in obtaining international financing, those projects have not materialized yet.

4. China's Great Steps in Atlantic Tiny lands

4.1. The case of Cabo Verde

With some background on the economic, political, and social (among other) characteristics of Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, we now focus on the analysis of China's strategic interests in these two remote PSCSISs.

Until the early 1990s, Sino–Cabo Verdean cooperation had based on the political and institutional fields. Since then, bilateral relations have evolved as China adapted to the context of the opening-up and economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997). While many international partners prioritized social support, China began to assist Cabo Verde in the construction of infrastructure. This included the provision of military equipment and the construction of housing and education infrastructure. China has also provided financial support including interest-free loans, which illustrates that China is more than a permanent diplomatic partner in Africa; it is also an emerging investor. Furthermore, interests are far from being focused solely on the physical aspects of building infrastructures or seeking natural resources (Bräutigam, 2009; Addis & Zhu, 2018). Chinese rhetoric stresses that cooperation with African countries — South-South cooperation — is based on mutual gains, thereby seeking to distance itself from the idea of "neo-colonialism" as suggested by some scholars (Asante, 2018; Langan, 2018). Several public works are being started at this time with support from Beijing, including the construction of the National Library, the Amílcar Cabral Memorial, the Jorge Barbosa Auditorium, as well as social housing in the neighbourhoods of Palmarejo and Achada Grande Trás located in Praia on Ilha de Santiago (Silva & Varela, 2020). The creation of the Macau Forum in 2003 also facilitated China's business with Cabo Verde. This "Platform for Lusophony" has provided Macau with a very relevant role for Chinese foreign policy, giving the PSCs a welcomed opportunity to dialogue with Beijing. The forum organizes rotating business meetings among its members, which take place periodically in Cabo Verde (Silva, 2011a).

4.1.1. Economic dynamics of a changing China–Cabo Verde relationship

According to the National Statistics Institute of Cabo Verde (INECV, 2020), Cabo Verde's exports in 2019 totalled 55 million euros while imports were estimated at 710 million euros. The statistics also show that China and Cabo Verde's bilateral economic relations are relatively modest. Europe continues to be Cabo Verde's main customer, absorbing around 96.4% of the country's total exports (INECV, 2020). Spain ranks first among Cabo Verde's main customers in the European economic zone, representing 77.5% of total exports of the archipelago. Regarding imports, Europe is also the main supplier with 79.6% of the total amount, followed by Asia/Oceania which represents 10.1%. Portugal represents 42% of the

total imports. China is Cabo Verde's fourth largest supplier, with 5.4% of the total imports (INECV, 2020; Marques, 2020). However, economic relations between both countries have strengthened gradually, especially after Cabo Verde opened its embassy in Beijing. From a purely political and institutional sphere, the new relationship has evolved in the economic, commercial, financial, and business fields.

One can distinguish three different phases in the cooperation between Praia and Beijing: a first phase from 1976 to 1990; a second phase from 1991 to 2005; and a third phase from 2006 to the present (Tavares, 2010; Silva & Varela, 2020). Between 1976 and 1990, Sino–Cabo Verdean cooperation began to be centred around the political and institutional fields, while trying to adapt to the process of opening-up and economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping (Tavares, 2010). More recently, China started to support Cabo Verde in the construction of infrastructure, offering loans on special terms, interest-free loans, as well as concessional loans and grants. Chinese rhetoric emphasizes that cooperation with African countries is based on mutual gains (win-win). Policies for attracting foreign investment in Cabo Verde are in line with China's internationalization of its economy. To a great extent, Beijing becomes a trading state, i.e., a commercial actor which uses trade as a pacific way to achieve its objectives (Silva, 2019). Although realism is not keen on accepting it, liberalism is an extraordinary partisan of trade as a means of generating interdependence. Nonetheless, the conceptual advantage of the social evolution theory is that it sees trade embedded simultaneously in altruistic and realistic goals. In other words, Chinese trade with Cabo Verde is certainly peaceful, but it is also endowed with self-serving contours in the sense that the more economic interdependence China builds with the weak and small state of Cabo Verde, the more influence China has on it. Several public infrastructures are currently being built with support from Beijing, including the construction of the National Library, the Amílcar Cabral Memorial, the Jorge Barbosa Auditorium, as well as Social Housing in the outskirts of Palmarejo and Achada Grande (Silva & Varela, 2020). As of 2006, a new phase of cooperation began, based on the signing of a strategic partnership between the two countries.

4.1.2. Strategic positioning of the São Vicente Special Maritime Economic Zone

Du Xiaocong, the Chinese ambassador to Cabo Verde (April 2015 to present), has stressed the strategic potential that the archipelago has for China. According to him, the importance of Cabo Verde stems from its location in the Atlantic Ocean, a point of intersection between three continents. It has thus a unique location, in addition to having plenty of marine resources and political stability (Du, 2019). Cabo Verde is located at the convergence of several main shipping lanes: Europe–Latin America, Europe–West Africa, and Latin America–West Africa. At the same time, there is a growing strategic relationship between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Brazil. This cooperation may bring more importance to Cabo Verde (Government of Cabo Verde, 2019). Nevertheless, the archipelago is close to an African region that is very vulnerable, heterogeneous, and in many cases unstable. In fact, countries such Guinea, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali (struggle for power by Islamic groups), and Guinea-Bissau (internal political instability) are frequently at war

and have received support not only from the United Nations (UN), but also from regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Conflict Barometer, 2020; Suzuki, 2020).

The process of economic integration in the region is slow due to all these conflicts, including threats of terrorism, and subsequent poverty. Most ECOWAS member states lack infrastructure, particularly in areas of power, water, security, information, communication technology and transportation (Kaigwe, 2016; Akanji, 2019), so Cabo Verde does not benefit immediately from this organization, which is plagued by many problems. The creation of the São Vicente Special Maritime Economic Zone (SVSMEZ) aims to accelerate the economic integration in Western Africa, by becoming a hub in the maritime traffic. The project includes the construction of a deep-water port in Saragaça, near São Vicente (Expresso das Ilhas, 2018). It aims to interconnect with major international maritime routes, besides including operations of tran-shipment. This port will also host a container terminal as well as structures capable of repairing and even building ships. Furthermore, the project includes an airport for international fluxes of passengers and cargo, capable of attracting foreign companies. Cabo Verde has enormous tourism potential, which can benefit greatly from the creation of the SVSMEZ (Diário de Notícias, 2019).

Globally, Cabo Verde should be transformed into an attractive centre of logistics, business, tourism, and finance. At the same time, the government intends to encourage the Cabo Verdean diaspora settled in many parts of the world to invest in its own country. The creation of an ethnic incentive is intended to draw Cabo Verdean investors (Government of Cabo Verde, 2017). Chinese investment in the SVSMEZ has important strategic gains. The U.S.'s alliances with Japan, Australia, and India in the Indian-Pacific area, in an attempt to contain Chinese power, make the Atlantic a space of opportunity and strategic options for China. In other words, according to the social evolution theory, China recognizes that it needs to adapt to the shifting and unpredictable configuration of international power in order to survive. In this context, we are witnessing a relative phenomenon of retraction of China in the North Atlantic (given this is chasse gardé of both the U.S. and the EU and thus NATO) accompanied by a reinforcement of China's presence both in the Middle and South Atlantic. Many Chinese projects that were being developed in Panama have been cancelled, including a high-speed train linking Panama City with the north of the country, an electrical transmission project, and the concession to operate Panama Ports Company (Mendez & Alden, 2019; Youkee, 2020). The main reason for this is that the U.S. has been pressuring Panama's government against doing business with China (Wong, 2018). The same is happening with investments and Chinese cooperation in Portugal, particularly in relation to 5G technology, as well as investments in the Azores archipelago and Sines port (Duarte & Leandro 2020). This kind of countries were initially extremely interested in Chinese projects, but U.S. political pressure made third countries, neighbouring countries, or partners reconsider their previous expectations.

It is important to bear in mind that a substantial part of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in the Atlantic is still within the basis of the probability. In a meeting between U.S.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Portugal's Foreign Minister Augusto Santos Silva, the American secretary warned Portuguese partners of risks that may arise from Chinese investments, namely the "untrusted" 5G network (Waldersee, 2019). American diplomacy and influence still prevail in a geographic space where democracy is the main pattern, while China is being viewed with growing suspicion (Asante, 2018; Langan, 2018; Pei, 2020). All in all, the North Atlantic is a vast area where the largest military alliance in history—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—is centred. In turn, it functions as a buffer zone against Chinese presence.

In this context, where the North Atlantic is under close surveillance by the U.S., EU, and NATO, the Middle Atlantic emerges as a geo-strategic alternative for China, which strives to adapt and survive, in line with the tenets of the social evolution theory. This is not the same as saying that the Middle Atlantic is a place free from geopolitical and geo-strategic competition. In fact, there is a domestic political discussion on the possibility that Cabo Verde may join NATO, which would therefore be a limiting factor for China's incursions in the Middle Atlantic (Jornal Económico, 2019; RTC, 2019). The participation of Cabo Verde in international organizations, as well as the economic interest from foreign countries on the archipelago are strongly associated with its stability. To be sure, the relative political stability of Cabo Verde (compared to other regional countries that experience insecurity) captures investors' receptiveness, as they prefer to put their money in places with (high) probability of economic return.

The idea of strengthening Cabo Verde's connectivity in the Middle Atlantic seems to serve the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road which connects China with nations of Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, North Africa, Latin America, and Europe (Chung, 2019; Nantulya, 2019; Duarte & Leandro 2020). Although the BRI has yet to be formally extended to the Atlantic (it only appears in speeches and political strategic plans), the Cabo Verde government has already expressed its intention to be part of the project, for instance during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to the archipelago in 2017 (Lusa, 2019).

Following China's trend of building and obtaining leases for ports in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti), East Africa (Tanzania), and Southern Africa (Namibia), there is, as well, empirical evidence of China's naval presence growing in Africa (Chung, 2019; Fanell, 2019; Nantulya, 2019). In turn, the expansion of the Panama Canal (which concluded in 2016) has enhanced maritime connectivity between the Pacific and the Atlantic. The idea of connectivity is indeed of utmost importance for the Atlantic at a time of considerable technological developments in the means of communication (from merchant shipping to war, and underwater fibre optic cables where more than 99% of the Internet runs) (Jornal de Economia do Mar, 2019). Atlantic ports are of growing importance for new customers such as China. Cabo Verde's ongoing request to the United Nations to extend its continental shelf by up to 350 miles is another attractive factor to China (Macauhub, 2014). The application of investment in structural sectors, involving technological modernization, supply of logistical infrastructures, and commercial flows, provides the archipelago with greater strategic relevance. For China, it is also important to establish relations with Cabo Verde as

a way to maintain Taiwan's international isolation, particularly in Africa (Silva, 2011b). The participation of Cabo Verde in many international organizations — including the United Nations — is also relevant for Chinese diplomacy. In fact, more than economic factors, Cabo Verde also offers good conditions to test Chinese soft power. These two elements are important to project Chinese influence in the remote Middle Atlantic, considering that the North Atlantic is the EU and U.S.'s sphere of influence. Going south provides China with the means to adapt and, at the same time, mould the shifting geopolitics of the vast Atlantic, as is implicit in the postulates of the social evolution theory.

4.2. The case of São Tomé and Príncipe

Soon after obtaining independence in 1975, São Tomé and Príncipe initiated bilateral cooperation with China (An, 2016). The latter includes the signature of an Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation on December 1975, under which China granted São Tomé and Príncipe an interest-free loan of 30 million renminbi (RMB) for a five-year period. Several other agreements followed, including a credit of 8 million RMB for the construction of the Congress Palace.

Meanwhile, in 1997, São Tomé and Príncipe decided to cease diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, opting instead to recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan). About 20 years later, in December 2016, São Tomé and Príncipe reoriented its foreign policy and recognized the "One-China Policy." The move was considered a diplomatic victory for China, as Beijing and Taipei had been competing for allies since the end of China's civil war in 1949 (New York Times, 2016). According to social evolution theory, liberalism and its related values are not enough to keep ties. China skilfully understood that a poor state such as São Tomé and Principe would welcome massive investment in exchange for pressure to switch official allegiance from Taipei to Beijing. This calculated combination between economic support in order to spread influence and isolate Taiwan even more in the international arena, shows that Chinese foreign policy is quite aware of Lord Palmerston's view that "states have no permanent friends or allies, only permanent interests" (cit. by Leigh 2012, p. 68).

In April 2017, during a visit of São Tomé and Príncipe's Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada to China, the two countries signed a first five-year cooperation agreement relating to areas including tourism, infrastructure, technology, agriculture and fisheries, student scholarships, and medical assistance (Crabtree, 2018). This agreement included $146 million of Chinese financing for infrastructure projects, namely for the modernization of São Tomé International Airport and the construction of a deep-water container port, which could serve as a logistic hub for Chinese exports to Central Africa (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). Almost one year later, in January 2018, Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi concluded his annual trip to Africa with a visit to São Tomé and Príncipe, where he pledged that China would continue to provide support to the development of the small archipelagic country (Xinhua, 2018).

4.2.1. Towards a mutually beneficial strategic partnership

From that moment onward, both countries decided to establish a mutually beneficial strategic partnership. Annually, China donates around $30 million to São Tomé and Príncipe and bilateral cooperation has been ongoing in the areas of education, health, agriculture, officials' training, among others. Future fields are being considered, namely related to clean energies (solar, wind, geothermal, and tidal) and infrastructure (Lusa, 2019). As regards infrastructure, the two essential projects needed for São Tomé and Príncipe are the aforementioned deep-water tran-shipment port and the re-qualification and expansion of the international airport (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017).

For China, São Tomé and Príncipe emerges in this context as an important transit hub for maritime trade between the Atlantic, Africa, and the Indian Ocean (Plácido dos Santos, 2015). This transcontinental link is part of Beijing's plan to direct flows of hydrocarbons, minerals and other African natural resources to tran-shipment hubs in the Indian Ocean, from where they will be directly shipped to China. Furthermore, considering the various difficulties faced by traditional partners in financing the deep-water port project, that may give China the opportunity to use it as a central base for business logistics and investments and, at the same time, reaffirm once again its role as an alternative power for the development of São Tomé and Príncipe (Bragança, 2019). The social evolution theory helps to understand that the contours of Chinese investment and interests in São Tomé and Príncipe fit into the long-term logic of adaptation defended by this school of thought. Indeed, all logistical ventures that China carries out in the archipelago should be seen in the perspective of a state which is the most populous in the world and is aware that to survive, it must continue to go abroad in search of different partners, sources, and opportunities to build its *Pax Sinica* (Duarte, 2017).

In late November 2019, the government of São Tomé and Príncipe announced the launch of an international tender for the construction of a deep-water port in Fernão Dias, Lobata, in the northern part of the country. Presented in a DBFO (Design, Build, Finance, and Operate) model, it was launched by the Technical Unit to Support Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) and it aims to be a PPP led by the private sector (CL Brief, 2020a). The project foresees a depth of 16 meters for the new port, and the construction of a multipurpose terminal with capacity up to 30,000 tons, able to support and affirm São Tomé and Príncipe as a strategic point for maritime transit in the region (ibidem).

Given the current financial constraints of São Tomé and Príncipe — it is limited in the use of credit under the austerity programme of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Lusa, 2020) — the state's contribution will only be a small part of the financing of the project, with an estimated cost of at least $500 million (CL Brief, 2020a). The deadline for proposals was January 20, 2020, but, so far, the decision of the government is not known. As for the expansion and modernization of the international airport of São Tomé and Príncipe, its financing will be provided by China, further to the signing of an agreement in February 2020 in São Tomé (Nón, 2020). Under this agreement, the length of the runway is foreseen to be increased (from 2,170 to 2,800 meters), and it will be prepared to receive large-capacity

aircraft. The agreement also includes, among other interventions, the recovery of the lighting system, an update on air traffic control, and a cargo terminal (CL Brief, 2020b). The project, with an estimated cost of around $30 million, is expected to be developed during a period of four years. However, work has not begun yet, as it is dependent on technical preparations to be undertaken by both countries.

As regards trade relations, they are still insignificant and strongly unbalanced, although they have been increasing in recent years (+22% in 2019 comparing to 2018). From January to May 2020, China exported $351,000 but imported almost $2,000 in goods from São Tomé, meaning a total trade of $353,000 (slightly less than the $386,000 in the same period of 2019) (Forum China 2020). Last but not least, the bilateral relationship between São Tomé and Príncipe and China cannot be left outside the global context of competition for resources and influence in Africa.

4.2.2. What is at stake for São Tomé and Príncipe?

It is worth mentioning that, in the early decades of 2000, the U.S. was reportedly considering building a naval base in São Tomé and Príncipe to safeguard oil interests in the Gulf of Guinea region (Crabtree, 2018). However, as it became increasingly self-sufficient in energy sources (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2020), Washington started to shift its attention away from the Middle Atlantic and the Gulf of Guinea in particular, thereby opening a window of opportunity for Beijing to expand its interests in the region and take another step towards the consolidation of its global power status. As the social evolution theory claims, China is simply struggling to survive by adapting its means to cope with the encirclement posed by the U.S. in the north. In the process, China thus looks to the remote Middle Atlantic. For São Tomé and Príncipe, it would be very important to understand clearly what it can expect, not only from China but also from traditional partners such as the U.S. or some European countries (namely Portugal, considering the historical and cultural links), as it would be fundamental not to be dependent on the relationship with only one country. In this context, a country such as São Tomé and Príncipe, which carries the burden of government over-borrowing, which was even more exacerbated with the hidden debts' case (Macauhub, 2019), should take a close look at what is already happening in a significant number of African countries, i.e., the increasing tendency of over indebtedness towards China and its consequences (Pereira, 2020). Furthermore, the country, with all its fragilities and internal challenges (poor education, unemployment, excessive bureaucracy and lack of efficiency of public institutions…) needs to deepen the knowledge about itself and to figure out the role that it can play in the region. In other words, it needs to develop political thinking on how to take the best advantage of its geo-strategic position in the Gulf of Guinea (Neves, 2017; Bragança, 2019).

Directly related to this strategic thinking is the issue of oil exploration in São Tomé and Príncipe. Further to the signing of a Treaty with Nigeria which established the creation of a Joint Development Zone in 2003, and if a boom in oil exploration would be confirmed in the coming years, São Tomé must avoid, at all cost, the over-dependence on this resource

(the well-known "Dutch disease") (Sanguin, 2014). This positive outcome would be more easily guaranteed if a significant investment in good governance and institutional capacity building is made in the country, if necessary, building on the support and experience of institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.

5. Conclusion

The social evolution theory applied to the cases of Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe has shown that, despite the fact that academic literature has severely neglected the Middle Atlantic so far, this is bound to change. In fact, although the Middle Atlantic is a faraway ocean from China, the cases of Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe highlight the weight of geo-economics and geopolitics underlying China's growing incursions in these remote areas. Despite not being rich in natural resources, the small archipelago of Cabo Verde has been increasing cooperation with Beijing in recent years. The archipelago's privileged location in the Middle Atlantic provides it with great potential to become a centre of logistics and business, as well as a possible naval base for the People's Liberation Army navy in the long-term, inspired by the precedent of Djibouti's naval base in the Indian Ocean. In addition, China's massive investments in the archipelago's infrastructure projects provide practical evidence of Beijing's growing interests in Cabo Verde. In fact, the latter is bound to give China privileged access to a maritime area with plentiful resources and business opportunities, thus contributing to reinforcing China's presence in Africa.

As for São Tomé and Principe, ties with China have been flourishing since December 2016, after the archipelago ceased official recognition of Taiwan. For China, São Tomé and Príncipe can be a relevant transshipment hub for maritime trade between the Atlantic Ocean, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. In turn, for São Tomé and Príncipe, the recent resumption of bilateral relations with China is clearly considered as a lifeline, namely in a context of difficult financial conditions. Illustrative of these challenging times is the construction of a deep-water port and the modernization and expansion of the international airport, which are crucial for the development of the archipelago's economy and the fulfilment of its aspiration as a regional gateway in the Gulf of the Guinea region.

This helps explain why the Middle Atlantic is far from being a placeless void; it is quite the contrary: while NATO has been mainly concerned with Russia's maritime assertiveness in the North Atlantic, the Middle Atlantic seems to be a geo-strategic space where China is subtly advancing its interests. This is only possible given that while the North Atlantic has been chasse gardé of the U.S. and NATO, the Middle Atlantic has not been a geo-strategic priority for Washington, leaving thus China with more leeway to fill in such strategic vacuum. Ultimately, China's increasing interest in the Middle Atlantic is not qualitatively different from Beijing's interests and consequent naval assertiveness in other oceans. It is rather a matter of quantitative degree, time, and, above all, geo-economics, as there are no *forbidden waters*, just a permanent and pragmatic need to *adapt* and *survive*, as the theory of social evolution posits.

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Enhancing the Belt and Road Initiative with the SDGs: A Portuguese Silk Road Integrating Africa and the BRI

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Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Portuguese Silk Road

Abstract

Functional development models have a positive impact on communities, can heal and protect the planet, are economically and financially sustainable, and have faced and will continue to face many challenges.

Considering that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the largest development programme ever created by humankind, it is envisaged to be enhanced by adopting certain sustainable development goals (SDGs) as a global development language and to scale it up by integrating the whole African continent.

The approach used in this study consists of first analysing and finding common denominators between the SDGs and the Silk Road spirit, and, second, expanding it by adding the whole African continent to the programme. Considering the BRI, the connection between China and Europe is associated with two land routes via Russia and via Iran, and one maritime route via the Red Sea, to add, a new maritime route, The Portuguese Silk Road, around the Cape of Good Hope.

The results show that the SDG concept applies to BRI and that the strategy can be replicated to new geographies. That it is possible to design integrated development models that use the SDGs and the BRI that have a people-first approach, protect the planet aiming to net zero, and promote economic growth. These results imply that these types of development models can be applied bilaterally and multilaterally. The complexity added by taking multiple dimensions shall contribute to models that are more resilient and impactful, thereby promoting stronger relations in the long-term between the different parties, assisting UN member-states to jointly achieve the SDGs.

1. Introduction

This research covers the new development paradigm associated with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), on how SDGs enhance the Silk Road spirit to promote the development of strong institutions and sustainable partnerships, the new geo-economic center of gravity transition to the east, and the potential impact of adopting and integrating the SDGs into a *Portuguese* Silk Road.

Although Eurasia is a continuous territory, its geographical and cultural distances are large. The Silk Road represents the cultural and economic land bridge that was established for centuries. This relationship was also created in the 15th century by Portuguese navigators adding to trade and religion, a two-ocean perspective that included the African continent.

Figure 1 *The Portuguese Silk Road*



Source: Concept by the author and design adapted by Ana Thudichum Vasconcelos using The Belt and Road Initiative (Merics, 2018)

Today, two main trends must be considered, the first being a new global development paradigm that integrates simultaneously economic growth, social cohesion, and prosperity, named by the United Nations in 1987 as "sustainable development," adopted in 2015 as the basis of the United Nations 2030 agenda, unanimously approved by all UN member-states. The second is the fact that, through the Belt and Road (formerly "One Belt One Road") Initiative, the new Silk Road has become an impetus for China's economic growth to flow towards Europe.

The hypothesis considered in this chapter is to test if these new development paradigms can be used to improve the life of not only Eurasian but also African communities. In order words, the chapter examines not only Eurasia, but also the Portuguese Maritime Silk Road which includes an Africa situated between the Indian and the Atlantic Oceans.

The research starts by understanding the context of sustainable development, Sustainable Development Goals (UN Agenda, 2030), as well as the spirit of the historical (first) Silk Road. This context covers not only the economic growth within China but also its potential to export products and services to the rest of the world. This research is done via analyzing the relationships between the SDGs, the Silk Road spirit, and the BRI organization that supports it. Understanding the triangle composed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Tsinghua University, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), respectively, the implementing agency, the knowledge centre, and the financial arm have adopted the SDGs to implement the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), besides being probably the largest ever infrastructure development programme launched by any government, is also the base of the industrial policy that will represent the legacy of President Xi Jinping era. This programme combines, on one hand, the Silk Road spirit, being aligned with the SDGs, and, on the other hand, represents China's willingness to keep competitive prices in Europe by reducing transport costs. In parallel with infrastructure development projects in countries that are directly and indirectly part of the new Silk Road, China creates long-term financial relationships with each of these countries. Projects that were initially focused on reducing the costs of transport now have a broader scope.

The ability of each country to balance national public interest with the possibility of expanding its public investment capacity with Chinese finance has created a challenge for several countries. Portugal is an example where investment in the energy sector and potential port assets represent both an indirect and a direct approach of the BRI and China's industrial policy. Lusophone countries have similar challenges: long-term national public investment plans supported under the BRI umbrella, requiring as never before that public interest decision associated with vision and strategy to be evaluated carefully.

2. Literature Review

2.1 SDGs — A new development paradigm for the XXI century

Sustainable development represents a new paradigm that combines, simultaneously, agendas for people, planet, and prosperity. This process of combining economy, ethics, and environment can be traced to the work catalyzed by the United Nations in the past decades, but its origin dates back for centuries. This is an important perspective for understanding the present tendencies that take place across the world. The Industrial Revolution and the technological innovation associated with new ways to produce energy, to move goods and people, and to communicate, lead to unprecedented economic growth. In parallel, the impact of re-organizing people in cities to support the factories led to an urban environment characterized by a higher human density that was associated with social inequality originating from social conflicts. This challenge created the basis for people and social cohesion to be integrated into development agendas. The industrial urban transformation was also responsible for the poor quality of air, water, and solid waste management, raising the need to bring the environmental aspect into development. Although these challenges can be traced back to the 18th century, they were not approached as part of one development

equation. In the 1950s, Polanyi considered the simultaneous need to integrate *labour, land,* and *money* (Polanyi, 1944) representing an integrated approach combining environment, ethics, and the economy was taking shape by the mid-20th century.

In 1972, the UN discussed the need to associate the planet to its development agenda (United Nations, 1972), and later in 1987, Brundtland presented the concept of *sustainable development* (United Nations WCED, 1987), the innovation came from addressing simultaneously the social, environmental, and economic agendas and to incorporate them into an integrated development model. The sustainable development concept thus became a new paradigm, but it would take several more decades for it to evolve and be accepted globally. Key dates of this process are the UN conferences in Rio in 1992 Rio, in Johannesburg in 2002 (Rio + 10), and in Rio again in 2012 (Rio + 20). The full adoption by all UN member states came in 2015 when sustainable development was adopted as the UN agenda for 2030 (United Nations, 2015).

Sustainable development is associated with three Ps: People, Planet, and Prosperity. These cannot be separated; they must be developed in parallel. The concept has been accepted but its implementation has been and remains a challenge. Understanding sustainable development at the local level is complex and requires institutional innovation. When this is taken at the global level, the perception that multiple players and new rules are needed becomes even more evident. Implementation becomes the new challenge, and, to address it, new rules and new players are needed. A fourth P for *peace* and *strong institutions*, and a fifth for *partnerships* were added, and the Development *game* with three pillars, people, planet, prosperity had now rules and players for the game to be implemented. Development today, and considering the SDGs is associated with *people, planet, prosperity, peace* (and strong institutions), and *partnerships*.

Figure 2 *SDGs and the 5Ps: People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Strong Institutions, and Partnership*

Source: https://sdg.gdrc.org/post/128479353317/the-five-key-elements-5-ps-that-led-to-the

The current challenge and the way to address it is reflected today in the UN Agenda for 2030. The opening text of the agenda appeals to all development policymakers to adopt a new attitude towards fighting poverty while protecting the planet:

> We are resolved to free the human race from the tyranny of poverty and want and to heal and secure our planet.
>
> We are determined to take the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world onto a sustainable and resilient path.
>
> As we embark on this collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left behind. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets demonstrate the scale and ambition of this new universal Agenda. (UNDESA, 2015)

This new paradigm has been adopted by all member states through different institutional forms. The European Union (EU) in particular has been very explicit, as can be observed in this text from the EU consensus:

> The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), adopted by the United Nations in September 2015, is the international community's response to global challenges and trends in relation to sustainable development. With the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at its core, the 2030 Agenda is a transformative political framework to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development globally. It balances the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, including the key issues of governance and peaceful and inclusive societies, recognizing the essential interlinkages between its goals and targets. It must be implemented as a whole and not selectively. The 2030 Agenda aims to leave no-one behind and seeks to reach the furthest behind first. […] The 2030 Agenda and its 17 SDGs are universal and apply to all countries at all stages of development, based on national ownership and shared responsibility. Multi-stakeholder partnerships are key to the implementation of SDGs. (European Commission, Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, 2018)

2.2 Development in China and the Belt and Road Initiative

The last decades have been marked by the way that China has grown to become today the second-largest economy in the world and the associated impact, and through this process has taken 800 million people out of extreme poverty. This represents an alignment between development policies and transformational project implementation. It started by using a great deal of low-wage manpower but evolved to integrate new technologies and institutions. The complexity of the industry and the resulting products increased, and with it grew the quality of life and the cost of labour. To cope with exports and the improvement of labour conditions associated with labour costs, new integrated industrial policies and export strategies were required.

Figure 3 *Growing from strength-to-strength — Rapid growth means rising living standards*



Source: https://www.actionforex.com/live-comments/116400-imf-shift-from-high-speed-to-high-quality-growth-in-china-key-for-decades-to-come/

The symbology of the Silk Road and its spirit is reflected in the Belt and Road Initiative. Considering two variables of an export equation Labour and Transport Costs, to keep the prices competitive for the end buyers, and considering that the main market is composed of buyers in Europe, if the cost of labour increases, then transport costs have to decrease. Looking at the Silk Road as a complex transport network with multiple nations and multiple transport and logistics bottlenecks, the challenge becomes to address simultaneously countries and infrastructure assets and to transform nations into partners and bottlenecks into manageable processes and therefore to decrease transport time and consequently transport costs.

To approach this objective the Silk Road has been taken as a trade route to increase exports and optimize transport solutions. By associating in parallel development with the SDGs and with Trade and Cultural Exchanges, with Cooperation and Communication, a bridge is established between the past and the present, the east and the west development models. This perspective is reflected by the way the Silk Road is presented by NDRC.

> More than two millennia ago the diligent and courageous people of Eurasia explored and opened up several routes of trade and cultural exchanges that linked the major civilizations of Asia, Europe, and Africa, collectively called the Silk Road by later generations. For thousands of years, the Silk Road Spirit — "peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit" — has been passed from generation to generation, promoted the progress of human civilization, and contributed greatly to the prosperity and development of the countries along the Silk Road. Symbolizing communication and cooperation between the East and the West, the Silk Road Spirit is a historic and cultural heritage shared by all countries around the world.

> In the 21st century, a new era marked by the theme of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit, it is all the more important for us to carry on the Silk Road Spirit in face of the weak recovery of the global economy, and complex international and regional situations.
>
> When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Central Asia and Southeast Asia in September and October of 2013, he raised the initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (hereinafter referred to as the Belt and Road), which have attracted close attention from all over the world.
>
> The Belt and Road Initiative aims to promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas.
>
> The Belt and Road Initiative is in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. It upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
>
> The Belt and Road run through the continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end and developed European economic circle at the other, and encompassing countries with huge potential for economic development (NDRC, 2015).

3. Discussion — Analysis

3.1 Enhancing the Belt and Road Initiative via the SDGs

3.1.1 The Magic Triangle to Implement BRI

The Silk Road represents China's industrial and export policy, and the Belt and Road Initiative the implementation programme. The government of China has chosen the NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission) to implement the BRI, with two supporting arms — Tsinghua University as a knowledge centre and think tank, where the best practices of world development models are researched for Chinese adoption and adaptation; and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as the economic arm to structure the necessary financial solutions.

The recognition to have an institution to vertically and horizontally, design and implement medium and long-term development is not the only key for BRI but the success of China growth, as described by NDRC main functions:

> To formulate and implement strategies of national economic and social development, annual plans, medium and long-term development plans; to coordinate economic

> and social development; to carry out research and analysis on domestic and international economic situation; to put forward targets and policies concerning the development of the national economy, the regulation of the overall price level and the optimization of major economic structures, and to make recommendations on the employment of various economic instruments and policies; to submit the plan for national economic and social development to the National People's Congress on behalf of the State Council. (NDRC, 2015)

Recognizing and adopting innovation as a key for development success represents the need to create an environment for knowledge to thrive consistently. China has adopted a proactive approach to research and development and has adopted a clear partnership between proactive academy research centres and policymakers. Tsinghua University represents this knowledge centre, where researchers from around the world share best practices and see them being adopted and adapted to the Chinese reality. This tangible and very explicit use of technological as well as institutional innovation creates a development ecosystem for social scientists to live an ongoing social lab. Institutional Innovation is used by present and future global leaders. The living experience of being part of the Tsinghua team of experts namely on the design of new partnership models to implement BRI allows testifying the efficiency of the process. The rationale behind Tsinghua University is reflected:

> With the motto of "Self-Discipline and Social Commitment" and the spirit of "Actions Speak Louder than Words", Tsinghua University is dedicated to the well-being of Chinese society and to world development. As one of China's most prestigious and influential universities, Tsinghua is committed to cultivating global citizens who will thrive in today's world and become tomorrow's leaders. Through the pursuit of education and research at the highest level of excellence, Tsinghua is developing innovative solutions that will help solve pressing problems in China and the world. (Tsinghua University, 2019)

Having an implementing agency and a knowledge centre represents having a vehicle and a driver to define direction and goals, the third element is the energy to allow the vehicle to move. The energy, in this case, is the capital that is required for program and project implementation. Considering that multilateral development banks can transform an origination pipeline of ideas into bankable projects, by structuring the required finance, combining equity, debt, and sovereign guaranty instruments, and ensure the delivery of infrastructure assets that will solve bottlenecks affecting trade, the need to have this instrument is vital for the process. Considering that the global framework of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are based in Washington, D.C., for the World Bank Group (WBG), and in Manila for the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the same concept was adapted for a Beijing IFI, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was created. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Articles of Agreement, Article 1 Purpose:

> The purpose of the Bank shall be to (i) foster sustainable economic development, create wealth and improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by investing in infrastructure and other productive sectors; and (ii) promote regional cooperation and partnership in addressing development challenges by working in close collaboration with other multilateral and bilateral development institutions. (AIIB, 2021)

This triangle, composed of an implementing agency, knowledge centre, and a financial institution, or vehicle, driver, and energy, is not new, but, as with the SDGs, the fact that it is organized simultaneously and its geographic centre of gravity is now in China represents another development paradigm.

Figure 4 *The Magic Triangle to implement the BRI: Think (Tsinghua University), Finance (AIIB), Implement (NDRC)*

Source: Perspective developed by the author

3.1.2 Matching SDGs with the Silk Road spirit

The SDGs represent a new paradigm of development for multiple reasons. For the first time there is a global development policy that brings together not only the East and the West, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, the north and the south. It is also the largest public investment budget ever considered, representing $4.9 tn per year, and considering that the public sector can provide $1.4 tn, it is expected that the private sector will participate with $2.5 tn (Oteh et al., 2018). This represents the need to have at the table both public and private sectors. As 50% of today's population is urban, and with the figure expected to grow to 70% by 2050, and cities accounting for 80% of the global GDP and 70% of greenhouse gas emissions (WorldBankGroup, 2021), it is also vital that when the public sector is considered, both national and subnational levels are involved. The need to bring different players to the development policy table represents the need for institutional innovation to consider different geometries, leading to new rules of the game and new players. The biggest challenge however remains in writing development equations where the social, environmental, and economic dimensions are considered in parallel, knowing that the objective is simultaneously to leave no one behind and to *heal and protect the planet* for humans to live in.

These are some of the main challenges brought by the SDGs and that can be synthesized by people, the planet, prosperity, peace and strong institutions, and partnerships. These five Ps,

presented in no particular order, are found at the Silk Road spirit. Peace and cooperation are easily linked to peace and partnerships, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning, and mutual benefits, bring the interrelation between economic prosperity and social cohesion or in SDGs terms to People and Prosperity. Looking at Silk Road Cooperation Priorities, this relationship can also be made. Policy Coordination refers to the Players of the Game and the Rules of the Game, and Facilities Connectivity in today's world to our relationship with the territory and the planet. Unimpeded Trade and Financial Integration to Economic Prosperity, and People to People Bond, with the People agenda.

Figure 5 *Aligning SDGs with Silk Road Spirit and Cooperation Priorities*

Source: Concept developed by the author

3.2 The Portuguese Silk Road integrates the African continent in BRI

3.2.1 Adding Africa and the Atlantic to the Silk Road

The Portuguese *Silk Road* (Neves, 2019) brings an Atlantic dimension to the world's largest infrastructure programme. The corridor definition that combines a pair of origin-destiny between China and Europe is kept, where China is the origin, and Portugal (the port of Sines) is the destination, being the first European port for the Cape Route. It represents as well that all Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa become part of this development programme based on partnerships that work (Neves, 2017) and associated with the SDGs. This also brings an industrial policy, where all benefit from developing their infrastructure assets and management processes enhancing trading of products and services.

As China has created a triangle combining implementation, knowledge, and capital, the same could be used by the Portuguese speaking nations where, for example, Comunidade de Países de Lingua Portuguesa (CPLP), and other cities or nations, such as Macau and China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, involved in the Portuguese Silk Road, could be the implementing agency, a group of Universities from these cities and nations, such as the City University of Macau, Universidade Joaquim Chissano University, Universidade Agostinho Neto, Universidade de Lisboa, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, and others, could team up to form a knowledge center, and a group of Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) from each of these nations and cities could originate a pipeline of investable and sustainable

projects for people not to be left behind to protect the planet while promoting prosperity.

3.3 Possible SDG strategy for the Portuguese Silk Road

Another contribution of the SDGs is to privilege action plans and policies based on evidence rather than ideologies. A possible development equation shows SDGs, can be translated into a common language, with an implementable development model. This represents public participation not only at member-state level but also having its people and their entrepreneurs.

Looking to the Portuguese Silk Road, considering the first goal, *No Poverty* (Goal 1) of the SDGs, and accepting the best way to eradicate poverty is through local job creation and *Decent Work associated with Economic Growth* (Goal 8), this could be the starting point for a development strategy. This represents a need for *Quality Education* (Goal 4), which means that projects should include hands-on training, knowledge transfer, and privilege local participation at all decision-making levels, local labour, and local services. Education and economic growth should therefore aim to *Reduce Inequalities and promote Gender Equality* (Goals 5 and 10). The transformation process should also consider at its base to *fight hunger and improve the health and well-being* of the communities (Goals 2 and 3). Considering the urbanization trend, and the need to improve the quality of life in cities, namely improving housing and transport policies, the impact projects will have on the major corridor cities, leads to promote *Sustainable Cities* (Goal 11). These Cities are at the heart of *the Industrial Policies that require Innovation* and articulate the necessary *infrastructure for its growth* (Goal 9). Cities and industries also require an integrated approach to the water cycle, (Goal 6) and the use of *Renewable Energies* (Goal 7). This transformation must take us from a linear economy to a circular economy, associated with *responsible consumption and production* (Goal 12). The circular economy, complete water cycle, and a renewable energy approach associated with affordability will answer and improve the relationship with nature, namely the oceans (Goal 14), the land, and the forest (Goal 15). These processes enhance resilience to a path that deals with climate change (Goal 13). To achieve these goals, strong institutions are essential to promote and keep the peace. This approach will create the proper environment for local players to be involved and attract international players with investing and financing capacity.

Using the qualitative equations (Neves, 2020) represented in the figure below is just one way to organize an indicative development backbone, that can be an example of the added value that nations and cities can take from integrated solutions that use the SDGs as a common language.

Figure 6 *Possible SDG Strategy for the Portuguese Silk Road*

Source: Concept developed by the autho

4. Conclusion

The SDGs and BRI are new development paradigms. The SDGs form a global development agenda approved unanimously by all UN member-states, and have a people-first approach, coupling economic prosperity with social cohesion and planet protection. China's economic growth has marked global prosperity and has taken millions of people out of poverty.

The SDGs can be found embedded in the Silk Road spirit, which has guided the Belt and Road Initiative. China has been an important industrial centre of the world and its industrial policy allied with BRI has made China a new player across the world with an impact in developing economies. BRI can be associated with three routes, starting in China, and going west, and arriving in Europe. The first is a land route that goes north and crosses Russia, the second goes east and arrives in Europe via Turkey, and the third is a maritime route, that enters Europe via the red sea.

The Portuguese Silk Road should be considered as a fourth route that rounds the Cape of Good Hope and therefore brings to this development corridor the African continent, namely, the African Indian countries as well as those in the Atlantic.

The SDGs strategy at the Portuguese Silk Road, with Macau as its natural point of origin, and associated with the SDGs as an implementation strategy, could enhance the implementation of the BRI. This could focus on fighting poverty by promoting trade associated with local industrial development, sustainable cities, where education, health, agriculture are taken in integrated development models where local jobs, services, and products are privileged. These development models including an environmental approach represent water as well, energy, waste management approaches that allow countries to accelerate circular economies, protect the environment, and promote resilient policies that combat climate change.

A Portuguese Silk Road linking all Portuguese-speaking communities with the SDGs and the BRI is a way to promote sustainable development for the Silk Road, where routes of trade and cultural exchanges link the major civilizations of Asia, Europe, and Africa to promote peace and cooperation, openness, and inclusiveness, mutual learning, and mutual benefit and leave no one behind.

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The Geopolitical Idiosyncrasies of Guinea-Bissau

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Guinea-Bissau, CPLP, African Union, Geopolitics, Narcotrafficking, Bauxite, Casamance.

Abstract

This chapter analyzes several idiosyncrasies of Guinea-Bissau to answer the following research question: How may Guinea-Bissau overcome its permanent governance instability and avoid becoming a "failed state"? This question is particularly important in the context of avoiding being exposed to the economic interests of external actors. The analysis on this subject is strengthened with interviews with Bissau-Guineans from different backgrounds, complementing and contrasting the outsider academic non-participatory observations with opinions of those who have experienced Guinea-Bissau's daily life.

Guinea-Bissau is a small archipelagic country in Western Africa with an interesting portfolio of natural resources, investment opportunities, and business prospects. However, it has suffered decades of institutional instability and social fragility, resulting in the country being rated as "developed." Once the ideological cradle of colonial self-determination, Guinea-Bissau fought valiantly to gain independence from its former colonial power (1963–1974), unilaterally proclaiming independence on September 24, 1973 (Té, 2015, p. 30). Regrettably, however, after gaining recognition as a sovereign country, Guinea-Bissau has witnessed four effective coup d'états, several other (suspected) attempts, and one civil war. Several reasons have contributed to Guinea-Bissau's instability: (1) neighbouring countries' interests; (2) intense international influence and pressure; (2) poor literacy; (3) internal ethnic clashes; (4) military power overlapping political governance; (4) widespread corruption; (5) a misperception of democratic values; (6) a lack of vision and strategy in political parties; (7) systemic abuse of power; and (8) under-resourced and sloppy surveillance of the borders of the archipelago (comprising over 80 islands and islets). All these factors jeopardize the country's economy, drain its resources, and expose its borders to the threat of narcotrafficking. A

recent struggle between the President and the parliament regarding the foreseen revision of the constitutional law has further reignited political instability in Guinea-Bissau. Apart from the direct completion posed by Senegal, Guinea-Bissau has potential to become a reference economy in Western Africa, and an entry door for the multimillion consumers market of the Economic Community of West African States and the West African Monetary and Economic Union. However, nothing of the kind will ever happen without political stability and, for that to happen, there's an urgent need for Guinea-Bissau's defense and security sectors to reform. A reform not only in its structures but, above all, in mentalities, based on the role of the military in a representative democracy, strengthening the popular sovereignty over the military apparatus. This research has adopted a descriptive-inductive qualitative methodology, complemented with interviews with Guinea-Bissau's opinion leaders and representatives of its diaspora, as well as former Portuguese colonial agents. The authors wish to acknowledge that, due to the insufficiency of official sources, a number of media sources is used in this study, as well as online interviews with representatives of Guinea-Bissau's diaspora. Thus, we are taking the associated risk of academic inaccuracy to mitigate the scarcity of academic sources.

1. Introduction

Guinea-Bissau is internationally known as a country with high political-military instability, a "failed-state," and characteristic of a "narco-state" (Clarke, 2017). However, there is more to this western African country than meets the eye. To understand the instability of Guinea-Bissau's governance, one must first look at its history. Guinea-Bissau is a small coastal and archipelagic territory, covered by lush vegetation, located in the westernmost part of the African continent, halfway between the Equator and the Tropic of Cancer. The country is heavily irrigated by rivers and marshy areas, with more than 80 islands and islets forming what is called the "Bijagós Archipelago" just a short distance off its coast.

Before the arrival of Europeans on the west coasts of Africa, a large part of Guinea-Bissau belonged to the kingdom of Gabú, a tributary of the legendary Mali Empire of the Mandingas, which had flourished from 1235 and survived until the 18th century. The ethnic groups that inhabited the territory were the Balanta, Fulani, Mandayako, and Molinke (Medeiros, 2016). The first European explorers to reach the coast of present-day Guinea-Bissau was the Portuguese navigator Nuno Tristão and the group he led, in 1446, but they did not stay long. Only much later did the Portuguese return with the intention to establish trading outposts on that coastline. Portuguese colonization began in 1558 with the founding of Cacheu (town) (Medeiros, 2016). However, the Portuguese restricted their presence to the coast and along the banks of the main rivers. In the 17th century, a Captaincy-General of Portuguese Guinea was established, and in 1697, the town of Bissau was founded as a military fortification and a slave trade warehouse. Bissau was later elevated to "main city" status, and became the territory's capital, a status it has kept ever since (Medeiros, 2016).

Portuguese colonization throughout the interior of the territory only started in the 19th century, mostly due to the Berlin Conference (1884–1885). In that conference, European

powers claiming territories in Africa signed a colonial pact, demarcating the African continent into occupied territories under European jurisdictions (Portal Diplomatico). However, those borders were defined without taking into account the natives' reality on the ground — families from the same tribe were separated with a pencil-drawn line on a (poorly designed) map. Although some of the indigenous nations had sophisticated organizational structures, which included defence actions and the use of diplomacy in their relations with the Portuguese, the terms of the Berlin Conference altered that status quo. Furthermore, Guinea-Bissau was the only Portuguese-speaking territory located in what was a French-speaking area of Africa. The absence of Portuguese settlers in the interior of the territory meant that its natural resources were explored by French companies. Due to the rising threat of losing that territory to other European powers, Portugal began colonizing the interior of the territory, imposing its political dominance over tribes with which, until then, had only maintained commercial relations (including slave trade).

Portuguese Guinea, as it was known back then, like all other Portuguese territories in Africa and Asia, enjoyed considerable autonomy, with weak control from Lisbon (Rosas 1998). Following the most avant-garde currents of the 19th century, the Portuguese overseas territories were called "overseas provinces" (not colonies), in an attempt to integrate and assimilate those territories into the national structure. However, in 1933 the Portuguese President of the Council of Ministers (António de Oliveira Salazar) released a new constitution of his own design. That constitution incorporated something called the "Colonial Act" — a law that removed all autonomy from the parliament and centralized the legislative and executive power in the government. According to that new constitution, all matters related to the overseas territories was filed under the Ministry of Colonies. The "overseas provinces" were reclassified as "colonies," and the set of Portuguese overseas territories was renamed "the Portuguese Colonial Empire" (Portuguese Law 22:465 from 11 April 1933). That designation of "empire" was somewhat strange, as Portugal had never had an emperor. What did happen was that António Salazar took over the reins of power and created the "Estado Novo" (new state), exercising the "Pax Lusitana" in which the people would be represented through corporations rather than political parties, and where national interest was given priority over sectional claims (Kay, 1970). Therefore, Salazar stated a repressive, dictatorship regime over the homeland and the colonies.

In 1946, one year after the creation of the United Nations, Portugal expressed its desire to join, but was vetoed by Russia, alleging that Portugal disrespected the UN Charter as it denied people of its colonies access to self-determination. Simultaneously, as a result of the subliminal initiatives of the "Cold War," voices were beginning to disagree with Salazar's policies, both in European Portugal and in the overseas "colonies." In 1951, under great internal and external pressure, the Portuguese Constitution was reviewed and a new law entered into force — which revoked the Colonial Act and renamed the "colonies" "overseas provinces" — to strengthen national unity. Thus, Guinea-Bissau was now known as the "Overseas Province of Portuguese Guinea," as foreseen in the revision of the Portuguese Republic Constitution expressed in the law 2:48; Title VII; Chapter I; article 134 — 11 June 1951. Nine years after having first submitted its credentials to join the United Nations, in

1955, Portugal was finally accepted into the UN. However, the "Pax Lusitana" had already been facing passive resistance from, for example, Portuguese Guinea (Monteiro, 2011).

In 1956, Amílcar Cabral led the founding of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC). He first tried to negotiate a gradual path towards independence for Guinea-Bissau, with obvious negative results (D'Mari Sanca/Miate Bonte Có, 2017). In August 1959, sailors and dockworkers at the Port of Bissau went on strike, demanding better wages and better living conditions (D'Mari Sanca/Miate Bonte Có, 2017). The protestors decided to demonstrate at the harbour, but the police demobilized it using firearms. Allegedly, 50 demonstrators were killed, and more than 100 were wounded (DW, 2014). Not having been successful in the dialogue with the Portuguese authorities, Amílcar Cabral led his party to a liberation war. In 1963, two years after the start of the combats in Angola and the loss of the Portuguese colonies in India, freedom fighters of PAIGC began their armed struggle against the colonial regime. Out of the three overseas theatres of operations (Angola, Portuguese Guinea, and Mozambique), Guinea-Bissau was considered the fiercest combat zone, with heavy casualties on both sides. Interviewing the President of the Portuguese Former Combatants' League — General Chito Rodrigues –– it became perfectly clear that, in the early 1970s, after 11 years of fighting, contrary to what was happening in Angola and Mozambique, the Portuguese soldiers were starting to feel that the war outcome in Guinea-Bissau would not favour the Portuguese forces. The Portuguese military only had control of the urban areas, and had lost air supremacy due to PAIGC guerrillas' use of surface-to-air missiles. Meanwhile, Amílcar Cabral managed to engage in diplomatic venues and was gaining international recognition of his cause. PAIGC participated in some UN events as a representative of the Bissau-Guinean opposition, and managed to bring a UN envoy to the territories under PAIGC control, conveying to them the idea that Portugal no longer had the right to represent the people of Guinea-Bissau at the UN.

In 1973, Amílcar Cabral decided to do something innovative in terms of international politics: a unilateral declaration of independence. As a result of his diplomatic efforts, that symbolic act would gain immediate recognition from several countries friendly to the Bissau-Guinean cause. However, months before making that declaration, Amílcar Cabral was assassinated in Conakry (RTP, 2017), so he himself never tasted independence. Despite his death, the struggle for independence continued, and on September 24 of that year, the new leadership of PAIGC made a unilateral declaration of Guinea-Bissau's independence. In the ensuing months, the independence of Guinea-Bissau was recognized by several countries (Andrade, 1974), most of whom from the "Eastern Bloc" and African countries aligned with Moscow. Meanwhile, the fight against Portuguese forces continued, without showing any signs of subsiding. In April 1974, the Portuguese military staged a coup d'état in Lisbon, overthrowing the dictatorship regime, opening the way to democracy. Soon after that, the new Portuguese regime decided to recognize the right to independence of all overseas provinces. Guinea-Bissau was the first such overseas province to be recognized by Portugal as a sovereign independent state, on September 10, 1974. This recognition of Guinea-Bissau's independence was followed by most UN countries, and, on 17 September, 1974, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 356 (UNSC RES 356, August 12, 1974),

attributing UN membership status to the sovereign Republic of Guinea-Bissau. Relations between Portugal and Guinea-Bissau have since become very cordial, and there is now a very significant diaspora of Bissau-Guineans living in Portugal.

During its first 17 years of independence, Guinea-Bissau was run by an autocratic, Soviet-inspired, one-party regime. As its name suggests, the PAIGC's political project foresaw that Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde, initially constituted as separate states, would tend towards unification. Therefore, after their independence, although existing as two sovereign countries, they were to be governed by the same party. That idealistic concept lasted until 1980, but, on November 14 of that year, a coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau overthrew the first president of the republic (Teixeira, 2010), Luís Cabral (brother of the late Amílcar Cabral), and suspended the constitution of the republic, instituting the Council of the Revolution, formed by military and civilians. That coup d'état marked the end of the project of unification of the two countries. Nevertheless, Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau have always maintained very good diplomatic relations. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, like most other countries that enjoyed logistic and technical support from the Soviet Union, Guinea-Bissau entered a deep economic crisis. To overcome this crisis, the Bissau-Guinean government resorted to soliciting financing from the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, this option implied adherence to the neoliberal development model, which, in turn, resulted in the reform of the political regime and facilitated a multi-party system, bringing the expectation of building a more active and participatory society in political affairs.

In 1998–99 there was another coup d'état (Teixeira, 2010), followed by a bloody civil war that ousted President Nino Vieira (who had carried out the 1980 coup d'état). In 2003, a new military coup deposed of President Kumba Ialá, this time without bloodshed. Nino Vieira again assumed power, but was assassinated in 2009. In 2010, there was a military revolt that, after negotiations, was extinguished. In 2011, there was a failed attempt at a coup d'état, and in 2012, there was a new coup d'état that deposed of the incumbent president, Raimundo Pereira, while President Malam Bacai Sanhá died of unknown causes in Paris (Infante, 2016). Since the 1991 presidential election, which opened the country to a multi-party system, only one Bissau-Guinean president has fulfilled his term to the end without being assassinated, dying of unknown causes, or being deposed of in a military coup.

2. The Notion of National Space

Guinea-Bissau is located on the west coast of Africa, with an area of 36,125 km², of which 22% are alluvial river areas, with numerous islands along a very jagged coast. The mainland part of the country has a maximum length of 300 km and its widest width is about 250 km. The country has abundant hydrophilic forest, swampy regions, and mangroves under the influence of large tides, and the inflow of marine waters can go beyond 100 km inside mainland. The highest point in all of Guinea-Bissau's territory is 300 m. It borders Senegal to the north, Guinea-Conakry to the south and east, and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. Administratively speaking, the territory is divided into two distinct parts: a continental part, and an insular part — the Bijagós Archipelago, consisting of around 80 islands and

islets, is separated from the mainland by the channels of Geba, Pedro Álvares, Bolama, and Canhabaque. In 1996, UNESCO classified the Bijagós Archipelago as a World Biosphere Ecological Reserve (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2015), and only 17 out of the 80+ islands are inhabited. Guinea-Bissau is a unitary state, comprising eight regions: Bafatá, Biombo, Bolama Bijagós, Cacheu, Gabu, Oio, Quinara, and the autonomous sector of Bissau and Tombali. The regions are divided into sectors comprising sections and villages.

Figure 1 *Location of Guinea-Bissau in Western Africa, and territorial organization of Guinea-Bissau*



Source: Paulo Gonçalves (2021)

Guinea-Bissau has 280 km of coastline, with a smooth continental shelf where the waters are not too deep, which is favourable to large quantities of fish. The territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles (21.6 km) beyond the coastline and, immediately afterwards, there is the country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which respects the lateral limits of territorial waters but extends 200 nautical miles (360 km) beyond the furthest island of the Bijagos Archipelago. In total, the EEZ of Guinea-Bissau has 150,000 km², of which 45,000 km² are continental shelf (Câmara de Comércio e Indústria Portugal-Guiné Bissau 2016). The climate is tropical, composed mainly of two seasons — a rainy season from May to October and a dry season from November to April. Heavy rains are concentrated from July to September (Hikersbay, 2022) thus offering nine straight months of potential good weather for tourism. Regarding management of the territory, a national network of several protected areas covering about 470,000 hectares in total has been established (Instituto de Biodiversidade e Areas Protegidas da Guiné-Bissau, 2008). Two thirds of those protected areas are marine or estuarine spaces containing regulated fishing zones, in compliance with the Regional Marine Conservation Program (PRCM). These areas play a central role in the reproduction and regeneration of fish, shrimp, and mollusc stocks, ensuring the sustainable exploitation of these strategic resources. Therefore, due to the specificities of these subjects, the authorities of Guinea-Bissau created the Institute of Biodiversity and Protected Areas (IBAP).

3. People and National Identity

According to Ministry of Planning Economy and Regional Integration of Guinea-Bissau (2020), the country has a population of 1,624,945 million inhabitants. In Bissau, the capital of the country, lived approximately half a million people. The average life expectancy for men was 56.62 years, and for women it was 60.52. Overall, the average age of Bissau-Guineans is 34.5 years, hence it is considered a young population. The population of Guinea-Bissau is characterized (ANEME report 2018) by having an interesting amount of different African ethnicities. Although no ethnic group has the majority (50.1%) in relation to the national population, the Balantas constitute the most representative minority, with 27% of the population. They are followed by the Fulas (23%), the Mandingas (12%), Manjacos of Cacheu, (around 11%), the Papeis of Bissau (10%), and the remaining 17% composed of smaller ethnic groups such as the Felupes, the Baiotes, the Mancanhas or Brames, the Biafares, the Nalus, and the Bijagós.

In Guinea-Bissau's recent history, there has been no internal conflicts purely based on ethnic issues. Ethnic multiplicity has, in fact, been a source of national pride and anti-colonial sentiment, as the harmonious integration between Bissau-Guinean groups is considered unusual (Teixeira, 2020). However, with deteriorating economic situations and growing levels of corruption and nepotism, allegations of ethnic differentiation among the Bissau-Guinean population have emerged (interview with diaspora representative Tcherno Baldé). The proliferation of political parties, many of them with regional implementation where there is a hegemony of a certain ethnic group, opens the field to interpretations that there is ethnic-based partisanships. This relatively new ethno-religious differentiation in Guinea-Bissau is starting to get noticed in, for example, the selection of political leaders, parliamentarians, and high offices in the Guinea-Bissau state. In Guinea-Bissau, the "religion" factor plays an important role in the political arena. Religious differences are respected and, like ethnicity, have not been a reason for internal conflict. However, there is a stark contrast between the legitimacy of state authority and traditional local authorities. Local religious leaders have much higher precedence than secular state officials. The Bissau-Guinean population is made up of various ethnic groups representing different religious orientations. The Animist religion is practiced by 44.9% of the population, Islamic (Sunni) represents 41.9% of the population, Christians are 11.9%, and others (including atheists) will not be more than 1.3% (ANEME report 2018). It is the indigenous Animist religious system that has the greatest influence on the country's political culture, with practices that allow state officials to legitimize their authority and overcome the impasse of ethnic heterogeneity, compensating for loose relations between government and citizens. The manipulation of religious (animistic) symbolism by certain leaders with political ambitions in Guinea-Bissau is characteristic of the so-called "Africanization of Power," something that operates between superstition and the transcendental, and empowers authoritarian organizations. Regarding language, although the official language is Portuguese, the population communicates daily relations in Creole (which mixes African and Portuguese linguistic elements). Therefore, one can say that Guinea-Bissau has a polyglot population. According to Atlas Mundial de Dados (2021), the official language is Portuguese, but only about 27.1% are fully fluent in

it. Portuguese is used in documents, public ceremonies, the media, and in schools. Creole is a *lingua franca* used by 90.4% of the population, and it is through Creole that most social, economic, and political relations are conveyed. There are also tribes, making up 2.4% of the population, which speak a dialect of the Sudanese language belonging to the Black African language branch. French is spoken by 5.1% of the population, and English by 2.4%. The sum here is greater than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer in the 2008 census.

With a recent history of coups d'état, attempted coups d'état, assassinations of politicians, a civil war and a haughty attitude of the military towards the political rulers, Guinea-Bissau has been regressing in terms of human development and has characterized itself as a "failed-state," with nuances of a "narcotrafficking-state." These disparage qualifications are substantiated by reports of international organizations with responsibilities in these matters serious In fact, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has characterized Guinea-Bissau as a "landfall" of most cocaine entering Africa from South America, in transit to Europe (UNODC 2008), and, according to the non-governmental organization Transparency International (2021), Guinea-Bissau is considered a "highly corrupted" country, ranking 165 out of 180 countries. The Cambridge Dictionary defines a "failed state" as "a country whose government is considered to have failed at some of its basic responsibilities, for example keeping the legal system working correctly and providing public services such as electricity, water, education, and hospitals." However, although Guinea-Bissau has serious problems regarding social stability and poverty, it does not mean that its (actual) government has lost control of the country.

In the 1990s, with the opening of the country to a multi-party system and private initiative, private schools began to appear. Due to better salaries and the prestige of private institutions, the best qualified teachers began to abandon the public education system and move towards private education. On the other hand, the country's growing economic crisis led to major cuts in the state budgets dedicated to the education sector, with parents of students having to bear more and more expenses with their children's education, and school dropouts began to grow significantly (Alves & Rêses, 2021). As a general rule, the level of computer skills of Guinea-Bissau students is less than basic, because access to computer equipment is very scarce and the internet network works poorly. All of this has two negative consequences: on the one hand, in situations of movement restriction or confinement due to pandemics or natural disasters, teaching stops completely, as there is no possibility of taking classes online; on the other hand, as the higher technical education system is deficient and students have to do study abroad, they face extra difficulty because Bissau-Guineans start from a much lower level of knowledge than most of their colleague students in the host nation. In interviews conducted with elements of class of teachers, there were many criticisms to the current educational system. According to members of the teachers' body, access to the education sector requires a partisan posture, because both teachers and support staff are selected by their political party card, rather than on their merit or curriculum. Likewise, career movement depends more on party position than on profession credits.

In 2017, the United Nations Mission to Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS, 2020) reported that the country had reached a literacy rate of 49.9% among adults, which meant that, if this pace continued, it had reached a total literacy rate of 70% by 2020. To this end, the United Nations Children's Fund — UNICEF — worked in partnership with the Ministry of Education and other partners in the country program 2016–2020 focusing on primary education. However, although being a commendable effort, the scholarship level ambitioned was quite low — just being able to read and write — and approximately 44% of children aged 6 to 11 years were out of the education system, due to lack of access and poor quality of education.

4. Geo-economic Perspectives

The Guinea-Bissau geo-economic perspectives are discussed in the context of the following sectors: Fisheries, the extension of the continental shelf, aquaculture, agriculture, tourism, mining, offshore mining and oil.

4.1. Fisheries

With the exponential growth of the world's population, and concerns about the reduction of gases with greenhouse effects, the fishery sector assumes increasing importance. Due to its geographical location, the waters of Guinea-Bissau are particularly rich in fish abundance and diversity, and can simultaneously contribute to the food security of humanity, as well as to the country's sustained economic prosperity. The reason for such a wealth of marine life is essentially due to three interrelated factors. First, Guinea-Bissau's continental shelf provides large tracts of shallow seabed that are permanently irrigated with sediment brought in by the country's many freshwater courses. Secondly, the oceanic waters of Guinea-Bissau are covered by very specific currents that, in conjunction with the offshore winds, produce a phenomenon called "upwelling," which generates rising sea currents that bring nutrients deposited on deeper seabed to the surface. Thirdly, the coastal areas of Guinea-Bissau have the second highest concentration of mangroves in West Africa, and the 12th in the world (Dias, 2019). Mangroves are plant formations that develop in transition zones between marine and terrestrial environments, where there is great biodiversity. About 90% of marine organisms spend part of their life in this ecosystem, with 80% of the world's fish catches dependent on mangroves (International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2021). It should also be noted that, according to Nieto and Mélin (2017), Guinea-Bissau has large concentrations of phytoplankton on the continental shelf (the most extensive in the entire Gulf of Guinea) with the particularity of maintaining high levels of phytoplankton practically all year round, contrary to the seasonality of other coastal regions. Given that phytoplankton is the food base for all marine life, it is not surprising that the coast of Guinea-Bissau has very considerable fishery resources. Fishing activity in Guinea-Bissau comprises artisanal fishing — carried out in coastal waters (inland waters and territorial sea) — and industrial fishing outside the 12-mile zone. Given the high biodiversity of its waters, the extensive area of its continental shelf favourable to fishing activity, as well as the various international agreements in force, the Guinea-Bissau EEZ is frequented by a significant number of industrial fishing vessels. Taken into consideration the type of fishing

activity exercised, three fishing zones have been defined in Guinea-Bissau's waters (Table 1).

Table 1 *Types of Fishing Activities*

1	Artisanal fishing zone	Inland waters and territorial sea
2	Industrial fishing zones	Beyond 12 miles from coastline baseline
3		Common maritime zone between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal with irregular bottoms up to 200 meters deep, where there are abundant fishing resources are located.

Source: ANEME Report 2018

However, although geographical and climatological conditions enhance the replenishment of fish and crustacean stocks, there are serious problems regarding illegal fishing by both industrials and artisanal fleets (Sanca, 2021). In 2020, Guinea-Bissau's Undersecretary of State for Fisheries, Jeremias Intchama, told a leading Portuguese newspaper (Diário de Notícias, 2020) that the annual share of fisheries in Guinea-Bissau's Gross Domestic Product was 4% and created direct employment for 6,134 people and indirect employment for 26,000 Bissau-Guineans. Paradoxically, due to the predominance of an agricultural tradition in Guinea-Bissau, and because there has never been a fishing fleet worthy of the name in Guinea-Bissau, Guineans eat little fish. According to Jeremias Intchama, "foreign industrial fishing vessels are generally obliged, either through fishing agreements or the legal chartering regime, to disembark and sell part of their catch in national markets" (Diário de Notícias, 2020). This option seeks to solve the food shortage problem that plagues the country. However, post-capture activities are very restricted in Guinea-Bissau, and almost all industrial fishing vessels disembark their catch in Dakar –– Senegal, Abidjan –– Cote D'ivoire, or Las Palmas –– Spain. The fish will them travel from those ports to the final destination in Africa and/or Europe. The reasons for this situation are related not only to the small size of the Bissau-Guinean market, but also to the fact that Guinea-Bissau does not have adequate infrastructure and services for these industrial fishing fleets to operate in the only port in the country – Bissau. Namely, the absence of an internationally recognized quality certification system, excessive bureaucracy, little port capacity, lack of large refrigerated warehouses, lack of qualified personnel, poor road connectivity. In addition to the fishery agreement with neighbouring Senegal, Guinea-Bissau has fisheries partnership agreements with the EU and the People's Republic of China, which are the main trading partners in Guinea-Bissau's fisheries exports.

The fishery partnership agreement with the European Union (signed in November 2018) has a financial contribution of 15.6 million euros, with four million for sectorial support and the remainder for the General State Budget (Diário de Notícias, 2020). The agreement also contained tariffs from the Fishery Resources Management Fund for the fishing sector paid by shipowners, the embarkation of Bissau-Guinean seamen and the introduction of fish unloading to supply the internal market. The agreement with China provides for several investments, including the construction in Guinea-Bissau of a fish processing and

conservation unit. The agreement protocol also includes the construction of a warehouse for the sale of artisanal fishing materials, the installation in Guinea-Bissau of three ice factories and the expansion and modernization of the artisanal fishing port of Alto Bandim (Diário de Notícias, 2020). The fishery agreement with Senegal was signed under a good neighbour treaty within the ECOWAS framework, which provides for the sharing of resources between neighbouring countries. Ship-owners from both countries can carry out activities in the territorial waters of both states. However, this agreement resulted in an invasion of Senegalese artisanal fishermen into Bissau-Guinean waters and ports, but the reverse did not happen in Senegalese waters by Guinea-Bissau fishermen. This happens not only because Guinea-Bissau does not have the same potential as Senegal, but, above all, because the terms of the agreement were not disclosed to Bissau-Guinean fishermen, which claim that they do not know about the possibility of operating in Senegal. Once again, the population of Guinea-Bissau criticizes their country's authorities for protecting their northern neighbours, to the detriment of their own population (Diário de Notícias, 2020). As regards monitoring the activities of ships at sea, Guinea-Bissau uses a vessel monitoring system (VMS) via satellite, bought with the money earmarked for institutional support under previous fishing agreements (Portuguese Directorate-General for Natural Resources, Safety and Maritime Services). Although it is a very precise system, it only works on the basis of the "good faith" of the crews of registered ships, because it requires on-board identification equipment to be switched on (NAFO, 2021). If the crew disconnects it, the ship disappears from the system. In this way, it does not help to detect the activities of offenders.

4.2. Extension of the continental shelf

On September 24, 2014, Cabo Verde's Ministry of External Relations announced that they had been mandated by seven African states, including Guinea-Bissau, to submit a request to the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, for an extension of the continental shelf (Folha 8, 2014). If approved, these states would have jurisdiction of their ocean waters, and its bed, extended beyond 200 miles up to 350 mi. According to international conventions, the "territorial sea" extends from shoreline up to 12 mi (22 km), in which the State has full sovereignty, followed by 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), where the country has jurisdiction, which in turn can be followed by a Continental Shelf, up to 350 mi (Notícias Mundo ao Minuto, 2020). The UN decision requires a long-lasting process, with lots of technical-scientific arguments. As of the date of this publication, there was still no UN decision on these requests. Guinea-Bissau is strongly committed to extending its continental shelf, due to the resources (fishing, oil/minerals) that may exist in that region, and which will respond to the expected growth of the African population and respective food and energy needs.

4.3. Aquaculture

With regard to aquaculture, a potentially interesting area of activity within the mangroves zone and its nutrient-rich waters, there is only reference to a success story, funded by the Food and Agriculture of the United Nations (FAO) — not on the coast, but up the river, in the far

east of the country in the village of Pitche. A group of young people managed to carry out a project where they extract about 22.5 tons of fish per year (FAO, 2021). Aquaculture is an area of activity very profitable, which is being untapped by Guinea-Bissau's riverside population.

4.4. Agriculture

Food security in Guinea-Bissau depends on subsistence agriculture. However, access to land has not been a peaceful issue, as only 30% to 40% of Guinea-Bissau's territory is good quality agricultural land, with easy access to abundant water, and the rest is forests and wetlands. In 2018, the director-general of Bissau-Guinean Agriculture — Carlos Amarante — explained to the media that, according to data from the European Union, subsistence agriculture occupies 33% of the 1,200,000 hectares of arable land in Guinea-Bissau and, with the increase of the production and export of cashew nuts, disputes over the land started to be more frequent (Expresso das Ilhas, 2018). After the independence, all the land in the country was nationalized. It did not belong to anyone in particular, but to the state. This brought some land disputes and conflicts among the rural community. In order to solve the situation, in 1998 a "Land Law" was promulgated aiming to regulate the use of the territory, and to provide access to property to the most vulnerable layers of society. However, the civil war that started that year, and all the instability that followed, prevented its application. In 2018, the European Union made an investment of three million euros, in a four-year project, which would be conducted by the United Nations Agency for Food and Agriculture — FAO — seeking food security for the Guinea-Bissau population (Diário de Notícias, 2018). The main agricultural product in Guinea-Bissau is cashew nuts, being considered the main export product of the country. The country usually exports around 200,000 tonnes of cashew nuts each year, but, due to the COVID 19 pandemic, the production dropped to 160,000 last year (BBC News, 2021). Still, the cashew nuts represent 90% of Guinea-Bissau's exports. Further to that, there are yet more worries as the main buyer, India, is also grappling with the COVID-19 crisis. The small-scale farmers try to gain their living subsistence not only with the cashew nuts, but also with the wine and other alcoholic beverages they manage to extract out of the cashew apples. Mamadou Yerro Djamanca of the Cashew Exporters Association of Bissau-Guineans (BBC News, 2021) asserted that, while cashew products remain popular as ever domestically, Guinea-Bissau's export challenges over the coming times will be crucial for the fortunes of farmers' and distributors alike. As for the populations that live along the coast, it is the mangrove forests that act as a fundamental resource for their respective subsistence. In addition to fish farming, mangroves are also used for agricultural purposes, namely in the cultivation of mangrove rice, something very important in the traditional diet of Bissau-Guineans. It is also in the mangrove area that Guinea-Bissau's salt is extracted. The country seems to have the necessary agriculture resources for the size of its population, but, in 2021, the Food and Agriculture of the United Nations agency made an alert that Guinea-Bissau needed food assistance for almost 10% of the population (UN FAO "GIEWS — Global Information and Early Warning System," 2021). Over 45% of the cereal that the country requires is covered by imports. Rice accounts for about 80% of the import requirements, followed by wheat, which accounts for about 15%. Import requirements in the 2020/21 marketing year (November/October) were forecasted to be above-average level, which normally was 155.000 tonnes (UN FAO "GIEWS - Global Information and Early Warning System," 2021).

4.5. Tourism

The beauty of Guinea-Bissau islands and mainland forests, the exuberant biodiversity, and the cultural and ethnographic diversity provide a set of outstanding opportunities in the area of tourism. Paradoxically to its instability, Guinea-Bissau has been investing in the conservation of its biodiversity and its ecosystems. The creation of a National System of Protected Areas (SNAP) is proof of this. As a result, the tourism sector in Guinea-Bissau has potential for a sustainable economic growth and employment. Culinary, ethnic-cultural events, hunting and sport fishing, spa tourism and ecotourism are, among others, factors that contribute to further enrich the tourist experience. Furthermore, regardless of their internal problems and disputes, the population of Guinea-Bissau is traditionally sympathetic to foreign visitors. The Bijagós Archipelago is the ex-libris of Bissau-Guinean tourism, being considered one of the most beautiful places on the African continent, where the weather permits touristic activities approximately 10 months per year. Tourism thus emerges with growing importance in Guinea-Bissau to attract investors, with a view to creating adequate infrastructure and services that comply with the highest levels of the international tourist industry. However, here too, the results of the country's instability can be seen, because the tourism sector it is almost unexplored. There are some hotel units in Bissau, as well as in the Bijagós Archipelago, but they are modest in number, size and in the quality of the services' offered. The maritime connections, as well as the road network, are insufficient; there's a lack of medical care facilities (especially for underseas activities and radical sports); the internet connectivity is scarce; to name only a few restrictions. In 2019, Guinea-Bissau participated for the first time in an international fair dedicated to tourism, in Paris. In a media interview (RFI, 2019a), Guinea-Bissau's Secretary of State for Tourism — Catarina Taborda — said: "At the moment, we only have 3,000 tourists annually, but we have the ambition to significantly increase that number significantly in the next three years: one million, two million tourists annually. It is very ambitious, but we will work to achieve this goal."

4.6. Mining – Onto land mining – According to Edmundson (2014), reporting to the World Bank in a series of studies aiming Poverty Reduction and Economic Management in the Africa Region, there are two main minerals to explore in Guinea-Bissau: Phosphate and Bauxite.

Phosphate

In 1978, shortly after Guinea-Bissau's independence, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was the first international organization to investigate the country's phosphate deposits. However, there was no exploration because there was no mining infrastructure able to do it. Later in 1997, the Canadian Champion Resources Inc. made another study and reached the conclusion that Guinea-Bissau was rich in phosphate rock — close to 100 million tons of high-quality clay bounded ore, with 30.1% raw phosphate rock (approximately 40 years' worth of mining), plus an additional 400 million tons of lower

quality calcium bounded rock (up to 200 years of mining potential). The Canadians stated to explore the mineral but, in 1998, the civil war stated and everything was put to a stop. Since then, several other international initiatives were made, but the country's instability inhibits any solid enterprise in the subject. However, although phosphate mining could be very interesting for local employment and revenues, it can have very dangerous consequences to the environment if not handled properly. Phosphate mining and processing requires a substantial amount of water. The resulting clays and sands cannot be discharged untreated, or risks polluting the local rivers (e.g., Cacheu) and the sea, inducing enormous negative impact on the ecosystem and fisheries.

Bauxite

25% of the world-known resources of bauxite and other rare earth elements (REE's) are estimated to be located in Guinea-Bissau. Bauxite reserves are estimated at 17 million tons (Da Cruz, 2020). In the Boe area, southeast of the country, close to the border of Guinea-Conakry, there are five neighbouring deposits of bauxite minerals. Bauxite can be refined into aluminium, attracting a much higher price, but at a much greater cost. The Dutch discovered it in the 1950s, but it was the Soviets that made a proper study about it. Beyond the security and stability risks, the problem in exploring the bauxite in Boe, is that there are no proper roads connecting the mining region to the closest port — Buba — and the port itself in too underdeveloped to engage in such a project. Investing in bauxite mining in Boa would require prior investments in Buba port and a good road network. Despite these set-backs, both Angola and the United Arab Emirates have showed an interest in the region and have indicated the possibility of investments in the transportation system, as well as the mining infrastructure. The problem is the commercial viability of such a project, due to the heavy investments needed and the low prices of bauxite in neighbouring Guinea-Conakry.

4.7. Offshore mining

Although sustained studies have not yet been carried out on the potential of the seabed in the Guinea-Bissau EEZ, it is well known that there are concentrations of important strategic mineral in the seabed of the Gulf of Guinea (Abubakar 2016). Minerals such as cobalt crusts, the poly-metallic nodules (containing nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese), polymetallic sulphides (containing zinc, silver, copper, and gold), as well as monazite sand (containing significant amounts of uranium), as well as deposits of diamond, gold and phosphorus have been mentioned in different studies of different places in that same part of the Atlantic Ocean. Should those minerals exist in Guinea-Bissau's seabed, its mining could be significantly easier than in other latitudes, because the depths of the seabed are lower due to the extensive continental shelf.

4.8. Oil

It is also common knowledge that the entire Gulf of Guinea is an area of great potential for oil exploration, constituting the second largest concentration of hydrocarbons in the

world (CEIRI News, 2019). The territory of Guinea-Bissau marks precisely the northern limit of the Gulf of Guinea, so it is not surprising that there is interest on the part of large oil companies in exploring the seabed of the country. The maritime border between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal was agreed in April 1960, between the French and Portuguese governments. This delimitation was established following a line at azimuth 240 degrees, taken in the coastal zone of the land border between the two territories. To the south of 240 degrees, it is Guinea-Bissau's waters, and to the north of 240 degrees it is Senegalese waters. In 1993, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal signed an agreement to establish a Joint Exploration Zone (JEZ), with approximately 25,000 km², aiming for a joint exploitation of fishery and offshore hydrocarbon resources. The JEZ is defined by azimuths 220 degrees (which is inside Guinea-Bissau's waters) all the way up to azimuth 268 degrees (which is inside Senegalese waters). For this purpose, Guinea-Bissau has given 46% of its maritime territory and Senegal 54%. The 1993 agreement provided that fish dividends would be split in equal parts (50%–50%) for each country, but for hydrocarbons it would be 15% for Guinea-Bissau and 85% for Senegal. Although there were reasons for this disparity of oil revenues between the two countries, according to several interviews with representatives of Bissau-Guinean diaspora (Dr. Tcherno Baldé; Dr. Mo Senha; Dr. Diogo Gomes), the Guinea-Bissau's population never understood, neither did they agreed, why Bissau's authorities had signed such an agreement with Dakar. In recent years, several studies and evaluative drilling were carried out in the JEZ, made by different international companies, but commercial oil exploration has never taken place. However, the possibility of having oil in Guinea-Bissau's seabed is not restricted to the JEZ, because it could exist also inside the country's exclusive economic zone.

Figure 2 *Map of the Senegal/Guinea-Bissau JEZ*



Source: Paulo Gonçalves (2021) adapted from https://www.offshore-energy.biz/petronor-closes-guinea-bissau-offshore-blocks-buy/

In that regard, in August 2019, the government of Guinea-Bissau announced the granting of rights to carry out prospecting for the Chinese company –– China National Offshore Oil Corporation. In statements to the media, the Minister of Natural Resources Issufo Baldé said that he expected the Chinese to extract 30 to 60 thousand barrels of oil per day (RFI,

2019b). n addition to Chinese research, there were also oil companies operating in Bissau-Guinean waters from Angola, Dubai, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Norway. In November 2021, the Secretary-General of Guinea-Bissau Agency for Management and Cooperation with Senegal –– Inussa Baldé –– announce that the newly appointed President of Guinea-Bissau Umaro Sissoco Embaló, who was known to have good relations with the Senegalese President, would be renegotiating the agreement, in order to have least 30% for Guinea-Bissau and 70% for Senegal (CM/Lusa, 27 Nov 2021). However, in December 2021, the mentioned agreement between the two presidents was severely contested by Guinea-Bissau Prime Minister Nuno Gomes Nabiam thus bringing a new theme of difficult relations between the prime minister and the president addressing the media, Prime Minister Nabiam explained that that this type of agreements is a government's responsibility, with ratification from the national assembly and promulgation from the president, not the other way around as it seems to have happened. Furthermore, according to the prime minister's allegations, the oil to be explored happens to be on the Guinea-Bissau's part of the JEZ, hence the difference in revenue, if renegotiated, should also be the other way around, with the highest bid for Guinea-Bissau, not for Senegal (DW, 2021).

On December 14, 2021, the National Popular Assembly (Parliament) of Guinea-Bissau voted against the oil-sharing agreement signed between the presidents of Guinea-Bissau, Umaro Sissoco Embaló, and Senegalese, Macky Sall. In January 2022, the President of the National People's Assembly Cipriano Cassamá sent an official letter to his Senegalese counterpart with a copy of the deliberation approved by the majority of the Bissau-Guinean deputies, in which they declared the aforementioned agreement "null and without effect" (DW 2022). On January 20, the president addressed the media stating that he did not sign any oil exploration agreement, rather a cooperation agreement with Senegal, and that the parliament did not have the authority to dismiss that agreement (MSN/Lusa 2022). When President Umaro Sissoco Embaló explained the situation to journalists, he referred to the prime minister and parliament with harsh words, denouncing any potential political instability caused (MSN/Lusa 2022).

5. Key Infrastructure and Transport Networks

Guinea-Bissau's key infrastructure and transport networks are discussed in terms of: urban areas; airports and air travel; ports and anchorages; energy, railway and road network; merchant and fishing fleets; and telecommunications.

5.1 Urban areas

Approximately 44% of Guinea-Bissau's population lives in urban areas. It is estimated that the rate of urbanization is 3.2% per year. Approximately one-fifth of the population lives in the capital city of Bissau along the Atlantic coast, and the remainder is distributed among the eight others, mainly rural, regions. There are 44 main cities, whose urban population varies between 431,082 in the capital Bissau and 1,203 in Enxudé in the Quinara Region. Five cities have more than 10,000 inhabitants, 12 have between 10,000 and 5,000 inhabitants,

and the remaining 27 cities have between 4,000 and 1,000 inhabitants (CIA, The World Factbook, 2021).

5.2 Airports and air travel

Although there are several rudimentary runways in the territory of Guinea-Bissau (heritage from the colonial war), the only operational airport with the capacity to receive international flights is "Osvaldo Vieira Airport," in Bissau. The Airport has a good runway and it is equipped with suitable navigation aids and flight support lights. However, it has a modest size terminal and its capacity for handling several commercial aircraft simultaneously is limited. Guinea-Bissau does not have a national airliner. International connections to other destinations are made mainly through airlines operating from Portugal, Morocco, Cabo Verde, or Senegal. On April 2022, Minister of Urbanisation and Public Works Fidelis Forbs expressed the government's intention to start the building process of a new international airport between 2022 and 2024 (Forbs, 2022).

5.3. Ports and anchorages

The sea port of Bissau is the only international port in the country, accounting for 85% of exports and over 90% of imports. It is the largest docking port for commercial ships in Guinea-Bissau, with the capacity to receive ships of the class "Panamax" with a width of those locks is 32 m, the length up to 290 m, and the draft in tropical freshwater of 12 m (draft refers to the vertical distance between the waterline to bottom of the hull). The river/sea estuary in from of Bissau forms a natural harbour with large dimensions: Therefore, although only one of these ships can come to pier at time, the estuary permits the anchoring of several ships close by. Artisanal fishing boats unload their cargoes in small anchorages along the estuaries of the various rivers in the country. In November 2021, Guinea-Bissau's President Umaro Sissoco Embaló, following his "aggressive and proactive diplomacy," announced the launch of the feasibility study for the construction of the commercial and mining port on the Grande Buba River. According to President Embaló, this will be the biggest project of civil engineering in the country. The plan envisages a pier 18 meters deep and will allow for the outflow of bauxite from Boé and the simultaneous docking of three ships weighing up to 70 thousand tons (DW/LUSA, 2021). In 2019, the African Development Bank had already financed an initial study of this project with two million U.S. Dollars, but it never went ahead due to the country instability.

5.4. Railway network

The poor coverage of railway is a land transport weakness all over Africa. In terms of international intervention and donors, China is the main driver of rail networks on the African continent. Aware of this deficiency and the potential that the railway has, the African Union inscribed in its strategic plan –– Agenda 2063 –– that there should be investment in a high-speed rail network to unite all African capitals by 2063. However, no steps have been taken in this direction in Guinea-Bissau. Currently, Guinea-Bissau does not have a railroad.

5.5. Road network

Guinea-Bissau has a national road network of 3,455 km, of which 965 km are paved and 2,490 km are unpaved roads. The connection between the main cities is covered by a road network that allows comfortable transportation of people and essential goods, taking into account the population density and the existing economic dynamics. Weather conditions, namely the deterioration associated with the rainy season, require permanent investment in the maintenance of the road network. As the territory is mostly crossed by rivers, the transport of goods out of the main access roads relies on the frequent use of unsophisticated boats, which makes the entire transport process difficult. Road infrastructure is part of the large infrastructure sector, considered a priority for promoting the country's development and social sectors. The national road network is the main resource for the flow of almost all national production to the consumption centres and to the export port in Bissau. The road infrastructure needs large investments to support the desired development. In this sense, in 2018, China signed a contract with the Bissau-Guinean authorities, for the construction of an important road in the coastal area providing access to Bissau. This project has a non-reimbursable budget of USD 30 million, and it will be a Chinese donation to Guinea-Bissau (E-Global, 2018). However, connections between Guinea-Bissau and the two neighbouring countries (Senegal and Guinea-Conakry) need clear improvement, especially considering the international market. Thus, given that Guinea-Bissau's privileged neighbour for trade is Senegal, with which it has very good institutional relations, the two countries started a project, financed by the African Development Bank, to improve land access between Dakar and Bissau. This project is carried out within the framework of ECOWAS, which has a program for the implementation of infrastructure that contributes to the economic and social development of communities in the West African region. This new road between Farim and Dungal will have the characteristics of the agrarian development corridors ("agro-corridors") of the African Spatial development initiatives that are being implemented in the southern regions of the African continent. In an interview (1 April 2022) to the Guinean-Bissau diaspora online channel, the Guinea-Bissau Minister for Urbanism and Public Works — Fidelis Forbs — said that when his government took power, 83% of the road system of the country was destroyed, and he had the vision to invert that data by 2024, having 83% of the countries road system renewed. The minister continued saying that in two years (2020–2022) he managed to rebuild 800 km of that system. He carried on saying that the President Umaro Sissoco Embalo himself had taken the lead of the negotiation matters with the international and banking community, and managed to get loads at a very low rate (1%) to the Guinea-Bissau's state, thus contributing to a push up on the public works throughout the country. The government vision for his legislature was to initiate the process to build of a new international airport; renew the construction of the road system; and to build a circular highway around Bissau (Forbs, 2022).

5.6 Merchant and fishing fleets

Guinea-Bissau marks the northern limit of the Gulf of Guinea, which is a very dynamic region in the fishery and oil/gas extraction sectors. Likewise, the maritime routes that cross

the waters of Guinea-Bissau play a fundamental role in the logistic supply of goods globally. Despite the existence of faster transportation assets, the economic value involved in transporting goods by sea makes up for the longer time. Guinea-Bissau's waters are crossed daily by large oil and fishing vessels from the Gulf of Guinea to North America and Europe, by all kinds of ships coming from the South Atlantic to Europe and vice versa, and by trans-Atlantic ships coming from Europe to South America and vice versa. These sea routes witness the flow of hundreds of millions of metric tons per year. Therefore, the stability and security of Guinea-Bissau's waters is of particular importance in the world economy. However, Guinea-Bissau does not have a fleet of merchant ships, neither does it have a navy, or a coast guard, capable of providing Search and Rescue, policing and inspection of illegal activities in the waters under its jurisdiction. In addition to a few ferryboats and motorboats for transporting of passengers between islands, the vast majority of Bissau-Guinean vessels are canoes dedicated to artisanal fishing. In fact, paradoxically to the wealth of marine life of the country, most Bissau-Guineans living away from the shoreline do not have a culture particularly connected to the sea (UN – FAO/Republic of Guinea Bissau Report (2015) "Guiné-Bissau 2025 — Plano Estratégico e Operacional 2015–2020 "Terra Ranka"). Due to lack of accessibilities, the traditional culinary menu is richer in agricultural products, specially rise, than in marine ingredients (Alves & Andreia, 2006).

5.7. Telecommunications

Guinea-Bissau telecommunication capacity in is essentially based on mobile telephone network. The mobile network is 3G +/4G in urban areas and the service provider "Orange Bissau" has announced the plan to complete the coverage of the rural areas with 2G/3G in the rural area (APO Group, 2021). However, most of the rural areas are still without mobile service. The landline is not working due to the 1987–2012 instability and has never been restored since then (Logistics Capacity Assessments, 2021). The country has one National TV station and also receives the TV signal from the Portuguese national television channel dedicated to African countries. There is also a Bissau-Guinean national radio station and several other privet and local community radio stations. Less than 4% of the population uses the internet (CIA The World factbook, 2021) which has a low coverage and has a slow speed and is subjected to cuts (alleged by the Guineans and verified during online interviews).

5.8. Energy network

An American government report informs that Guinea-Bissau is among the 11 countries that have the less consumption of electricity in the World (CIA, The World Factbook, 2021). According to a United Nations' Environment Program (UNEP, 2015) report, only 60% of Guinea-Bissau's population had access to electricity. Fuelwood supplies about 90% of the domestic energy in the country. Guinea-Bissau is heavily dependent of foreigner electricity, and all of the national production is based in fossil fuel, especially coal and oil. The country plans to Shift from fossil fuels into renewable energies, but needs an investment of USD 700 million (United Nations News, 2018). Hydroelectricity is still not an important source of energy, and the transition to the green energies is slow but steady. Wave energy production

seems to be very promising, due to the tidal amplitude of 3.4 meters recorded on the banks of some rivers (United Nations Environmental Program, 2015). The Chinese company Sinohydro began the construction of the first large scale solar plant, with the purpose of selling power to national utility EAGB (Electricity of Guinea-Bissau), under a long-term contract, which will triple GB's power generation capacity (currently, there are only 11Mw of installed power generation capacity). As a matter of fact, one of the country's greatest potentials is on hydroelectric power, since most of the country does not have the necessary supply of electricity (IEEFA, 2020).

6. Characterization of Guinea-Bissau's economic activities

In the human development survey carried out by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for 2019, Guinea-Bissau ranked 175 out of 189 countries (UNDP, HDR 2020). This means that Guinea-Bissau is the 14th last place, belonging to the group of countries considered as having a "low human development." Previously, in January 2016, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) assessed investment risks in the most problematic countries, using a scale from 0 to 7, where 0 equals minimum risk and 7 equals maximum investment risk. In that assessment, Guinea-Bissau was classified with a score of 7. Therefore, the investment scenario is indeed unattractive regarding Guinea-Bissau. However, although the attribution of this level of risk appears to be very negative, it is in line with many other African countries. Consequently, this will not stop investors interested in African countries; especially in the case of a country with "low human development" and interesting natural resources, where all kinds of investment are welcome and the prospective of profit is high. But only if the local authorities manage to stabilize the country. Guinea-Bissau's economy is based on the exploitation of natural resources, so its main source of income, in addition to international aid, loans and diaspora remittances, are the concession of fishing licenses and the export of cashew nuts. Following the majority of the Western African countries, Guinea-Bissau informal economy dominates the nation's workforce, with more than 90% of informal labour employment (ILO 2020). Although Guinea-Bissau is considered to be the fourth world producer of cashew nuts, generating 18% of GDP, 90% of revenues exports and 33% of household income (UN – FAO/Republic of Guinea Bissau Report (2015) "Guiné-Bissau 2025 — Plano Estratégico e Operacional 2015-2020 "Terra Ranka") and enjoys a great wealth of marine resources, the country has a small participation in the production and geo-economics of Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2020 and 2021, this weakness was aggravated by the CIVID 19 pandemic, which had a particularly strong impact on the performance of almost all sectors of the Bissau-Guinean economy. 2020 GDP was USD 1.43 billion, and per capita GDP was USD 650,47 (Trading Economics 2020). According to the report on the Macroeconomic and Budgetary Framework of the Ministry of Finance of Guinea-Bissau (Governo da Guiné Bissau – Ministério das Finanças, 2020), the real GDP growth rate for 2020 was revised downwards to stand at -1.9% against the 4.5% corresponding to 2019. The same report pointed to an inflation in 2020 of 2.0%, against 0.2% in 2019. The report estimates that the balance of payments will stand at -10.0 billion CFA francs for 2022, and -18.0 billion CFA francs for 2023. The money supply could be situated at 377.3 billion CFA francs in 2021, 357.3 billion CFA francs in 2022 and 357.4 billion CFA francs in 2023.

The primary sector (agriculture, livestock and fisheries) will continue to grow, although the stimulus for cashew production is weaker than expected for a country considered to be one of the world's largest cashew producers. On the other hand, the secondary (industry) and tertiary (commerce and services) sectors will tend to fall in such a way that they cancel out the growth of the primary sector. In 2015, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) agency presented a document entitled: "Guinea-Bissau 2025 — Strategic and Operational Plan 2015–2020 'Terra Ranka'." This document, portrayed Guinea-Bissau's strategy for 2025, foreseeing a diversified economy based on the four growth drivers: agriculture and agro-industry, fishing, tourism, and mining. Once again, due to social instability of the country, most of the steps needed for its success were not taken, but the goals designed in this strategy were absolutely appropriate (UNEP, 2015a).
One of the programmes inserted in the country's 2025 strategy, was the creation of Special Economic Zones in Guinea-Bissau (program 38). Guinea-Bissau is a member of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), which attempts to eliminate the border tariffs between African nations. That means pan-African sourcing can take place with goods consolidated into one area for processing and assembly. In order to deal not only with this promising pan-African trade, but also Worldwide, the country's strategic thinking envisions to implement Special Economic Zones, especially in Bissau, which has port facilities. These are integrated economic platforms designed to accelerate private investment, through the incentive of a tax-free zone, offering land, facilities and services with special protection to entrepreneurs (UN – FAO/Republic of Guinea Bissau Report (2015) "Guiné-Bissau 2025 — Plano Estratégico e Operacional 2015–2020 "Terra Ranka"). The Special Economic Zone program is slowly but steadily being implemented, and it foresees two different areas. One Special Economic Zone will be the capital city of Bissau, which has a port, and will be boosted with the recent agreement between Guinea-Bissau and China regarding the Belt and Road Initiative. Another one of this type of trade platforms will be a Special Tourism Zone, to be established in the Bijagos Archipelago, aiming to project Guinea-Bissau's paradisiac tourism worldwide.

The implementation of integrated economic platforms aims to provide investors with a competitive environment and adapted reception spaces for the rapid launch of their activities. Foreigner investments are also being made in innovative sectors responding to a fragile, but growing, stabilization of the country. Guinea-Bissau is a member of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), which legal regime reflects in an additional guarantee for foreign investors. Recently, Guinea-Bissau became particularly attractive for those interested and investing in solar plants and generation of electricity capacity. Although some countries consider Guinea-Bissau as quite an unsafe country, the reality is that, despite the political turmoil, the current political situation does not affect foreign companies' and individuals' investments.

6.1. State budget

Guinea-Bissau's 2022 state budget was just over USD 435 million, approaching USD 320 million of which was state-generated income (taxes) and USD 115 million was deficit,

which would have to be covered by loans and/or donations. More than half of the state budget (56.8%) was destined to the payment of salaries to public servants, goods and services, interest and transfers, 29% to investment expenses and 14.2% to Public Treasury charges (ANGOP, 2022). In 2021, Guinea-Bissau's external debt represented 79% of the national GDP, which denounces a considerable amount of non-returnable donations from international stakeholders, in order to maintain investments without raising the country's liability (DW, 2020a).

6.2. National currency

As Guinea-Bissau is located in the Francophone part of Africa, the country's currency country is the FCA (Franc of the African Community, formerly Franc of the French Colonies in Africa). As a reference of FCA exchange value, on November 26, 2021 (00:00), 1 U.S. dollar = 585 FCA at the official exchange office of Bissau International Airport (Governo da Guiné Bissau – Aeroporto de Bissau, 2020). Also identified internationally by the acronym XOF, this currency unit is not exclusive to Guinea-Bissau, but to a community of eight independent West African states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

7. Domestic Politics

There is an old saying in Guinea-Bissau — "If the tongue and the teeth sometimes enter into conflict, imagine different people discussing the same issue!" — that let us in on the Guinea-Bissau situation. Teeth and tongue belong to the same mouth and there is no question about living peacefully together, it is the "working together" that, sometimes, becomes a problem. Likewise, in the multi-ethnic Guinea-Bissau there is no problem regarding different religions or cultural backgrounds; but when politics enters the game, things change. After the implementation of multi-partyism, in 1991, the new political parties pressured the government to carry out state reforms, decentralize power, and privatize public companies. Paradoxically, with the instability that ensued, the informal economy proliferated and the state became the country's main employer. Guinea-Bissau's population entered a system of nepotism in the selection of civil servants, where membership of a political party mattered more than a candidate's own credentials. In the last 30 years, Guinea-Bissau has had more than 50 political parties and civic movements for a population of less than two million (DW, 2021b). The problem with having such multiplicity of political parties for a small population is that it raises the suspicion that they do not differentiate between political concepts or doctrines, but rather between personal objectives of their leaders, turning political struggle into ethnic/tribal confrontation. The most representative political parties are PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde — in Portuguese: Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde); Madem G15 (Movement for Democratic Alternation Group of 15 — in Portuguese: Movimento para Alternância Democrática, Grupo dos 15) and PRS (Party for Social Renewal — in Portuguese: Partido da Renovação Social), with several other political forces trying to win space among the population. During the compilation of information for this research, a group of young university students from Guinea-Bissau (students of Public Administration, Jurists and African Studies) was questioned about their opinion on the country's Public Administration" (production, delivery and distribution of State goods or services to citizens). The words they used were: "disorganization," "nepotism," "slowness," and "corruption." It became clear that Guinea-Bissau's Public Sector lacks definition of objectives and progress indicators, plus the survey of needs for each area. Something that could be put together and become a strategy. The problem is, regarding the good intentions and the planning processes, the entire structure is partisan and hostage to the ruling party. Government changes (which are frequent) block the normal functioning of public services. Guinea-Bissau is a republic with a constitutional democracy, with a semi-presidential regime (evolving to a full presidential regime) composed by a Judicial Branch — the Highest Court and the Subordinate Courts; an Executive Branch — the President of the Republic, and the Government; and a Legislative Branch – the Assembly of Republic (Assembleia Nacional Popular).

7.1. Judicial power

The Judicial Branch is composed of the Supreme Court (in Portuguese - Supremo Tribunal de Justiça), and regional Appeals Court (subordinate courts). The Supreme Court, which has both appellate and constitutional jurisdiction, is composed of nine judges and is organized into Civil, Criminal, and Social and Administrative Disputes Chambers. The Supreme Court judges are appointed by the President of the Republic, according to a nomination by the Higher Council of the Magistrate. The subordinate courts — First Instance Appels Courts –– are organized to decide judicial matters in a regional, or military, competencies.

7.2. Executive power

The executive branch of Guinea-Bissau is defined as a semi-presidential regime, where the President is the Head of State but the highest instance for conducting the country's policy resides with the government's Prime Minister. It is the President who appoints the Prime Minister, after consultation with party leaders represented at the National People's Assembly (parliament). Therefore, the parliamentarian majority should present a name to the President and s/he should appoint him/her as Prime Minister. The Prime Minister would then form a government according to the parliamentarian majority's party(ies) and run the country. However, the constitutional law has several gaps leaving room for different interpretations of the President's powers, which is why sometimes the regime appears to be fully Presidential, with the President steering the government and foreigner policy. The President is elected by popular vote, requiring an absolute majority (in two rounds if needed), for a five-year term. He/she cannot apply for a third consecutive term, nor within the 5 years following the end of the second term. President Umaro Cissoko Embalo (Madem G15 party) was appointed on February 27, 2020, and as the appointed head of government the Prime Minister Nuno Nabiam. However, by the end of 2021, the relationship between the President and the Prime Minister soured (Notícias Mundo ao Minuto/Lusa, 2022).

Throughout 2021, the situation remained volatile, mostly due to the lack of a developed civil society with a clear understanding of democratic institutions and values, and, as a part

of the political culture, a nationwide consensus on the role and mission of their military. Meanwhile, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló reformed the armed forces. Although no details of this reform plan have been made public, the President seems to be quite engaged in it, to the point of not authorizing the retirement request of the Joint Chief of General Staff — General Biagué Na Ntan. Addressing the media in a ceremony to the falling heroes, the President explained that General Na Ntan could not retire now because he is a stabilizing element in the reformation process of the armed forces (Observador & Lusa, 2022a). In that same media opportunity, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló told journalists that there was an ongoing process of recruitment of new military personnel, and that the goal was to modernize the armed forces and allow them to take part in international peacekeeping missions. The political control of the armed forces by the executive power is a paramount condition for a representative democracy to flourish. President Umaro Sissoco, himself a General, is aware of it and the decision to postpone General Biagué Na Ntan's retirement seems to be a measure to achieve that control. General Biagué Na Ntan is respected among the ranks and has expressed his loyalty to President Umaro Sissoco. On the 1 February, 2022 there was an attempt of a coup d'état, which has failed because the defence and security forces answered to the political power and not to the insurgents. Speaking to the country, the President of Guinea-Bissau Umaro Sissoco Embaló thanked the country's defense and security forces for preventing a coup d'état, which constituted an "attack on democracy" (Expresso das Ilhas, 2022).

7.3. Legislative power

Legislative Branch: Guinea-Bissau's National People's Assembly (in Portuguese: Assembleia Nacional Popular) is a unicameral parliament. It has 102 parliamentarian seats; 100 members directly elected through party-list proportional representation, plus two parliamentarians representing citizens living abroad (one for Africa, one for Europe); all members serve four-year terms. The elections held in 2019 (next to be held in March 2023) provided the following National Assembly composition (Observador & Lusa, 2022b): PAIGC 35.2%, Madem G-15 21.1%, PRS 21.1%, other 22.6%. Seats by party - PAIGC – 47; Madem G-15 – 27, PRS – 21, APU/PDGB (United People's Assembly/Democratic Party of Guinea-Bissau) – 5, PND (Social Renewal Party) – 1; UpM (Union for Change) – 1. Gender composition - men 88, women 14, percent of women 13.7%. Although PAIGC managed to have more votes, and elected more parliamentarians, than any other of the parties, it has lost the National Assembly majority. A group of opposition parties — Madem G15, PRS and APU-PDGB — made a parliamentarian alliance, thus having the majority of the Assembly votes. Hence, the parliamentary alliance formed the country's new Government by presenting to President José Mário Vaz (the predecessor of President Embalo) the name of the politician to be appointed as Prime Minister. Later that year, this same political alliance sponsored the presidential run of President Embalo, which downplayed even further the traditional hegemony of PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau's political arena. However, this new alliance seems to have weaknesses, and there were rumours that PAIGC was negotiating with PRS an agreement which could block the country's governance, and generate the need for the President to make a tough decision regarding anticipating parliamentarian elections.

Throughout the year 2020, relations between the Presidency and the National Assembly became less cordial and President Embalo started to have a (too) strong political engagement in the governance of the country, much to a full presidential style regime. Likewise, there seemed to be tension between the President and the Prime Minister, several episodes of which were highlighted by the media. President Embalo, alleging that Guinea-Bissau had to turn its political paradigm into far more proactive diplomacy, started to make international agreements without the knowledge or participation of the government. Furthermore, and against what the country's constitution legislates (because that is a National Assembly competency), the Presidency presented a proposal for a constitutional revision, in which the president's powers would be reinforced. The need for a revision of the constitutional law arose in the wake of the Conakry Agreement, signed in 2016 by the major driving forces in Guinea-Bissau and mediated by ECOWAS, with a view to consolidating peace and stability in the country. Bissau's inactivity in this constitutional review has led ECOWAS to act and put pressure on Guinea-Bissau's authorities. This pressure of ECOWAS, at times, resulted in an internal perception of interference in Bissau-Guinean sovereignty issues, but, in fact, the promised revision of the constitution was due to have been done years ago. This awkward situation between the presidency and the national assembly resulted in two different proposals to revise the constitution law, one done and discussed by the national assembly, the other by the presidency. The proposal debated at the national assembly looked for the reinforcement of semi-presidentialism, of a parliamentary bias, and outlines the powers of the sovereign bodies, with special clarity with regard to the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. Something that was not clear in the text 1996 Constitutional Law. The Portuguese media had access to the proposed text and the number of articles had raised from 137 to 317. The proposal of President Umaro Sissoco Embalo, on the contrary reinforced the powers of the head of State, who would preside over the Council of Ministers, the Superior Council of Défense and the Superior Council of National Security (Observador & Lusa, 2022c). Throughout Guinea-Bissau's recent history, the country governance has been devastated by three effective coups d'état, 16 different attempts of coups d'état, one civil war, assassinations of politicians and interference of the militaries in the conduction of the country's policy. Most international analysts consider that one of Guinea-Bissau's major problems (if not the problem) is the role of the military in the country. Guinea-Bissau is a representative democracy; therefore, the principle of political control of armed forces is applicable. However, its small (approximately 4000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen) but politically active military apparatus did not assume this desideratum. Due to several negative factors that weaken the governance structures and its conductors, there's no supremacy of civilian institutions over the military, and security apparatus based on popular sovereignty.

Figure 3 *Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS)*

Source: Paulo Gonçalves (2021)

8. Guinea-Bissau Geopolitics

Although geographically Guinea-Bissau is located in the Northern Hemisphere, in geopolitical terms it is considered to be a South Atlantic country, being part of the bloc of countries that constitute the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic — ZOPACAS — proposed by Brazil and materialized by the 1986 UN resolution 41/11, which aims to respect the principles of non-intervention, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as warding off military confrontation, promoting the absence of nuclear weapons, the non-existence of foreign military bases in the region and the protection of the resources of the marine environment. Although geopolitically important, the ZOPACAS has had periods of international interests and disinterest, of which Brazil has been the driving force, without any visible major support from other countries. However, with the foreseen withdrawal of Brazil from other peacekeeping operations around the world, it is feasible to think that ZOPACAS will be revitalized in the near future.

Figure 4 *Casamance Area*

Source: Paulo Gonçalves (2021)

8.1. Borders

Guinea-Bissau has extremely porous land borders, with the same tribe on either side of the line of separation. In some parts of the border, the population has difficulty in recognizing where the separation is between the two countries (see Figure 2 for sea borders). The sea borders are not adequately surveyed by the Bissau-Guinean authorities due to lack of assets.

8.2. Threats and risks to Guinea-Bissau's social and economic development

Guinea-Bissau does not have a direct threat of military aggression from any of its neighbouring countries, or from any other countries from outside the region. However, there are known organized forces of illegal activities, crime, and drug trafficking inside the country. There are alleged recurrent entries, exits, and use of Guinea-Bissau territory by foreign individuals and organized groups for various types of illegal activities. The local population has been complaining about animal theft, vandalism of fishery resources, illegal removal of cashew nuts, illegal cutting of trees, even land disputes, all having to do with foreigners. However, there is a particular situation involving foreign military forces inside Guinea-Bissau's territory with potential to drag the country into a proxy war. Independence guerrillas from neighbouring Senegal regularly cross the northern border into Guinea-Bissau, setting military bases without the consent of Bissau's authorities. The problem stems from a particular Senegalese region called Casamance located between the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, and this conflict, though little known, is one of the oldest independence struggles in Africa. The territory of Casamance was once also a Portuguese colony, but later became a French possession through an agreement between those two European colonizing powers. During Guinea-Bissau's war of independence, the PAIGC guerrillas frequently resorted to Casamance to establish second line bases (RTP, 2018). These PAIGC sites beyond the northern border were used for logistic support and refuge against attacks from the Portuguese forces. Nevertheless, the Portuguese forces regularly launched military operations across the border into Casamance to eliminate the PAIGC bases. Several of these cross-border operations had consent from Dakar. In 1974, with the independence of Guinea-Bissau, the territory of Casamance was pacified, but it maintained a strong community of Bissau-Guineans. In 1982, Casamance was again on the local news with the emergence of a separatist movement — the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC). As tensions increased between the central government of Dakar and the independence representatives, the MFDC constituted a military arm and, in 1990, the armed conflict in Casamance began. For years the situation of the Portuguese colonial war was reversed, with the MFDC guerrillas seeking refuge in Guinea-Bissau after attacking the positions of the Dakar forces. The presence of the MFDC guerrillas, as well as the trafficking of drugs, wood, and arms justified several incursions by Senegalese forces into Bissau-Guinean territory. Over the decades, the Casamance conflict has seen periods of ceasefire and resurgence of fighting, but it has never been resolved and the occasional presence of Senegalese forces in Guinea-Bissau has been a reason for political instability in Bissau (E-Global, 2021).

During 2020, the conflict of Casamance was dormant. However, with the election of President Umaro Sissoco Embalo in Bissau, a strong ally of President Macky Sall of Senegal, a series of cooperation initiatives between the two countries began, which included the resolution of the Casamance conflict. In January 26, 2021, a combined operation between the military forces of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau army began, with the aim of putting an end to the MFDC's presence in Guinea-Bissau. Senegalese forces entered Guinea-Bissau's territory from the north, supported by artillery fire and combat aviation, and Guinea-Bissau forces closed the southern flank. Success of this 2021 operation was limited, and although greatly weakened, reportedly there were still MFDC positions in Guinea-Bissau (McGregor, 2021). Guinea-Bissau opposition parties accused President Embalo of authorizing Senegalese forces to enter without informing the national assembly (Notícias Mundo ao Minuto, 2021). The Bissau-Guinean population does not appreciate the presence of foreign military on their land, and the opposition parties capitalized on the subject, remembering that one of the motives form the 2012 coup d'état was to have an Angolan military contingent stationed in Bissau, regardless if they were fulfilling a bilateral agreement and providing training to the Bissau-Guinean armed forces. Once again, the close relations between the two presidents generated, in some sectors of society, a feeling of distrust due to the alleged abusive and illegal exploitation of the northern neighbour in relation to Bissau-Guinean resources.

8.3. Deforestation

As a heavily forested country, Guinea-Bissau has a strong stock of highly valuable rosewood, teak, and other hardwoods, which have become scarce worldwide and whose demand and prices have soared as a result. This has led to the decimation of forests in Guinea-Bissau, with the regions of Bafatá (east) and Oio (north) most devastated between 2012 and 2014, to a point that Oio has been left without primary forests. In 2015, the National Assembly approved legislation that outlawed the felling of trees for 5 years. During that time, deforestation eased significantly, but felling for domestic consumption and illegal logging and timber trade remained. In 2018, Guinea-Bissau's Director-General for Forests and Fauna Mamadu Camará announced that the government had started to export 1,500 containers of seized illegal wood, which had been left strewn across the country's forests (Ambiente Magazine, 2018). At the end of that five-year period, the government of Guinea-Bissau reauthorized the felling of trees. In October 2020, Nelvina Barreto, former Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and environmental activist, said in an interview that she repudiated the government's announced intention to reauthorize the felling of trees, and appealed to the civil society to mobilize against that decision. According to her, the government would contribute to exacerbating the effects of climate change, causing the rainfall regime to change over time, temperatures to rise, and the water table to drop and become inaccessible. She added that logging decimates more than 625 cubic meters of forest each year, reducing it by 30% in the Tombali region in southern Guinea-Bissau, and shrinking 57% of the savannah coverage in the Bafatá region, as well as 19% of the mangrove forests in Oio and Gabú (DW, 2020b). In addition to exploiting forests for commercial purposes, deforestation is also the result of domestic consumption of firewood as an energy source. The yearly consumption of wood for energy is about 1.29% of the available biomass

resource, which is about 48.3 million m^3, translating into a deforestation rate of 30,000 to 60,000 ha/year (UNEP, 2015b).

8.4. Narco-trafficking

Due to the vulnerability of its economic and social structures, Guinea-Bissau became open to the actions of South American drug cartels, and the country started to be used as a launch pad to take narcotics into Europe. The origins and destinations of narcotics may not be the responsibility of Guinea-Bissau, but there are consequences of this traffic in Bissau-Guinean society that cannot be ignored. Drug trafficking brings with it other organized crimes such as the trafficking of arms and people, and, above all, it poisons the society wherever it takes root. Criminal activity is no longer a "common crime" but takes on a higher level of complexity and violence. The highest decision-making spheres (civil and military) are absorbed in the drug traffickers' web and national decisions are made in accordance with their interests. For example, in August 2021, the United States (Department of State Narcotics Rewards Program) offered five million dollars for the arrest of the former head of the Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces — General António Indjai — considered "one of the most destabilizing figures" in the country. General Indjai was Chief of Staff of the Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces from 2010 to 2014, being one of the leaders of both the April 1, 2010 military uprising and the 2012 coup d'état. He is no longer a military leader, but he was operating freely in West Africa (Observador & Lusa, 2021a). Even if Bissau-Guineans want to fight drug trafficking, they do not have the means to do it. Indeed, drug trafficking is not a problem unique to Guinea-Bissau, nor should it be fought in isolation by the small African country. Almost all countries in the Gulf of Guinea (in the broadest sense) are, to a greater or lesser extent, subject to narcotics trafficking from South America by air or by sea. After entering the African continent, the traffickers' network makes "the product" travel overland towards the north, to the Mediterranean Sea, from where it jumps to Europe. It is assessed that over 75% of the "product" manages to reach European shores. On 10 November, 2021, the executive secretary of the Guinea-Bissau Observatory for the Fight Against Drugs and Drug Addiction in Guinea-Bissau — Abílio Aleluia Có Júnior — said in an interview to the media that drug trafficking had increased in Guinea-Bissau, with the involvement of state agents. He said:

> We've always drawn attention to the increase in drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, so it doesn't surprise us at all. In fact, it is a sad and shameful situation for the country and with each passing day we are seeing the involvement of politicians, the military, defence and security agents, and businessmen in drug trafficking." The executive secretary of the Guinean Observatory for the Fight against Drugs and Drug Addiction says that a lot of political will is needed in the fight against drug trafficking in the country, but "that's what doesn't exist, because most politicians and government officials are involved in drug trafficking. (Voice of America, 2021)

The narco-trafficking has also contaminated the armed forces, with high-ranking officers being identified as relevant elements in the drugs' cartels, and suspicions of soldiers

facilitating and providing security to drug transports (Voice of America, 2021). President Umaro Sissoco Embalo has called the fight against drugs cartels one of his administration's major goals. In fact, he has expressed to the media that, as a result of his anti-drugs engagement, the failed attempt of the coup d'état that occurred on the 1st of February 2022, might have been promoted by the drug cartels, in order to remove him from power (Diário de Notícias, 2022).

8.5. Global warming issues

As a country where a simple high tide can make the sea water penetrate about 100 km through the inland rivers, it is easy to see that Guinea-Bissau will be one of the countries strongly threatened by the average rise in sea water due to global warming. However, there is a great lack of information regarding Guinea-Bissau's position on climate issues. In the interviews with several Bissau-Guinean citizens, it was easy to come to the conclusion that the country has so many absolutely basic problems to solve that, although the seriousness of the situation is acknowledged, climate issues are not yet on the agenda. Like other countries in the West African region, Guinea-Bissau's economy relies heavily on the use of fossil fuels. However, without realizing it, Guinea-Bissau has a relevant role to play in the fight against global warming. Atmospheric carbon sequestration is a global concern, and Guinea-Bissau has the right tools to do it: the extent forests of mangroves, and the high concentrations of phytoplankton in its ocean waters.

The extensive coastal forests of mangroves are one of the most effective ways of capturing and fixing carbon, which is why the flora of Guinea-Bissau is extremely important for the decarbonization of the planet. Likewise, the presence of large amounts of phytoplankton in the Atlantic Ocean that bathes the Guinea-Bissau continental shelf is in itself another extremely effective way of capturing carbon. The more carbon the phytoplankton absorbs; the more phytoplankton reproduces. Since phytoplankton is the essential basis for feeding fish stocks, the captured carbon enters the food chain in a health way. Therefore, the concern to watch over the quality of the sea and the preservation of Guinea-Bissau's mangroves assumes a dimension of global importance, something that could be paired with concerns about the preservation of the Amazon rainforest.

8.6. Illegal or unreported fishing

In his speech to a CPLP group of experts in fishing matters, Guinea-Bissau Under-Secretary for Fishing Activities Dr. Maurício Sanca said that illegal, non-declared, and non-reglementary fishing is one of the biggest problems facing Guinea-Bissau (Sanca, 2021). This abusive and unlawful activity is not only impoverishing the country's economy, but above all is extinguishing resources and destroying the sea bed and the mangrove forests. The illegal and excessive fishing that takes place inhibits the protection seasons and could deplete fish resources within a very short time. It should also be noted that trawl fishing dedicated to the capture of large shrimps, in addition to destroying the seabed, brings to the surface many other species that are returned to the sea dead. Finally, Senegal's artisanal fishermen fish indiscriminately in Guinea-Bissau's territorial waters, without any license and, to make matters worse, destroy considerable amounts of mangroves in order to collect wood to smoke the fish they catch. In this way, they contribute to further aggravate the problem by destroying the refuge of species in their juvenile state.

8.7. International treaties

Regarding Guinea-Bissau's international relations, the country has signed and ratified international treaties or is a member of the following organizations: The African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AcFTA), the African Caribbean and Pacific Nations (ACPN), the African Development Bank Group (ADBG), the African Union (AU), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECWAS), the European Union (EU), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), the United Nations (UN), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and the World Bank (WB). The United Nations had a great influence on the way Portugal dealt with the independence movements of its colonies, being a key factor in the international recognition of the PAIGC independence movement. Thus, once Guinea-Bissau's became officially independent from Portugal, it immediately requested access to the United Nations, which was promptly accepted. The United Nations had a political mission in Bissau — UNIOGBIS — for 20 years. By decision of the UN Security Council, this mission ended its functions in 2020 because the UN's efforts were not seeing results. According to a report (S/2018/1086), UNIOGBIS faced insurmountable challenges to its mandate due to the "engines of instability" installed in the country. The fragility of the Bissau-Guinean state suffered from structural problems: "a political class deeply divided; the growing political influence of a shadow economy based on drug trafficking; the absence of the State, particularly in rural areas, and its ineffectiveness when present; human rights violations and widespread impunity; resignation to poverty and lack of access to basic services." Furthermore, it was mentioned that Guinea-Bissau did not have the institutional and physical infrastructure, nor the human resources with the necessary training, to absorb the technical and financial support provided by the international community. It concluded that the long presence of UNIOGBIS "may have contributed to a lesser sense of ownership of the political process among the leaders and of their responsibility to advance the country." The post-electoral crisis that broke out in early 2020 confirmed all the points of the UN report. The crisis in the system was joined by the COVID-19 pandemic, which had a strong impact on the way UNIOGBIS had planned its phased exit, as well as on the transfer of mission tasks to United Nations' funds, agencies and programs that will continue on the ground, assuring that the footprint of UN support will continue to be seen in Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, before withdrawing from Guinea-Bissau, UNIOGBIS encouraged ECOWAS, the African Union, the CPLP and the European Union — the "Group of Five" — to promote aid to Guinea-Bissau (Global Initiative, 2021).

Guinea-Bissau joined the African Union (AU) in 1973, even before being officially independent from Portugal (through its Unilateral Declaration of Independence). AU promotes regional integration as a form of economic development. The ultimate goal of AU is the complete integration of the economies of all African countries into an African Economic Community. From the 1990s onwards, with the opening to multi-partisanship, Guinea-Bissau entered a situation of latent internal conflict, with successive coups d'état, a civil war and permanent political instability. Thus, the AU placed the country under close surveillance and, when the 2012 coup d'état took place, the African Union suspended Guinea-Bissau's membership, and applied sanctions to the country, until constitutional normality was implemented again. The democratic elections of 2014 came to mark (officially) the return to normality, and the African Union reinstated Guinea-Bissau membership. To deal with regional issues, such as Guinea-Bissau which is located in the West African region, the African Union works in concert with ECOWAS, which works as a regional integration facilitator. Guinea-Bissau is a founding member State of the Economic Community of West African States – ECOWAS (also known as CEDEAO in Latin languages) — joining the organization in 1975. ECOWAS is a political and economic integration organization, with peacekeeping concerns due to the fact that it is located in a zone known as the "coup belt," due to the frequent coups d'état and rebellions that have occurred among its member States (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone). The organization is composed of 15 member States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Mauritania and Morocco have also demonstrated interests in joining the organization (ECOWAS, 2021). Following the 2012 coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau, and the withdrawal of the Angolan forces which were in Bissau under a bilateral military cooperation agreement, ECOWAS deployed a peacekeeping force to the country. The ECOWAS peacekeeping mission was named ECOMIB. Initially, the international force had an 800-strong military apparatus, with the task to ensure the security of the local holders of sovereign bodies. Later on, the force reduced its contingent to 500 soldiers and police agents. ECOMIB had military personnel from Nigeria, Côte D'Ivoire, Togo, Senegal, and Burkina Faso as well as the police contingent from Nigeria. The peacekeeping force had an initial mandate of six months, agreed with the host nation. However, in 2017 the force was still in Guinea-Bissau, and not much improvement could be seen regarding the violence and instability. The locals claimed that the foreigner military had been "contaminated" by the drug dealers, and were trafficking themselves; that the foreigner forces had too much Senegalese military, bringing bad memories of the neighbouring country's participation in Guinea-Bissau's 1998/9 civil war, questioning the force's neutrality; and that the ECOMIB compounds were too far away from Bissau, where the violence resided, thus leaving the population unprotected. In September 2017, ECOMIB redeployed to their sending nations, and no other international force substituted it (Global Security, 2017). Another good indicator regarding the importance of Guinea-Bissau in the geopolitics of Western Africa was the differentiated attitude of ECOWAS towards the country, by sending a peacekeeping force and, subsequently, maintaining a permanent political engagement. This close contact engagement was not repeated in the case of the internal conflicts of Guinea and Mali, where ECOWAS suspended these countries from the organization as a demonstration of

disapproval for their lack of capability to solve their internal problems.

In October 2016, ECOWAS made yet another important contribution for the pacification and stability of Guinea-Bissau, by promoting and mediating a reconciliation meeting, in Conakry, with all Bissau-Guinean stakeholders. The result of this meeting was a written agreement between all parties, which became known as the Conakry Agreement. The Agreement provided for the formation of a consensual government comprising all parties represented in the National Assembly, the appointment by consensus of a prime minister and far-reaching institutional reforms. In institutional reforms, the UN supported the drafting of a new electoral law, the revision of the constitution law and a law on political parties. However, in the two years following the agreement, none of the provisions revised therein were implemented. Therefore, ECOWAS decided to intervene and applied sanctions on 19 Bissau-Guinean political actors, accused of promoting instability in the country, and political obstructionists. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations fully endorse the decisions of ECOWAS. They reiterate their endorsement of the centrality of the Conakry Agreement as a roadmap for Guinea-Bissau's future (United Nations SG, 2018). The United Nations, the European Union and the United States of America was had sanctions imposed over Bissau-Guinean military personnel because of their actions in the coup d'état of 2012. In 2021 several of the sanctioned persons saw their bank accounts frozen by the United Nations, and the new President — Umaro Sissoco Embalo — told media representatives he was going to try negotiate with the United Nations the raising of such sanctions (Observador & Lusa, 2021b). On May 2, 1997 Guinea-Bissau became the organization's eighth (and only non-francophone) member state of the West African Economic and Monetary Union — WAEMU — which is a customs and currency union between the members of ECOWAS. Being a member of WAEMU, Guinea-Bissau shares the organization's objectives and enjoys the benefits of a customs union with Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Trade between these countries has no customs duties, having been introduced in January 2000 a Common External Tariff (CEP), based on the World Trade Organization Customs Valuation Code.

In March 2018, the African Union promoted the signing of an international agreement among the African States for the creation of an African Free Trade Area (AfCTA). Twenty-two countries signed the Agreement. A year later, Guinea-Bissau also signed the AfCTA Agreement (but at the time of this publication the National Assembly had not yet ratified it). The main objective of the AfCTA is to create (much like the European Union) a single market, in which the free movement of people and goods and a future system of a single currency for all signatory countries is established. The implementation of the AfCTA will be divided into stages and will include several protocols dealing with a wide range of matters. Another relevant international forum in which Guinea-Bissau has an "equal in-between pairs" seat, and is a founding member State, is the Community of Portuguese Language Countries – CPLP. Created in 1996, CPLP has 9 member states, eight of which are Portuguese-speaking countries: Angola, Brazil; Cabo Verde; Guinea-Bissau; Mozambique; Portugal; São Tomé and Príncipe; Timor-Leste; and one non-Portuguese-speaking country, Equatorial Guinea. The overall population of CPLP countries is approximately 300 million. The mission of

CPLP is to promote the political-diplomatic consultation among its member states, namely to reinforce its presence on the international scene; cooperation in all fields, including education, health, science and technology, defence, agriculture, public administration, communications, justice, public security, culture, sport and media; and the materialization of projects for the promotion and dissemination of the Portuguese language. One area of particular emphasis is the cooperation in the defence sector, an area where Guinea-Bissau can profit from the military and security capabilities of its CPLP partners. Specially in the surveillance of the waters under Bissau's jurisdiction. Guinea-Bissau military personnel has been participating regularly in CPLP "Felino" exercises since 2000, exchanging experiences and practicing new tactics with the rest of CPLP military community. In September 2021, the Presidency of Guinea-Bissau expressed the wish to take the (rotate) two years' presidency of CPLP, after São Tomé and Principe, which will end in 2025 (Observador & Lusa, 2021c).

8.8. Bilateral relations

In 2012, the "Groupe de Recherche et de Realization" (GRDR), sponsored by ECOWAS, mapped the Bissau-Guinean diaspora (Répertoire des associations de la diaspora bissau-guinéenne, n.d.). The diaspora sends home yearly about USD 47 million, representing 3.1% of Guinea-Bissau's GDP. The results of that research beyond Guinea-Bissau's region were not surprising: most Bissau-Guineans living abroad reside in Europe, with Portugal leading the list. Overall, 5.3% of Guinea-Bissau's population live out of the country but maintain a very strong link with their home country. The results were later (2019) updated and trimmed by Lisbon University (ISEG) in order to verify the engagement of the Bissau-Guinean diaspora in their host nations' projects. The numbers were impressive, showing that Bissau-Guineans are a proactive community. According to the Portuguese Border and Emigration Service (SEF), in 2019, there were approximately 19,000 Bissau-Guinean nationals, which represents 1% of Guinea-Bissau's population (Sangreman et al., n.d.). Therefore, the bilateral relationship between Portugal and Guinea-Bissau is particularly solid. Portugal operates as a bridge to European Union funds for African countries, and as a negotiator/facilitator for European fishing interests in Guinea-Bissau waters.

The Soviet Union had a major role in the independence process of Guinea-Bissau. After its independence, Soviet support continued to help develop the young country. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian support, although effective, became residual. Nowadays, Russia is still an option for Bissau-Guinean students wishing to carry on with their superior studies. In October 2021, relations between the two countries entered a new chapter. The Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement announcing the agreement between Russia and Guinea-Bissau regarding visa waiver for diplomatic and service passports, as well as a new technical-military agreement. Quoting Minister Sergey Lavrov, the press release said: "The natural next step must be to intensify trade, economic and investment cooperation in order to bring it to the level of good and credible political dialogue" (Observador & Lusa, 2021d).

The most relevant of Guinea-Bissau's bilateral partner laying "beyond the horizon" seems

to be China. Not only do Chinese presence and support to Guinea-Bissau go back to its days fighting for independence, but they also continue until today, with commerce and diplomatic engagement. China is the only country that has an embassy in every African country, which includes Guinea-Bissau. The fishery sector is of particular interest to China having made fishing agreements with Guinea-Bissau for that matter. China is also a major importer of legal timber from Guinea-Bissau. The forests of Guinea-Bissau, if explored with sustainable methods, can provide good quantities of (expensive) rosewood, which is coveted for shipbuilding and used in traditional Chinese *hongmu* furniture. Beyond the financial compensation of such commercial exchanges, China has also constructed several facilities in Guinea-Bissau, aiming to provide wellbeing to the Bissau-Guinean population. However, a recent development seems to have brought this bilateral relation to a higher level. In 22 November 2021, Guinea-Bissau joined the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The MOU was signed by the Chinese Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, Guo Ce, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guinea-Bissau, Suzi Carla Barbosa.

The admission to BRI will open the Guinea-Bissau territory to new Chinese investments, such as a Chinese commitment to build a USD 184 million bio-mass plant in the country, and has undergone several redevelopment projects in the country, including USD 48 million to renovate the antiquated telecommunications system, highway construction, deep-water fisheries and fishery land support facilities, potentially oil exploration and, capitalizing on a future Special Economic Zone in Bissau, the installation of more Chinese enterprises (Devonshire-Ellis, 2021). Senegal is a reference raising power in Africa, and it is not interested to have a "failed-State" at its doorstep, where drug and arms dealers' rule, and where Casamance's separatist movements can find refuge. Furthermore, Guinea-Bissau's offshore oil and inland resources are also interesting businesses for the Senegalese enterprises. Therefore, it is in the best interest of Senegal to have a stable and developed Guinea-Bissau, and that can be the seen in recent bilateral partnerships. Angola and South Africa — two great sub-Saharan powers — saw their cooperation with Guinea-Bissau interrupted with the 2012 coup d'état. However, there are signs that they are interested in returning to cooperate with Guinea-Bissau, which clearly demonstrates the potential that the country has on the international scene. This is seen a good indicator of the relevancy that Guinea-Bissau natural resources have in the geo-economics of sub-Saharan region.

9. General assessment

Guinea-Bissau is a poor country, with a great wealth in natural resources, where instability and illegal activities flourish. From 1973 to 2020, Guinea-Bissau has had 21 governments, 34 prime ministers, 11 presidents, and countless government officials. For example, within the duration of the IX legislature alone (2014–2018), nine prime ministers were appointed (Teixeira & Tamilcon, 2020). The genesis of the country's instability lies within poor governance, which in turn results in a scarcity of financial resources capable of providing the population with an acceptable standard of living. In the absence of immediately available resources in the public sector, and its authorities defying the rule of law, the population engages in an unrestrained struggle for access to the scarce resources of the state and the

opening up to all types of informal and illegal economy. This rivalry favours partisan nepotism, increasingly basing itself on the differentiation of the different ethnicities and cultures that populate Guinea-Bissau. This contradicts the successful process of building a unitary state that began with the struggle against the colonizing power and persisted until the civil war of 1998–1999. The complex process of tribalization mixed with political nepotism, in which Bissau-Guinean society is currently immersed, is both motivation and consequence of corruption. Successive coups d'état that have taken place over the past five decades have weakened the process of state building and the implementation of a liberal democracy based on the rule of law. Governance in Guinea-Bissau is regularly discontinued and this has had a negative impact on public policies, with a direct impact on the lives of the population. It could almost be said that Guinea-Bissau had a stronger relevance and effective geopolitical posture before becoming independent than after assuming sovereignty. At the international level, efforts have been made to support the country and to avoid the categorization of a "failed state," with state building and conflict prevention measures, but these measures appear not to have contributed to the democratization of the country, with the necessary consequences for the economy, and the gradual disinterest of international stakeholders. Thus, Guinea-Bissau is at the bottom of the world scale in terms of human development. In its last report to the United Nations Security Council, the UN mission in Bissau wrote: "There is great fatigue on the part of donors with the cycle of conflict and political stagnation in Guinea-Bissau" (Global Initiative, 2021). However, the "failed-state" and "narco-state" labels may be simplistic, not having taking into account the true potential of the country and its population. While drug trafficking is something with great complexity and multiple connections, it is also true that Guinea-Bissau is not a producing or transforming country of narcotic products, but rather, and only, a revolving platform of trafficking. The drugs come from South America, are disembarked in Guinea-Bissau, and proceed to their true destination –– Europe. If the country's authorities, together with the international entities responsible for fighting narco-trafficking, manage to stop the incoming flow, Guinea-Bissau's involvement in narcotics will also stop.

9.1. SWOT Analyses

Should one make a strength, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis, it becomes evident that, although the negative aspects occupy more labels (W, T), the positive aspects (S, O) are far more powerful and sustainable.

Table 2 *Guinea-Bissau SWOT Analyses*

Strengths (S)	Location; weather; natural resources; multi-ethnicity; member of good & trade unions.
Weaknesses (W)	Low rate of human development; poverty; nepotism; lack of transportation and Communications facilities; bureaucracy; low rate of privet investment; dependent on donors; military structures misunderstanding their role in a representative democracy.
Opportunities (O)	Fishery; tourism; mining; oil; cashew; large African market.
Threats (T)	Narcotraffic; military-political instability; corruption; illegal fishing/ wood cutting resulting in the depletion of natural resources; arms and human traffic.

Source: authors

9.2. Potential mishaps

Guinea-Bissau has a low rate of population education/qualification and an inherent high level of poverty. The lack of resources jeopardizes the good governance that the country needs, opening the society to all kind of "other solutions" such as corruption, nepotism, and illegal activities. These disrupting actions are significantly increased by the misunderstanding of democratic values by both military apparatus and the posture of the ruling authorities. All these homemade damaging effects are exponentialized, and encouraged, by narco-traffic dealers, which are using Guinea-Bissau as a transit platform for their stupefacient product to travel from South America to Europe.

9.3. Potential capabilities

In material terms, the Guinea-Bissau needs almost everything, much of which will be obtained externally, in the form of both donations and investments.

Investment

Not only can investments benefit stakeholders, they can also be the engine for development and for the well-being of the Bissau-Guinean population. These developing projects may generate a spinning effect attracting the Bissau-Guinean diaspora and encouraging the return of highly qualified individuals, as well as their financial savings, that could boost and create small and medium-sized companies.

Tourism

The tourism sector can, and should, be further explored, because it offers great potential, especially in the Bijagos Archipelago, taking advantage of the possibility of establishing a special economic zone for tourism.

Special economic zone

The setting up of a special economic zone in Bissau capable of attracting important international investments depends on three factors; (1) political stability and fight against corruption; (2) qualification of human social capital; and (3) ability to attract international businesses.

Inland exports

Cashew is the main export of Guinea-Bissau, and not only the quality of raw cashews but also derived products containing cashew nuts should be improved. This would require setting up processing plants, employing more manpower, and augmenting export of that product. If logging is legalized and sustainability practice can be ensured, there is a significant market awaiting Bissau-Guinea lumber: China is potentially an important importer of its rosewood. Furthermore, should proper investments in the road and harbour systems be made, the country could start exploiting the minerals in its subsoil.

Blue Economy

Offshore oil exploration may prove to be an excellent contribution to the country's economic balance. However, it should be done with the three permanent concerns: It must not be a source of oceanic pollution; it must be done taken into consideration that the World with rely less and less on fossil fuels; and it must not turn the country absolutely dependent of the oil business. However, the privileged conditions for the breeding and capture of fish, molluscs, and shrimp are very unique to Guinea-Bissau are the obvious immediate answer for the country to prosper. Further to the fisheries, the ocean floor of Guinea-Bissau, is likely to have mineral resources with low exploration costs due to the shallow depth of its extensive continental shelf. Investments in ports, systems and services to support and provide maintenance to industrial fishing and merchant operating in the waters under Guinea-Bissau's jurisdiction have been wasted opportunities.

10. Conclusion

Guinea-Bissau was the former Portuguese colony that presented the strongest armed struggle for its independence against Portuguese colonial forces. After its independence (1973), Guinea-Bissau entered a long period (1973–1991) of a single political party system, which might have framed the political posture of the midlife/senior echelon of some sectors population, prompting political misunderstandings and inadaptation to the subsequent multiparty system. Civil dissatisfaction, due to poor live conditions, and a military apparatus with a political bearing, lead to frequent cases of instability. From its Independence Day to 2020, the country has had 21 governments, 34 prime ministers, 11 presidents, and countless government officials. Guinea-Bissau is ranked by international organizations as being one of the poorest countries in the world, with very high levels of corruption and drug trafficking. However, the country has a considerable amount of different natural resources (fisheries, minerals, agriculture, and potential offshore hydrocarbons), which, together with an outstanding bio-diversity, cultural variety, and unexplored paradisiac locations (all extremely interesting for touristic enterprises) could raise Guinea-Bissau to the level of a pleasant country to live in, with low unemployment rates and a good standard of living. To the main research question: How can Guinea-Bissau overcome its permanent governance instability, and avoid becoming a "failed state"? we therefore offer the following conclusions:

Although the instability's activities are normally attributed to the defence sector, which seems to have difficulties in complying with the role of the military in a representative democracy, and the weak governance conducted by politicians that fail to act according to the rule of law, the real reason for the instability is poverty among the population. The population suffering is best represented by the Guinea-Bissau saying: "the greater the famine, the greater the protest in the streets." Most of the reasons for Guinea-Bissau's governmental services' malfunctioning are common to other African countries — weak structures. This happens because the sovereign state of Guinea-Bissau has adopted the colonial (Portuguese) way of governance, incorporating the Western model of structuring the state, without taken into consideration their own culture and way of living. This provoked that the new born country had incompatibilities between different layers of its society, adding an extra motive of instability. Furthermore, this week governance has been surreptitiously aggravated by transnational malicious actors interested in maintaining instability in the country, in order to use Guinea-Bissau as a drug trafficking platform. However, the SWOT analyses clearly demonstrates that the country's weaknesses are, in fact the reverse engine for its opportunities, and it can become a beacon of progress in the western African region.

Therefore, Guinea-Bissau might have reached the tipping point of its political evolution. It is worth noting that Guinea-Bissau is a representative republic with a democratic semi-presidentialism regime. However, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló — a former army general elected to become Guinea-Bissau's head of state in February 2020 — has shown tendency to assume a full presidential government style, leading foreigner affairs negotiations, presiding over the council of ministers, and exercising tight control over the higher echelons of the armed forces. Although internal criticism of the politically educated people has arisen (Voz da Diaspora Guineense), fearing for the independence of the State institutions, the fact is that the popular support that elected President Embaló with 53.55% of the votes does not seem to have decreased (DW 2020c). Furthermore, interviewed high-ranking officials (Forbs, 2022) of the Guinea-Bissau government, it becomes clear that the presidential initiatives have indeed opened further financial and foreigner diplomat support to Guinea-Bissau. This "presidential style" overtakes the role of Guinea-Bissau Prime Minister's role, questioning the type of regime (semi-Presidential or Presidential) the country needs. This happens while the Parliament and the Presidency are proposing the reviewing of the country's Constitutional Law.

Guinea-Bissau needs firm, transparent, and consistent political leadership that follows democratic values, exercises fair political tutelage over its armed forces, demands loyalty from the military ranks, but acts in accordance with Guinea-Bissau's culture values, while striving for the well-being of the civilian population.International investments in Guinea-Bissau's structures — the so-called State Building — are only relevant if national values — Nation Building — have previously been enshrined. Apparently, in the case of Guinea-Bissau, the order of factors has been changed. The constitutional review due to take place will have to clarify the role of the president and his/her powers. Only after achieving the political stability can the country engage in a serious campaign to expel narco-traffic and fight corruption, entering in the path of a promising restructuring of the economic

network of Guinea-Bissau. Any initiative to project Guinea-Bissau's economy towards an auspicious future will require the establishment of partnership agreements with national and foreigner entities such as the CEDEAO, the UE, China, and private funds, in order to develop win-win projects between Guinea-Bissau and the investors. These projects can have a development spinning factor through the planned exclusive economic zone(s) set to be implemented in Bissau and (specifically for tourism) in the Bijagos.

Only after the stabilization of Guinea-Bissau can the traditional geopolitical question — What has this country to offer to the world? — be answered; and the country has potential for the answer to be: sustainable provision of blue economy resources, a stable and growing economy good for investment, and a paradisiac leisure/touristic destination.

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Part 4

Sustainable Development in the Portuguese-speaking Countries

Restructuring African States for Sustainable Development

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Poverty and Inequality in Lusophone Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique

Samuel Igbatayo
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The Social and Economic Impact of Education in the Islands of São Tomé and Príncipe

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The Media in São Tomé and Príncipe and Its Contribution to Country Development

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Restructuring African States for Sustainable Development

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Independence; Exclusion; State-race; Sustainable development; State-nation; Fragile state; Santomensity; Negritude; Pan-Africanism; Nationality; "National Truth and Reconciliation"

Abstract

The tragedy of contemporary Africa is that it was caught up and trapped in the cultural revolution dictated by Négritude while negotiations of the plan for the reconstruction of its independent societies. Indeed, the "return to sources," which benefits the re-valorization of African cultures once trampled by colonization, has turned into an instrument of exclusion in the hands of political and economic decision-makers. From then on, a question has tormented our minds: How will Africa be able to experience sustainable development if a part of our population is excluded from the circle of the collective construction of the destiny of our nations?

From the scenography as presented by Moura (1999) applied to the work of Tadjo (2000), this present communication transcends the dilemma of African states as demonstrated by the Republic of Rwanda during the period of the genocide to propose a new structuring of our states integrating all the living forces of our nations. This approach led us to an overhaul of the notion of "santomensity" and a reappraisal of the ideals of Amílcar Cabral for a structural renewal in Guinea-Bissau. This chapter revisits the writings of Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon for a renewal of the thought of African intellectuals for an ideological correction which is essential for a more dynamic and conquering Africa.

1. Introduction

Published in 2000, *L'Ombre D'Imana - Voyage jusqu'au bout du Rwanda* is a work of reference in the process of expressing the modern memory of the African continent. The fruit of a collective project entitled "Rwanda: écrire par devoir de mémoire," this work is a radioscopy of the African continent's jitters in general terms confronted with the management of its daily

life after the celebrations of independence. Veronique Tadjo (2000) managed to condense the structural dilemma of the African countries in a pictogram presented on the cover of the book. In short, she set out to reconcile Africa with herself to exorcise the curse into which she was plunged while resolving the issues of her continent's historical specificity. Based on a careful analysis of the scenography of this work, the present chapter intends to unveil a methodology for the reconstruction of African institutions for a sustainable development. In its second phase, the chapter will apply this methodology onto the cases of Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe in an attempt to create a new model of Africanity capable of correcting the mistakes of the common past.

2. Literature Review

Dating back to 1994, the genocide in Rwanda has now become part of the contemporary history of the African people, but mainly the people of the Republic of Rwanda. Despite the aftermath of this tragic episode, Rwanda has learned many lessons from this massacre such that it is on the way of becoming one of the most economically advanced African countries. However, the monstrosity of this event is still being debated to this day, and many academics and journalists on the continent have reflected upon the Rwandan genocide. One example is Benjamin Chemouni's article entitled "Introduction au thème: La recherche sur l'État rwandais en débat," published in the journal *Politique Africaine* in 2020. Beyond the critical reflection on this subject, we also note a vast work expressing the collective trauma born from the genocide. This is the case with the Ivorian author Véronique Tadjo (2000), whose novel *L'Ombre D'Imana — Voyage jusqu'au bout du Rwanda* is an open forum for the traumatic expression of genocidal exclusion.

In parallel, the theme of exclusion as the result of an epistemological error associated with the celebration of the African independence was the subject of my doctoral thesis entitled "Aimé Césaire: De la Révolte à la Révolution — Pour une lecture croisée postcoloniale des œuvres d' Aimé Césaire et de Frantz Fanon" (2017) where I analyzed the ideas of Frantz Fanon who critiques independent Africa in his work Les Damnés de la terre (2002). The culturalism on which our nations were built following Aimé Césaire's logic of Negritude (1963) has hindered the sustained development of our states.

3. The Heart of African Drama: Enunciation or Denunciation?

"Genocide" is not a word heard every day. The taboo that encapsulates this cultural phenomenon is the combined result of several parameters, be they legal, political, economic, or even ethical. In any case, the post-independence realities of Africa are coloured by genocides that frighten the continent's daily life. Public opinion can sometimes be uninformed regarding such events, as the trauma of genocide blocks expressions in such a way that everything becomes subsumed in deep silence. The intellectual would in this case becomes Aimé Césaire's "*la bouche des malheurs qui n'ont point de bouche*"[1] (1983) in order to denounce the silence, enunciating the social fracture caused by the genocide.

[1] (Free translation) The mouth of misfortunes that have no mouth.

Veronique Tadjo breaks the silence generated around the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This was at the same time when Nelson Mandela was elected President of South Africa, a fact that marked the end of apartheid. Mandela's victory was so celebrated that it overshadowed the horrific news from Rwanda. Tadjo set up a writing project for the genocide with a well-calibrated focus on enunciation: the novel works on a combined synergy of several crossed voices. It merges and confuses the enunciator and the co-enunciator in a narrative device animated by writers, lawyers, journalists, ordinary men, and tourists. This diversification of the narrative's points of view allows us to discover the social realities of Rwanda in its deepest aspects.

3.1 The Heart of African Drama: Enunciation or Denunciation?

The writer's intervention draws without misunderstanding the post-independence problem in Africa: "*Les Hutus ont peur des Tutsis parce qu'ils sont au pouvoir. Les Tutsis ont peur des Hutus parce qu'ils peuvent s'emparer du pouvoir. La peur est demeurée sur les collines*" (Tadjo, 2000, p. 38).[2] We witnessed the fracture of a republic in two ethnic blocks, namely, the Hutus and the Tutsis. Social cohesion is absent. Fear takes over inter-social relations, deconstructing the social contract that Jean Jacques Rousseau (2001) defined in the 18th century as the foundation of republican ethics. The work dissects evil and helps the reader to remotely navigate in the past till the source of evil: "*La royauté a été abolie et la république proclamée. Les traces de la noblesse ont été effacées lors des affrontements successifs entre les féodaux tutsis et les masses populaires hutues*" (Tadjo, 2000, p. 29).[3]

The proclamation of independence, far from abolishing the social dichotomy created by the colonial machine, deepened the chasm by establishing a difference between citizens from the first zone and those from the second zone. Republican unity was polarized in an effort to differentiate between the natives and non-natives. The result was a series of massacres whose first was marked shortly after the proclamation of independence: "*Au moment des massacres de 1963, son oncle paternel l'a fait fuir hors du pays avec ses frères et ses sœurs*" (Tadjo, 2000, p. 88).[4] It should be noted that such massacres were always for the purpose of purging the land of all those who came from other places. The work reveals the knot of the issue in the following terms:

> *Une des raisons pour lesquelles les Tutsis ont été pourchassés vient des hypothèses [qui] leur attribuèrent une appartenance étrangère. Les pasteurs 'watutssis' qu'ils trouvaient grands et élancés, contrairement aux agriculteurs hutus d'une taille plus petite, n'étaient pas originaires d'Afrique centrale. Pour certains, ils seraient venus d'aussi loin que le Tibet ou l'Egypte. Mais le lien avec l'Ethiopie reste l'affirmation la plus courante. […] lors du génocide, des milliers de Tutsis ont été*

[2] (Free translation) The Hutus are afraid of the Tutsis because they are in power. The Tutsis are afraid of the Hutus because they can seize power. Fear remains on the hills.

[3] (Free translation) Royalty has been abolished and the republic proclaimed. The traces of the nobility were erased during the successive clashes between the Tutsi feudal lords and Hutu popular masses.

[4] (Free translation) At the time of the 1963 massacres, his paternal uncle drove him out of the country with his brothers and sisters.

jetés dans les eaux du fleuve Kagera afin qu'ils 'retournent en Ethiopie'. (Tadjo, 2000, p. 33)[5]

This non-natives hunt degenerated into pro-Hutu propaganda summarized in the following commandments:

> *"5. Toutes les positions stratégiques, qu'elles soient politiques, administratives, économiques, militaires ou de sécurité, doivent être confiées à des Bahutus.*
>
> *6. Le secteur de l'éducation (élèves, étudiants, enseignants) doit être composé en majorité des Bahutus"* (Tadjo, 2000, pp. 128–129).[6]

These commandments were copied from the post-independence's nationalization program of the economic heritage dictated by the cultural and political pragmatism of "Negritude."

3.2 Where the "Negritude" Programme Errs

The main animator of the Negritude movement was Aimé Césaire, along with Léopold Sédar Senghor and Léon Gontran Damas. All three have this particularity of being Negroes or descendants of Negroes. It is with this in mind that Césaire condensed the problem of racism suffered by blacks into a phrase that he called the problem of the black world. However, this notion is not unanimous. Fanon (2001) for example protests against this terminology. Indeed, the black world, according to the understanding of this former pupil of Césaire, is an appellation that brings all the struggle of the colonized to the biological level. It is a way to enclose the man in a vicious circle where he will not be able to escape racism. To be honest, this is to freeze the culture of the colonized, depriving it of any possibility of dynamic structuring:

> *Les institutions ainsi valorisées ne correspondent plus aux méthodes élaborées d'action déjà acquises. La culture encapsulée, végétative, depuis la domination étrangère est revalorisée. Elle n'est pas repensée, reprise, dynamisée de l'intérieur. Elle est clamée. Et cette revalorisation d'emblée, non structurée, verbale, recouvre des attitudes paradoxales.* (Fanon, 2001, p. 54)[7]

[5] (Free translation) One of the reasons why the Tutsis were hunted down comes from the hypotheses [which] gave them a foreign affiliation. The "watutssis" pastors whom they found tall and slender, unlike the smaller Hutu farmers, were not originally from Central Africa. For some, they would have come as far as Tibet or Egypt. But the link with Ethiopia remains the most common claim. [...] During the genocide, thousands of Tutsis were thrown into the waters of the Kagera River so that they "return to Ethiopia"

[6] (Free translation) 5. All strategic positions, whether political, administrative, economic, military or security, must be entrusted to Bahutu. 6. The education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be made up mostly of Bahutu.

[7] (Free translation) The institutions thus valued no longer correspond to the elaborate methods of action already acquired. The culture encapsulated, vegetative since the foreign domination, is revalued. It is not rethought, taken up, energized from within. It is proclaimed. And this revaluation from the outset, unstructured, verbal, covers paradoxical attitudes.

This lack of cultural structuring naturally distorted the political scope of the conquests of Negritude. Indeed, the ultimate goal was the demand for self-determination of the African peoples. This political autonomy supplies an epistemological basis to the cultural revolution of the colonized. This is why the independence tendencies of the African continent have oriented the emergence of African nations towards culturalism. With culture being the basis of the claims, it was natural that the African countries which achieve independence should rather be race-states and not nation-states.

3.3 Tragedy of a State-race

> *Le contexte colonial, avons-nous dit, se caractérise par la dichotomie qu'il inflige au monde. La décolonisation unifie ce monde en lui enlevant par une décision radicale son hétérogénéité, en l'unifiant sur la base de la nation, quelquefois de la race.* (Fanon, 2002, p. 53)[8]

No doubt we are here in the communicating vase which contributed to the escape of the synergistic efforts of the good old days with promising lights. There is communication of course — tacit communication between nation and race. Communication whose objective is to overturn the colonist/indigenous dichotomy to promote a new order sanctioned by the birth of an independent state. As long as there is a permanent effort of resistance against the colonial order, the nation-race structure almost merges. This is the era of both cultural and nationalist awareness. As said earlier, this step is essential. Awareness forces the colonized to rethink himself, to reposition himself in relation to himself. This is Fanon's famous "I am what I am." He eventually realizes that he exists as a social individual. He tries to get closer by negritude to all those who like him have suffered the omnipotent spitting (Césaire, 1983). The race is forming. Negro culture is rising to the surface. None other than Césaire gives a daring account of this struggle of the Negro against colonial assimilation. All is well so far, but when the race takes the path back to its native land, there is nuance. It is urgent to define the formula to be adopted. Should we found a nation-state or a race-state? The temptation is to take the cultural path back and push it to the end. The halo of the singers of "negritude" at that time, moreover, invites everyone in this direction. But "*L'intellectuel colonisé cependant tôt ou tard se rendra compte qu'on ne prouve pas sa nation à partir de la culture mais qu'on la manifeste dans le combat que mène le peuple contre les forces d'occupation*" (Fanon, 2002, p. 210).[9] The people. The territory. The fight. The people do not care about beautiful poems. The people don't care about Negro authenticity. I am Negro! Of course… and then what? Does my negritude give me something to eat? Are my "Dark Hosts" (Senghor, 1948) helping me solve the equation of hunger and development? This is where negritude is trapped. Haiti was trapped in the

[8] (Free translation) The colonial context, we have said, is characterized by the dichotomy it inflicts on the world. Decolonization unifies this world by taking away from it by a radical decision its heterogeneity, by unifying it on the basis of the nation, sometimes of the race.

[9] (Free translation) The colonized intellectual, however, sooner or later will realize that one does not prove his nation on the basis of culture but that one manifests it in the fight led by the people against the occupying forces.

negritude of Toussaint Louverture for example. And what about a free Africa in all of this? Thorny question to which we are trying to find an answer based on an analysis of the case of Guinea-Bissau.

4. At the Heart of Guinea-Bissau's Post-independence

4.1 Amílcar Cabral's Ideal

Amílcar Cabral is one of the famous intellectuals of Africa in the post-colonial context. Along with Kwame Nkrumah, he had a Pan-Africanist ideal by considering the problem of Africa as some whole despite nationalist peculiarities. Liberating the African continent from the colonial machine consisted of him proposing a continental structure that would transcend borders to create a "United States of Africa" once it won independence from colonial rule. Amílcar Cabral based his Pan-Africanist ideology on collective responsibility that would lead to participative democracy. Such a desire to share responsibilities led him to orient his fight against colonialism towards a regionalism which aligned the fortune of two peoples/territories: Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde. It is with this in mind that he created the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) whose main objective was to dissolve Portuguese colonialism, to immediately proclaim the independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde, and to unite the two peoples in the perspective African union. Indeed, Cabral recognizes the danger of proclaiming independence on a racial or ethnic basis:

> *Para Amílcar Cabral os sentimentos 'étnicos' não constituem problemas em si próprio, mas existe perigo quando esses sentimentos são usados por dirigentes oportunistas e ambiciosos à procura da sua promoção social. Amílcar Cabral conclui que […] "a maior asneira que se podia fazer na nossa terra seria criar na Guiné, partidos ou movimentos na base de etnias"* [10](Cassama, 2014, pp. 85–90)

However, his untimely demise paralyzed the momentum of his Pan-Africanism. Survivors of the struggle for independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde eventually rushed in and separately proclaimed independence, Guinea-Bissau first, in 1973. However, the tear noted in the charter of independence between Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde re-launches the internal ethnic tear which will upset the entire structure that Cabral wanted to establish. The proof is that 48 years after its independence, the country still lives in institutional instability marked by post or pre-electoral violence. Result… The social divide has set in. The state apparatus has become deficient.

[10] (Free translation) For Amílcar Cabral, "ethnic" feelings do not constitute problems in themselves, but there is danger when these feelings are used by opportunistic and ambitious leaders looking for their social promotion. Amílcar Cabral concludes that […] "the biggest blunder that could be done in our land would be to create in Guinea, parties or movements based on ethnic groups.

4.2 Radioscopy of a Fragile State

In this part of our work, we will meet the eyes of two authors who have questioned the international community on the fate of Guinea-Bissau. Maria Ferreira dos Santos (2019) was concerned with the international community's interpretation of modern Guinea-Bissau. She reviews all the international terminology on evaluating the effectiveness of a State apparatus. She takes a close look at the notion of "fragile state" which seems to be one of the big obstacles to the development of most of the countries of the world:

> *Os Estados são frágeis quando as estruturas estatais não possuem a vontade política e / ou a capacidade para fornecerem as funções básicas necessárias à redução da pobreza e ao desenvolvimento e para assegurarem a segurança e direitos humanos das suas populações.* (Ferreira dos Santos, 2019, p. 48)[11]

A fragile state is a dysfunctional state incapable of assuming its own functionality in terms of guaranteeing the well-being of its citizens. Ferreira dos Santos reveals that in 2015, the World Bank ranked Guinea-Bissau sixth on a list of 26 countries classified as fragile states. This situation, according to the author, is the slow culmination of bad decisions that have been made at various times since independence. One of them is the rapid nationalization of agricultural domains. Nationalism has taken over regionalism without creating any real conditions for the survival of the local economy once the settlers left. In addition, an ethnic rivalry was quickly developed within the PAIGC, a fact that naturally culminated in the catastrophic events of 1980. We will mention here that Ferreira dos Santos was inspired by the work of O'Regan and Thompson (2013), published by the Center for Strategic Studies of Africa, which associates the fragility of the Guinean state with the dysfunction of the National Army which has over time become the mark of social progress. The political "instrumentalization" of the army ended up installing tribalism in the ethnic management of military promotions:

> *[…] acentuou a questão da etnia, alegando que sendo o maior grupo do país, os Balanta deveriam contar com uma maior representação no Estado, especialmente entre as altas patentes, num desafio implícito à autoridade de […] por motivos étnicos. A questão transformou-se num forte pomo de discórdia durante um período difícil de transição, particularmente entre os que corriam o risco de perder posições privilegiadas nas Forças Armadas, em vésperas de uma vasta desmobilização pós-guerra.* (O'Regan & Thompson, 2013, p. 31)[12]

[11] (Free translation) States are fragile when state structures lack the political will and / or the capacity to provide the basic functions necessary for poverty reduction and development and to ensure the security and human rights of their populations.

[12] (Free translation) […] Accentuated the issue of ethnicity, claiming that being the largest group in the country, the Balanta should have greater representation in the State, especially among the top ranks, in an implicit challenge to the authority of […] for ethnic reasons. The issue became a strong bone of contention during a difficult period of transition, particularly among those who were at risk of losing privileged positions in the Armed Forces, on the eve of a vast post-war demobilization.

This situation is completely out of phase with the ideal of Amílcar Cabral who decided to put aside the ethnic inclinations of each other during the period of the struggle for independence: "*As rivalidades étnicas eram praticamente inexistentes durante a luta pela independência e a guerra civil de 1998–1999*" (O'Regan & Thompson, 2013, p. 31). The only way out is based on a re-structuring of the state apparatus, taking into account errors of the past: "The leadership reveals its strength and its authority by denouncing errors, by taking advantage of every backward movement of conscience to learn the lesson, to ensure new conditions for progress" (Fanon, 2002, p. 142).

4.3 Restructuring the State Apparatus

The progress of modern Africa is measured by challenging the cultural conditionality of its struggle for independence. Africans had all the legitimacy to demand the recognition of their cultural values flouted by colonization. However, and this is what Fanon reproaches Césaire for: the desperate struggle of the colonized to be respected by the colonist so obsessed him that he shut himself up in an ivory tower from which it became difficult to go out or to welcome the uninitiated. The African and his continent have entered in a vacuum that blocks their sustained development. It is therefore necessary to fundamentally restructure the apparatus of our states which was developed under very strong psychological pressure. African states must rethink their structure, mature their management style and expose their operating systems to consistent validation tests in order to proof its effectiveness.

One of the basic questions is the notion of nationality. This right is normally guaranteed by the state which outlines the contours of this concept. However, the rise to independence under the conditions we know has not left time for our legislators to regulate nationality law very concisely. This constitutional vagueness allowed the new local bourgeoisie to reproduce the colonial error in reverse: an institutional hierarchy was established, with citizens of lower areas (ethnic minorities) and citizens of upper areas (ethnic majorities). This structural dichotomy naturally results in an inequality of legal, political, and economic opportunities. Minority citizens are excluded from the social game in such a way that the republic operates at a double speed; an accelerated speed for some, and an idling speed for the others. As proof, the question of nationality is at the heart of the Rwandan genocide: Who is Rwandan and who is not? Answering this question would in fact be tantamount to raising the issue of the structural unification of the state apparatus by revising this key notion of nationality. Beyond the fact of being Hutu or Tutsi, the feeling of belonging to the same nation in which we are all equal in dignity and in law strengthens our social ties and readjusts the chronogram of the political and economic activities of the nation.

The methodology to be applied here would be a "national truth and reconciliation" programme that has proven successful in South Africa. Indeed, Nelson Mandela had the great merit of engaging the "Rainbow Nation" of Africa not on the path of racial revenge in the post-apartheid period, but rather towards a reconciliation between black victims and white executioners. The result has been a strengthening of the state apparatus and an economic revival. It is true that the race question is far from being eradicated in South

Africa, but the intervention in the structural fracture of the state has resulted in a resurgence of mutual trust in a multi-racial society.

Coming back to the case of Guinea-Bissau, the Center for Strategic Studies of Africa (2013) includes in the list of its recommendations a more increased dynamism in the interventions of the National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation created in 2009. It is a commission which would, in the long-term, allow a more profound dialogue between the various protagonists of the political and social scenes. O'Regan and Thompson (2013) offer a look back at the history of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism during which Amílcar Cabral was able to converge all the voices towards the unity of the nation with a view to its liberation from colonial rule and its self-determination.

It is a methodology that is applicable to almost all African states as the phenomenon of exclusion is not an isolated reality in the economic and social fabric of African states. The result will be measured in the near future at the time of the assessment of 100 years of African independence. It is in a futuristic spirit that we move epistemologically from Guinea-Bissau to São Tomé and Príncipe. Indeed, the linguistic unicity of Lusophony, considering the historical link with Portugal, attenuates the geographical distance between these two territories. We remain within the framework of the specificity of Portuguese colonialism in Africa in this momentum of building the "santomensity" for future generations.

5. Santomensity Construction Essay for the New Generation

We owe much to the Santomean author Francisco Costa Alegre (2005, p. 15) from whom we borrow this introductory quote:

> *As páginas que seguem tentam abordar questões que, embora ténues, exaltam a importância de que se reveste a necessidade de investimento no estudo da sociedade santomense, estudo a que chamo santomensidade. Donde vimos, para onde vamos, quem somos, o que fazemos, o que falamos, como falamos, até que ponto nos podemos entender, para que todos, em conjunto, numa teia miscigénica e complexa, possamos erguer este país.*[13]

Costa Alegre's concerns can be summed up in a series of societal parameters delimited by the questions: Where? Who? What? How? How far? This reveals the outlines of his research, which he calls "Santomensity." These questions will guide us in our attempt to project Santomean society into the near or distant future. Indeed, since its discovery in 1470, São Tomé and Príncipe has defined itself as a true land of welcome. According to historians, the first occupants of the islands came from the African coast. This means that initially São

[13] (Free translation) The pages that follow try to address issues that, although tenuous, exalt the importance of the need for investment in the study of Santomean society, a study I call Santomensity. Where we come from, where we are going, who we are, what we do, what we speak, how we speak, to what extent we can understand each other, so that everyone, together, in a miscigenic and complex web, we can build this country.

Tomé was a miniaturization of the whole of Africa as it welcomed populations from all over the continent. This is why the *savoir-vivre* together which characterized this first population can be attributed to its cosmopolitan character.

The intermingling of peoples of various cultures and races caused by colonization has also put to test the Santomean societal competence of knowing how to live together. Despite the brutal force exerted by the Portuguese colonists to impose themselves culturally, politically, and economically on the natives, the Santomeans ended up adopting the Portuguese and cohabiting with them while manifesting their desire to be respected in their differential humanity. The consequence of this cohabitation is the number of mestizos in the Santomean population, proof of the fact that the beautiful Santomean women had ended up generously opening up to Euro-Portuguese sensuality in order to attenuate the epistemological tensions linked to the principle of colonization. The current context of globalization places the archipelago of the Ecuador as the centre point of goods, services, and people crossing due to its geo-strategic position in the Gulf of Guinea. São Tomé and Príncipe welcomes in this 21st century a large population from the African, European, Asian, and American continents who settled on the islands so that we are now witnessing another mixing of cultures on the islands. More and more there is the emergence of a new generation of Santomeans born from this modern mix of cultures that circulate on the island so that we have a society of plural colors. Indeed, the cultural dialogue that nourishes the various community interactions on the island compels each Santomean to remain awake towards the concern for the harmonization of social relations, stigmatization, xenophobia, and exclusion being evils that must be banished.

5.1 Santomensity — A Perpetual Construction

> *A santomensidade torna-se assim o estudo, a definição, construção da identidade santomense, ou seja, a aquisição da alma santomense, se é que se pode falar deste jeito. S. Tomé e Príncipe é por natureza um país a construir em todas as vertentes. Esse processo de construção, embora afrocentrico, porque S. Tomé e Príncipe é um país africano, abre a aceitação de outras culturas, de forma a fazer-se um país de miscigenação sócio-cultural, político económica.* (Costa Alegre, 2005, p. 151)[14]

Francisco Costa Alegre follows in the footsteps of Frantz Fanon in this vision of cultural openness of santomensity. Indeed, the modernity of São Tomé and Príncipe cannot be grasped all at once. It is a constant corrective backward and forward move between what is done and what should be done as the world changes and evolves. Building a modern São Tomé and Príncipe is synonymous with the inclusion of everyone born on the island or chooses this country as second homeland. Universal brotherhood must be the basis of

[14] (Free translation) Santomensidade thus becomes the study, definition, construction of the Santomean identity, that is, the acquisition of the Santomean soul, if one can speak in this way. S. Tomé and Príncipe is by nature a country to be built in all aspects. This construction process, although Afrocentric, because S. Tomé and Príncipe is an African country, opens up the acceptance of other cultures, in order to become a country of socio-cultural, political and economic miscegenation.

modern santomensity. All discrimination is to be banned in a plural society where everyone coexists, touches each other, talks to each other, and dialogues.

The santomensity of the 21st century answers the initial questions that Costa Alegre asked at the beginning of his book via a set of altruistic and structuring considerations. It is a question of creating a national identity which is the full representation of all cultural components active in our society. It is a question of inventing a new Santomean who is able to discern the humanist impulse that tolerance conveys. That is, we need to unite all the forces and social trends, namely minorities and majorities, "foreigners" and natives so that all together we define the model of society that we want for the future generation which will be a better mixture than we are today. The socio-economic rewards of this construction are significant. Indeed, the sustained development of Africa in general and of São Tomé and Príncipe in particular is directly proportional to the healthy social climate free from discrimination and exclusion. Let us build together the São Tomé and Príncipe that Francisco Costa Alegre dreamed of for the good of Africa as a whole.

6. Conclusion

At the end of these reflections, it is safe to reaffirm that the return to cultural sources prescribed in "Negritude" has been beneficial for the struggle for the recognition of African cultural values. It has been not only useful but necessary to dive back into our way of life to force the settlers to recognize our right to be different. However, once this right has been recognized, it is no longer appropriate to build a protective wall around ourselves, as this would mean entering a capsule and locking ourselves up once more.

Once African independence has been attained, we have to rethink our cultural structures and calibrate them according to the new aspirations of the people who are to acquire a purchasing power strong enough to meet their basic needs such as health, water, electricity, food, and education. A look at Africa today tells us that more than half of our populations still live below the poverty line. An in-depth analysis of this situation reveals to us that not all of the nations' vital forces have been called upon after independence. Some minds and thinkers have been excluded from community interactions, causing a very visible social divide. It is therefore fair and useful to prescribe a societal restructuring which calls into question the measures taken after independence within the framework of the return to sources called "nationalization." Far from constituting a leap into the void, this reconstruction of the ideals of post-independence republics constitutes the strategic remedy to be prescribed for each African state, namely the national reconciliation which would include all socio-political minorities in the drive for national reconstruction. As long as part of our populations are still excluded from community interactions, there will always be a leak of social energy, which is a real wound to sustained development.

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Poverty and Inequality in Lusophone Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique

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Poverty, Inequality, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Development.

Abstract

Poverty and inequality are particularly endemic in Sub-Saharan Africa, constituting binding constraints to decades of development efforts. According to a Brookings Institution (2018) report, the average poverty rate in the region stood at about 41%, and of the world's 28 poorest countries, 27 were from Sub-Saharan Africa. The report also reveals that poverty in the region rose from 278 million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015. Indications are that inequality trends mirror poverty rates in the region. For example, in 2010, six of the 10 most unequal countries worldwide were in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, in its 2020 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (HDI), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reveals all 10 countries with the lowest ranking among 189 countries worldwide were in the region. Income inequalities in Sub-Saharan Africa translate into inequalities in access to social services, perpetuating a vicious circle of poverty. The major objective of this chapter is to shed light on the state of poverty and inequality in Lusophone Africa, with a comparative analysis of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. The study employs empirical data sourced from a variety of publications, complemented by interviews of stakeholders to analyze the scourges across the countries. In a paradox of plenty, findings reveal that most Lusophone African countries feature endemic poverty in the midst of abundant natural resources. Except for Cabo Verde, which features a low poverty rate, estimated at 7% of the population; other Lusophone countries show endemic poverty, with 38, 70, 45, and 33% for Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe, respectively. Also, World Bank (2019) data on inequality reveals Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe with GINI Index of 42.70, 47.20, 50.70, 54.00, and 30.80, respectively.

1. Introduction

The twin scourges of poverty and inequality could be likened to the two sides of the same coin, which unleash underdevelopment outcomes, particularly in the developing world. Along

with South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa is home to the largest number of poor people around the world. The region's economic profile reveals a prevalence of low income countries, with 32 nations listed alongside the world's 48 least developed countries in 2020 (UNCTAD, 2020). The high prevalence of poverty and inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa continues to undermine development efforts over the past several decades. The scourges have been largely blamed for the region's inability to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015, and pose considerable threats to meeting the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In a paradox of plenty, Sub-Saharan Africa is richly endowed with natural resources, but is unable to turn abundance in natural wealth into prosperity for the majority of the population. This development also reveals a worrisome trend in Lusophone Africa, where endemic poverty and inequality have stifled development efforts in the past several decades, with grave consequences for sustainable livelihoods and human well-being.

The chapter is structured into four parts: Section one introduces the issues of poverty and inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Lusophone Africa. Section two reviews literature on the prevalence of poverty and inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in Lusophone Africa, while section three discuses a comparative analysis of poverty and inequality in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Finally, section four ends the chapter with concluding remarks.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Prevalence of poverty and inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa

Poverty can be aptly defined as extreme deprivation undermining the ability of an individual or people in a society to afford such basic needs of life as food, clothing, and shelter. Williamson and Reutter (1999) define poverty as "the deprivation of economic resources that are required to meet food, shelter and clothing needs necessary for physical well-being." While poverty levels continue to decline around the world, indications are that the poverty headcount ratio is high and has stagnated in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, while it has actually increased in several countries in the region. In 1990, 36% of the global population lived in poverty (defined as an income of less than USD 1.90 a day in 2011 purchasing power parity). By 2015, however, poverty levels had declined dramatically around the world to an estimated 10% of the global population (World Bank, 2018). In contrast to global trends, the prevalence of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, while declining from 56% in 1990 to 41% in 2015, actually witnessed a considerable rise in the number of people living in deprivation, rising from 278 million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015 (Brookings Institution, 2018). The majority of the global poor now resides in the region, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1 *Global Distribution of Extreme Poverty*



Note: The inner circle is proportionate to the percentage of the total population of poor people living in each region. The outer circle is similarly proportionate, but at the country level.

Source: PovcalNet (online analysis tool), World Bank, Washington, D.C., http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/.

Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa has acquired an endemic dimension over the past several decades, with 27 of the world's 28 poorest countries domiciled in the region. The high prevalence of poverty has tasked the efforts of policymakers and their development partners. The negative trend has prompted concerted efforts at creating and implementing anti-poverty strategies since the 1980s, with varying degrees of outcomes. The African Development Bank (AfDB), in a report on eliminating extreme poverty in Africa (2015), affirmed that Sub-Saharan African reduced extreme poverty by 10% between 1999 and 2010, in a development attributed to accelerated economic growth during the period. Nevertheless, an alarming proportion of the region's population, estimated at 48%, lived in extreme poverty in 2010, and accounting for 30% of the global poor.

While poverty levels remain high across Sub-Saharan Africa, it reveals a divergence in its distribution, both within and between countries. The AfDB report (2015) reveals substantial differences in poverty rates among sub-regions and countries in the region. For example, while frontier markets were acknowledged with a steady role in poverty reduction in the 2000s, the trends in fragile states had been subdued. On the other hand, such frontier markets as Zambia and Tanzania have witnessed high rates of poverty, while some middle income countries (MICs), particularly Cabo Verde and Seychelles, have virtually eliminated it. In contrast, high poverty rates prevailed in the MICs in Southern Africa.

In addition, among fragile states, both large (Democratic Republic of Congo) and smaller countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone) have recorded very high prevalence of poverty. Regarding country-specific trends in poverty prevalence, Nigeria has emerged with one of the highest proportions of the population living in extreme poverty in 2010, estimated at 69 % of the population. The AfDB report (2015) also reveals that other states featured more than half of their population living in extreme poverty, including frontier markets (e.g., Mozambique), as well as some middle income countries (e.g., Swaziland). In another report on poverty in Africa, the World Bank (2016) affirmed some progress in poverty reduction across the continent, but challenges remain, particularly against the backdrop of the region's emergent demographic explosion. According to the report, more Africans were still living in poverty, as 330 million were affected in 2012, against 280 million in 1990. Regarding spatial poverty, the report acknowledges Africa's rapid urbanization in the majority of countries, with 65–70 of the population living in rural areas. Indications are that rural residents are witnessing higher poverty rates. However, the gap between the poverty rate in rural and urban centers across countries declined from 35% in 1996 to 28% in 2012. Among Africa's four geographic sub-regions, only urban area in Western Africa reduced poverty by one-half. In addition, rural poverty in Western and Southern Africa declined by 40% during the same period.

In a report on the latest trends in the prevalence of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, the World Bank (2020) acknowledged the region with the largest concentration of the extreme poor around the world. Indeed, the concentration of high poverty prevalence in the region can be likened to the image of a poverty belt, stretching from Senegal in West Africa to Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, and from Mali in the Sahel to Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. Employing data, based on PovacalNet estimates, a World Bank (2020) report reveals that of the 44 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with available poverty estimates, 38 feature poverty prevalence higher than 10%. In addition, one-half of the economies witnessed poverty rates higher than 35%. Even more worrisome is the fact that the prevalence of extreme poverty in the region is estimated at 40%, a level that has stagnated over the past three decades.

An assessment by the World Bank (2020) of country-level information reveals various local patterns in poverty prevalence. Findings further reveal that of the 32 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the latest two years of survey data are comparable in PovacalNet, 25 feature a reduction in poverty, while seven witnessed as increase. A look at changes greater than 1% per annum reveals nine countries feature a decline, and four witnessed an increase. Indeed, for every country where poverty increased by more than 1%, there were two where it declined. This development underscored the degree of progress in poverty reduction recorded across the region. The manifestation of poverty reduction is exemplified by Ethiopia, which featured a decrease of 7% in extreme poverty rate between 2004/2005 and 2015/16, driven by the virtuous circle of prosperity prevailing since the early 2000s. Similarly, the proportion of the population living below the threshold of poverty reduced from 44% to 37% between 2005 and 2015 in Kenya, and from 23% to 13% between 2009 and 2015 in Namibia. However, several other countries have recorded less successful efforts. For example, Angola featured a rise in extreme poverty by 18% over the last decade, while extreme poverty escalated by 6% in Uganda between 2012 and 2016. In the case of Tanzania,

its rapid progress in poverty reduction has come to a halt, following an 11% reduction in poverty rate between 2007 and 2011. Data for 2017 reveal stagnation in the prevalence of poverty at 49%.

At this point, it is pertinent to examine inequality, particularly its prevalence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Inequality is defined by the United Nations (2015) as "the state of not being equal, especially in status, rights, and opportunities." However, inequality has assumed a generic dimension in recent times, often meaning different things to different people. It is, however, important to note that inequality is multi-dimensional, comprising both social and economic inequality. While the former refers to inequality of rights and association obligations; the latter embraces income or monetary inequality or, more broadly, inequality in living standards.

Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa is a development challenge that has assumed a worrisome trend. For example, in its annual Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) for 2020, the United Nations Development Programme's ranking reveals poor performance by countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, which are mostly grouped into the Low Human Development category. In the UNDP ranking of 189 countries worldwide, all of the 10 countries with the least IHDI scores were from the region. The IHDI combines a nation's achievements in health, education and income, accompanied by how those achievements are distributed across a country's population by "discounting" each dimension's average value in accordance with its level of inequality. While the Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index of average human achievements in human development dimensions (established by the UNDP since 1990); the IHDI measures the level of human development, when the distribution of achievements across a population is accounted for. A World Bank (2019) data also reveal that eight of the 10 most unequal countries are domiciled in Sub-Saharan Africa, with grave implications for socio-economic development.

In an in-depth report on income inequality trends in Sub-Saharan Africa, UNDP (2017) reveals that International Income Distribution Database for Sub-Saharan Africa (IID-SSA) show that the average regional unweighted Gini index of household consumption inequality per capita declined modestly over 1991–2011. However, the trend masks the degree of inequality among countries. Indeed, 17 countries (including nine predominantly agricultural economies in West Africa, and a few others from East Africa and other regions), translating to 40% of the region's population, featured declining inequality, especially in the 2000s. On the other hand, resource-rich economies of Southern and Central Africa feature rising inequality, beginning from around 2003. However, most nations with a profile of low inequality in the region experienced a reduction, while those with high inequality featured a rise of stagnation at high levels. Consequently, the unweighted average Gini index for Sub-Saharan Africa has declined since 2000, while the standard deviation and coefficient of variation of the Gini distribution of the IID-SSA countries increased. The UNDP (2017) report suggested that the emergent heterogeneity of inequality across countries in the region is attributable to land tenure and resource endowment, which have assumed an acute dimension. In a detailed study of inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa, Adesina (2016) affirmed

that the average rate of income inequality in the region declined between 1960 and the 1980s, then rose in the 1990s and declined again in the 2000s. The decline in recent times is driven by economic growth in some countries, particularly in the 2000s. Indeed, four countries revealed an inverted U-shaped trend, with the Gini index rising and subsequently falling. In addition, seven countries reveal a rising Gini index during this period, while the last group of countries in the study shows a U-shaped Gini index, with income inequality falling before rising over the period. In general, of the 29 countries examined, Ethiopia (2011) featured the lowest Gini index, at 33.6, while Botswana (2009) and South Africa (2011) had the highest, at 68.6 and 65.0, respectively.

An African Development Bank (AfDB) report (2015) reveals that inequality levels remain highest in middle income countries, particularly in Southern Africa, in a development largely attributed to the "middle income trap." This is reinforced by rising inequality in East Africa, a sub-region comprising some of the World's fastest growing economies.

2.2. The State of Poverty and Inequality in Lusophone Africa

2.2.1 Poverty headcount ratio and inequality

This section examines the prevalence of poverty and inequality in Lusophone African countries. The countries are: Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, as well as São Tomé and Príncipe. They are examined in turn.

2.2.2 Angola

Angola is a resource-abundant economy. It is the second largest producer of crude oil in Africa (Igbatayo et al., 2017), and the fourth largest producer of diamond in Africa. The nation's wealth of natural resources also includes other mineral resources, as well as lumber, and fish. However, in a paradox of plenty, Angola's resource-rich economy is unable to turn natural wealth into prosperity for the majority of its population. Indeed, two-thirds of the population lives on less than USD 2.00 per day (Kraus, 2016). Poverty is endemic in Angola, particularly in rural areas, which account for 38.5% of the population, with 94% of rural households categorized as poor.

A World Bank (2020a) report reveals that between 200 and 2009, and 2018–2019, the share of people living below the national poverty threshold rose from 37 to 41%. However, arising from the new benchmark survey (IDREA 2018–2019), as well as the new poverty line; the prevalence of poverty is now estimated at 32% nationally, with 18% in urban areas and an alarming rate of 54% in rural areas humbled by poverty. While less than 10% of Luanda's population is below the poverty line, the provinces Cunene, Moxico, and Kwanza Sul feature a considerably higher prevalence of poverty, estimated at 54, 52, and 50%, respectively. However, driven by sustained economic recession in recent years, as well as a decline in oil production by 5.2%; the prevalence of poverty increased in 2019 to 48.4%, compared to 47.6% in 2018, based on USD 1.90 per person, per day (2011 PPP). The World

Bank report (2020a) also projects that poverty is expected to remain high in the next three years, as the economy struggles against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic. It also reveals a relatively high inequality, with Gini index rising at 51.3 in 2018–2019.

2.2.3 Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau features endemic poverty, with about two-thirds of the population living in extreme deprivation. Endemic poverty in the county is largely driven by persistent political instability, poor economic performance and fragility. The prevalence of poverty also disproportionately affects women and children, particularly those aged between 15 and 25 years of age. Guinea-Bissau features some of the highest incidences of maternal and infant mortality in the world, placed at 667 deaths per 100,000 live births, and 51.9 deaths per 1,000 live births, respectively. Similarly, illiteracy levels are high, featuring 71% of women and 45% of men over 15 years of age (Jaayfer, 2020).

While Guinea-Bissau conducted a new household survey in 2019, the findings have yet to be released. Consequently, the last Poverty Evaluation Household Survey (ILAP) was conducted in 2010. It reveals widespread poverty, with about 1.2 million, or 67% of the population living in poverty. The nation also ranked poorly on the 2018 UNDP Human Development Index, placed 178 out of 189 countries around the world. A World Bank (2020a) report estimated poverty rate in Guinea-Bissau, based on the 2010 ILAP survey, suggesting that poverty measured by USD 1.90 stands at 61%, a reduction of 6% from 2010. However, in view of rising population rates, the number of people living in poverty has risen by at least 18,000. Also, revised estimates, including the COVID-19 impact informed the upward review of poverty prevalence of 2020 and 2022, at 60.9 and 58.2%, respectively. The Inequality measure or Gini Index of Guinea-Bissau was put at 0.50 in 2010, the last measure of the scourge. The 2010 data indicated that total consumption at the top 10% of consumption distribution (42%) is 28 times higher than the bottom 40 (13%).

2.2.4 Mozambique

Poverty remains a binding constraint to development efforts in Mozambique. In 1990, the prevalence of poverty was at an alarming proportion, estimated at 80% of the population. However, following the "war of destabilization" in 1992, stability returned to the country. However, poverty stagnated between 2002 and 2009. Meanwhile, economic growth accelerated, rising from 2008 to 2015, and accompanied by poverty reduction. National poverty estimates now range between 41 and 46% of the population, or between 10.5 and 11.3 million living in extreme deprivation. While welfare at the national level has improved, compared to prior survey; the positive trend is yet to spur convergence in welfare level between rural and urban areas, or by geographical regions (UNU-WIDER, 2016). In a regional context, indications are that poverty reduction accelerated in the southern provinces, where the prevalence fell by 18%, led by Maputo Province. On the other hand, poverty reduction was significant but less rapid in the centre, falling by 11%. These reductions were distributed rather evenly across the central provinces. The improvement was however offset

by an increase in the north, estimated at10%, with the largest increases in Niassa Province.

Mozambique's economy has slowed down in recent years, with growth estimated at 2.2% in 2019, the lowest in 19 years. The development is attributed to the global economic downturn, exacerbated by tropical cyclones, which undermined agricultural output and triggered food and nutrition insecurity. Consequently, the prevalence of poverty worsened across the nation, while the COVID-19 pandemic is also fueling losses in labour earnings, particularly in the services sector (World Bank 2020a). Inequality measure in Mozambique reveals a Gini Index of 54.0 in 2104, a fairly high score.

2.2.5 São Tomé and Príncipe

São Tomé and Príncipe, classified as a lower, middle income country, features a significant proportion (estimated at 35.6%) of the population living in extreme poverty. The prevalence of poverty has increased from 31.4% in 2000 at an average growth of 6.54% per annum (Knoema, 2017). However, the nation has engaged in concerted effort to reduce poverty over the past few decades, improving its rankings on the UNDP Human Development Index from 0.454 in 1990 to 0.574 in 2017. The 26.4% improvement earned São Tomé and Príncipe a medium human development ranking on the HDI. It is noteworthy that the country, however, lacks up-to-date poverty data. Thus, the most recent data from the 2008–2009 household survey reveals that 47.5% of the population lives in multidimensional poverty (Quinn, 2017).

A World Bank report (2020) on poverty in São Tomé and Príncipe reveals that between 2010 and 2017, the prevalence of national poverty remained unchanged at an estimated 66% of the population. It also reveals that the population living in rural areas has been disproportionately undermined, particularly with the employment of multidimensional poverty measures. Additionally, the World Bank report affirmed that poverty incidence remained largely unchanged between 2018 and 2019, estimated at 34.5%, using the USD 1.90 per person per day (2011 PPP) international poverty threshold. However, indications are that the prevalence of poverty has increased marginally, and with the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, widespread deprivation is expected to trigger higher levels of poverty. Inequality in São Tomé and Príncipe is fairly high, with a Gini index of 56.3 in 2017.

3. Discussion — Analysis

3.1 Comparative analysis of poverty and inequality in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique

In order to comprehend the prevalence of poverty and inequality in the right context, it is important to explore the socio-economic profile of Guinea-Bissau. The nation is one of the poorest in the world, accompanied by considerable fragility, which had persisted since its independence from Portugal in 1974. Guinea-Bissau is highly dependent on subsistence agriculture. Exportation of cashew nuts is a major source of revenue and foreign exchange earnings. The nation also has considerable potential in the development of solid mineral

minerals, particularly phosphate, bauxite, and mineral sands. In recent times, exploration of oil and gas has commenced offshore (Index Mundi, 2020).

A World Bank overview (2020b) of Guinea-Bissau reveals an economic recovery in 2019, estimated at 4.6%, up from 3.8% in 2018. The recovery was largely driven by higher cashew output, accompanied by higher electricity generation attributed to newly installed power generation capacity. However, economic growth was projected to decline to -1.5% in 2020, fueled by the effects of the lockdown that manifested in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Table 1 reveals Guinea-Bissau's key macroeconomic indicators, including projections from 2019 to 2022.

Table 1 *Key Macroeconomic Indicators for Guinea-Bissau (2019–2022)*

	2019	2020		2021		2022	
	Est.	Pre-Shock	After Shock	Pre-Shock	After Shock	Pre-Shock	After Shock
Real GDP (% change)	4.5	4.9	-2.4	5.0	3.0	5.0	4.0
GDP deflator (% change)	-3.5	2.1	0.1	3.6	3.0	3.2	2.8
CPI inflation, average (%)	0.3	1.5	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.0
Current account (% of GDP)[2]	-8.6	-4.5	-10.1	-4.6	-6.4	-4.6	-5.4
Overall fiscal balance, cash basis, incl. grants (% of GDP)	-4.9	-5.4	-10.0	-5.3	-5.7	-5.2	-3.6
Total public debt (% of GDP) Memorandum items	66.9	71.5	78.4	71.1	78.4	71.1	76.7
Nominal GDP (CF AF billion)	843	893	824	972	874	1053	935
Cashew nut export prices (US$ per ton)	1098	1140	1000	1180	1100	1221	1155
Cashew export volume (thousands of tons)	196	208	140	214	189	221	202

Remarks:
1 - Projections as of January, 2020
2 - In 2019 the current account deficit includes the one-off import (3.5% of GDP) of a power-generation ship that is anchored of the coast of Bissau and supplies electricity to the city. For 2020 and 2021, the current account in the macro framework does not include additional financing in response to the pandemic.

Source: Adapted from IMF (2021)

The state of social development in Guinea-Bissau is particularly sobering. In 2019, the nation was ranked 178 of 189 countries listed in the UNDP Human Development Index; with an average score of 0.455, which is well below the average in Sub-Saharan Africa, at 0.537. In 2017, the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) and the UNDP conducted a joint analysis on the state of poverty in Guinea-Bissau. The findings reveal that 58% of the households are multi-dimensionally poor, with 97% of the children deprived in a minimum of one fundamental right (UNICEF, 2017). A major factor for the high prevalence of multidimensional poverty in Guinea-Bissau is the poor health infrastructure across the country. The country's one fully functioning hospital is devoid of critical drugs and equipment, fueling high rates of mortality and morbidity, and accompanied by low life expectancy (at birth) (AfDB, 2015a). Health challenges are particularly sobering, exacerbated by high fertility rate of five live births per woman (6.8 in rural areas); the dearth of education about reproductive health, access to services, and reproductive health, access to services and contraceptive use (86% of women aged 15–49 with a spouse/regular partner avoid contraception); the high rate of pregnancy among girls 15–19 (30%), attributed to early marriage; as well as the high rate of maternal mortality (790 per 100,000 live births). Education remains a critical challenge in Guinea-Bissau, with a record of poor primary school completion rate, placed at 64% in 2010. Indications point to a largely dysfunctional school system, characterized by generations of children growing up and lacking in the basic numeracy and literacy skills (AfDB, 2015a). Experts have blamed incessant instability in the educational sector, with frequent teacher strikes, fueled by non-payment of salaries and resulting in school closure. Literacy levels among adults are poor, with a literacy rate of 58% of women aged 15–49 years. However, the literacy rate is higher among women aged 15–24 years, at 60%, while it is 84% in rural areas. Table 2 shows the poverty and inequality profile of Guinea-Bissau.

Table 2 *Poverty and Inequality Profile of Guinea-Bissau*

Poverty	Number of poor (millions)	Rate (%)	Period
National Poverty Line	1.1	69.3	2010
International Poverty Line - 449 in CFA franc (2010) or US$1.90 (2011) ppp per day per capita	1.0	67.1	2010
Lower Middle Income Poverty Line 1299.7 in CFA franc (2010) or US$5.50 (2011) ppp per day per capita	1.3	84.5	2010
Multidimensional Poverty Measure		79.7	2010
SHARED PROSPERITY			
Annualized Income or Consumption Growth per capita of the bottom 40%	N/A	N/A	N/A
INEQUALITY			
Gini Index		50.7	2010
Shared Prosperity Premium=Growth of the bottom 40-Average Growth		N/A	N/A

Source: Adapted from World Bank (2020a)

It is pertinent to explore the socio-economic profile of Mozambique in order to locate the context of its poverty prevalence and inequality. With a population of more than 31 million, Mozambique obtained political independence from Portugal in 1975, but was undermined by the prolonged 16-year civil war that was brought to an end in 1992, following a UN-brokered peace agreement between the warring factions (Igbatayo & Igbinedion, 2020). The country is endowed with natural resources, including coal, titanium, natural gas, hydropower, tantalum, graphite, etc. It is also endowed in rare earth elements (REEs) (Index & Mundi, 2020a).

Mozambique had featured considerable economic growth from 1992 until recently. The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic triggered an end to the nation's positive economic outcomes, with real GDP contracting by an estimated 0.5% in 2020, the first decline in 20 years. This development followed a moderate growth of 2.2% in 2019. The downturn in macroeconomic performance, particularly in construction, tourism and transport, as well as a decline in commodity exports, assumed a critical dimension in recent times. The situation was also exacerbated by the escalating conflict in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, fueled by Islamist insurgency, which displaced more than 250,000 people, and accompanied by the death of thousands of men, women and children. According to an African Development Bank report (2021), the economic contraction in Mozambique is projected to trap 850,000 people inside the vicious circle of poverty in 2020, an increase of 1.2% to 63.7% of the population. In addition, the GDP per capita was expected to contract by -3.4% in 2020. However, growth prospects appear positive in the short term, with GDP expected to grow by 2.3% in 2021 and 4.5% in 2022, to be driven largely by rising gas investments, according to the AfDB report (2021). Table 3 reveals selected macroeconomic indicators in Mozambique from 2017 to 2019.

Table 3 *Selected Macroeconomic Indicators in Mozambique (2017–2019)*

	2017	2018	2019
National Income and Prices (Annual percentage change unless otherwise indicated)			
Nominal GDP (MT billion)	804	876	946
Real GDP growth	3.7	3.3	1.8
Consumer price index (end of period)	5.6	3.5	8.5
Government Operations (percent of GDP)			
Total Revenue	26.2	24.2	24.0
Total expenditure and net lending	31.4	31.2	37.0
Overall balance, after grants	-3.4	-5.5	-6.5
Primary balance after grants	-0.3	-1.9	-2.5
Money and Credit (annual percentage change unless otherwise indicated)			
Reserve money	4.7	21.8	16.3
M3 (Broad Money)	5.1	10.9	7.6
Credit to the economy	-13.7	-2.6	5.6

Table 3 *Selected Macroeconomic Indicators in Mozambique (2017–2019)*			
(Percent of GDP)	28.1	25.1	24.5
External Sector (million US dollars)			
Merchandise exports	42.0	16.8	8.0
Merchandise exports, excluding mega projects	15.7	10.5	8.6
Merchandise imports	4.4	3.4	53.3
Merchandise imports, excluding mega projects	13.3	3.1	2.2
External Public Debt	11,372	13,132	14,780
External Current Accounts after grants	2,512	-4,371	-8,748
Net international reserves (end of period)	3,062	2,844	2,670
Gross international reserves (end of period)	3,297	3,079	2,905
Source: Mozambican authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections			

Despite the resource abundance of Mozambique, almost one-half of the population (46%) is living in extreme poverty. The nation's poverty profile feature considerable disparities in access to and usage of services, with a dichotomy between rural and urban areas, southern and northern regions of the country, boys and girls, as well as between the various wealth quintiles (UNICEF, 2019). Some provinces reveal prevalence of poverty in excess of 50% of households (Gaza 51%; Zambezia and Nampale, 51%; Niassa, 61%). However, poverty reduced to 11% in Maputo city in 2015, reinforcing economic growth of previous years. In addition, data reveal that more than 50% of households in Mozambique are food insecure, with 24% featuring chronic deprivation, and leaving them vulnerable to shocks, especially recurrent flooding and droughts prevalent in the southern and central regions, which undermine agricultural productivity. Consequently, undernourishment has emerged as a critical challenge that pose considerable risks to child development, with 43.3% of children stunted.

Inequality remains a development constraint in Mozambique. The latest household survey (IOF, 2015) reveals that most of the growth in household consumption was witnessed in the wealthiest quintile; with the wealthiest fifth of Mozambicans spending 14 times more than the poorest fifth, a rate that is double the ratio of 7 to 1, only six years earlier, as illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2 *State of Inequality in Mozambique (2008–2015)*



Source: UNICEF (2019)

Illiteracy rate is high in Mozambique, estimated at 53% of the population. However, the female rate, at 72%, is far higher than its male counterpart, at 40%. While 94% of girls are enrolled in primary school, more than one-half withdraw by the fifth grade, with only 11% continuing their education in secondary schools, but a paltry proportion of 1% proceed to college (USAID, 2021). The low human development holds grave implications for poverty. A key indicator in multi-dimensional poverty is access to healthcare services. In Mozambique, accessibility to healthcare infrastructure is poor. More than half of the nation's population has to walk for an hour or even more to the nearest health facility, where drugs are usually in short supply. The ratio of doctors to the population is poor, estimated at three doctors per 100,000 people, a proportion rated alongside the lowest in the world (USAID, 2012a). Yet, the nation's health sector is burdened with considerable challenges. For example, more than one in 10 Mozambican adults, or 1.2 million people, are living with HIV/AIDS, 58% of whom are women, and 200,000 are children are. The high mortality and morbidity rates prevalent in Mozambique are attributable to poor healthcare infrastructure. For example, in 2019, infant mortality rate was 54.8 deaths per 1,000 live births. Also, maternal mortality rate is put at 1,500 to 100,000 live births, a level rated among the highest in the world. With a population of 19.6 million people, the ratio translates to about 9,800 maternal deaths per annum, or about one in seven women dies from pregnancy or child birth complications. The health infrastructure is weak and burdened with a wider array of endemic and communicable diseases. Among other things, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and influenza pose considerable threats to the population. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2017), the top 10 causes of death in Mozambique are: HIV/AIDS, neonatal disorders, tuberculosis, malaria, stroke, lower respiratory infections, diarrheal disease, congenital defects, and road injuries. Table 4 shows the poverty and inequality profile of Mozambique.

Table 4 *Poverty and Inequality Profile of Mozambique*

Poverty	Number of poor (millions)	Rate (%)	Period
National Poverty Line	12.5	46.1	2014
International Poverty Line — 32.9 in Mozambican metical (2014) or US$1.90 per day per capita	16.5	62.9	2014
Lower Middle Income Poverty Line 55.4 in Mozambican metical (2014) or US$3.20 per day, per capita	21.5	81.9	2014
Upper Middle-Income Class Poverty Line	n. d.	79.7	2010
95.2 in Mozambican metical (2014) or US$5,50 per day per capita	24.2	92.0	2014
Multidimensional Poverty Measure	n. d.	76.6	2014
SHARED PROSPERITY			
Annualized Consumption Growth	n. d.	1.87	2008–14
INEQUALITY			
Gini Index	n. d.	54.0	2014
Shared Prosperity Premium = Growth of the bottom 40-Average Growth	n. d.	-3.85	2008–14

Source: Adapted from World Bank (2020a)

Having examined the poverty and inequality profile of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, it is pertinent to compare the country experiences, particularly with trends. It is noteworthy that instability in both countries had fueled political and economic fragility, which is attributed to the deepening of poverty and inequality. The prolonged civil war in Mozambique and incessant military coups in Guinea-Bissau have been accompanied by social instability and widespread poverty. Also, in a paradox of plenty, both countries, which are resource-rich, feature large proportions of their populations living in extreme poverty and are listed alongside the world's 47 least developed countries in 2020. Poor macroeconomic policies are also blamed for the prevalence of extreme poverty and inequality in both countries.

While Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique both feature endemic poverty profiles, there are differences in national prevalence. The multidimensional measure of poverty presents a clearer prevalence of deprivation. Its measure in Guinea-Bissau was put at 58% of households in 2017; while it was estimated at 76.6% in 2014 across Mozambique. On the other hand, the income/consumption measure of poverty varies in both countries. It reveals a prevalence of 69.3% of the population in 2010, and 46.1% in 2014, across Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, respectively. Furthermore, another critical element in the multidimensional measure of poverty is literacy rates, particularly for women. In Guinea-Bissau, the literacy rate for women aged 15–49 years is 58%; in Mozambique, the corresponding level is 28%. The high prevalence of poverty in both countries largely accounts for the relatively high levels of inequality. The Gini index, a measure of inequality, is placed at 50.7 in 2010 and 54.0 in 2014

across Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, respectively.

4. Conclusion

Poverty and inequality have undermined development efforts across Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly over the past several decades. The issues have emerged as, perhaps, the most binding constraints against development efforts in contemporary times. In a paradox of plenty, the region has emerged with the largest number of people living in extreme poverty in the world, against the backdrop of natural resource abundance. Policymakers have yet to transform resource wealth into prosperity for the majority of people in the region. The development profile of Lusophone African countries mirrors that of Sub-Saharan Africa, characterized by endemic poverty and underdevelopment challenges. Lusophone countries also feature high levels of poverty and inequality among the population. While poverty and inequality are critical issues undermining development efforts in both Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, the prevalence varies, as is triggered by instability and fueled by recurrent military coups and a prolonged civil war, respectively.

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The Social and Economic Impacts of Education and Training in the Islands of São Tomé and Príncipe

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São Tomé and Príncipe, colonial period, independence, public policies, education and training, social and economic changes

Abstract

This study concerns the social and economic impacts of education training on the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe. Consequently, this chapter envisages to answer the following research question: How have post-colonial public policies from 1975 to 2021 brought social and economic changes to the archipelago of São Tomé and Príncipe? This chapter hopes to contribute to the debate on the changes that have taken place in the archipelago during said period by bringing some social and educational data, which could make it interesting to compare the colonial and post-colonial periods. Framing this chapter is an incursion into history to supply context for understanding the changes that have occurred after independence. We highlight the role of education and staff training and the way in which this process has evolved since independence, as well as its global effects, focussing mainly on education and health. We choose qualitative analysis combining data collection, both from selected bibliography and interviews which provide some more highlights to these social and economic effects. These public policies have had cross-cutting effects in all sectors of national life, and it can be concluded that São Tomé and Príncipe has seen remarkable progress, as, through these policies, it was possible to overcome the enormous socio-economic backwardness recorded at the time of national independence. Today the country has infrastructure, technicians, and educational and health coverage to ensure that all citizens have social rights.

1. Introduction

Located in the Gulf of Guinea, the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe were colonies of Portugal since their discovery in the last quarter of the 15th century until 1975 (the year they became an independent country). As a colony serving only the interests of the metropolis, very little was done in the field of education and training of the endogenous population. Thus, making an incursion into history, this chapter aims to shed light on how the political, socio-economic, and cultural history of these islands evolved, in order to facilitate better

understanding on the transformations that took place here in the post-independence period. With regard to education and training, the picture was bleak, since the population's level of literacy was very low and the internal conditions for training were almost non-existent. There were no middle or higher schools, which is why only a very small elite of islanders could fulfill the dream of having a secondary or higher education abroad. What this study seeks is to analyze the socio-economic effects of education and training in São Tomé and Príncipe in order to understand the changes registered after independence and it is specially relevant because the data provided in the tables below shows changes that really took place. Among the most important measures adopted by the state was the priority given to education and secondary and higher education of national staff, meeting the need to create the human capital necessary for the process of national reconstruction, a process that counted widely with international cooperation. Progress has been remarkable, as can be seen in Part II of the study. As a result of such progress, the country already has sufficient middle and senior managers to meet its needs and its multiplier effects are also visible.

By looking at the fundamentals of the trilogy education/training/development relationship in an objective and realistic way, many authors have focused on matters concerning the topic of our study such as Becker (1964, 1994, and 2002) for whom there is a close relationship between education and social and economic progress of individuals as well as of the nations. In his own words (2002, p. 5) "The global economy cannot succeed without considerable investment in human capital by all nations." Billhim (2011) shares the same opinion, emphasizing that education and training function as promoting agents of modern economies. For the World Bank (1995, p. 19) "… education contributes to the strengthening of the institutions of civil society, to national capacity building, and to good governance …" and that investment in education leads to the accumulation of human capital, which is key to sustained economic growth and increasing incomes. For Sen (2007, p. 29) "Developments should be related mainly to the people well being and with freedom that they enjoy." The bottom line here is that individuals and countries can prosper if they invest seriously in human capital to get development. By looking briefly at such approaches, it can be interesting to look how it seen in the case of the archipelago. However, we should note that, as far as we can recall, this topic lacks research, which perhaps translates into the main constraint of this study. Adopting as methodology the qualitative document analysis and observation (interviews), the study is divided into three parts: the first part is dedicated to the evolution process of the islands as a colony of Portugal, the second is dedicated to social achievements, where attention is centred on the domains of education and health, and, part three recovers some data from an interview survey carried out during the preparation of the author's doctoral thesis, where the socio-economic effects of training and higher education on the perception of respondents were analyzed.

Part I: Historical background: Brief historical overview of the archipelago

São Tomé and Príncipe is an archipelago composed of two main islands (the island of São Tomé, and the island of Príncipe) of volcanic origin, 150 km apart. Located in the Gulf of

Guinea, they have a land surface of 1001 km2, a maritime territory more than 60 times larger than land and a population, according to the estimate of the National Institute of Statistics (2021)[1] for the year 2021, of about 205,000 inhabitants. This part seeks to contextualize the socio-economic, political, and cultural reality of the São Tomé e Príncipe archipelago before independence, in order to shed light on the structural and strategic processes and changes that took place in the post-independence period.

1. From discovery to the introduction of sugar cane

The history of the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe goes back to their discovery by Portuguese navigators at the beginning of the 1470s. Both islands were then uninhabited, so their effective settlement in fact began in 1493, by Europeans as well as by Africans, both of whom of different origins; the Africans included numerous slaves whose purpose was to explore the agricultural potential of the islands through the sugar cane plantation and to provide sugar for the European markets. Thus, the settlement would end up having as its immediate aim: the colonization of the space. For Henriques (2000), it was about the invention of a society: since there was no human presence on the islands, it was necessary to take people there in order to fill this void and start the process of social and economic construction. As she states (2000, p. 31): "The issue of settlement was the first concern of the Portuguese facing the need to make island territories profitable." In other words, São Tomé and Príncipe was the world's largest sugar producer in the 16th century.

1.2. Evolution of the economic and social situation: The colonial period

In order to better understand a series of processes and phenomena that occurred in these Atlantic islands, we will now make a brief analysis of the evolution of their economic and social framework. The social-economic history of this archipelago is the history of several economic cycles, starting with sugar cane, passing through the slave trade and subsistence agriculture and, finally, through the coffee and cocoa cycles, economic initiatives developed in close relationship with European consumer. São Tomé and Príncipe stood out in the 16th century in the world market with the export of sugar, and in the 19th and 20th centuries with raw materials such as coffee and cocoa, without neglecting the centuries of trafficking, 17th–18th centuries, in which it was an "Atlantic Inn" and was the example followed in the Americas, especially in Brazil and the Caribbean through the forced immigration of people from various places (for settlement purposes) and from the plantation system using slave labour. As Shillington states:

> In the early sixteenth century São Tomé became the largest single producer of sugar for the European market. Ultimately, the São Tomé plantation system, owned and run by European overseas and manned by African slave labor, was to become the model for plantation slavery in the Americas and the Caribbean. (1993, p. 171)

[1] The National Institute of Statistics is the main national institution which deals with data collection, including population census.

Facilitated by several factors,[2] sugar quickly became a driving force in the economy until the mid-17th century. However, from the end of the 16th century onwards there had already been a sharp drop in production and exports, and according to Pinto:[3]

> Thus generating a climate of insecurity, violence, fear and uncertainty, unfavorable to sugar production, the owners and masters of the mills, the technicians, the owners of sugar lands leave the island and leave the island with their capital and assets to Brazil… From then on, production declined progressively, causing the archipelago to cease to be a major sugar producer. (2018, p. 118)

After this cycle, the 17th and 18th centuries would represent the emergence of a new economic model. According to Pinto (2018, p. 119), "The archipelago ceased to be a plantation colony to become a slave warehouse, becoming its economy to be fundamentally based on the slave trade," one of the main routes for slaves in the Atlantic.

At the beginning of the 1800s, coffee and cocoa were introduced. Thus, the agricultural renaissance would come at the expense of the insertion of these cultures, the replacement of the slavery regime by the contract regime, and the struggle for land ownership. In the second half of this century, the archipelago occupied third place in the ranking of world's cocoa production. From the beginning of the 1800s onwards, the islands would be marked by huge conflicts that pitted the colonized populations against the colonial authorities, resulting in permanent social upheavals.

1.3. Struggle for Independence

The establishment of the Republic, in 1910, in Portugal, was followed by a period of political construction of a state, the so-called Estado Novo. Sixteen years later, this country would plunge into a long period of fascist dictatorship, which came to an end only in 1974. Thus, the cultured men of São Tomé society, enlightened and discontented with the deepest reasons for that state of affairs, sought to defend their ideals and interests in the face of colonial intolerance. Thus emerged anti-colonial nationalism, especially from the 1940s–1950s onwards.[4] The idea of association for the defence of the islanders' interests attracted many intellectuals, both inside or outside the national territory.

[2] According to Henriques (1993, p. 266) in the 15th century ". . . Sugar consumption was extended to a wider public as a result of European economic development and the progressive appearance of social groups particularly linked to trade and holders of an important purchasing power . . ."

[3] Elements taken from the doctoral thesis completed in 2017 and defended in July 2018 at the Higher Institute of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Lisbon.

[4] This movement resulted in the creation of various associations of natives who intended to defend their interests in the face of an increasingly aggressive colonial system. Among these associations, the Sporting Club de São Tomé stands out.

On the economic front, o Estado Novo had done little to meet the needs of the local populations. As the chronic labour problem persisted in an attempt to solve it, it sent a new governor, Carlos de Sousa Gorgulho (1945–1953), for such a mission. However, having failed to achieve the essential objective, that is, to convince the native population of the islands to accept working as a contractor, Gorgulho, in retaliation, began, on February 3, 1953, a hideous massacre against the defenseless populations, resulting in an indiscriminate number of deaths. This vile action would eventually provoke rapid anti-colonial reactions that resulted in, among other things, the creation of the Committee for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (CLSTP) in 1960. This Committee was later transformed, in 1972, into the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe, which fought for national independence, which took place on July 12, 1975.

1.4. Establishment of the Republic

Assembled in socialist molds, the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe proceeded with the organization of the state, having immediately nationalized the former colonial farms, banking, and commerce, promoting at the same time, social reforms, based on democratization and free education and the consequent nationalization of schools, free healthcare, guaranteeing equal rights to workers from former colonial farms, including women, among other measures that would launch the bases for reversing the situation prevailing in the colonial period. On the economic plane, we are witnessing the state's monopoly over the economy, also set up along socialist lines. Only in 1987, with the growing economic crisis, was the economy liberalized, allowing private initiatives.

In political terms, the structure of a monolithic state was created, which only came to an end in 1990–1991[5] with the establishment of a truly democratic republic. Thus ended the First Republic (1975–1990) and began the Second Republic (1990–1991 to the present).

Part II: The socio-economic impacts of education and training

The country's independence in 1975 produced radical changes in the social sector, especially in the areas of health and education. These are the focuses of this part. With the implantation of democracy in 1990–1991, new opportunities were opened to deepen these changes. The National Assembly Law of Constitutional Revision (2003) ensured broad social rights to citizens, which at the same time translated into a more substantive and active participation of the state and civil society in initiatives promoting these sectors, as well as international organizations.

2.1. Education

This was one of the sectors where the most significant social changes took place, as marked by profound achievements that brought significant changes. In a close relationship between

[5] In 1990 a new constitution was signed, and in early 1991 the first democratic elections were held in the country.

education and development and given the importance of human capital for the growth and development of societies, the different governments, since the beginning of national independence, assumed that education should play a relevant role in the reconstruction of the society. As Pinto highlights:

> Today, there is an unprecedented awareness of the intrinsic relationship between education and development, in the perspective that the former constitutes the critical raw material for the latter, that is, education is today, more than ever, considered the driving force of development. (2018, p. 39)

This understanding is corroborated by the World Bank (1995, p. 19), according to which "Investment in education leads to the accumulation of human capital, which is key to sustained economic growth and increasing income […] In addition, education contributes to the strengthening of the institutions of civil society, to national capacity building, and to good governance …" Contributing to the reflection, Becker (2002, p. 5) considers that the higher the level of qualification of the workforce, the higher their remuneration and that "The global economy cannot succeed without considerable investment in human capital by all nations." Brás (2007) also recognizes the importance of investing in human resources (in education and training), as this is how countries qualify for greater competitiveness of their economies, in a world of rapid economic and technological changes. For this author (2007, p. 294) human capital constitutes: "… one of the most important intangibles that organizations have, being crucial in the performance of the knowledge society… Therefore, the success of the performance of each organization is largely based on the quality of the human capital of the individuals (human resources) who work in the organization." In this regard, Bilhim (2011, p. 57), recognizing the value of human capital as an instrument for wealth growth, especially for small countries dependent on foreign aid, says that "… having people is not enough… It is necessary to invest, the absence of investment means from the outset a devaluation of the initial capital due to inflationary phenomena. Countries and families, economic agents in general, have to invest in available human capital if they are to overcome the competitive challenges they are or will be facing."

The Constitution of the Republic, Law nº 1/2003, article 35, point 1, emphasizes that "Education, as a right recognized to all citizens, aims at the integral formation of man and his active participation in the community" and it is in the light of this right that, since its independence, São Tomé and Príncipe has invested significantly in the education and training of Sãotomeans, as this is the only way to overcome the failures of the colonial education and training system. It is also in the context of this right that, since 1975, public education policies have focused on its democratization by transforming it into the public good accessible to the entire schooling population. The opportunity for access was guaranteed to all citizens.[6]

[6] The Education Policy Letter – São Tomé and Príncipe (Vision 2022), emphasizes the universality and obligation of quality pre-school education, as well as primary and secondary education.

2.1.1. Literacy

The struggle against illiteracy was one of the areas in which São Tomé and Príncipe had its greatest success after independence. According to article 4, point 4, of Law nº2/2018, Basic Law of the Educational System, literacy and post-literacy are encompassed in out-of-school education, complemented by article 40, point 3, paragraph a), according to which basic adult education covers literacy and post-literacy, and both seek to raise the cultural level and professional training of adults.

A study produced for the Meeting of Education Ministers of the PALOP (Portuguese-speaking African countries) and Equatorial Guinea, under the theme "Adult Literacy — The experience of São Tomé and Príncipe, from independence to the present day" (2004, p. 5) clarifies that before independence "… the population became aware of the importance of literacy" and in this context "… several initiatives were launched and that "In this context, Literacy initiatives emerged that had the voluntary participation of primary school teachers, civil servants, young students and all those who, at the time, joined the political cause."

After Independence the State assumed adult literacy as one of the most important priorities of public policies for the education sector as well as a National Poverty Reduction Strategy (ENRP)[7], also as part of literacy in the context of Education for All (EPT)[8]. According to this last source (2004), at independence 80% of the population was illiterate. This data is corroborated by the Education Policy Charter — São Tomé and Príncipe Vision 2022 (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2012), according to which fifteen years after independence, in 1990, illiteracy dropped to 30%, and it was estimated that the literacy rate in the 15 to 24 age group was 95.4% of the population and that in the case of adult literacy this estimate was 88%.

The adult literacy campaign began in 1976, with Brazilian cooperation.[9] A study carried out by Bonfim (2017) indicates that in the four-year period (1981–1985) the illiteracy rate was reduced by 50%, but that in the 1990s, youth and adult literacy suffered a small decline due to lack of financial resources. According to data from the National Institute of Statistics (INE), in Bonfim (2017), in 2000 the illiteracy situation was still dismal, since 27% of the adult population was considered illiterate. Among men, the rate was 26.1% and among women, 33.8%. Brazil is once again called upon to support the fight against illiteracy, this time with a project model called Alfabetização Solidária (Solidarity Literacy, free translation),

[7] Recalling that one of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), first in this case, is "Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger" and the country has followed this global policy measure.

[8] Also remember that in the EPT Dakar Framework for Action, the Literacy component appears as Goal 4 "Improve Literacy levels for Adults by 50%, particularly for women, by 2005 and ensure that all adults have equitable access to the programmes of basic education and permanent education".

[9] Paulo Freire was the face of this campaign.

from 2001 onwards. The project came to an end in 2011. According to the Education Policy Charter (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2012), within the scope of this project for the literate it was possible to reduce the dropout rate, in 2005, from 36.6% to 5.38, in 2010. The success of this project resulted in the reduction of the illiteracy rate from 27% to 10%, one of the lowest on the African continent. The state remains committed to eradicating illiteracy at an annual rate of around 20%, according to the Education Policy Charter (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2012). According to Bonfim (2017), São Toméan authorities are betting on the definitive eradication of illiteracy among young people and adults over 15 years of age, by 2022.

2.1.2. School infrastructure

To start with, this is one of the fields where changes were more remarkable for the differences before and after independence. Law No. 4/2018 — Basic Law on the Educational System, in its article 1, point 2, characterizes "The educational system as a set of means by which the right to education is fulfilled, which is expressed by the guarantee of permanent intervention oriented towards favoring the global development of the personality, the social process and the democratization of society." On the other hand, article 2, point 4, states that "The educational system responds to the needs resulting from the social reality, contributing to the full and harmonious development of the personality of individuals, encouraging the formation of free, responsible, autonomous and supportive citizens and valuing the human dimension of work." It is in light of these assumptions that, since national independence, public education policies have also focused on the problem of school infrastructure nationwide. At the onset of independence in 1975, there were only 22 primary schools and only one secondary school. There was also a preparatory school that covered the fifth and sixth grades. There were no kindergartens; only day care centers located in colonial plantations. These numbers show the elitist character of education. See the tables below and the changes that have taken place in this area.

School infrastructure before Independence: School network

Table 1 *School infrastructure before Independence: School network*

Type of School	Crèche	Primary	Preparatory	Secondary	Professional	Higher education
Number	0	22	1	1	2	0

Notes: Only in the former plantations there were such facilities as Crèches, and they were not available for the public.
Professional schools are very reductive in its essence and offer.

Source: Personal authorship, based on data from Statistical Bulletin of Education Academic year (2018–2019)

46 years after the independence, according to the Statistical Bulletin of Education, for the 2018–2019 school year, we currently have the following scenario:

Table 2 *School infrastructure after Independence: Preschool Education Network*

Type of School	Public kindergarten (3 to 5 year of age)	Private kindergarten (3 to 5 years of age)	Crèche (kindergarten) (0 to 6 year of age)	Total
Number	29	18	56	103

Source: Personal authorship, based on data from Satistical Bulletin of Education Academic year (2018–2019).

Table 3 *School infrastructure after Independence: Basic school network (1st to 6th grade)*

Type of School	Public	Private	Crèche (kindergarten)	Total
Number	87	5	56	92

Source: Personal authorship, based on data from Satistical Bulletin of Education Academic year (2018–2019).

Table 4 *School infrastructure after Independence: Secondary school network*

Type of School	1st cycle (7th to 9th grade)	2nd cycle (10th to 12th grade)	Total
Number	29	9	38

Source: Personal authorship, based on data from Statistical Bulletin of Education Academic year (2018-2019)

Table 5 *School infrastructure after Independence: Higher education network*

Type of School	Public	Private	Total
Number	1	2	3

Source: Personal authorship, based on data from Statistical Bulletin of Education Academic year (2018-2019)

The data presented above clearly shows the gains achieved after independence by bringing schools closer to the community, except in higher education, as all infrastructure is concentrated in the country's capital.

2.1.3. Training

This is another sector where remarkable progress has been made after independence. In fact, before 1975, the only training schools in the country were geared towards arts and crafts, female training, and basic training for primary school teachers (from first to fourth grade) and general training in commerce and the industry. In the 1980s, the first middle training schools were created in the fields of health and education and were aimed to train nurses and teachers. The emergence of the first higher education institutions dates to the 1990s, namely the IUCAI (University Institute of Accounting, Administration and Information Technology) in 1994, the Higher Polytechnic Institute of São Tomé and Príncipe (ISPSTP) in 1996, and the Lusíada University of São Tomé and Príncipe (ULSTP) in 2005. In 2014,

the first and only public university was established — the University of São Tomé and Príncipe (USTP). As we collected testimonials, we learned that before independence, there would have been approximately three dozen senior staff, trained mainly in Portugal, some of whom residing there. However, independence in 1975 "did not bring about an immediate change to this reality, given that academic training continued to be obtained abroad and it was only from the 1990s onwards that a new academic stage began with the emergence of institutions and, at the same time, the partial inversion of this situation" (Pinto, 2018, p. 149). The Metropolis had no concern in creating endogenous higher education opportunities for the local populations.

It should be noted that the metropolis was not concerned with the higher education of the local population, so the technical and administrative staff of higher level were, in essence, Portuguese" (Pinto, 2018, p. 149). However, soon after independence the state began to invest seriously in the training of its middle and senior staffs, based on the management and guidance of scholarships offered by friendly countries,[10] transforming education into a cardinal instrument for creating middle and senior staff capable of taking over the direction of socio-economic and cultural life from the country.

According to the National Institute of Statistics (INE) based on the last census (2012), there were 2,261 senior staff in the country, a growth of over 700% in 37 years, when compared to 1975.

2.2. Health

It is also in the field of health that significant gains have been made. However, given the data on education and training presented in Section 2.1, we will summarize here just a few aspects that stand out in this sector, with emphasis on health infrastructure and the incidence of the main diseases.

2.2.1. Infrastructure

The tables below show the evolution of health infrastructures before and after independence.

Table 6 *Health infrastructure before Independence*

Health infrastructure	Hospitals	Health centers	Health posts	Private clicnics	Private drugstores
Number	2	1	8	0	3
Source: National Statistics Institute (2021)					

[10] The list of these countries includes: Brazil, Portugal, China, USA, USSR, Germany, Cuba, France, Bulgaria, Spain, Algeria, Congo, among others.

Table 7 *Health infrastructure after Independence*

Health infrastructure	Hospitals	Health centers	Health posts	Private clicnics	Private drugstores
Number	2	6	13	11	13
Source: Health Statistic Yearbook (2020) — Ministry of Health					

2.2.2. Main disease: Malaria

Of all, malaria was the disease that caused the most damage to the population over the centuries, but its incidence is currently very low. Attempts to eliminate malaria date back to the 15th century, with no significant improvements being recorded until the very recent past. In 1968, according to data from Viegas de Abreu (2021) from the National Center for Endemic Diseases (CNE), the Malaria Eradication Mission (MEP) was created for the first time to combat the disease. In 1980, an intensive indoor spraying campaign was launched, twice a year, which lasted until 1984. After three spraying cycles there was a considerable drop in the age group from 3 to 14 years old from 19.2% to 0.6%. Children were the biggest victim of the disease. Pursuing the objective of combating malaria, the State joined the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) initiative in 2000 and drew up a National Strategic Plan for Malaria Control, 2001–2010, which included a reduction by 100 % of malaria deaths in children under 5 years of age and 90% of malaria morbidity, resulting in a drastic decrease in cases and deaths, over 80% from 2005. At the same time, the campaign for the use of impregnated bed nets increased, whose effect has been positive.

2.2.3. Other diseases

Still according to Viegas de Abreu (2021) in global terms, there has been remarkable progress in terms of public health in São Tomé and Príncipe, when compared to the reality in Sub-Saharan Africa. The tuberculosis vaccination rate increased by more than 80% from 2002, with a considerable drop in maternal and child mortality as well. There has also been a considerable drop in the prevalence of HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus), estimated at 1.5%. Regarding COVID-19, by November 1, 2021, there were 56 deaths and 3,714 cases of infection. Overall, São Tomé and Príncipe outperforms sub-Saharan Africa on the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index and has made progress in improving other social indicators. It has a gross primary school enrollment rate of 110%, a life expectancy of 66 years, a mortality rate of children under the age of 51 per 1,000 live births, access to an improved water source for 97% of the population, and access to electricity for 60% of the population. The Gross National Product (GNP) per capita was USD 1,960 in 2019 (World Bank, 2021).

Part III: Perceived socio-economic effects of education

Interviews conducted by us in 2016–2017, within the scope of our doctoral thesis, allowed us to build the perception of more than four dozen senior managers about the effects of

education and higher education on their personal and professional lives. Therefore, to complete this chapter, we will bring some of the most important opinions.

Table 8 *Interviews to senior managers about the effects of education and higher education on their personal and professional lives (2017)*

Interviewee and Occupation	Opinion
Olinto Daio University Professor Date: September, 2017	"… We can say that throughout the Public Administration we have got people with higher education especially those who run the institutions."
Jorge Bom Jesus Linguist and University Professor Date: September, 2017	"Having started from zero, there are necessarily great impacts… we have seen that the number of expatriate manpower is quite small, which means that Sao Tome is currently taking over the reins of the process."
Agostinho Sousa University Professor Date: September, 2017	"… in 1998–2001, at the level of secondary education we had about 20% of trained teachers, but . . . we now have about 70–80% of teachers with training in secondary education."
Fernanda Pontífice Linguist and University Professor Date: September, 2017	"If we consider the number of doctors, nurses and other staff outside São Tomé and Príncipe, this is a real drain on the State and on the investments made in them"
Aires Bruzaca de Menezes Economist and University Professor Date: September, 2017	"There must be good politicians for good education and training policies"

Source: Interviewees

The same can be said of the health sector, where the training of doctors and nurses in the post-independence period allowed for good national medical coverage. The general opinion of the respondents can be summarized as follows:

a) The effort to improve secondary education and access to higher education and the training of staff is allowing feedback from the education system and higher education as well as the other sectors of society;

b) In general, all interviewees believe that their higher education courses had great meaning for their personal and family life;

c) Education made it possible to minimize socioeconomic and ethnic differences and the social ascension of individuals from humbler families, as well as better social inclusion;

d) Generically, the evaluation of the effects of higher education on Sao Tome society is positive, but there is dissatisfaction with the quality and poor investment in endogenous higher education;

e) Feedback from the educational system, with regard to teachers and other staff, through training carried out, both inside and outside the country;

f) Improvement on public administration, which now has many senior staff;

g) Improvement on education and health services, taking into account success indicators, including the fight against diseases, including sexually transmitted diseases, malaria and others, as well as maternal and child protection and positive education indicators;

Conclusion

Starting with our research question — How the post-colonial public policies had brought socio-economic changes in the archipelago of São Tomé and Príncipe? — we can conclude that the impacts of public education and training policies on the socioeconomic evolution of São Tomé and Príncipe in the post-independence period, when compared to the colonial period, are unquestionable. As a colony, the archipelago did not experience remarkable progress in the socio-economic and cultural domain. With the massification of education after independence, the progress made is unquestionable, and we can say that the impacts of public policies on education and training in the country are very evident. Among others, we highlight the policies for higher education of national staff, initially abroad, and later in the country with the creation of endogenous institutions. One of the positive effects of these public policies was the training in almost all domains of national cadres, considerably reducing the initial dependence on expatriate ones.

On the other hand, the multiplier effects of these policies have to do with the fact that the country can provide feedback to its general education and staff training system from those who, having adequate qualifications, participate in the ongoing process of education and training of the youngest generations. When comparing the conditions of educational and training offered in the colonial and post-independence periods, we realize that the differences are abysmal. This is also why we say that the impacts are positive, after 46 years of independence. In education, in public administration, in the sectors of health, agriculture, livestock, fishing, services, law, economics, technologies, and all others, the country is almost self-sufficient, although it lacks some specializations. Although the returns are not always satisfactory, progress has been made.

Although there have not been much bibliography produced both inside and outside the country to deepen this research, we believe that progress can still be made in terms of a quantitative study to provide more data which can highlight further social and economic changes that have taken place in the archipelago.

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Free Trade Zone Projects in São Tomé and Príncipe

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Authority of Free-trade Zones, Free-trade Zones, São Tomé and Príncipe

Abstract

This chapter has been designed to evaluate the different projects concerning the free trade zones in São Tomé and Príncipe (FTZ-STP), the framework legislation, the concession contracts, as well as the main causes leading to project failure. Methodologically speaking, this research uses qualitative data (laws and decree-laws, official newspapers, academic studies, and a selection of data from different public institutions) as well as statistical data, and is presented in the form of a macroeconomic study. The lack of available information on these FTZ-STP projects has greatly affected the analysis, but has also explained why discussing this topic is important. Thus, the qualitative methodology has been supplemented with information drawn from interviews conducted with the help of the head of the former FTZ-STP authority, Arzemiro dos Prazeres. The chapter advances the notion that several FTZ-STP projects were not successful because, essentially, the global correlation of FTZ-STP projects and the oil sector does not seem to have been a good strategy. Particularly in relation to the FTZ Malanza project (2020), we can also conclude that without considering and learning from the factors that explain the failure of previous projects, this project would not be successful. As the government of São Tomé and Príncipe does not provide official English translations of the legal instruments mentioned in this research, this analysis uses free translations from the original version according to our best interpretation.

1. Introduction

São Tomé and Príncipe (STP) is a small island developing state (SIDS), the second smallest economy in Africa, and has endured chronic structural problems. According to the World Bank Group (n.d., p. 14), STP's economic growth has been explained by an unsustainable reliance on public spending, especially on public investment financed by donations. Thus, since 1989 — a period which São Tomé and Príncipe 's economy experienced successive recessions — succeeding governments and political and business classes have come to the conclusion that free-trade zones in São Tomé and Príncipe (hereafter FTZ-STP) can be

an instrument to facilitate and attract foreign direct investment to reorient the economy towards the private sector. In the 1990s, the government of São Tomé and Príncipe (GOV-STP) began to create a set of laws to support FTZ-STP, namely, Decree-Law 70/95 (Sociedades Anónimas) (Offshores Limited Companies (free translation)); Decree-Law 61/95 (Franco Regime) (Free Taxes Regime (free translation)); Decree-Law 33/98 (Zonas Francas e Actividades Offshore) (Free-trade Zones and Offshore Activities (free translation)). Thus, with the approval of the Decree-Law 33/98 in 2004, the GOV-STP created an FTZ authority, with its responsibility defined as to regulate the FTZs. In 2011, the GOV-STP terminated the authority. In 2019, the GOV-STP passed Decree-Law 23/2019 to support the creation of the FTZ of Malanza (District of Caué on São Tomé Island), and the National Agency for the Promotion of Trade and Investments (APCI-STP) became responsible for regulating the activities of the FTZ-STP. In addition to this legislative framework, GOV-STP also passed laws and regulations relating to money laundering and funding terrorism, namely, Law 08/2013 (Lei de Prevenção e Combate ao Branqueamento de Capitais e Financiamento do Terrorismo) (Prevention and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (free translation)) and BC-STP SOP (NEP) 07/2018 (Avaliação e Gestão de Risco de Branqueamento de Capital e Financiamento de Terrorismo) (Assessment and Risk Management of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (free translation)).

Such aforementioned legal framework supported the GOV-STP during the last three decades to promote different projects, and of the numerous projects, six stand out: (1) Zona franca de Baía das Agulhas (located on Príncipe Island); (2) Zona Franca Aeroportuária (located on São Tomé Island); (3) Zona Franca de Fernão Dias (São Tomé Island); (4) Zona Franca de Ponta Figo (São Tomé Island); (5) Zona Franca de Porto Alegre (São Tomé Island); (6) and Zona Franca de Malanza (São Tomé). Regrettably, of these six projects mentioned, with the exception of the Zona Franca de Malanza on São Tomé Island, none could be considered successful. It is in this line of reasoning that rests the importance of this study, as it aims to evaluate each one of the projects, and the associated legislation, agreements, and specific circumstances.

2. Context of São Tomé and Príncipe and Cabo Verde

a) Contextualization of Free Trade Zones

Free-trade zones (FTZ) or "free ports" are geographical spaces within a state that enjoy special legal, and economic status(es) as well as preferential tax incentives. FTZs are usually located in the vicinity of a large infrastructure, such as a sea port or an airport, which provides internal and external connectivity. This connectivity envisages to facilitate the flow of people, capital, knowledge, and technology. An FTZ is perceived as an instrument of trade and commercial policies, designed to advance development through the facilitation of the movement of goods, people, capital, knowledge, and technology, in particularly beneficial market conditions. The most important types of FTZs are free zones, free port zones, and export processing zones. FTZs may provide the following benefits: duty exemption; duty deferral; duty reduction or inverted tariff; merchandise processing fee (MPF) reduction; streamlined logistics; and quota avoidance.

b) Concepts and Short History

Siroën (2014, p. 5) offers a sort of categorization of the FTZs in different groups such as special economic zones (SEZs), free economic zones (FEZs), export processing zones (EPZs), technological free zones (TFZs), free ports (FPs), industrial free zones (IFZs), enterprise zones, specialized zones, and logistic zones. The same author likewise asserts that these names refer to differences in their characteristics such as geographic form (concentrated or widespread), type of business (transit, processing, commercial, etc.) and industrial specialization (such as service, technology, and logistics). According to Guangwen (2003, p. 5), the first FTZs were established in Ireland and Taiwan in the 1960s as a result of the relocation of industrial production. However, according to the Korea Maritime Institute (KMI) (2005, p. 5), FTZs in the form of free harbours were first established more than 2,000 years ago. Indeed, in the last half of the 20th century, FTZs underwent substantial changes and adaptations as a result of an exponential growth in world trade and improvements in transport efficiency, particularly in the port sector. Guangwen (2003, p. 5), asserts that between the late 1950s and the mid-1960s, the first group of FTZs combining trade and manufacturing functions emerged. The FTZ concept was also used in Puerto Rico and Latin America in 1962. The first two FTZs in Asia were set up in Kandla seaport (India) in 1957, and Kaohsiung seaport (Taiwan) in 1965. Today, FTZs are present around the world, with particular emphasis from export-driven economies. FTZs have been relatively successful in the context of economic activities and employment dynamics. Along this line of reasoning stand the examples of Honduras, El Salvador, Mauritius, the People's Republic of China (hereafter China), Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Sri Lanka. Scholars and governments around the world have different views about FTZs, as some of them see them as a mechanism to leapfrog state control, especially in terms of tax. Nevertheless, according to Li et al.:

> The first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) was created in Brooklyn, New York, United States, in 1937. Later, the first success history of a SEZ, having significant impact in the development of its region and its country, was observed in Ireland, under the name of Shannon Development. It was created in 1959 and it operates and supports a great deal of Ireland economy and industry still today. However, it was the central role of the SEZ and their remarkable performance in supporting China's economic development model that motivated the increasing interest by researchers, policymakers, and the public opinion. (2022, p. 288)

Furthermore, according to the World Bank Report 2015, SEZs have contributed 22% of China's GDP, 45% of total national foreign direct investment, and 60% of exports. SEZs are estimated to have created over 30 million jobs, increased the income of participating farmers by 30%, and accelerated industrialization, agricultural modernization, and urbanization. Miguel (2017, p. 21) stated in 2017 that there were about 3000 free trade zones in 135 countries around the world. Later, as mentioned by Li et al., as of 2021, there were "an estimated 5,900 SEZs worldwide, spread around approximately 150 countries and territories (Projection over the World Investment Report, 2019)" (2022, p. 288). Miguel (2017, p. 21) also asserts that since the Roman Empire, FTZs have been created along trade routes, used

to store duty-free goods before being re-exported. The free cities of the Middle Ages and the duty-free ports of the British Empire (Singapore, Gibraltar, Hong Kong) have continued that tradition until now.

c) STP and Cabo Verde

For São Tomé and Príncipe, since 1989, a period which the economy had been experiencing successive recession, the GOV-STP has already debated the possible implementation of the FTZ-STP in order to exploit its strategic position in the Gulf of Guinea region as a hub for providing services. In addition, in 1997, the GOV-STP the first oil exploration agreement with Environmental Remediation Holding Corporation (ERCH). Consequently, between 1989 and 2019, the public authorities passed legislation to support the existence and the functioning of the FTZ. The following Table 1 depicts the seven most important legal instruments.

Table 1 STP-FTZ Normative Framework

Legal Instrument	Original Designation	Free Translation
Decree-Law 11/1989	Criação das Zonas Francas	FTZ Creation
Decree-Law 61/1995	Regime Franco	Free Regime
Decree-Law 62/1995	Actividades Bancárias Offshore	Offshore Banking Activities
Decree-Law 70/1995	Sociedades Anónimas Offshore	Offshores Limited Companies
Decree-Law 33/1998	Código das Zonas Francas e actividades Offshore	Code of FTZ and Offshore Activities
Law 08/2013	Lei de Prevenção e Combate ao Branqueamento de Capitais e Financiamento do Terrorismo	Law to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorism financing
Decree-Law 23/2019	Criação da Zona Franca de Malanza no Distrito de Caué – Região de Porto Alegre	Creation of the Malanza FTZ in the region of Porto Alegre

Source: Author

In 2001, after concluding the agreement that implemented the Joint Development Zone Treaty between GOV-STP and GOV-Nigeria, the market and the private sector became optimistic about the expectations created around the advantages of oil exploration. That is why, in 2004, GOV-STP decided to create the FTZ-STP-Authority, naming Arzemiro dos Prazeres head of the body. The creation and appointment of this regulatory body pushed for new projects. Indeed, the following six initiatives were brought into the existence:

Table 2 *STP-FTZs*

Designation/Date	Island	Purpose
Centro Logístico de Baía das Agulhas (2004)	Príncipe Island	Baía das Agulhas Logistics Centre
Zona Franca Aeroportuária (2006)	São Tomé Island	Airport FTZ
Zona Franca de Porto de Fernão Dias (2008)		Seaport FTZ Fernão Dias
Reservatório de Petróleo da Ponta Figo (2009)		Ponta Figo Oïl storage plant
Zona Franca Turística de Porto Alegre (2019)		Porto Alegre Tourism FTZ
Zona Franca de Malanza (2019)		Malanza FTZ

Source: Author

Regrettably, out of these six initiatives, only the last has attained some success. All the others have been unsuccessfully established, for different reasons, among which were morbidity in oil exploration projects, investor discretion, and lack of institutional capacity. Turning now our observation to Cabo Verde, the reality seems not to be different. Indeed, the process leading to the establishment of FTZ has begun more or less by the same time. The first legal framework, according to Miranda (2009, p. 53), designed to support commercial FTZ, was Law 83/IV/1998 and Decree-Law 48/1999. One year later, in 2001, the public authorities passed Decree-Law 3/2001 to regulate an area on the São Vicente Island for the development of FTZ approximately 5,492 m2 in area. In 2005, with the passage of Decree-Law 32/2005, commercial activities associated to commercial FTZ were finally regulated. However, despite the aforementioned legal instruments, due to economic and bureaucratic difficulties, until 2021, it had not been implemented.

3. Key Aspects of the Economy of São Tomé and Príncipe

São Tomé and Príncipe is a small island developing country, located on the west coast of the African continent, off the Gulf of Guinea, with 215,056 inhabitants (World Bank, 2019). The archipelago has 1,001 km2 of land surface and consists of two islands and a dozen adjacent islets: the island of São Tomé and islets make up 859 km2 of surface and the island of Príncipe and islets covers 142 km2. Príncipe island is around 112 miles northeast of São Tomé, and a handful of high-end resorts have made preservation of the island's distinct ecological makeup central to their operations. Príncipe is a UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Biosphere Reserve due to the diverse range of endemic plants, birds, insects, and marine species found here. São Tomé and Princípe being a small island developing country faces poverty and its main causes are the low income, lack of productive assets and means of production, lack of infrastructure, and lack of human social capital. In December of 2016, with the resumption of diplomatic relations between STP and China, the GOV-STP programmed a series of structural investments,

namely, expansion and modernization of the international airport, construction of a deep seaport, and requalification of the road that connects São Tomé airport to the city in order to boost the growth of the economy. The sources of financing for these investments were the European Union, the Netherlands, and China. However, these investments were not made, and since 2016, there has been a decrease of donations to finance public investment and, consequently, a cooling of the economy.

a) Recent Economic Developments

According to the World Economic Outlook (WEO, 2020) the economy of São Tomé and Príncipe contracted by an estimated 6.4%, after growing by 2.2% in 2018 and 1.3% in 2019. In the same source, the contraction in output, for the first time in a decade, is attributed to a sharp decline in tourism and the service sectors, which were severely hurt by weak external and domestic demand and COVID-19 containment measures. Subdued aggregate demand also hurt the hotels and restaurant, transport, construction, and manufacturing sectors, while cocoa exports were disrupted by widespread international border closures. 7.7% in 2019 due to pandemic-related shortages of food and other essential goods. Likewise, the fiscal deficit was estimated to widen to 5.0% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2020, up from 2.4% in 2019 (WEO, 2020), as spending related to COVID-19 increased and tax revenues fell. Public debt rose rapidly to 104.9% of the GDP in 2020, up from 94.8% in 2019. The current account deficit widened to 17.5% of GDP in 2020, from 16.6% in 2019, mainly due to the reduction in tourism and cocoa harvest. Nonetheless, official reserves improved to four months of import cover from three months in 2019, boosted by budget support inflows.

b) Structural Analyses and Perspectives

Regarding to Figure 1, the trajectory of the GDP shows high oscillations since 1980. For this reason, to analyze the trend, the polynomial trend is the instrument that best explains the relationship between effective GDP and potential GDP — R2 explains 37% of the errors around the effective GDP rate.

Figure 1 *STP GDP (1980–2020)*



Source: WEO (April, 2021) –Author's analyses (2021)

According to Figure 2, public expenditure fluctuates very much, and its trend is similar to GDP's. The downward trend in public expenditure observed since 2010 seems to explain the slowdown in GDP.

Figure 2 *STP public expenditure (2000–2020)*



Source: WEO (April, 2021) –Author's analyses (2021)

However, to confirm this relationship, it is necessary to analyze the structural relationship between GDP and public expenditure:

Table 1 *Results of Linear Regression Analysis between GDP and public expenditure*

Regression statistics – VAR	
Multiple R	0,979769
Square of R	0,959948
Square of adjusted R	0,907317
Standard error	348483,3
Observations	20

Source: Author's production (2021)

A relationship between public expenditure and GDP can be confirmed via the VAR test. The dependence of public spending to promote growth of GDP presents risks concerning uncertainty in public revenues, particularly, in donations. However, it is important to emphasize that the containment of the fiscal deficit is one of the essential requirements to guarantee the sustainability of the exchange rate anchor and, consequently, nominal convergence between STP and Portugal.

Figure 3 *Inflation parity between STP and Portugal (%)*



PRT (Portugal); Inflação (Inflation)
Source: Eurostat / INE-STP –Author's analyses (2021)

In general, the risks and structural problems associated with the STP economy are as follows:

1) The real sector of the economy is concentrated in service activities: According to the STP National Statistics Institute (INE-STP), the service sector weights (2010–2020) on average more than 70% of the GDP. The group of trade, transport, and storage of goods alone weights more than 35% of the GDP. Therefore, inevitably, when trade in consumer of goods or capital falls, the STP economy as a whole plunges.

2) On average, public investment financing depends more than 90% of donations: According to the MFEA-STP, public financing is highly correlated to the annual donations level. Therefore, GDP is highly correlated with public expenditure, and any changes in public investment (donations) are directly transmitted to the real sector of the economy.

3) Exports are small and are in a single product: According to INE-STP, 80% of the volume of exports rests with cocoa beans. Since 1975, the gradual drop in cocoa export has led to a worsening of the trade balance. However, to compensate for this situation, from December 2019 to January 2022, palm oil produced by the company Agripalma presented very positive perspectives.

4) Imports have an excessive weight in the GDP: According to BC-STP, imports represented more than 30% of the GDP, between 2014 and 2019. The economy is dependent on imports of almost everything, from consumer goods, capital goods to fuels and derivatives. Thus, the stability of trade (the country's largest economic activity) and construction (the second largest economic activity) is dependent on imports;

5) STP exports are structurally concentrated towards the European Union: According to BC-STP, more than 75% of exports are destined for the European Union.

6) Due to the high external trade deficit, the sources of financing for net international reserves are based on donations: The eventual drop in donations affects the foreign exchange coverage of imports and negatively affects the sector.

7) Public debt is excessively concentrated in external debt, which entails systematic repayments in foreign currency for payment of debt services: According to da Gama (2020), STP's debt situation has undermined the country's development aspirations. The country has been classified as being in debt distress because of prolonged unsettled external arrears since 2018, based on available data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). STP achieved the completion point in March 2007 and benefited from debt relief under HIPC and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), amounting to USD 327 million. Following debt relief in 2007, the country had a period of "relatively stable" debt from 2008 to 2010. Since then, the situation has begun to deteriorate, with the stock of debt reaching 195% of GDP in 2015, representing 77% of the debt relief obtained in 2007.

8) BC-STP monetary policy instruments are ineffective: This factor is driven by the very low level of potential output, high level of non-performing loans in the banking sector, slowness of the courts in decisions aimed at executing real guarantees and excessive bank concentration in one bank.

4. São Tomé and Príncipe as Service Platform

a) STP as service platform for the Gulf of Guinea

GOV-STP is pointed to in many analyses as a possible platform of services of regional Africa due to its location in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, Sousa (2017) refers to the geostrategic and geo-economics position as a fundamental factor to promote socio-economic development. In this analysis, a set of strategic vectors for the socioeconomic development of STP was listed, namely: (1) tourism conceived from a perspective of quality; (2) deep-water port (transshipment); (3) the institutionalization of financial market - offshore banks, insurance companies and tour operators; (4) STP as a center of education and training oriented to regional; (5) STP as the headquarters of African and/or international regional organizations. Mackenzie Consultant (2014, pp. 4–5) also developed a strategy oriented to provide services for regional Africa for the acceleration of STP economic development (aceleração do desenvolvimento económico de STP). In this study, these axes for sustainable development were proposed: (1) Promotion of a tourism niche with high added value, enhancing sustainability and traditional heritage; (2) Agriculture for the export of premium crops (high value finished products); (3) Financial hub; (4) Oil exploration; (4) Port transshipment hub. In fact, recent studies have pointed to STP as a service delivery platform to serve West Africa due to geographic proximity. The identified strategic sectors for investment are as follows: (1) Eco or quality Tourism; (2) International port and airport services; (3) Support services to the oil industry; (4) Energy, sanitation and water; (5) Telecommunications; and (6) Health and Education.

b) São Tomé and Príncipe as a Free Trade Zone

Legal framework

Since 1989, GOV-STP has identified that FTZ can be an instrument capable of attracting investments to the private sector. As mentioned previously, a legal framework has been created to govern the existence of FTZ. Decree-Law 11/1989 was the first law created by the authorities to support the FTZ, followed by Decree-Law 61/1995, which defines FTZ as a part of the customs territory of STP. Furthermore, this legal instrument materially delimited the existence of FTZ and declared that it intended to attract private corporations. In this context, any corporation that intends to fit into a free regime must be approved. As also been mentioned before, Decree-Law 62/1995 is the instrument that regulates offshore banking activities. Pursuant to this law, companies authorized to engage in offshore banking activities may not pursue other activities. The law requires that these companies have a capital equivalent of USD 1,000,000. The exercise of offshore banking activity is authorized by licence from STP-BC, upon proposal by the Approvals Office. Licences cannot be transferred to third parties. According to this Decree-Law, bank accounts opened in the name of customers must always identify their holder, but this information must be kept in bank secrecy (secrecy can only be lifted through criminal procedures). It is also important to note that offshore banks cannot have more than 10% of their shares as well as opening branches without prior authorization from BC-STP. Offshore companies are also designed like extraterritorial companies or extraterritorial companies. Decree-Law 62/1995 defines offshore banking activities as the set of banking operations and transactions carried out with non-residents (the entire entity registered under the free and offshore regimes and physically operating outside the territory of STP) in the national customs territory, in convertible currencies other than the national currency. In this context, offshore banks are offshore companies licensed by the BC-STP for the purpose of exercising offshore banking activities, exclusively serving people residing outside the STP fiscal territory, and not using the STP national currency in its transactions. Regarding Decree-Law 70/1995 (Sociedades Anónimas Offshore) (Offshores Limited Companies (Free translation)), it states that an offshore company must effectively and exclusively exercise the activities governed by the free regime or extraterritorial activities. This legal instrument requires a number of two partners and their responsibility will depend on their participation in the share capital (minimum required is USD 5,000,000 any convertible currency). Offshore companies are constituted by public deed and are registered at the Offshore Business Center.

Decree-Law 33/1998 (Código das Zonas Francas) (Code of FTZ and Offshore Activities (Free translation)) established the FTZ authority, as an autonomous administrative entity, with executive competencies delegated to it by the GOV-STP. The competencies are associated with the management and supervision of all aspects related to free and offshore activities, including the records of offshore companies, the instruction of the licence granting process for the exercise of offshore banking activities and other investment incentive schemes, but the FTZ authority cannot regulate banking activities under the free regime, only because they are supervised by the BC-STP. However, it is also important to

note that STP has created laws and regulations relative to crimes of money laundering and terrorism financing, namely, Law 08/2013 (Lei de Prevenção e Combate ao Branqueamento de Capitais e Financiamento do Terrorismo) (Law to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorism financing (Free translation)). In light of this law, the BC-STP created a specific internal regulation — BC-STP SOP (NEP) 07/2018 (Avaliação e Gestão de Risco de Branqueamento de Capital e Financiamento de Terrorismo) (Risk assessment and management of money laundering and terrorism financing (Free translation)).

c) The Six FTZ Projects in São Tomé and Príncipe

1. Baía das Agulhas FTZ

The Baía das Agulhas FTZ is located on Príncipe island. Two investors agreed with the GOV-STP to explore this project. A first agreement was signed in 1997 between GOV-STP and the South African company Western African Development Corporation (WADCO), which was created in 1997. Another agreement was signed in 2006 with the Logistics Operations Management Company of STP (Geolog S.A.) — this company was incorporated in STP legal order by Decree-Law 70/1995 of 31 December. The GOV-STP made the concession of land, with a dimension of 500 hectares, for a period of 50 years, and would be automatically renewed for an equal period if it is not denounced by either party at least six months in advance. Furthermore, this Geolog S.A. was constituted as a Portuguese-Spanish private investor and enjoyed tax exemption in commercial acts developed in the physical space of the FTZ, as long as they are carried out with entities that do not belong to the legal order of São Tomé and Príncipe , as envisaged by the Decree-law 61/1995 and the Decree-law 33/1998. As the Group's responsibility, the company should prioritize local labour, deliver to GOV-STP 10% of the annual gross revenue, and make the contribution to the Fund for Training and Promotion.

In January 2000, the company WADCO abandoned the project due to a lack of interested investors. However, the failure of the project seems to be equally related to the failure of the agreement between the GOV-STP and the ERHC Energy, Inc. Regarding the waiver of the contract between the GOV-STP and Geolog S.A., the main reason resulted from the slowness in the implementation of oil industry projects in the joint exclusive economic zone between STP and Nigeria. The FTZ project in Baía da Agulhas was publicly presented in 2004, with the aim of creating a logistical support center for oil platforms in the Gulf of Guinea. To this end, the GOV-STP made the first concession of land, with a dimension of 500 hectares, to a Portuguese-Spanish private investor, designated "Logistics Operations Management Company of STP — Geolog S.A." Therefore, business activities planned for this region of Príncipe were as follows: (1) industrial transformation; (2) support for oil exploration; (3) offering of products and services; (4) offering of accommodation activities; (5) offering of real estate assets; (6) storage; (7) tourism and leisure; (8) shipyard. The project envisaged the construction of four hotels, helicopter landing platforms, and a pier for the transfer of products and services to oil platforms. The hotels were designed to have in mind the client and staff working on the oil platforms in the Gulf of Guinea. One of the reasons

for choosing this location was due to its proximity to the large oil markets in the Gulf of Guinea, being just 20 minutes away by airplane. In this region, there are approximately 470 oil platforms of oil companies, many of them receiving logistical support from other logistics centres, namely, ONNE Free Zone in Nigeria or SONIL in Luanda and Soyo. According to the concession agreement, Geolog S.A. could assign, in whole or in part, its rights to another company, provided that it has a participation of at least 30% of the respective share capital, but, after prior consent of the FTZ-STP-Authority. However, notwithstanding the partial leasing right to another company, a clause that would even allow the investor to add other partners to the project, there was no material realization of the business plan of the "Logistic Center." Among other reasons, the failure of this project would be associated with the sluggish evolution of the oil industry project in the Joint Petroleum Exploration Zone between STP and Nigeria, a situation that led investors to remain in "standby." Thus, the GOV-STP unilaterally terminated the agreement with investors due to non-compliance with the conditions and deadlines established. This fact did not result in the payment of an indemnity to the company Geolog S.A. because this investor did not make any investment (if there were any investments made, the termination of the agreement unilaterally would imply compensation equal to the value of the investments made to Geolog S.A. or to its subsidiary companies).

2. The FTZ Airport Project

In 2006, the GOV-STP publicly presented the project for the construction of an FTZ in the vicinity of the STP international airport. This FTZ would function as a service provision plaque for the Gulf of Guinea region, re-exporting finished and semi-finished products from Asia to regional Africa. Thus, the GOV-STP assigned 20 hectares of land to a Portuguese business group called the "Sociedade de Desenvolvimento de São Tomé, S.A." (São Tomé Development Society S.A.), with essentially Portuguese share capital. The São Tomé Development Society S.A. was financially supported by the Portuguese Bank (BPN, Banco Português de Negócios). According to the FTZ-STP-Authority, the processing of these products in the country would guarantee the national economy 35% of added value, because they would be transformed locally, and would have the label of having São Tomé origin and would then be exported to markets with which the state has trade agreements, such as those of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). However, the project ended up not being executed, because the bank that supported the project went bankrupt in 2008 and the entire structure of investors also collapsed.

3. Fernão Dias Deep Seaport and FTZ Project

According to the limited information available, the Fernão Dias FTZ project had the purpose of taking advantage of the construction of the deep waters seaport in the same location, publicly presented by the GOV-STP in 2008 and valued USD 580 million, which constituted the largest investment projected in São Tomé and Príncipe . The GOV-STP agreed with the Terminal Link Society — STP (this company was a subsidiary of the French shipping company CMA CGM Group), created after the signing of the concession agreement

in 2008. This project had been designed to be the largest and most modern deepwater port in western Africa. It was in this context that a group of national companies decided to create the FTZ company to exploit the Fernão Dias FTZ, whose purpose was to create a support structure to all flows of people, goods, and services. The construction of the deepwater seaport would be done by the Sociedade Terminal Link — STP. The project would be the largest and most modern deepwater seaport in western Africa. Thus, it was in this context that a group of national companies decided to create a company to exploit the Fernão Dias FTZ and for the purpose of creating a support structure for the deepwater seaport. The deepwater seaport was scheduled to be built in 2010; it was estimated that the first ships to dock at the Fernão Dias container terminal would take place in the final months of 2012 or early 2013. It was also expected that the infrastructure would directly employ 1,300 people. However, as of 2021, the seaport's construction project had not commenced, nor had the FTZ project been implemented. After the withdrawal of Terminal Link, in October 2015, GOV-STP signed a memorandum of understanding with China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd. (CHEC) for the deepwater seaport container terminal in Fernão Dias. The CHEC promised to participate with USD120 million in total investment estimated at USD 800 million. In 2019, GOV-STP and the Minister Ovaldo Abreu launched a public tender for a construction of a significantly smaller seaport in Fernão Dias.

4. The FTZ of Oil Plant Project

In 2009, the GOV-STP and the Sociedade Sonangol STP Offshore, S.A. signed a concession agreement for the realisation of the project "Ponto Franco Oil Plant da Sonangol." The Sociedade Sonangol STP Offshore, S.A. was established by Decree-Law 70/1995. With this agreement, Sociedade Sonangol STP Offshore, S.A. had the purpose of supplying fishing and cargo vessels circulating in the Gulf of Guinea, and the activities were as follows: the commercialisation of fuels and their derivatives; the commercialisation of drinking water; marketing of other similar or similar products. The oil plant would be located in Ponta Figo in the city of Neves in São Tomé, and was valued at about USD 23 million. The concession was for a period of 20 years, with complete tax exemption. It should be noted that, according to the business plan made by the Angolan company, the business would be able to attract hundreds of vessels that circulate in the Gulf of Guinea area daily. With this deal, the GOV-STP would receive, annually, 5% of the gross revenue of Porto Franco and would employ 50 STP workers. Like the other projects, this one was not completed; the investor did not comply with the clauses, and so the GOV-STP terminated the agreement. The cause was possibly related to expectations regarding the GOV-STP project regarding oil exploration.

5. The FTZ Tourist Project in Porto Alegre

The Porto Alegre Tourist FTZ project was conceived by the FTZ-STP Authority, but was never formalized by the GOV-STP. The project was focused on transforming the region of Porto Alegre into a Tourist FTZ. With the study developed by the FTZ-STP-Authority, it was concluded that the characteristics of the city of Porto Alegre presented very good tourist potential, especially because of its location and agrarian structure. However, as a

result of successive crises in agricultural holdings and the consequent low productivity, the population was reduced to around 2000 people, located essentially in Vila Malanza at the company's headquarters. Most people are engaged in fishing activities. Infrastructures, buildings, and access roads within Porto Alegre have been degraded and are in a state of neglect. The traffic by sea is scarce due to the lack of large vessels and adequate ports in this region. The old aerodrome has become a planting area. The Porto Alegre region has an enormous potential for tourist activity due to the beaches, tides and underwater wealth, and a wealth of natural resources conducive to the establishment of an integrated tourist activity, including water sports, spearfishing, and sunbathing activities. Based on these characteristics of Porto Alegre, the Porto Alegre Tourist FTZ project was conceived by FTZ-STP-Authority, a tourist activity that was expected to cover a space with 200 hectares of land, including the following points: (1) From Pesqueiro de Deus Beach (with 60 m of coastline), passing through Praia Inhame (with 40 m, including Ponta Lama Porco and Ponta do Homem da Capa), passing through Piscina Beach (with 80 m) and ending at Faleiros Beach (with 40 m of coastline); (2) From Faleiros Beach (with 40 m of coastline), including Jalé Beach (with 140 m) and the islet bearing the same name.

6. Malanza's FTZ Project

The recent Malanza FTZ was formalized by Decree-law 23/2019 and will be located in the District of Caué. With funding from a Canadian investor in a public-private project valued at USD 1.3 billion. The GOV-STP plans to provide 263.8 hectares of land to potential investors. With the dissolution of the FTZ-STP-Authority in 2011, the responsibility for coordination this project will be the National Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APCI). This project aims to transform STP into a service platform for the African sub-region of the Gulf of Guinea and the world. The services to be provided will be the following: industrial transformation activities, assemblage and storage of goods for export, and educational and tourist complexes. The project is in its initial stage of formalization and administrative bureaucracy.

d) Factors that may have explained the failure of the FTZ projects

Throughout this study, reference was made to studies and opinions favourable to the coastal regional market as a region of particular strategic importance for STP. The growing favourable opinion around the region market explains the strategies of the different FTZ projects focused on the mecca of that region. According to Macedo and Kabbaj (2002, p. 4) there is growing perception on the part of public policymakers that the experience of economic integration in other regions of the world could potentially be transferred to regions in Africa. In the same document it is also mentioned that in other regions, as in the case of the European model of integration, the initial conditions were quite different; the institutions were built from the top down and that clarity of the objectives assigned to regional integration is needed. Regarding integration in the African continent, one of the reasons that it contrasts with other examples in the world is the definition of unrealistic objectives combined with an outdated structure of official agencies, absence of an effective

political will and inability to follow through on long-term projects, as well as lack of economic and infrastructure reforms.

With regard to the STP FTZ projects, it is important to highlight that after signing of the first oil agreement with ERHC in 1997, the formalization of the 45-year Joint Development Zone (JDZ) Treaty between STP and Nigeria in February 2001, and the first oil auction in the Joint Zone in October 2003, STP started to attract investors to the materialization of FTZ projects. However, the oil industry project in the Joint Zone with Nigeria did not materialize; some companies even transferred exploration rights to other investors and abandoned the JDZ completely between 2007 and 2013. Another reason for the failure to fulfill responsibilities is related to the financial limitations of investors. In the models of contracts initiated between the GOV-STP and investors, it is stated in its pledges that an investor could assign, in whole or in part, his rights to another company, provided that the latter is held by him in at least 30% of the respective share capital, after obtaining prior consent from the Free Zones Authority. It can be felt that this benefit has risks for the state, because investors could assign/sell land to potential investors without first making any investment. It is suggested that this version of contract may have contributed to attracting investors with weak financial capacity. Frequent changes of the political guidelines of the GOV-STP always represent problems for long-term projects. Throughout the FTZ projects, there were at least seven different prime ministers who dealt directly with the FTZ dossier, namely, Raul Bragança Neto (1996–1999), Guilherme Pósser da Costa (1999–2001), Maria das Neves (2002–2004) Tomé Vera Cruz (2006–2008), Rafael Branco (2008–2010), Patrice Emery Trovoada (2010–2012; 2014–2018) and Jorge Bom Jesus (since 2018). Thus, based on a cross analysis of information, we conclude that the obstacles to carrying out the projects are related to the following: (1) the strategy for implementing those FTZ activities associated with the development of the country's oil exploration projects; (2) investor identification; (3) GOV-STP instability and institutional articulation; (4) absence of greater openness or inclusion of the country's different competences in discussions about critical projects that struggle with important resources, such as land and sea; (5) pending land assignment to other investors without any investment requirements.

5. Conclusion

After analyzing a set of aspects inherent to the FTZ projects, we need to acknowledge that they did not translate into an instrument that facilitates investments to boost the private sector in São Tomé and Príncipe. The dissolution of the FTZ-STP Authority in 2011 explains only partially the failure of these projects. The extreme correlation of the FTZ projects with the evolution of the projects inherent to the exploration of oil in the Joint Zone of STP and Nigeria and the São Tomé and Príncipe Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) seems to have carried risks to the projects. So far, despite the fact that many oil companies have agreed to explore different blocks in the Joint Development Zone (JDZ) and the EEZ-STP, the fact is that there is still no commercial exploitation of oil in STP. The selection of investors also seems to have been a problem for the development of the FTZ projects, as some of them were anchored to third-party structures that guaranteed

the financing of the projects. Thus, with the bankruptcy of one of the banks indirectly inherent to the FTZ projects in São Tomé and Príncipe, investors failed to comply with the clauses established in the agreements. We also must conclude that defining projects aimed at the regional market in the Gulf of Guinea is something that necessitates some preceding conditions for this purpose. According to Macedo and Kabbaj (2002, p. 4) it is necessary to define realistic goals and an effective political will. Thus, it appears that there are still no effective conditions in STP to facilitate private investments towards regional economic integration. Furthermore, the GOV-STP's instability and lack of institutional articulation have been a real inconvenience for the attraction and dynamization of private investments for São Tomé and Príncipe. The political instability that has arisen since the opening of the state to the democratic regime in 1990 — since then, governance has not exceeded, on average, two years. Therefore, the political instability coupled with lack of knowledge about the projects has greatly affected the smooth running of the projects. Finally, regarding the FTZ Malanza project, it remains a hopeful political wish, but is difficult to push forward without political stability and successful oil exploration.

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The Media in São Tomé and Príncipe and Its Contribution to Country Development

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São Tomé and Príncipe; Media Development; Country Development; Important goals; Strengthening Social Cohesion; Internal and External Credibility; Digital Media; Regional and Community Radios; Citizenship; Trustworthiness

Abstract

Anywhere in the world, the media must have a premise to facilitate communication between the multiple and diverse development agents. In São Tomé and Príncipe (STP), such focus also appears to be an essential impetus for democracy. Although digital media can play an important role in propelling country development, there is still a long way to achieve several important goals including strengthening social cohesion, internal and external credibility, to promote sustainable growth and resilience. This chapter will unravel how effective media can propel development in this African country and the reasons behind it. Digital media, particularly regional and community radios, can play a major role. Combining historical research with analysis of contemporary empirical data collected through interviews, the main research question of this article is: Does the STP's media contribute to the country's development? The chapter also explains how media, especially digital media, can contribute a more effective way to increasing the development and trustworthiness of the country.

1. Introduction

Fibre optics revolutionized the world of telecommunications and offered the possibility of worldwide connections and new ways to communicate. Digital media, particularly the regional and community radios, can penetrate the community and encourage citizenship participation. The verbal expression has made enormous progress in human communication, particularly regarding the transmission of knowledge and the development of different cultures. Language, especially the verbal language, whose status is irreplaceable as a means of communication. Those tools of communication in STP are starting a precious asset that favours and reinforces authentic dialogue, citizenship, and development.

Media development involves fostering independence and diversity. Attention should be given to the private, state-owned, and community media. Although private media is the "yellow-press" tabloid newspapers with low proficiency and ethical standards, it can spread messages wildly and quickly in Africa and they are holding the government to account. State-owned media, especially the broadcasting service which has the widest and able to potentially reach the greatest influence. Their principal goal is to serve all sections of the population and to become impartial and free from government interference. For community media, most of them are owned by private enterprises to serve the audiences for free. Most respondents viewed this sector of the African media in particular as advancing development objectives, giving a voice to and empowering communities. However, it is never easy to run a non-profit community media, to main financial sustainability is its main challenge (BBC World Service Trust, 2006).

The exercise in São Tomé and Príncipe remains at a rudimentary level. The entire media industry is mostly dominated by men and not even a single female director can be found. Also, due to insufficient financial support, the media companies are not able to afford expensive equipment and the media players, including journalists, cannot enjoy a fair compensation package for their position. Dependence on powers, namely economic and political ones, this scenario generates unquantifiable self-censorship on the part of communication agents to avoid publishing politically susceptible posts. Sometimes journalists seem to confuse the political party militancy with the performance of their duties. There are known cases in which journalists are recruited according to their connection to political parties and consequently protected by them. As the University of São Tomé and Príncipe (USTP) professor of International Relations, Esterline Género said, "The professional practice of journalism in São Tomé and Príncipe is in fact in line with the national democratic process, in which advances and setbacks are seen. That is, not always free, not always muzzled by obscure political interests" (interview with Género, February 12, 2021).[1] The vast majority of journalists do not have specific training in areas such as culture, politics, society, economics, or sport, requiring continuous training systematically. Training is scarce but there is one course in the area being taught throughout the territory, offered by the Higher Institute of Education and Communication (ISEC) of the University of São Tomé and Príncipe. The Embassy of the United States of America and the FONG (Federation of NGO's in São Tomé and Príncipe) has created sporadic training courses in investigative journalism. Preparation in Communication and Journalism, Social Communication, or Communication Sciences is, according to Género,

> Essential for the consolidation of democracy. It must be comprehensive training that allows for the combination of different development factors. However, the selection criteria (which are expected to be maintained) focus on students who are committed to journalistic causes, both in terms of media and vocation. Keeping all this as idealized, I believe that good results will be reaped for the strengthening of journalism taught at STP. (interview with Género, February 12, 2021)

[1] Esterline Género received a PhD in Social Sciences with a specialization in Socioeconomic Development at ISCSP – the University of Lisbon, a career diplomat and professor of International Relations at the University of São Tomé and Príncipe.

Moreover, proficiency in other languages such as English, French, and Spanish remains at a primitive level. The management of the media is in most cases in the hands of people who are not well-trained and have little knowledge of the functions to be performed. To improve the effectiveness of the operation, some media companies set up some editorial norms and directives but these guidelines are often ignored. The non-compliance and non-observance of these lines are essentially due to the insufficiency of relevant knowledge. According to an academic work entitled "From the Right to Inform to the Promotion of Citizenship: A diagnostic study on the media landscape in São Tomé and Príncipe," given the situation in the country, many journalists began to avoid expressing themselves freely, fearing possible retaliation by different sectors, particularly public/state ones. One example:

> As a way of obtaining answers closer to the true opinion of the interviewees, we chose not to make identification mandatory in the questionnaires, leaving it up to the respondents. As a result, none of the more than 20 participants put their names on the questionnaire. Most limited themselves to identifying the media organization to which they are linked. This detail, in itself, is quite illuminating that professionals have not yet assumed their role and professional responsibility and, even worse, the courage that their professional brilliance is above all. Many are afraid of their "tomorrow" (Menezes, 2019, p. 28)

Related to the same study, "The majority of respondents believe that the media perform their duties, although there are those who agreed that they should improve because they still do not fully respond to requests" (Menezes, 2019, p. 28). One of the priorities would be to make the media more influential to society, informing, training, approaching citizens, responding to their needs, reflecting society, and giving voice to those who do not have it. On the other hand, society needs to review itself from the media and feel represented by them, as well as becoming more participatory and active in the process of news publication.

2. Discussion-Analysis

2.1 Media, Democracy, Development and Citizenship

The previous rector of the University of São Tomé and Príncipe (USTP) has no doubt:

> In São Tomé and Príncipe, the media, in general, are captured by political power and they weaken the democratic process. The concept of citizenship is completely distorted and the media, in general, generate obstacles to the country's development, to social cohesion and internal and external credibility. (interview with Brazuca, December 29, 2021)[2]

[2] Aires Bruzaca is a Professor and ex-Rector of the University of São Tomé and Príncipe.

The local academic administrator Adelino Vera Cruz believes that the notion of citizenship and its exercise has space to be strengthened in the media. "It can be exercised through participation in programs created in the media for this purpose, taking into account that citizenship is the set of rights and duties exercised by an individual who lives in society" (interview with Vera Cruz, January 8, 2022).[3] The main question is, according to Bruzaca, the fact that "most of society and citizens do not understand and do not even know what this is." João Carlos Nascimento[4] agrees: "Citizenship and its exercise and strengthening in the media is carried out by independent media, with trained human resources and guaranteed basic working conditions, which does not exist in STP" (interview with Nascimento, December 16, 2021).

2.2 Possible Improvements and Directions

Communication and information can contribute to promoting participation and encouraging the practice of citizenship:

> Since the effective participation of society (community) in the development process, through the media, is a form of exercising citizenship. For São Tomé and Príncipe, it is necessary to broaden the notion of citizenship so that citizens understand not only their rights but also their duties and can positively exercise them for the benefit of themselves, the community and society as a whole. (Menezes, 2019, p. 29)

An example of this was the television programme *Tela Non, Omali Non*, which focused on the country's economic, cultural, and social development. Bringing together these different sectors provided a public service and contributed effectively to the country's sustainable development process. "These programs allow the dissemination of information, increase agricultural production, protects the marine species, in extinction, like turtles, creates a citizenship link" (interview with Vera Cruz, January 8, 2022). Despite the good acceptance and prominence that the *Tela Non, Omali Non*-program achieved, the private entity stops funding the program and the show was forced to come to an end. Above all, the point is that it is essential to create good organizations, complemented by economic and financial support to make journalistic or communication companies viable. "Place a capable manager in the direction of television, capable of presenting a management plan, with defined and clear measurable objectives. A good and experienced journalist does not imply being a good media manager" (interview with Nascimento, December 17, 2021). Brazuca agrees that "It needs training, management, monitoring and evaluation based on results" (interview with Brazuca, December 29, 2021).

[3] Adelino Vera Cruz is ex-Administrator of the Institute Superior of Education and Communication of the University of São Tomé and Príncipe.

[4] João Carlos Nascimento is an Assistant Professor at the University of São Tomé and Príncipe, Post-Doctorate in Education, Sciences, Doctor in ICTs in Education.

Those issues are not familiar to the big majority of the local citizens. "São Tomé and Príncipe citizens are more concerned with their survival in a country where the levels of poverty do not stop growing" (interview with Brazuca, December 29, 2021). The future will necessarily have to involve bringing journalists and media players closer to civil society, strengthening the people's identity, stability, social cohesion, and the citizens' self-esteem. "To provide a better public service, the media should create programs with public debates, similar to the RSTP (Rádio Somos Todos Primos)" (interview with Vera Cruz, January 8, 2022). Education is, indeed, an engine of changes in society. "Education helps in spreading knowledge in society. This is perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of Education. There is a quick propagation of knowledge in an educated society. Furthermore, there is a transfer of knowledge from generation to another by Education" (Toppr, n.d.). The rector fears that "If society goes in a completely uncontrolled direction, we have to talk about re-education. This process is even more painful" (A. Brazuca, personal communication, December 29, 2021).

2.3 Short press history in STP

In the 1990s, several newspapers were founded in São Tomé e Príncipe. In 1991, *O Labor, Crónica*, and *Jornal Notícias* were started up but very soon a non-private newspaper Revolution replaced the equally state-owned. During 1994–1999, there were three newspaper start-ups including *O Parvo* (1994), *Tribuna* (1998), and *Vitrina* (1999), respectively. In 2005, the *Correio da Semana, O País*, and *Transparência* appeared. At present, Jornal K is the only private printed newspaper in this country and is free and charged with limited print runs to distribute. The number of readers is short, and the habit of reading is very small.

> In recent years, both the main television channel, TVs, and Rádio Nacional, are on the air 24 hours a day. Several digital newspapers emerged as a result of technological development. It reflects a natural evolution, being a response to the difficulty of guaranteeing the sustainability of printed newspapers that are not distributed in newsstands. (interview with Rodrigues, March 22, 2021)[5]

In this context, STP Digital (stpdigital.net), *Jornal Tropical* (jornaltropical.st), *Transparência* (jornal-transparencia.st) and *Tela Nón* (telanon.info) are considered as national media, and the satirical O *Parvo* (parvodigital.info) which had already existed in paper form and the magazine *Santomensidade*. Also, São Tomé e Príncipe has a national media platform with a presence on the internet and in Portuguese language: *Jornal de São Tomé e Príncipe* (http://www.jornal.st/). In addition, there are community radios (*S. Catarina, Tlacha, and Yogo Yogo*) located in different parts of the country covering areas with a local population, speakers of local languages, the "ngola," in Angolares, and the "forro," in Guadalupe, on *Radio Guadalupe*, respectively. *STP-Press* is a news agency established in the country which centralizes, processes, and disseminates news to all local media and Portuguese-speaking countries. Due to the scarcity of equipment and materials, there is great difficulty in doing justice to the genesis of its creation as a state media body.

[5] Juvenal Rodrigues is a journalist, consultant, and the last director of the private weekly newspaper *Correio da Semana*.

> The media has undergone profound changes due to new technologies and, in particular, the massive use of the Internet. Even in a country like STP, still limited in its connections and the economic possibilities of a large part of it of the population, it is increasingly easier to access new sources of information and communication between different national and international actors. (Sebastião, 2016, p. 323)

New technologies in the area of communication reveal their full potential, but it is also necessary not to ignore their disadvantages, mainly because they are the ones that accelerate the existing society fragilities. The local media has to be at the service of the country's development, supported by the Portuguese language — used by 95% of the population and the only language to be used in education, public administration, and media. "Unfortunately, that is not the reality. They are at the service of powers that have captured the country and the social order" (interview with Brazuca, December 29, 2021).

2.4 Build Connections

In general, neither radio, television nor newspapers make a strong connection with the population, especially with the young people. "Radios and newspapers have almost zero relationships with young people. In the case of television, the relationship is better, but the massive adherence of young people to the 'Internet' through social networks cannot be compared" (interview with Nascimento, December 16, 2021), confirms Professor Nascimento. The gap between the media and population, particularly the youngsters is widening but the media parties seem to have no interest in minimizing the distance. They are more connected to cyber-journalism and news transmitted by social networks that are neither produced nor broadcast by local journalists or professionals. There is a strong need to "improve the quality of education and citizen training. Something transversal to the whole society. That must start at an early age" (interview with Brazuca, December 29, 2021). The common opinion is that "the politic power is not able to take full advantage of these tools" (interview with Brazuca, December 29, 2021). This is the Government's responsibility not to limit the transmission of speeches for the sake of countries' development.

There is an unavoidable need for journalists to receive continuous and systematic training, being taught with technical knowledge, ethical and deontological study. It is also necessary to consider that pluralism, differences of opinion, press freedom and tolerance cannot be synonymous with debauchery and extremism. The media must not use the antennas or even give them to anyone who misuses the power of communication to trample on rights universally recognized by citizens and enshrined in the laws of the Republic. "With the proclamation of independence, the Representative Assembly of the São Toméan People entrusted the MLSTP Political Bureau to assume the direction of society to guarantee autonomy and national unity. Its practical application was a disaster" (interview with Brazuca, December 29, 2021). Fifteen years later, the Central Committee decided to ratify the national aspirations towards the participation of other politically organized forces to develop democracy and modernity in the country. Brazuca says with irony that "doing so, in São Tomé and Príncipe is a crime against the country" (interview with Brazuca,

December 29, 2021). The main question is that the "Judicial system does not work and it is completely politicized" (interview with Nascimento, December 17, 2021). For the journalists, the exercise of the profession in the national territory is linked to a series of requirements were established by the Press Law and the Journalists' Statute. Among other legislation, but which lacks regulation. Within the framework of the implementation and development of the legal regime established in the Journalists' Statute, it is urgent to provide the country and the journalistic community with legal instruments that allow professionals to exercise their activity ethically and honestly. "Investigating signs of mismanagement or corruption, facilitating the exchange of ideas and opinions on issues relevant to the country's development should part of the media's intervention package" (Menezes, 2019, p. 37).

Implementation and development of the legal regime established in the Journalist Statute is another important tool, but "if decision-makers do not reach a consensus on these issues, any other step would only be a theatre and the process would not reach the good port" (interview with Nascimento, December 17, 2021).

Vera Cruz believes that the solution is to create "An external consultancy to propose the real needs" (interview with Vera Cruz, January 8, 2022), and try to get more support from the developed countries.

> I genuinely believe that the world's citizens believe in giving humanitarian support to those gravely in need, wherever they are, whomever they are and however their need has arisen. But, of course, even with the increased generosity of the world in support of humanitarian action, we find that the gap has grown wider because the needs are getting much more exponential. Whilst the world is generous, its generosity is not sufficient to meet the needs, so we need to be very careful to do what we can to close that gap. (Kuwonu, 2016)

2.5 Distrust, Control and Censorship

In his article in *Téla Nón*, Manuel Dende, a senior journalist at *STP-Press*, quotes journalist Juvenal Rodrigues, who stated that:

> There is a perception that the telephones are being tapped. In the logic of divide and rule, there is a generalized climate of distrust because the friend can be an informer. One cannot truly speak of the rule of law in this framework. […] The convinced democrat is not afraid of the contradiction, he is not afraid of criticism and he does not feed the owls. Pluralism is one of the characteristics of democracy. (Menezes, 2019, p. 37)

Such a scenario is indicative of the little solidity of the local democratic system, existing, especially at the time of elections, a climate of suspicion, control, and pressure on journalists. Freedom of speech is not being taken seriously in the realm of São Tomé and Príncipe.

There is freedom of expression, but freedom in journalism is sometimes uncontrolled. On the other hand, if we talk about the absence of rules in the practice of freedom of the press, then we can have the principle of a narrower thesis that needs to be deepened. This must be regarded as an irreversible phenomenon, since, in addition to the opportunism or strength of the actions of governments and other groups, both information and industrial companies must follow economic laws in general. The freedom to inform itself is at issue, insofar as the pursuit of objectivity is further diluted according to the interests of the government or the economic group that owns a particular medium. In São Tomé and Príncipe, the editors, the publishers, and the owners are empowered to control and regulate the practice of journalism. However, some of them abuse their position as interlocutors between society and power. The absence of rules should not encourage the voluntary break of respect for the adversary or the right to the restoration of truth. This scenario reinforces that without a good organization, complemented by economic and financial supports that make journalistic or communication companies viable, it is impossible for the media to effectively contribute to the process of sustainable development.

The São Tomé and Príncipe social communication means are conditioned by several factors and above all, until recently, by political power. In this context, the journalistic community must strive to detach itself from patronage and attempts at interference, analyzing facts and reality in an impartial, objective and rigorous way, promoting its role of giving voice to civil society, contributing to social well-being, promoting consensus, bonds of belonging, values rooted in culture and tradition, sustainable human development, favouring a more holistic view of reality, contributing to inform with love for the truth and to form better citizens, opening paths for dialogue, multiplying social cohesion factors, building more positive journalism based on news from cultural, educational and scientific areas. It is equally important that citizens keep an objective and attentive eye on the news they consume, following the paths of truth and eliminating rumours, untruths, false, or unproven news.

In the editorial statute of any newspapers committed to preventing ethical violations and focusing on the fundamental principles of good information. It is being encouraged that the professionals must report the truth rigorously. The sources of information must be carefully verified, identified, and presented accurately. For some exceptional situations, the confidentiality of the sources may not be needed to be justified. We believe that journalists must decide the off-record and that anonymous sources must, at all costs, be avoided. It is equally relevant that a distinction is made between facts and commentaries, and between news and opinion, separating both from the principle that facts are sacred and commentaries frees. Brazuca believes that "In São Tomé and Príncipe most of these so-called communication professionals should be removed due to poor professional quality and lack of deontology" (interview with Brazuca, December 29, 2021).

3. Conclusion

Does media in São Tomé and Príncipe contribute to the country's development? The media must have a premise to facilitate communication between the multiple and diversified

development agents and the development of the country but there is still a long way to go. Traditional media, with a few exceptions, seems to have had serious difficulties in doing so, but regional, community radios and digital media have a more effective and important role in contributing to the country's development by strengthening social cohesion, internal and external credibility, and promoting inclusive, sustainable growth and resilience. The local media plays an important role in creating synergy, encouraging civic participation and allowing them to have a chance to voice out their thoughts and opinions.

Vera Cruz gives, as an example, the RSTP (*Rádio Somos Todos Primos*), a local communication organ that promotes the connection through the Internet, sharing and entertaining at the local and diaspora levels. The reflex of globalization, this organ does not spread the news and, reflecting globalization and long-distance work, the mentor created this online channel in Portugal and now lives in England. Other radios, like *Rádio da Região Autónoma do Príncipe, Rádio Lobata ou Rádio Caué* are other good examples of community communication. "Media plays an important role in building an informed society. Citizens need credible information from a media that can skillfully moderate the debate and provoke meaningful conversations that can lead to transforming Africa," says Eric Chinje, Chief Executive Officer of the African Media Initiative (AMI), a Nairobi-based pan-African organization that seeks to strengthen the continent's media (Zipporah, 2016). The radios and the digital media can provide STP citizenship. Thanks to the burgeoning of Twitter-ing, blogging, citizen journalism, etc., fibre optics revolutionized the telecommunications industry. The Internet is getting cheaper, faster, and reaching more communities even in remote areas of Africa. More people now use smartphones to receive digital content than ever before. To remain accessible, conventional media practitioners in Africa need to quickly adapt to a new media world that is time-sensitive and more interactive. Advocacy journalism is growing exponentially — bloggers and citizen journalists are mobilizing for various causes, including good governance.

In 15 years, media technology has experienced a vast change but that does not change its traditional role which is to transmit information, educate and entertain the public. In Africa, the media plays an even more critical role, deepening and institutionalizing democracy. Citizens need to be informed as nations take on new responsibilities in a globalized world (Zipporah, 2016). Somehow, citizens to a certain extent notice the crucial role of social media which functions as agents of government action and motivators of the debate on issues of public interest. In the foreseeable future, there will be an opportunity for the further development of tourism as there is still a way to go. The process represents a foundation and development of a factor autonomous and distinctive that is vital to the region and represents a state in the historical development of the local communications and information. In its origin, people defined themselves by connection with the traditional means of expression, creating relations, respect, and proximity. The development of news means of diffusion and its functions and structures are evolved similarly.

Marcuse believes that "it is the word that orders and organizes, which incites people to do, to buy, to accept. The style in which it is conveyed, in which the structure of the

phrase is condensed and summarized, constitutes a true linguistic creation, opposed to the development of meaning" (Mishari, 1975), noting that the idea of reciprocity can be lost and that communication may no longer have its true meaning, becoming a monologue. The verbal expression has made enormous progress in human communication, particularly regarding the transmission of knowledge and the development of different cultures. The power of language can neither be replaced by technology nor other means, not only by the richness of the content of the message that a word may contain, or otherwise by the "quality of speech," but also for social reasons. Much of humanity, particularly the populations of developing countries — which represent 60 to 70% of the global population — transmits, receives, and especially conveys messages through digital media, including regional and community radios. Spoken language as a tool of communication in São Tomé and Príncipe, far from being an obstacle, is a valuable asset that favours and reinforces authentic dialogue, citizenship, and development.

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12 February 2021, with Esterline Género, PhD in Social Sciences in the specialization in Socioeconomic Development at ISCSP — the University of Lisbon, a career diplomat and professor of International Relations at the University of São Tomé and Príncipe

16 December 2021, with João Carlos Nascimento, Assistant Professor at the University of São Tomé and Príncipe, Post-Doctorate in Education, Sciences, Doctor in ICTs in Education

22 March 2021, with Juvenal Rodrigues, journalist and consultant, last director of the private weekly newspaper *Correio da Semana*

Part 5

Outlook for the Portuguese-speaking Countries and their cooperation with China

China and African Portuguese-speaking Countries in the 21st Century- Economic Structures Diversity, Scope and Limits of Functional Cooperation

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Chinese FDI in Africa: How Japan and the U.S.A. Approach Sino-Africa Relations

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Implications of China's Energy Transitions for Oil and Gas Producers: The Case Study of Southern African Portuguese-speaking Countries

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China and Guinea-Bissau: Prospects and Paths for All-round Cooperation

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China and African Portuguese-speaking Countries in the 21st Century — Economic Structure Diversity, Scope, and Limits of Functional Cooperation

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People's Republic of China, African Portuguese-speaking Countires, Power, National Interest, Cooperation.

Abstract

This chapter analyzes relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the African Portuguese-speaking countries (APSCs), with a special focus on Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. These two countries share with China, on the one hand, the experience of anti-colonial struggle and the ideals of independence and development, and, on the other, elements of differentiation in terms of economic structures, technological infrastructure, and financial capacity. Considering that for regimes with asymmetrical capabilities but are engaged in cooperation, the goals and gains that they pursue will also be asymmetrical, this chapter then ponders the question: Can China-APSC linkage restructure the classic core-periphery relational model? Based on the international political economy, it is maintained that cooperations between the PRC and the APSCs are not exempt from the rationality of maximizing gains in light of their capacities and national interests within the framework of the interaction of heterogeneous economic structures. This heterogeneity, together with the need to support the logistics of its emerging global power, explains the functionality, scope, and limits of the cooperation between China and the APSCs.

1. Introduction

Within the framework of the re-structuration of the international system (IS) and race for global influence, the 1989 U.S.–based Washington Consensus appeared to be justified by the "end of history" corollary and the triumph of the economic liberalism doctrine over a disintegrating Soviet bloc. As an expression of *Pax Americana*, the adoption of the Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was vindicated as instruments of foreign policy of the Western states, offering financial credits and aid to subvent the development of weak African countries, by democratic reforms and the adoption of structural readjustment programmes. However, multiple difficulties induced by these structural adjustment programmes in Africa between 1989 and 1999 led the African Union to adopt, in 2000, what was called the New Partnership for Africa's Development

(NEPAD), in a view to diversifying partnerships in lieu of a U.S. - centric unipolarism (Dominguez, 2018). Supported by a 2030 and 2063 agenda, the NEPAD's objective was the "rebirth of Africa, based on the construction of democratic and peaceful societies, strong and competitive economies, supporting infrastructure, technological innovation, economic growth and sustainable development, intra-African trade and integration" (NEPAD, 2001, pp. 11–12).

To present itself as a global player in the post–Cold War period, Japan launched in 1993 the International Conference for the Development of Africa (TICAD) to promote development in Africa via partnerships and multilateral cooperations. Six conferences were held, with the expectation that Africa would experience structural changes on the basis of an agenda towards 2030. TICAD's proposals focus on cooperation for industrialization, infrastructure, and human capital training (UNIDO, 2016). On the other hand, following the 1999 U.S.–Africa Ministerial Conference, in 2000, the U.S. Congress approved, in response to to NEPAD, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a programme of non-reciprocal trade preferences, engaging African states through programmes that aim to expand their market economy and democracy, as well as to offer aid for trade as part of the U.S.' foreign policy and interest. This chapter assesses the relationship between the PRC and APSCs in the context of IS dynamics in the post–Cold War period. The Forum for Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAC) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) from 2000 onwards, and the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Forum Macao) since 2003 have become institutional frameworks for its regulation and bilateral agreements into mechanisms for its operationalization. The relationships between the PRC and the APSCs are cooperations based on asymmetrical capacities and needs, as a result of differences in terms of their configurations of economic structures, technological infrastructure, and financial capacities, guided by their respective contexts of insertion and the national interests. This heterogeneity in structures confers a functional role and limits to cooperation: for the PRC, it serves as a mechanism for creating and reproducing the logistical support for global power and balanced relations in the region of insertion, which is the Asia-Pacific; for the APSCs, as weak states, they are under the interaction of combined domestic factors, such as governance, social conflicts, weak economic productivity and weak formal institutions, and those coming systemic level, e. g., regional insecurity, globalization, and superpowers external policies. As weak states, they are therefore unable to fulfil their basic functions (Hentz, 2004, as cit., Ferreira, 2014, p. 51). Furthermore, as they are pursuing the process of national integration and are under influxes of social and political demands arising from democratization, cooperation on asymmetric bases creates contexts, not of economic restructuring, but of the weak states' capacity to offer basic goods and services to their citizens, and the significance of democratic citizenship and, thus, government legitimacy and governability of the society.

Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, with the support of the PRC and other socialist countries, embarked on an armed struggle against colonialism-Fascist, and became independent in 1974 and 1975, respectively. However, they emerged as states with limited capacities to defend

their national interests and supply to their populations basic goods that are fundamental for constructing their national identity. Mozambique, in particular, under threat from the white minority regimes of Southern Rhodesia (1965–1980) and from apartheid in South Africa (1948–1994), saw in the alignment, with the Eastern Bloc and with the PRC, a possibility of mobilizing resources for self-preservation.

In this race for Africa, the PRC reveals itself to be the holder of a long relationship with African states. An aggregator of newly decolonized states, it played a central role in the Bandung Conference in 1955, from which emerged the Non-Aligned Movement against the hegemony of the superpowers (the U.S. and the USSR); A source of multifaceted support for the Liberation Movements of the African peoples under colonial rule in the 1960s and 1970s, it contributed to the change in the balance of forces, and the rise to independence of many African states, which, together with the interest of the U.S. to elevate the PRC to the status of ally in the conflict with the USSR, they legitimized, in 1972, its status as a member of the United Nations (UN) and of the Security Council (Pires & Mattos, 2014, p. 211).

The re-qualification of China as an emerging and regional power, with aspirations to become a global power, is a phenomenon of contemporary international relations illustrative of power, as a mode of social relationship based on asymmetric capabilities. This inequality of capabilities stems from the differentiated access to resources for action, translated into international relations through the concept of the balance of power as a vital objective of states. Power does not take the form of reality but as a perception of the probability of an actor, within a social relationship, to make their own will effective despite resistance, whatever basis this probability may have (WEBER, 1920, as cit. Perroux, 1973, p. 30.) As a starting point, the asymmetrical capabilities are always exercised in the standpoint of relative gains, the power serves as a tool for states to manage different social contexts of order or disorder, always present in their environment, towards the governance of societies and international subsystems. The set of resources available to a state form the source of its national power.

Knowing that in cooperation regimes based on asymmetric capabilities, the actors have relatively unequal gains, will China be able to restructure the classic relation core-periphery model? In fact, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique are sovereign states, whose rationalities legitimize their participation in the cooperation regime, which, by their macroeconomic indicators, are presented as unequal actors and, therefore, beneficiaries in unequal manner of the cooperation. The exploratory methodology, supported by crossing historical, political, economic, and international cooperation analyses, allows (i) the statement of reasons for the syncretic theoretical-conceptual approach to be the objective of this study; (ii) the explanation of political and economic dynamics, the origin of the repositioning of the RPC in the international system; and (iii) the explanation of the linkage between the PRC and the PSCs cooperation between them and its evaluation in the first quarter of the 21st century.

2. Power and National Interests of the PRC: Relevance of Theoretical Syncretism

The states put in centrality the defence of power, vital and strategic national, interests, circumscribed to the agenda of their foreign policies in the form of principles, values, and programmes that guide their relationship with other states and international organizations. National power and interest, as categories of analysis, necessitate that a state a positioning of centrality of the interaction between the systemic and the domestic environment, for the perception of what represent threats to their vital and strategic interests. This interactive relationship between the systemic and domestic spheres has shown that states, while IR actors can emerge in the contexts of order and disorder, require themselves the mobilization of political resources to build their own capabilities for security. For the correlation between the possibility of success or failure in the defence of national interests, in the environment of anarchic interaction between states, Khan writes:

> National power is always relative to time and resources. The power of a nation has to be analysed both through an analysis of the capabilities and ability of the nation as well as by a comparison of tits national power with other nations. Further, National power is dynamic. It keeps on increasing or decreasing. […] National power has a non-stable, dynamic character and as such it has to be continuously, or at least periodically and regularly evaluated for understanding the role of the nation in the international relations. National power is always dynamic. A powerful nation can become less powerful or more powerful in future. This depends upon the changes in the power potential of the other nations as well as upon the various components of national power.[1] (Khan, 2021)

In the particular context of the PRC, the relationship between the systemic environment and its domestic framework allows the identification of two periods based on the nature of how resources were mobilized to defend national power and interests: First, the "Century of Humiliation," between the First Sino-British Opium War (1839) and the end of the Chinese Civil War (1949) in which political incursion, economic exploitation, and military aggression from the Western powers and Japan are considered the main external factors that destroyed the historical glory of the Chinese civilization and humiliated the nation (Xing & Shaw, 2018, p. 58); the Second World War (1939–1945), which ended with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the signing of the September 2, 1945 treaty which not only marked the surrender of Japan but also heralded the beginning of the Cold War. The U.S., in the interest of reinforcing superiority, established military bases as part of a strategy to contain the expansion of the USSR, through alliances with Japan and multifaceted support for civil wars (Przytup, 1999): the Vietnam War (1955–1975) — a prolonged conflict between North Vietnam and the U.S. as its main ally against the communist guerrillas of the south;

[1] As suggested by Gates, the components of national power are the following: the military, diplomacy, economic leverage, cyber capabilities, development assistance, communications, intelligence, alliances, science and technology, culture, ideology, the private sector, religion, nationalism, wise, and courageous leadership (Gates, 2020).

and the Korean War (1950–1953) — a confrontation between the Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of South Korea. The war reached international proportions in 1950, when North Korea, aided by Soviet supplies, invaded South Korea, and the PRC became involved in providing support to the North. For the PRC in particular, the balance of forces having proved favourable to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the mainland, while Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Kuomintang Party, and its entire leadership fled and took refuge in Taiwan, where, with U.S. support, they founded the Republic of China (Mendes, 2011, pp. 344–345). Under this context, according to a PRC source, national interest represents an inalienable rights of any states, and the national interest of the PRC involve three basic components: (i) the political system, that is, stability of the regime; (ii) peace in the international system, with the objective of developing the economy; and (iii) territorial integrity of the nation (including the prevention of secession of any regions such as Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and others) (Xuetong, 1995, as cit. Malena, 1917, p. 109). Therefore, the balance of power as a resource and dynamic situation will be placed in a central position in the set of options for the promotion of national interests. According to Morgenthau:

> The balance of power can be understood as a situation or as a policy. As a situation, the balance of power can be in equilibrium or disequilibrium. The balance of power in equilibrium refers to conditions whereby the power of one state or set of states is literally balanced by equivalent power of another states. The balance of power in disequilibrium describes a condition in which the distribution of power among the contending states not balance. (Morgenthau, 1946, as cit., Claude, 1962, p. 13)

In order to optimize the systemic environment and the balance of power in favour of its national interests, through a belief in realism as reference for political action, militarization and strategic alliances became part of the PRC's reference for action. The PRC's ability to respond to threats in its region of insertion — Southeast Asia — is marked by the presence of a strategic alliance between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, based on the restructuring of the Chinese armed forces as an instrument of power. Reinforcing its combative readiness, first under the Jiang Zemin administration (1992–2002) and with constitution during the governance of Hu Jintao (2002–2012) and Xi Jinping (2013). Indeed, as Gates points out:

> During their tenures, the Chinese navy greatly expanded its submarine fleet including ballistic missile — launching subs; commissioned its first aircraft carrier and began building the second; initiated a major shipbuilding as well anti-ship missile programs; and began developing stealth fighter aircraft. By 2019, under Xi Jinping's (2012–) administration, China had built the region's largest navy, with over three hundred surface ships and submarines and, according to the Department of Defence, planned to deploy as many as seventy-eight submarines by 2020. (Gates, 2020)

This structural response of the PRC to the regional context of Southeast Asia after the Cold War still presents unresolved problems, resulting in the perception of insecurity on the part of local actors. It is the security pact between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, the latter countries being the territorial platform of 15 military bases for, in case of need, the support

and defence of U.S. interests. The PRC's plan to reunify China through the "one country two systems" platform served as a reference for the integration of Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999). This possibility, however, has no progress in relation to Taiwan. The origin of this blockade is the defence cooperation agreement in 1996 between the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan, and which has also since extended to South Korea. Another problem that remains unresolved is the question of borders for delimiting, according to conventions of Public International Law, the spaces of sovereignty over the seas and islands in the East and South China Sea, in the Pacific Ocean, which results in international disputes. Russia has a dispute with Japan over the Kuril and Kurilla islands, occupied during World War II by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Russia controls these islands; the PRC and Japan's dispute over sovereignty of Diaoyutai/Senkaku and the East China Sea. The PRC, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, and the Philippines' also have sovereignty disputes over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. These are archipelagos with several small islands which are rich in resources such as oil and gas, and are strategic for navigation control and guarantee of regional security (Przytup, 1999, pp. 34–36; Reis et al., 2015, pp. 111–113).

In the second period, in the context of globalization, without underestimating the political centrality of the state and its legitimate capacity of using violence, the regional security complex (RSC) and soft power theory are considered as strategic tools to promote power and national interests. The PRC and its region of insertion, the Southeast Asia region, are moving, in this first quarter of the 21st century, despite the problems inherited from the Second World War, towards a growing complementarity of the region's economies. This phenomenon, based on the restructuring of the IS in the post–Cold War era, creates regional and global markets, which become platforms for the interaction of people, economic, and social organizations, for the flow of goods and capital, and supranational organizations, which articulate states to international decision-making processes, on political, economic, and international cooperation matters. These changes turned the Southeast Asia region into an regional security complex. Due to its genesis to the interactive and conflictual context between states during the Cold War, the Copenhagen School's approach in terms of RSC legitimized the constructivist perspective, which greatly contributes to the treatment of security problems based on the dynamics and correlation between agency and structure. Thus, the approach based on the RSC framework assumes that a set of states, or a set of agencies, with similar or common security problems, have a relatively broad interaction. In addition to this explanation, on the issues of securitization and military concerns, this set of states are interdependent, in the sense of inevitability and occurrence, of reciprocal effects between the states or actors from different states (Keohane & Nye, 1989 Friedman & Starr, 1997; Buzan et al., 2003). In other words, this reality legitimizes the action framework according to which the consequence of insecurity, with perverse effects on stability and international development, is located in this reciprocal relationship between agency and structure, and agency and its surrounding environment, requiring its treatment in collective engagement.

The perception of the relevance of this approach to issues relating to the securitization of national interests explains the genesis of supranational organizations, of which the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) is an example. Formed in 1967, with the

accession of different countries in the region, the member states decided that, from 2003, ASEAN's programmatic action would be guided by three pillars, namely the ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Sociocultural Community. In 2020, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of ASEAN, the vision of the ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, out wars, looking living in peace, stability, and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community carrying societies. The ASEAN region has a population of about 500 million, a total area of 4.5 million km2, a combined gross domestic product of almost USD 700 billion, and total trade about USD 850 billion (European Union, 2020). Assessing gains from its relationship with ASEAN, as a state with aspirations of being a regional and global power, after eight years of negotiations, the PRC played a fundamental role in the legitimization of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which paves the way for the creation of a free-trade area, encompassing 10 Southeast Asian economies, which represent 30% of the world's GDP and where more than 2 billion people live (Lusa, 2020).

The RSC and the intergovernmental organizations that support them are spaces for interaction between the member states and their external environment par excellence, marked, according to the volume of action resources in defense of their national interests, by vertical or horizontal relations. Vertical relations between states within the framework of the regional security complex are nothing more than a geopolitical and geo-strategic phenomenon. As Chautard (2008) points out, the hegemony of a state results only from a process of managing possibilities and limitations identified in its surroundings, through the mobilization of internal and external resources. It does not become a real experience unless it harms other territories and other peoples as subjects of a political order, with institutional mechanisms and systems of social representations mobilized as references for social intermediation.

As Chautard (2008, p. 24) explains, from a classical point of view, geopolitics translates into offensive actions in response to five fundamental assumptions: 1) conflict, which corresponds to the struggle for the ownership of resources, the seas and routes under control, and ideological domination, to assert the supremacy of a community; 2) space, comprising land, sea, and air surfaces that representing not only classical territory but also the special territory as well as the space represented by the commercial exchanges (capital, information, goods) of the transnational actors; 3) borders, representing the territorial, political, legal limit (of the states); 4) imperiality, manifested by the domination of a state over populations of different origins over a continuous or discontinuous territorial set; and 5) global, reflected in the domination of strategic points, of different actors that allow those who control them to act on numerous other states and the power to dominate strategic places. Underlining the consequences of vertical relationships in the framework of geopolitical relationships, Ratzel (cit. Chautard 2008, p. 27) considers the state "as the living organism aggregating a people on a soil, the nature of the state nourishing itself on this people and on this soil." Simultaneously, exploring geopolitics and geo-strategic in the spaces that constitute RSC in favour of the economic interests of the states, as an IS player, the PRC has been making progress in geo-economics. Luttwak (2001, cit. by De Lima, 2018) associates this possibility

with the fact that both military power and classical diplomacy have lost their importance, displaced as they were by economic rivalries, which they began to occupy a central role in the IR agenda and in the balance of relative power among states. Geo-economics is characterized by Luttwak in the following terms:

> This new version of the old rivalry between states I have called geo-economics. In it, invested capital for industry provided or guided by the state is equivalent to firepower; the development of state-subsidized products is the equivalent of weapons innovation; and state-supported market penetration replaces military bases and garrisons abroad, as well as diplomatic influence. The same things — investment, research and development and marketing campaigns — are also done every day by private companies for their own purely commercial reasons. But when States intervene to encourage, support or direct these same activities, it is no longer the "vanilla flavour" economy that is happening, but on the geo-economy basis. (Luttwak, 2001, as cit. De Lima, 2018, p. 12)

Applied to the analysis of the hegemonic posture of China, an international player defending the "harmonious relations and non-interference in domestic affairs of other states," the innovative way through which the PRC legitimizes its hegemony and peaceful influence in the world was soft power — persuasion by non-coercive methods used in the interest of influencing attitudes and perceptions of other societies and governmental decisions in order to obtain support for the state's objectives (Gates, 2020). The promotion of power and national interests of the PRC, which ensures it the power to influence international policies and competitiveness of its economy, is therefore based on a complex system whose functionality requires enormous logistical support. In the PRC's context, the state occupies a central position and deals with the management of military power as a deterrent against others states; non-military resources as an economic-financial, scientific-technological, and diplomatic power, and the Confucius Institute as a complex cultural industry legitimize the PRC's status as both a regional and global power.

3. PRC-APSCs in the 21st Century: Economic Structures and Instrumentality of Cooperation

3.1 PRC's transformation on industrial-financial centre and return to Africa

The transformation of the PRC into an industrial and financial centre with capacity of global influence is due to its restructuration and the post–Cold War IS changes. In this context, regarding the question of how the state and its organizations can safeguard national power and interests, peace, and stability, Deng Xiaoping argued that the PRC should obtain the means to play an important role in international politics and that this possibility would depend on the restructuring and modernization of its economy (Deng, 1984a, as cit., Malena, 2017, p. 110). This utilitarian perspective was the reason why, unlike the USSR which underwent democratization under Gorbachev, the PRC under Deng's leadership experienced no

changes in its political system — political control was retained by the Communist Party (CCP) and economic growth and development were given utmost importance. This strategy, as a result of economic reforms, made it possible to transform the PRC into an industrial and financial centre. From this perspective, the liberalization of trade, the creation of incentives for entrepreneurship in rural areas and villages, and the competition between small, medium, and large companies have given rise to the reorganization of economic activities in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Technological improvements, production surpluses, and the systematization of links between rural and urban China were at the base of small and medium producers' transformation and industrialization, as well as the development of the services sector, due to the need to satisfy internal demands from a labour force of 800 million people (Arrighi, 2007, cit. Jabour & Dantas, 2021, pp. 172–174).

To accelerate these reforms, the internal market was connected externally to the markets of Asia and the Pacific, by creating, since the 1980s, under the principle of one country two systems, Special Economic Zones (SEZs): in Fujian province opposite Taiwan, the Xiamen SEZ; in the provincial border with Hong Kong, the Shantou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai SEZs, the Hainan Island SEZ; the Pudong SEZ in Shanghai. All provincial capitals, autonomous regions, and coastal and border cities now benefit from SEZs. The SEZs, which are located in port and urban areas, are governed by specific legislation and benefit from the opening of the market to foreign capital, have diversified industrial production and oriented towards exports, were equipped with a set of infrastructures to attract foreign financial capital, cheap and plentiful labour, assume the model of a market economy, and are tax-exempt.

The systematic articulation between teaching, science, technological innovation, and the economy as a platform for productivity and competitiveness was also adopted as a complementary strategy to support the economic reforms. Thus, in the PRC, as Gates says, between 2001 and 2014, China built more than 1,800 new universities and produced some five million sciences, technology, engineering, and physician's graduates. Chinese investment in research and development grew by more 20% annually between 2000 and 2010, and by nearly 14% between 2010 and 2015. By 2015, China was spending over USD 400 billion each year for research and development (Gates, 2020). The SEZs enabled the mobilization of foreign capital held by liberal Chinese in neighbouring countries, the U.S., and the European Union; they also provided for the formation of large joint ventures in different business domains. As observed by Jabour and Dantas, (2016, p. 175) between 1990 and 2008, 45% of foreign direct investment (FDI) made in China in the Hong Kong–Macau complex, in second place came from the U.S., tied with Taiwan, with 9 %, followed by Singapore with 6%, Germany and France corresponding to 2% and 1%, respectively. The influx of investments from the U.S., the European Union, and Japan generated economic complementarity and interdependence, witnessed by intense trade exchanges between the PRC and these states. In these terms, since 1992, the PRC has been the largest recipient of FDI, surpassing the U.S., with a total of USD 82 billion in 2007 (Ribao, 1998, as cit., Malena, 2017, p. 95), which explains the growth, as shown in Table 1 below, of the respective GDP:

Table 1 *PRC's GDP between 1980 and 2009*

Year	DGP	Year	DGP	Year	DGP	Year	DGP
1980	7.9	1988	11,3	1996	10,0	2004	10,1
1981	5.3	1989	4,1	1997	9,3	2005	10,4
1982	9,0	1990	3,8	1998	7,8	2006	11,6
1983	10,9	1991	9,2	1999	7,6	2007	13,0
1984	15,2	1992	14,2	2000	8,4	2008	9,0
1985	13,5	1993	14,0	2001	8,3	2009	6,5
1986	8,9	1994	13,1	2002	9,1		
1987	11,6	1995	10,9	2003	10,0		

Source: IMF, China's GDP's, 1980-2009, Malena (2017, p. 95)

As a consequence of its economic growth, the PRC has amassed the second largest reserve in the world after Japan, totalling USD 2.20 billion in 2008 (USD 1.67 billion in 1978). By the late 1990s, China was the second holder of U.S. Treasury bonds (USD 46,000,000,000 in 1990) reaching first place in September 2008. In terms of international trade, China went from being ranked number 27 in world export in 1978 to reaching number one in 2009 (Renmin Ribao, 2009, as cit. Malena, 2017, p. 97). The growth of the PRC national power is the logical consequence of its economic reforms. The adjustment of its foreign policy, translated, into the 21st century, by the political-diplomatic and financial capacity to promote cooperation on a global scale, articulating with countries from different regions of the world.

3.2 Functional and instrumental cooperation: Linkage between PRC and PSCs

Cooperation between states lends itself to a plurality of objectives, but never dissociable from a sacred interest, that of promoting their national powers and interests. The cooperation between the PRC and Africa, and with the PSCs in particular, from the point of view of the guidelines of the State Council of the PRC is explained as based on the principle of non-interference and common development, given the interdependence between them and being guided by the principle of openness and mutual benefits (State Council of the PRC, 2011).

With regard to Africa and the PSCs, there is in particular a direct relationship between the structuring of the PRC into an industrial and financial centre, with the adoption in 1999 of the "Going Global" policy. Faced with competition for the influence and engagement of states in various cooperation regimes, the PRC in 1995 reformulated its economic cooperation policy. In addition to the policy of donations and interest-free loans, emblematic of the Cold War era, it started to make concessional credits available, establish commercial agreements, and export, through its companies, capital for investment in different domains. Following Jiang Zemin's visit to Africa in 1996, the PRC adopted the "Go Out" strategy, which aimed to internationalize Chinese state-owned companies. Approved by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 2000, incorporated into the 10th Five-Year Plan 2001–2005, the internationalization programme became associated with the permanent strategy

of Going Global (Dominguez, 2018; Lopes et al., 20).

Without underestimating FOCAC's role as a governance and political marketing platform, bilateral cooperation is taken as of utmost importance to understand the scope and limits of functional cooperation between the PRC and Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, based on the diversity of economic structures and on asymmetric capacities. The reference to action expressed by the State Council of the PRC seems to underestimate the contextual variables of states and their impact. It does not allow, for example, to understand the functional and instrumental role of cooperation by the PSCs, with a deficit of trade balance, with the status of recipients of development assistance, with the GDP supported by primary sector activities, and by export of commodities, with the PRC, whose situational variable is characterized by a surplus economy as a result of uninterrupted double-digit growth, source of credits for development assistance, enormous GDP based on the industrial and services economy; inserted in the Asia and Pacific region, the world's largest market, with industrial economies whose capacity to compete is based on the use of state-of-the-art technologies and the exploration of production chains that articulate interdependent production units, in the space of the member states of ASEAN and of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. This reality, in addition to re-launching the debate on the scope and limits of core-periphery cooperation, does not nullify the hypothesis that states, in terms of cooperation, are driven by gains, proportional to the investment they make, in favour of power and national interests, which explains the relevance of functional and instrumental cooperation.

3.2.1 PRC–Guinea-Bissau cooperation: Scope and limits of functional cooperation

Relations between the PRC and Guinea-Bissau have had two diachronic periods. The first, in the period 1949–1978, within the framework of the Cold War, in which the PRC supports the Liberation Movements in a multifaceted way, as a defender of the African peoples' cause against colonialism for ideological reasons. The first contacts between the leadership of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Due to the proximity or distance from the Soviet socialist model, the provision of multifaceted support to Movements that were not inspired by Soviet Marxism was a strategy. Wang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, refers to "the disembarkation of a group of guerrillas to receive military training and assimilation of guerrilla tactics" (M'bunde, 2015, p. 73), which highlights two visits by Amílcar Cabral, leader of the PAIGC, the provision of military support to this movement, for the fight against colonialism. With the independence achieved in 1974, in addition to diplomatic relations, cooperation between the PRC and Guinea-Bissau was limited to the strategy of supporting their mutual political, economic, and ideological system, within which Guinea-Bissau benefited from cooperation with PRC in the fields of education and health.

In the period from 1990 to 1998, relations between Bissau and Beijing experienced a setback, due to a change in Guinea-Bissau's foreign policy which originated from President Nino Vieira's recognition of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Rapprochement and diplomatic

relations between Bissau and Taipei ensued, beginning from May 1990, following a break between Beijing and Bissau (M'bunde, 2015). This reorientation of Guinea-Bissau's position regarding the Beijing-Taipei conflict was limited to the struggle between the PRC and Taiwan for legitimacy through international alliances, in which Taipei would have invested, to Guinea-Bissau's benefit, financial resources and various cooperation programmes. The change in this framework of disparate positions between Beijing and Bissau, following dissuasive actions on the Guinean authorities, towards realignment with the PRC, regarding the diplomatic agenda of "One China, two systems," which resulted in the re-establishment, at 23 of April 1998, of diplomatic relations with the government of Guinea-Bissau.

On the other hand, the more intense and multifaceted second phase took place from this rapprochement between Beijing and Bissau and the rapid economic growth of the PRC (a result of its reformist policies), implemented in a systemic way in the fields of agriculture, industry, science and technology, foreign policy, and the armed forces, from the perspective of the socialist market economy. It is this process that has given rise to a new trend in cooperation with Africa, in general, and Guinea-Bissau, in particular. This change in relations between the PRC and Guinea-Bissau coincides with the implementation of Beijing's "Go Out" strategy, of which the commercial and economic dimensions are priorities (M'bunde, 2015, p. 73). The linkage between Beijing and Guinea-Bissau in relation to this strategy results from the correlation, on the one hand, of the requirements of China and, on the other, of the contextual variable marked by the chronic needs of Guinea-Bissau. The expected gains from the Structural Adjustment Program under the funds from the Bretton Woods Institutions from 1986 onwards, for the re-creation of macroeconomic equilibriums, as a prerequisite for economic growth and expansion, did not generate intended results (Cruz, 2007, as cit. M'bunde, 2015, pp. 54–55). The testimony of the ambassador of the PRC is indicative of this reality when he says, "Guinea-Bissau needed a home, buildings, it needed hospitals in that period (2000s) and we cooperated in this sense" (M'bunde, 2015, p. 84). It is this reality of the weak state — with difficulties in fulfilling its mission of providing basic goods and services to its citizens — that the PRC undertook what Kurlantzick (2007, cit. Ramos, 2015, pp. 8–9) describes as a "charm offensive," where the PRC was seen as acting in favour of promoting African countries' national interests, using two instruments of influence, namely, business, through which the Chinese government "encourages firms to invest in strategic industries and select countries." this is economic diplomacy, understood as "a strategic instrument or practice in the implementation processes of foreign policy actions for the inherent fulfilment of economic and political national interests, trough creative innovation promoting both the linkage between the private and public sectors and corporate internationalization developments" and "the tools of culture" showing that "a culture promotion is part of a broader effort at public diplomacy" (Kurlantzick , 2007, cit. Ramos, 2015, p. 9). Through the action of these soft power instruments, the Social Renewal Party (Partido de Renovação Social — PRS) and President Koumba Yalá (2000–2003) guided their foreign policy towards aligning with the PRC, enabling the construction of infrastructure listed in Table 2 below:

Table 2 *Projects and Infrastructures carried out by the Guinea-Bissau government under PRC´s support*

Project	Supporter	Financier	Beneficiary	Construction year	Amount in US$
24 de Setembro National Stadium	China Government	China Government	Guinea-Bissau Government	1987	.....
Canchungo Regional Hospital	China Government	China Government	Guinea-Bissau Government	1980s	.....
National People's Assembly Building	China Government	China Government	Guinea-Bissau Government	2001	.....
11 Buildings for the residences of former combatants	China Government	China Government	Guinea-Bissau Government	2000	.....
Government's palace	China Government	China Government	Guinea-Bissau Government	2010	USD 25 million
Sino-Guinean Friendship School (National Health School)	China Government	China Government	Guinea-Bissau Government	2008	USD 15 million
National Institute of Health	China Government	China Government	Guinea-Bissau Government	2013	USD 10 million
Sino-Guinean Friendship Hospital (Military Hospital)	China Government	China Government	Guinea-Bissau Government	2009	USD 12 million
Armed Forces Officers Residences	China Government	China Government	Guinea-Bissau Government	2000	.....
Republic Palace Rehabilitation	China Government	China Government	Guinea-Bissau Government	2012	USD 7.5 million
24 de Setembro National Stadium Rehabilitation	China Government	China Government	Guinea-Bissau Government	2012	USD 15 million

Source: M'bunde (2015, pp. 85–86)

The Go Out strategy, expression par excellence of the power and national interest of the PRC in conquest of alliances and markets in the 21st century, had as a means of efficiency economic diplomacy, associated with cultural diplomacy, to provide the materialization of the objectives of the foreign policy of the PRC. The assessment by the Guinean leadership on the mechanisms of multilateral cooperation and governance over the process, of which FOCAC is emblematic as a result of the charm offensive, is expressed in the following terms: FOCAC is a "platform full of opportunities and mutual benefits for Guinea-Bissau and China" for Africa, Guinea-Bissau in particular should "strengthen its cooperation with China, which it considers beneficial," and should have "more ambitions and present more projects" (Xinhua, 2020).

Oriented towards access to markets and raw materials, relational frameworks in which the PRC and other countries are engaged bring about changes, but not of a structural essence. The interdependence, which is not presented as the context of the relationship between the PRC and Guinea-Bissau but as a reference for action, would induce, as in the Southeast Asia and the Pacific region, structural changes based on a systematic human capital development policy. For Guinea-Bissau, with an effective population of 1,976,187 people, among which 53.74% are of working age, of which 82% are active in the agriculture sector (est. 2017), and 18% in the industrial and services sector (est. 2000), its external debt is estimated at $1,095 billion (est. December 31, 2010), and $941.5 million on December 31, 2000) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021). Therefore, the challenge of identifying a sustainable development strategy remains.

3.2.2 PRC-Mozambique cooperation: Scope and limits of functional cooperation

Relations between the PRC and Mozambique are based on situational contexts that explain the dynamics of the cooperation policies of each of the states. In the 1960s, when the PRC's priority was the promotion of non-alignment movement against the hegemony of dominant powers, the Mozambican people, still in the phase of armed struggle (1964–1974) led by the Mozambique Liberation Front, benefited from multiform support from China, which allowed the balance of power to defeat a modern Portuguese colonial army supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As a result of the armed struggle, Mozambique gained independence in 1975 and established diplomatic relations with the PRC in the same year.

Mozambique was at the centre of geopolitical conflicts in southern Africa, opposing the emerging, decolonized states and the white minority regimes of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia (1965–1980) and Apartheid in South Africa (1948–1994). Between 1975 and 1998, Mozambique experienced strategies that severely limited its power and capabilities. In this regard, it is pointed out the systematic support by the Apartheid regime to the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) to sustain the war in Mozambique, which, associated with international isolation, resulted in the malfunctioning of its economic system and weakening of the State, in terms of guaranteeing security and access to public goods and services for its population. Peace and the redefinition of Mozambique's international insertion were imposed as options of strategic relevance. In the subscription of the N'Komati peace agreement (1983), the interest of the government of Mozambique was to look for a pact of non-aggression, good neighbourhood, and to cut support for RENAMO and South Africa under the apartheid regime, which required Mozambique to stop logistical support to the African National Congress (ANC) as a prerequisite for peace. In the same context, in an environment of war led by RENAMO, after several rounds of negotiations, Mozambique signed, in 1984, the agreement to join the Bretton Woods Institutions.

A structural adjustment programme was put in place in 1987 to open up a market economy, which, together with the constitutional reform in 1990 that introduced a multi-party system, was decisive in the granting of credits by the Bank of Mozambique (BM) and IMF within the framework of the Official Development Assistance (ODA). Notwithstanding, with the 1992 General Peace Agreement between the government of Mozambique and RENAMO and the consequent multi-party general elections in 1994, the country did not resume, due to the unsustainability of the debt service to the creditor countries. Indeed, as noted by Roque and Alden (2012), ODA by the BM and IMF continued to finance government expenditures by more than 50%. However, though Mozambique's poverty reduced by 22% between 1997 and 2006, the country continued to be one of the poorest in the world, ranking 172nd in the 2005 Human Development Index. More than 70% of the population lived on less than USD 2 per day (Roque & Alden, 2012, p. 13). It is in this context of ODA from Western financial institutions that Claphan (1996, as cit. Roque & Alden, 2012, p. 13) describes the predicament in Mozambique as having "reduced capacity of the government to govern itself," consequently giving Sino-Mozambican relations a new orientation and new dynamics: on the one hand are

the PRC's Going Global strategy and FOCAC as a multilateral political marketing platform projecting its potential as an alternative cooperation partner for the African countries; on the other is the need for Mozambique to experience a cooperation regime with a non-paralyzing impact of the country's relocation efforts on the development tracks, in the belief of sovereignty over its resources, in parallel with cooperation with the Bretton Woods Institutions, with the EU. The rapprochement of the PRC and Mozambique is demonstrated by the following high-level visits: Joaquim Chissano, President of Mozambique (1986–2004) visited the PRC in 1998 and 2004; his successor Armando Guebuza (2005–2014) visited Beijing in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2011; and Hu Jintao, during his term as President of the PRC, visited Mozambique in 2007 in return. Sino-Mozambican relations have grown progressively, as illustrated in the Table 3 below on provisions from the PRC to Mozambique, ranging from solidarity relations to commercial and technical-financial cooperations.

Table 3 *Sino-Mozambican Relations Between 1998–2011*

Year	Chinese credits and investments	Purpose
1998	USD 20 million credit agreement by Exim Bank	Incentive to PRC companies to do business in Mozambique; building of PRC embassy
	USD 7 million credit	Construction of houses for officers of the Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique (FADM)
		Training of FADM officers
	USD 150,000 credit	Recruitment of Chinese physicians; Purchase of antimalarial
	Agreement to award 40 scholarships	Higher education in different areas
	Boane Centre for demonstration and transfer of agricultural techniques.	Introduce new agricultural techniques
2001	Creation of the Joint Economic and Commercial Commission	
2004	Agreement on concessional credit of USD 15.6 million for public constructions	Joaquim Chissano Internacional Conference Centre; The Mozambican Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, New Building; Construction by China Henan of 154 Km of Roads between Muxungue and Inchope
	USD 30 million concessional credit	Rehabilitation of the water system in Maputo
	USD 25 million credit	Rehabilitation of the Beira and Quelimane water supply systems
2006	Debt forgiven agreement relating to credits dating back to the 1980s, in the amount of USD 20 million.	
2007	USD 1.5 million credit	Modernizing the FADM
	USD 115 million credit	Rehabilitation of Maputo airport
2007	Agricultural company Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique Co. Lda invests USD 1.2 million in the Ponela irrigation system (Xai-Xai); Wambau Africa Agricultural Development Lda. in 2011 invested USD 289 million in the Lower Limpopo.	For rice production to supply the internal and external market (PRC).
2010	Concession agreement, within the visit of the Mozambique PM to the PRC to Beijing, of US$100 million by the China Development Bank (CDB)	Construction of a cement factory in Sofala Province; Construction of a cotton factory in Maputo province
2010	Partial financing in the amount of USD 400 million	Construction of the Maputo Circular Road, with 74 km
	USD 11 billion financing	Maputo-Katembe bridge

Source: Author's compilation, based on Roque & Alden (2012), pp. 13–16, and Jafar (2017), p. 307

This increase in Sino-Mozambican relations is in line with the rise of the PRC, in 2008, into the position of second largest investor after South Africa. Bidirectional trade grew from USD 284.1 million in 2007 to USD 950 million in 2011 (Roque & Alden, 2012, p. 16). The PRC supplies the Mozambican market with household goods and utensils, electronics, and various machinery, while Mozambique exports wood, minerals, unprocessed wood, and seafood and fish (Jafar, 2017, p. 307). Regarding fishing exploration in Mozambique, the PRC has recently become very active. Mozambique's maritime coast stretches over 2,7000 km from north to south, its territorial waters extends 12 miles from the coast to the sea, and its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends a further 12 miles beyond the imaginary 12-mile boundary. The involvement of Chinese capital in the fisheries sector has gained significant expression from 1917 onwards, following the issuance of licences by the Administração Nacional de Pescas, Ministério do Mar, Águas Interiores e Pescas (ADNAP-MMAIP, National Fisheries Administration, from the Ministry of the Sea, Inland Waters and Fisheries), in favour of PRC ship owners.

The Bank of Sofala, with the Save River as a departure point in the north of Inhambane Province, to Angoche in Nampula Province, where there is much sought-after seafood, is the area of choice for its intervention. By donating to ADNAP-MMAIP, Zheijank Beimli Agriculture Development (ZBAD) obtained the licence to "carry out a fishing project in Mozambique using 20 industrial vessels, 8 trawlers, 3 shrimp, and 3 tuna vessels, with a quota of 767,800 tonnes" (Contract between ADNAP-MMAIP & ZBAD according to Mosse, 2021). In June 2017, the Nanjug Runyang Fishing Corporation was legitimized to hold the right of presence and the respective fishing allowances, namely: gamba (120 tons), crayfish (30 tons), crab (30 tons), fish (30 Tons), cephalopods (24 Tons), and lobsters (30 tons) (Mosse, 2021). Following the granting of licences for this purpose, the year 2021 marked a large increase in fishing exploration by PRC ships in Mozambique. The cooperation between the PRC and Mozambique, in addition to allowing the reconstruction of infrastructures destroyed by the 1976–1994 war and the construction of others, enables the state to respond to public demands in terms of goods and services. Managed by the parties in a functional and instrumental manner in light of their respective national interests, it does not manifest itself as a factor in changing the economic structure of Mozambique. Of the economically active workforce of 12.9 million people, 74.4% are engaged in agriculture, 3.9% in agriculture, and 21.7% in services. The composition of GDP by sector of activity, according to 2017 data, is 23.9% for agriculture, 19.3% for industry, and 56.8% for services (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021). The articulation between markets and within the framework of functional and instrumental cooperation, more oriented towards the extraction of commodities, suggests the relevance of reversing this reality, in the sense of creating assumptions for the productivity of the economy, based on the re-qualification of the human capital, greater articulation of science, technology, and innovation, for participation in the global market as a source of incentives for development.

4. Conclusion

In this quarter of the 21st century, the intensification of relations between the PRC and Africa, especially with the Portuguese-speaking countries, results, on the one hand, from the dynamics

towards the formation of the PRC as a new industrial and financial centre in the Asia-Pacific region. The linkage because the PRC and the PSCs, as evidenced by their adhesions to Forum Macao and FOCAC, is inseparable from constraints perceived as threats to the national capacities and interests of each one of the actors, in an individual or collective form. On the part of the PRC, the need to consolidate its competitive capacity vis-à-vis emerging economies and the great powers in the Asia-Pacific presupposes the construction of alliances with states from different regions of the world; on the part of the Portuguese-speaking countries, the insignificant room for manoeuvre, due to the weakness of their economies, in relation to the conditionality policies of access to development assistance by the EU countries and the Bretton Woods Institutions, equally justifies their search for new alliances for cooperation.

Cooperation between the PRC and the PSCs are placed on platforms of economic interaction with asymmetric capabilities and action references associated with the national powers and interests of the respective states. The PSCs are presented under the variable in which the activities of the primary sector are dominant, and the trade balance is in deficit and have the status of ODA recipients. The PRC, on the other hand, is characterized by a surplus economy as a result of double-digit growth, a source of concessional credits, and an enormous GDP based on an industrial and services economy in the Asia-Pacific region — the world's largest market — with industrial economies whose competitive capacity is based on the formation and articulation of the internal market with the international market, and intensive productivity based on the use of science, cutting-edge technologies, and the exploitation of production chains that articulate interdependent production units, in the space of the member states of ASEAN and RCEP.

Under this context, the gains from cooperation based on asymmetric capabilities are necessarily asymmetric. Functional and instrumental cooperation make cooperative articulation possible, in which, on the one hand, the rationality of African states, the PSCs, in particular under FOCAC, is the export of commodities and, on the other, that of the PRC, access to resources that make it the most competitive economy in the Asia-Pacific and in the world. The cooperation between the PRC and the PSCs, of which the cases of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique illustrate how the framework of action changes in international cooperation, to the detriment of the reproduction of dependency, promoting relational frameworks based on interdependence to correct the classic model of core-periphery cooperation in the 21st century.

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Chinese FDI in Africa: How Japan and the U.S. Approach Sino-African Relations

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Investment, Development, Economic growth, Infrastructure, Africa, raw materials, cooperation, strategy.

Abstract

This chapter analyzes Chinese FDI in Africa and how Japan and the U.S. respond to China-African relations. The findings of this chapter are made possible through consulting various documents, most of which published on the government websites of the three countries in question, conferences, reports, books, magazine articles, and agreements. Organizations and human integration for the analysis are selected under the belief that China's presence in Africa intends to create value on human career development (job creation) and facilitate organizational communication. Guided by a research question, this study is based on available data, as well as crossing theory with evidence of the emergence of Sino-African relations over years of Africa's struggle for independence. The study particularly analyzes the beginning of the period during which China, Japan, and the U.S. engaged in investments and other forms of cooperation in Africa. Considering Africa's long history with outside players, the research focuses its analysis on the relations between select African countries and China, Japan, and the U.S. in an attempt to offer more details to enrich the level of knowledge and understanding on Africa.

1. Introduction

In recent years, the African continent has witnessed a huge presence of strategic world players with investments in its natural resources, trade, and even financial debt relief. The United States, Japan, and China have been endeavouring to strengthen ties with Africa. In turn, traditional African determinants to investments have contributed significantly to developing the three countries' economic interests. For China, it enters Africa with a strategy aiming to achieve positive results in terms of capital formation by designing policies that include financial packages and other operations in Africa. Part of these packages include tax exemption from a list of selected products entering Asia and the Western market in exchange for international currency. However, the chapter does not focus on the whole continent as wished, although doing so brings insight into the figures from Africa. It broadly analyzes

the cooperation between China and Africa, the U.S. and Africa, and Japan and Africa, and takes some African countries as examples. This analysis makes comparisons in financial packages, designed programmes for Africa, types and scopes of cooperation, including the tendency of these three countries' investments in Africa. Yet, attempting to explore the relationship among these three countries with some African countries may not bring transparent results due to discrepancy and lack of available domestic and external data. Research on this specific topic is relatively recent; however, interest in understanding the tendency of investments in Africa has strongly influenced the focus of the current chapter.

The overall analysis of this chapter is conducted in support of the dependency theory, to better understand the type of cooperation that has been established or intended to be developed by one of these three international players in Africa. The analyzed period starts from the '90s to 2018 in regard to investments, agreements, trade, and loans made by the U.S., Japan, and China in Africa, with a special focus on Portuguese-speaking countries, which include Mozambique.

2. The Theoretical Debate

Theories contribute strongly to explaining issues discussed in a study, due to their conceptual background over a problem, studied subject, and help better understand knowledge philosophy. This study is therefore based on the cooperation theory: dependency theory. There are many ways to understand what a theory is. Some scholars consider a theory as a paradigm. For Riche (2010), a theory in some cases provides conceptual systematization, which allows the analyst to access detailed information of the studied object, allowing an argument to be built.

3. Trends of Chinese versus U.S. and Japanese ODI in Africa

The rivalry between China and Japan has long been a global phenomenon. In the African context, the rivalry is very evident and is mostly asymmetrical in terms of quantity — China's contribution to Africa far surpasses Japan's except in foreign direct investment (FDI) (Hirono, 2019). This Sino-Japanese rivalry in Africa is, presumably, an extension of tensions between the two in Northeast Asia (Adem, 2015, p. 90). Their rivalry in Africa intensified when former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe went on a three-nation Africa tour in January 2014 that took him to Ivory Coast, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. In Maputo, his declaration that "Japan will not just extract resources from Africa but create jobs" suggested Japan's view regarding China in Africa, not only making clear Japan's intention to gain top influence on the continent, but also serving as an alert for Africa.

The strategy crafted by Japan aiming at gaining a top position in Africa was supported by another declaration: "Our assistance is aimed at securing access to the vast mineral resources of Mozambique" (Kantei, 2014). The rivalry between Japan and China over the African continent in fact began when Japan launched the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993 and China took up the gauntlet when it launched

the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) seven years later in 2000 (Elochukwu, 2020, p. 71). As shown in Figure 1 below, China's demand and consumption of oil and coal remain high compared to other commodities. For instance, in 2021, China is still the world's number two oil consumer. Over the past 10 years, the country's crude oil imports averaged 5 m barrels/day, second only to the 9 m b/d imported by the U.S. This figure can explain China's energy consumption in 2010 with the high local demand for coal and oil. However, recently, China's oil consumption was reported at 14,224.627 barrels/day in December 2020, an increase from the 14,005.099 barrels/day for December 2019 (CEIC, 2020).

Figure 1 *Consumption of Crude Oil in China from 2005 to 2020**



*- in million metric tons
Source: Statista from: https://www.statista.com

Between 2005 and 2020, China's energy consumption doubled. Figure 1, which concerns China's energy consumption, shows a steady increase in oil consumption. Analyzing this situation clearly shows that the reason explaining Chinese firms' operations in Africa is to seek commodities such as oil, gas, and coal. China is currently the world's second-largest oil consumer and Africa is quickly becoming an alternative source of oil imports. However, for Mwengei (2013), China with its large-growing population absorbs basic commodities from across the world, including from Africa, and its appetite does not equal any world power. If prices continue to rise, this would have a distinctly strong effect on African economies, depending on whether they are net exporters or importers of a given commodity. African countries such as Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, and other oil-exporting economies could benefit from high oil prices.

4. Chinese and U.S. Strategy Regarding Africa's FDI

It seems that a support strategy directed towards private firms is a common strategy adopted by both China and the U.S. For example, one year after the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was enacted, former U.S. President George W. Bush addressed the forum and announced several initiatives: first, a $200 million overseas private investment corporation (OPIC) support facility to give U.S. firms access to loans and guarantees and political risk insurance for investment projects; second, to boost and help attract new investments in Africa, Washington created a regional office of the Trade and Development Agency (TDA)

located in Johannesburg. The political and economic measures have developed the Trade for African Development and Enterprise Program funded at USD 15 million, to establish regional hubs to help African businesses in the global market (Jones, 2009). The three regional hubs are located in Accra in Ghana, Gaborone in Botswana, and Nairobi in Kenya. With this U.S. marketing strategy, gains from Sub-Saharan Africa during the year of 2011 were estimated at USD 74.2 billion, up 14% compared to 2010. The main supplier to the U.S. markets was Nigeria, with a revenue of USD 33.7 billion mainly in crude oil; the second contributor country was Angola, with an amount estimated at USD 13.5 billion from crude oil, and South Africa stood in the third position with US$9.5 billion mainly from precious stones and metals. Gabon had revenue estimated at USD 4.5 billion which was also from crude oil and Chad had a revenue of USD 3.1 billion.

As the U.S. implemented a "sophisticated" strategy to gain a strong trust in Africa, Japan included in its package to Africa, an amount of USD 2.5 billion fund to help Japanese firms invest more in Africa and achieve the target of doubling Japanese private sector direct investment to the continent according to (Gouede, 2008). The Yokohama Declaration, Plan of Action and its Follow-up Mechanism are the key for strengthening a business partnership platform between Japan and Africa. As of April 2020, Japan had concluded 34 bilateral investment treaties in which Mozambique was part of, as indicated by the U.S. State Department (2021). Surprisingly, the strategies developed by Japan, China, and the U.S. over Africa had something in common — government support for the private sector to boost business relationship with Africa. Despite the similarity in strategy, Chinese private firms have a strong advantage due to their strong spirit of entrepreneurship. Some studies indicate that this tool (entrepreneurship) is one of the most important features of Chinese firms to start their investment in Africa. However, entrepreneurship is arguably not the only tool to help Chinese companies to succeed in Africa.

Generally, this adventure to Africa takes together the expansion of culture and Chinese language through Confucius institutes' implementation strategy all over the African continent. This strategy again puts China ahead of Japan and the U.S. For example, there are a few centers for Japanese studies in the continent, a situation that contributes to the lack of knowledge about Japan by Africans. One of the most known centers is in Pretoria, South Africa. As for African countries' relations with western nations like the U.S., there is at least a long history of relations, whereas Japan plays the role of the newcomer. In this context, we can assume that neither the U.S. private firms nor the Japanese are placed ahead of China in terms of business policy engagement. Seeking materials is an important motivation for Chinese ODI, especially in Africa. On the other hand, Japan's interest in Africa continues to be the access to raw materials, particularly for precious metals and oil and gas. Analyzing the tendency of competitiveness among China, the U.S., and Japan, there is one assertion about what Japan may do to change this picture: First, it is obvious that Japan is seeking a permanent seat in the United Nations. However, strengthening ties with African countries is one of many strategies Japan can craft in order to have their support in the United Nations. Secondly, to compete with China at the same level, Japan needs to create and implement more centres for African studies in its territory and in Africa to help private firms understand more about the continent. This would provide these firms with knowledge about the African market, which is essential for starting a business there.

Thirdly, Japan needs to expand its policy in Africa through more intensive state trips together with the private sector to exchange experience with local businessmen. Moreover, experience is also the second requirement in the process of internationalization. There is a lack of clear information on the real situation in Africa. Assumptions or biases over regulatory and legislative regimes remain a barrier for Japanese companies to commit to Africa.

5. Trade Balance between the U.S. versus Japan and Africa

Total two-way goods trade between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa increased 5.8%, from $36.9 billion in 2015 to $39 billion in 2017, with top U.S. goods exports to sub-Saharan Africa: machinery ($2.3 billion), vehicles ($1.6 billion), aircraft ($1.5 billion), mineral fuels ($1.4 billion), and electrical machinery ($864 million). The top U.S. export markets in the region were South Africa ($5 billion), Nigeria ($2.2 billion), Ghana ($886 million), Ethiopia ($873 million), and Angola ($810 million) (AGOA, 2018). Available data on the AGOA website indicates that U.S. investment in sub-Saharan Africa stood at $29 billion in 2016 (the latest year with available data), down 23% from 2014's $37.5 billion. The three largest destinations for U.S. investment were Mauritius ($6.7 billion), South Africa ($5.1 billion), and Nigeria ($3.8 billion).[1]

There are some data discrepancies about the year 2011 and 2012, regarding imports and exports. However, intentionally, the study includes random years without any follow up. According to our analysis, the missing years do not matter much in our study. Take the year 2000 as an example for the triangle analysis (China, the U.S., and Japan). China in this period had undertaken over 500 projects in Africa which mainly saw investment in infrastructures. Japan had just suffered the side effect of China and U.S. competition over the African market with the tendency of decreasing its investments in different regions. In the same period, the U.S. had also enacted the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), an act aiming at fostering an improved business environment with many African countries with a focus on increasing trade between the U.S. and the countries of the continent. Relatively speaking, there is no room for bewilderment. Observing carefully U.S. presence in a given country, it can be seen that, the U.S. always engages in investment aimed at cooling conflicts or political issues such as improving democracy and civil society.

U.S. policy precludes investing in countries with political instability. If such countries are blessed with natural resources, then, clearly, U.S. strategy is to intervene rather than to build peace; security and stability, to further better explore the business opportunities that accommodate its interests and Africa's interest in creating infrastructures. China and the U.S.'

[1] American Government Act Opportunity for Africa 2018: Retrieved on April 27, 2022, from https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html

strategies are quite similar. Investment in infrastructures is a must in Africa due to several reasons: first, infrastructure, if reliable and affordable, can solve problems such as water, sanitation, transport, power, and communication; second, African governments see FDI as a source of capital for solving development problems. This has been the main reason for African countries to craft strategies aiming at attracting inward FDI. The recent tendency of Africa's FDI is explained by the need to transfer technology through resource exploitation, job creation, and performance in the trade balance. Unlike Japan's picture in Angola and Mozambique, this Asian country announced a $570 million official development assistance (ODA) to develop the Nacala corridor region that stretches from northern Mozambique to Malawi. According to the Africa Development Group (2022), the project will include road rehabilitation in Malawi and the establishment of single border posts, one between Malawi and Mozambique, and another between Malawi and Zambia. Yet, recently the pictures of global outward investments are showing a different trend. Data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2019) indicates that global FDI flow decreased by 27% in 2018 to USD 1,097 billion. This was largely due to U.S. tax reform, causing FDI flows to also decrease by 16% in 2017.

Second, from this analysis, it is now possible to answer the questions that this study has posed — Who will be Africa's number one business partner? Depending on what African leaders want from these three countries, we can offer two hypotheses: The U.S. would not gain much from Africa even with a 100% liberalization rate of African products to enter the U.S. market. The USD 7 billion announced by Obama was exclusively for electricity in Africa, while China and Japan invest in diverse industries which, in turn, means diverse opportunities for the private sector. The U.S. trade and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has comprised only 1% to 2% of U.S. total investments all around the world. This percentage pertains only to the year 2000 which marked in history the interest of the U.S. in Africa. Thus, according to OECD (2019), Japan, China, and France were the largest sources of FDI worldwide. The study indicates that the United States registered negative outflows in the first half of 2018. The country, according to the source, regained its position as the major source of FDI outflows worldwide in the second half of the same year.

Third, China would be the country gaining more trust in Africa. China in its policy to enter Africa in 1996, has stressed the so-called five-point proposal aiming at developing sincere friendship, strengthening solidarity and cooperation, treating each other as equals and seeking common development. These five points were delivered by Jiang Zemin during his state visit to Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Zimbabwe. The Chinese government has created a strong network in Africa through the support given by various embassies in Africa. Not all companies receive this support because there are still many Chinese businessmen who do not know the procedures for financial support. The fact that China has given unconditional support to African countries in the period before their independence and after the recovery from the damages of colonialism will always remain a strong point to be considered by African leaders. The historical rivalry between China and Japan has been extended to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), motivated by the strategic search for raw materials and a market for investments and manufactured goods (Osei-Hwedie, 2015).

As regards Japan, we can foresee strengthening ties with African countries and increased aid and investments in the continent for two reasons: first, Japan seeks a permanent seat in the United Nations. To achieve this goal, Japan will have to craft better strategies that benefit and please the leaders of the African continent. Africa is also Japan's strategic partner. Meanwhile, it is important to note that trade between China and Africa increased by 700% during the 1990s. In this same period, Japan ranked first in the world in terms of overseas direct investment. As pointed out by Renard (2011), China's trade increased rapidly due to the support of the local Chinese government that strongly incentivized exports. As a result, in 2012, trade volume reached USD 198.5 billion. However, the value of China-Africa trade in 2019 was $192 billion, up from $185 billion in 2018 according to the China-Africa Research Initiative (2021). The fact that China is in obsessive competition with the U.S., one possible scenario sees China trying to convince Africans to hold the yuan as a reserve currency to make it a reference in the continent. China is internationalizing its currency with a clear objective of turning it into a trading currency. The improvement of the trade balance for China and Africa is quite clear. China's global demand for commodities will make Africa its main trade partner. China has the need to supply its local market and other Asian countries with final manufactured products. China has a competitive advantage over U.S. and Japanese investments in Africa. China and Africa need each other. Neither China nor Africa would survive if their relationship ceases to exist. This relationship is complementary. Chinese overseas companies play an important role in China's economy.

Figure 2 *China-Africa Trade*



Source: China-Africa Research Initiative, UN Comtrade (2021)

In 2019, as stated in the China Africa Initiative, Angola was the largest African exporter to China, followed by South Africa and the Republic of Congo. China's engagement in Africa will influence the way the U.S. negotiates on issues such as democracy and human rights with China — a situation which the U.S. is willing to approach in the short run. However, the U.S.' approach to Africa needs a strategic dialogue with China in order to convince China to promote an international system of peace and security in the region. This will no doubt require strong negotiation from both sides (featuring government and corporations). Good governance and transparency issues do matter to the U.S. Analyzing these figures with U.S. imports from Africa pertaining to the same period clearly shows that they were

quite smaller, accounting for only one third. Another aspect that would strongly boost trade between Africa and China is to impose zero tariff on African products. However, China will be the first winner as Africa's trade partner, compared to the U.S. and Japan in many aspects. First, thousands of Chinese government scholarships offered to African students have contributed to the presence of entrepreneurial students elsewhere in China. Also, there are reports indicating business partnership of Chinese citizens with African students. This event will certainly boost business in Africa. Based on data provided by students and other businessmen already operating in Africa, Chinese private firms take the risk of heading to Africa without any knowledge or commitment, as suggested by the Uppsala School of Sweden. Knowledge and experience over a certain market remain a strong tool in the internationalization process. Reviewing China's cooperation with Africa needs to be seen from the different perspectives of China's contributions to Africa.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa and explained how Japan and the U.S. respond to Sino-African cooperation. The competition among these three countries on the African continent has strongly benefited African countries, as they are in a continent with raw materials. Thus, the approach of this work was possible using a theory that explains the behavior of cooperation between countries, namely: The dependency theory that better discuss the benefits, advantages or disadvantages that countries can have when they sign agreements. However, the U.S., Japan, or China will do everything possible to engage much more with Africa in order to gain trust and establish a competitive edge over the other. Each country seeks to have a thriving business model that would convince Africa to agree to more cooperation, to offer more financial guarantee, capable of solving the continent's problems, which are mostly shortage of infrastructure, technology, employment, quality human resources, and institutional capacity.

Dependency theory argues that countries cooperate without reducing the gap between the wealth of some and the poverty of others. There is a kind of permanent subjugation between the cooperating countries, on account of interests that are individuals, not intended to solve the problems of the community but increasing the wealth of nations with economic advantages. There are increasingly richer and poorer, and this reality betrays the economic imbalance among the countries in cooperation. That is why each of these countries approves financial intervention packages in Africa according to its strategy and image that it wants to create in Africa. In fact, each of these countries announces its financial intervention through big conferences and agreements. For example, for Japan, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD); for China, FOCAC; and for the United States, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Thus, in addition to government financial support, these countries unveil financial packages for the private sector to start operations in Africa with an advantageous financial capacity that ends up being monotonous for a given sector, leaving behind local companies that lack technology and capital. Meanwhile, the U.S. looks at China in Africa as a neo-colonizing country that approaches all of Africa's problems, within its intervention plan and strategy for the

continent. China, as a major energy consumer in the world, will undoubtedly engage much more in this sector, cooperating with Africa in order to acquire this commodity in exchange for infrastructures, which are a serious problem in Africa. Therefore, one of China's popular sayings is "If you want to develop, build roads and bridges." China understands that it is on the basis of this type of infrastructure that any nation can develop, because creating them will allow the exchange of goods and products and the movement of people from one side to the other. China is working hard on its huge "One Belt One Road" project aiming at connecting the Middle East, Europe, and Africa by sea and land to ensure, first and foremost, communication among countries. It is an ambitious project that places China as a strong opponent for Japan and the United States.

This current power and the world's second-largest economy designed a regional integration strategy that places it at the top of the game, as a number of countries connect to each other, which better facilitates the flow of trade, capital mobility, and the exchange of goods and services. The ongoing Chinese project "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) is currently one of the biggest projects that connects a good part of the countries of the world together. However, as discussed in this chapter, good cooperation means mutual gains, albeit not necessarily in a balanced way. For many African countries, their lack of negotiating capacity forces them to submit to the individualistic interests of their partners. Africa is lacking capital, a situation that leads to their subjection and acceptance of the type of cooperation under terms that are to the absolute advantage of either China, Japan, or the U.S. The competitive rivalry among these three countries in Africa can bring enormous benefits to the continent, since most of the resources are still unexplored and untapped, and the countries under study show an increasingly and accentuated scarcity of resources to satisfy the market of origin. The problems of Africa discussed above, such as the lack of capital, make China an important partner because this Asian country grants loans to its cooperation partners without constraints or intervention regarding the type of project for which the funding is intended.

It is this type of Chinese strategy that poses a permanent threat to the U.S. and Japan. The economic and political strategy of these last two countries is still far from competitive with China's commitment and delivery in Africa. If they want to be competitive with China, they must further enhance their culture and education. We refer to the creation of more centres for Japanese or American studies, as China has done in almost the whole world. China's influence becomes more accentuated not only with its financial aid policy, direct investment in major infrastructure, and concessional loans, but also with the increase of Chinese culture and language study centres that, in the near future, will place Chinese presence in the continent unforgettable due to the huge number of infrastructural projects, more people who speak Mandarin and know their culture. This is what constitutes China's biggest threat to Japan and the U.S. Thus, to reduce or eliminate this threat, a scenario of great competition is drawn up, so that the engagement of each of the three countries is, in fact, expressive and convincing to Africans. Should this happen, Africa may be able to make use of the presence of the three countries towards development and economic emancipation.

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Implications of China's Energy Transitions for Oil and Gas Producers: A Case Study of Southern African Portuguese-speaking Countries

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Energy Transitions, Decarbonization, China, Angola, Mozambique, Oil & Gas Producers

Abstract

China has adopted a series of policy instruments aiming to curb carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Despite having an ambitious agenda to decarbonize, China's reliance on oil and gas imports will likely continue to be significant in the next decades. Evolving energy policies and energy security strategies, however, have geopolitical implications, as the adjustment of China's energy mix and fossil fuel consumption may impact existing interdependence relations between China and its established oil and gas suppliers. This chapter presents an exploratory study that aims to discuss the implications of China's road to decarbonization on its relations with southern African Portuguese-speaking countries. Based on pre-defined China's energy supply and demand scenarios, this study draws on a range of empirical evidence from case studies on Angola and Mozambique to highlight how China's energy transitions can impact China's foreign policy priorities and the strategic importance of these two southern African Portuguese-speaking countries to China. The main conclusion that emerges from the analysis is that Angola is on track to lose relevance as major supplier of fossil fuels to China, while Mozambique could become an important supplier of natural gas. The research methodology is based on the analysis of scientific and grey literature, combining quantitative and qualitative data.

1. Introduction

China is the world's largest primary energy consumer and carbon emitter, the second largest oil consumer, and the third largest natural gas consumer. Coal accounts for over 60% of its electricity generation and new coal-fired power plants are planned for the coming years. As

the country accounts for one-third of global carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions, Chinese energy transitions and national emission reductions are crucial for the global effort to mitigate climate change (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2021). In September 2020, at the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China will "aim to have CO_2 emissions peak before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060," and scale up its Nationally Determined Contributions submitted under the Paris Agreement by "adopting more vigorous policies and measures" (Xinhua, 2020, September 20).

China's reliance on oil and gas imports will likely continue to be significant in the next decades, despite its ambitious plans to decarbonize. Nevertheless, China's evolving energy policies and energy security strategies have geopolitical implications as the adjustment of China's energy mix and fossil fuel use may impact existing interdependence relations between China and its established oil and gas suppliers. The following is an exploratory study discussing how China's decarbonization will impact its relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries in Southern Africa, namely, Angola and Mozambique. Based on pre-defined China's energy supply and demand scenarios, this study draws on a range of empirical evidence to highlight how China's energy transitions can impact China's foreign policy priorities and the strategic importance of the aforementioned southern African Portuguese-speaking countries to China.

The main argument that emerges from the analysis is that Angola might lose relevance and its place as a major supplier of fossil fuels to China. Mozambique, on the other hand, might become an important supplier of natural gas to China. Further, these expected shifts in fossil-fuel supplies to China from both countries may have implications on the intensity of diplomatic relations between them, as well as priorities of Chinese investment. The research methodology is based on an analysis of scientific and grey literature, combining quantitative and qualitative data. This chapter is structured as follows: First, the dimensions that the energy transitions entail are outlined; second, China's evolving energy security priorities in the context of decarbonization pathways are briefly reviewed; third, the case studies will be presented; and, lastly, the findings of this exploratory study will be discussed and further research directions will be suggested.

2. Energy Transitions and China's Roadmap to Decarbonization

The world is witnessing a process of energy transition, characterized by a rapid deployment of renewable energy technology, driven by a combination of multiple factors among which climate change and environmental degradation are the main concerns leading to a path of decarbonization of the global economy. These transformations entail fundamental changes along the socio, economic, political, environmental, geopolitical and security dimensions. For this reason, there is no standard or universal definition of energy transition; instead, it has emerged as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry. In a broad sense, energy transitions have been defined as pathways towards major structural transformations of the energy systems and economies: a change in the fuels and their associated technologies (Hirsh & Jones, 2014; Miller et al., 2013), significant changes to patterns of energy use in a society

(O'Connor, 2010), switch from an economic system dependent on one or a series of energy sources and technologies to another (Fouquet & Pearson, 2012). Sovacool and Geels (2016) remind us that energy transitions are complex processes, which are path dependent across different economic and geographical contexts. Blazquez, Rolando, and Manzano (2019) sum up the nature of the energy transitions as a "multidimensional, complex, non-linear, non-deterministic, and uncertain phenomenon […] difficult to characterize using a small number of features." In this framework and in line with the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), this chapter adopts a limited view of the energy transitions as pathways towards transforming the global energy sector from fossil-based to zero-carbon by the second half of this century.[1] This definition accommodates future technological innovations, by putting forward a broader view that the energy transitions are pathways to a decarbonized economy, not a restrictive transition from fossils to renewable energy. The plural form (energy transitions) is adopted for the reason that, on the scale of a country or territory, the transformations required to cope with the global energy challenges occur in different ways according to local resources, policies, and constraints.

The decarbonization path was triggered by the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1992, which required the parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Later, the Paris Agreement, signed in 2015, established a new commitment towards decarbonization, by enforcing the signatory parties to substantially reduce carbon dioxide and other global greenhouse gas emissions to limit global warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius. The Paris Agreement introduced the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) — the commitments of each country to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change. In 2015, the UN member states adopted the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, as part of the 2013 Agenda for Sustainable Development. SDG 7 sets an ambition (to be achieved by 2030) in regard to energy transitions: 7.1) to ensure universal access to affordable, reliable, and modern energy services; 7.2) to increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix; 7.3) to double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency; 7.A) to enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology; 7.B) to expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services to all developing countries.[2]

The momentum created by the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals, together with the declining cost of renewable energy technologies, are driving major shifts in the global energy landscape. In the context of China, Professor He Jiankun, Dean of the Institute of Low Carbon Economy at Tsinghua University, argues that:

[1] Retrieved on January 17, 2022, from: https://www.irena.org/energytransition\

[2] Retrieved on January 19, 2022, from: https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/energy/

> a long-term low-carbon development and transition strategy should be an integrated win-win strategy that seeks to balance the sustainable socio-economic development at home and the global fight against climate change, […] should adapt to and lead the global trend of low-carbon development and transition, and strengthen the country's competitive advantage, […] must be developed within an overall framework and supported by strategies and actions in all areas, which is an important part of the overall long-term national development goals and strategies.[3]

In September 2020, at the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China will "aim to have CO2 emissions peak before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060," and scale up its nationally determined contributions (NDCs) submitted under the Paris Agreement by "adopting more vigorous policies and measures" (Xinhua, 2020, September 20). In line with these targets, the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) for National Economic and Social Development and Vision 2035 of the People's Republic of China were endorsed by the National People's Congress (NPC) on March 11, 2021, targeting at reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP and carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP 13.5% and 18%, respectively. The 14th Five-Year Plan aims at promoting an "energy revolution" and building a "clean, low-carbon, safe, and efficient energy system to enhance energy supply capabilities," increasing "the proportion of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to about 20%," enhancing "the scale of wind power and photovoltaic power generation," and willing to "safely and steadily promote the construction of coastal nuclear power facilities" (The Chinese Central Government's Official Web Portal, 2021, March 13). Subsequent to the Five-Year Plan, five main documents on climate and environmental policy were further released:

- Working Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality in Full and Faithful Implementation of the New Development Philosophy, released on October 24, 2021 by the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the State Council (National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China, 2021, October 24);

- Action Plan for Carbon Dioxide Peaking Before 2030, released on October 25, 2021 by the State Council (National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China, 2021, October 27);

- Responding to Climate Change: China's Policies and Actions, released on October 27, 2021 by the State Council Information Office (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021, October 27);

[3] Retrieved on January 19, 2022, from: https://www.efchina.org/Attachments/Program-Update-Attachments/programupdate-lceg-20201015/Public-Launch-of-Outcomes-China-s-Low-carbon-Development-Strategies-and-Transition-Pathways-ICCSD.pdf

- China's Achievements, New Goals, and New Measures for Nationally Determined Contributions (Xinhua, 2021, October 29);

- China's Mid-Century Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy, released on 28 October 2021 (Xinhua, 2021, October 29).

The Working Guidance and the Action Plan mentioned above constitute the core of China's "1+N" policy framework for carbon peaking and neutrality and constitute "the top-level design to help accomplish the carbon goals" (Xinhua, 2021, October 25). The "1" refers to the Working Guidance, a set of high-level principles that specify China's targets to peak emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, foreseeing an increase in the use of non-fossil fuels to about 25% of total energy consumption by 2030 and to more than 80% by 2060, as well as the reduction, by 2030, of CO_2 emissions per unit of GDP by more than 65% compared to 2005 levels.[4] "N" stands for a set a new plans, with the Action Plan at the top setting targets for energy and key industrial sectors. The "1+N" policy framework, together with the subsequent sectoral action plans, sets a clear timeline for China's targets to peak CO_2 emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.

The low carbon transformation pathways of China's energy supply and energy demand have been largely discussed in the scientific and grey literature, namely the feasibility of the Paris Agreement targets and schedule under different scenarios (Zhang & Chen, 2022; Zhou et al., 2021; IEA, 2021; Energy Research Institute of the National Development and Reform Commission of China [ERI], 2021). The International Energy Agency recognizes that there is no single pathway for China to achieve its climate goals, but many paths "involving different rates of change" and "many uncertainties," and apart from policy action, how the energy transitions unfold "depends on the pace of innovation in new and emerging technologies in China and elsewhere, the future lifestyle choices of Chinese citizens, the availability of sustainable bioenergy, and the extent and effectiveness of international collaboration" (IEA, 2021, pp. 53–54). The International Energy Agency has set a scenario called an Announced Pledges Scenario (APS),[5] in line with China's announced ambitions

[4] Retrieved on January 28, 2022, from: https://icapcarbonaction.com/es/news-archive/803-china-publishes-framework-for-carbon-peaking-and-neutrality-confirming-plans-to-strengthen-and-expand-national-ets

[5] IEA has also set out an alternative scenario called Accelerated Transition Scenario (ATS), exploring the impact of an even faster transition by assuming "enhanced policy efforts to 2030 compared with the APS in three key areas: a faster decline in coal use in the power and industry sectors; higher deployment of low-carbon technologies like renewables, EVs and heat pumps; and increased energy and material efficiency in end-use sectors." In this scenario, coal demand in 2030 is nearly 20% lower than in the APS, and the share of coal in generation falls to 38% in 2030, about ten percentage points below the APS. The ATS brings additional socioeconomic benefits such as extra job creation and further pollution reduction (IEA, 2021, p. 201). In addition, Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) assesses "the evolution of China's energy system on the assumption that the policies and measures that have already been adopted by the Chinese government with respect to energy and the environment are implemented" which "does not assume any future changes to existing policies and measures."

and targets, and taking into consideration "the underlying technological transformation that would be required to reach a peak in emissions before 2030 and net zero CO_2 emissions from the energy sector by 2060."

In the APS, China's primary energy demand first rises by 18% to 2030 and then falls by 26% by 2060. This reduction in energy demand is justified by efficiency gains, where electrification of the end uses plays a very important role, and also by an expected shift away from heavy industries to less energy-intensive economic activities. The share of low-carbon energy — solar, wind, hydropower, bioenergy, other renewables, and nuclear power — increases to 23% in 2030 and to 74% in 2060. Solar energy will be responsible for around a quarter of the demand in 2060. Coal consumption decreases by more than 80%, oil by around 60%, and natural gas by almost 45%. Although the use of fossil fuels will fall significantly, it is expected that they will still be in use around 2060 in conjunction with carbon capture, utilization, and storage technologies (IEA, 2021, p. 52). While the transition to 2030 can rely on a range of available technologies and policies, for long-term transition, IEA foresees four additional "technology opportunities": further electrification of end-use sectors; deployment of carbon capture, utilization, and storage technologies; use of low-carbon hydrogen and hydrogen-derived fuels; and use of sustainable bioenergy especially in road and air transport (IEA, 2021, p. 59).

Figure 1 represents China's primary energy consumption, combining the APSs with the Carbon Neutral Scenario (CNS) set out by the Energy Research Institute [ERI] of the National Development and Reform Commission of China (2021), Citigroup[6] and the Institute for Climate Change and Sustainable Development [ICCSD] at Tsinghua University (2022)'s scenario. All these scenarios illustrate different pathways for achieving the same the dual goals: letting carbon emission peak by 2030, and achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.

Figure 1 *Scenarios for China's primary energy consumption*



Source: Authors' own elaboration based on IEA (2021); ERI (2021); ICCSD (2022) and Citigroup analysis

[6] Retrieved on January 30, 2022, from: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/19/citi-stock-picks-to-buy-and-sell-on-chinas-ambition-to-go-green.html

In all scenarios, the use of coal and oil will basically be phased out by 2060 and be replaced by non-fossil fuels. This comparative analysis also reveals the importance of natural gas in China's energy mix, both in the medium (2030) and long term (2060), which seems to back up previous analysis on the role of gas as a transition fuel in the ongoing global energy transitions (IEA, 2020). The disparities found in the 2060 scenarios are an important reminder of the speculative nature of looking ahead into the coming decades. Scenario analysis should not be regarded as a deterministic prediction of future behaviour, but rather as a range of possible outcomes and the impact of policy options.

In the APS above the baseline scenario, the growth in the use of renewables justified by IEA is mainly driven by "assumed stronger policies to tackle climate change, enhance energy security and improve air quality in line with China's long-term goals" (IEA, 2021, p. 63). In fact, sustainability and environmental protection are not the only drivers of energy transformations. The complexity of the different dimensions of energy transformations are captured by the "energy trilemma," an expression coined by the World Energy Council to represent the interplay of: 1) energy security, which concerns the capacity to meet current and future energy demand reliably with minimal disruption to supplies; 2) energy equity, which is the ability to provide universal access to affordable, fairly priced, and abundant energy; and 3) environmental sustainability, which relates to the transition of a country's energy system towards mitigating and avoiding potential environmental harm and climate change impacts.[7] The three dimensions — security, equity, and sustainability — that constitute the trilemma address the often conflicting challenges that energy policies need to tackle.

Energy security, in particular China's dependency on foreign energy resources, has long been a major concern and challenge to Chinese leaderships and can be traced back to China's failed experience with Soviet participation in China's oil sector: Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, China suffered from "severe energy shortages" that left China dependent on the Soviet Union "for more than 50 percent of its critical refined oil products" (Downs, 2006, pp. 43–44). Economic growth in the following decades exacerbated China's dependence on foreign energy resources, and in 1993, China became a net importer of oil (Figure 2).

[7] Accessed on 30 December 2021 from: https://www.worldenergy.org/transition-toolkit/world-energy-trilemma-index

Figure 2 *Evolution of China's total crude oil production and consumption*



Source: Taylor (2021)

In 2021, China's dependence on oil imports has decreased from 73.6 percent in 2020 to 72% in 2021, reportedly due to "increasing efforts by domestic energy companies in local oil field exploration and exploitation in the past few years" (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2022, February 24). Apart from increasing domestic oil production, Taylor (2021, pp. 897–900) identifies other elements of China's energy security strategy over time: diversifying oil suppliers, in particular the reliance from the Middle East due to its political complexity, and transportation routes, taking in consideration that around 80% of China's oil imports pass through the strait of Malacca; building and expanding government-controlled strategic oil reserves; and engaging in economic statecraft and diplomacy with oil-producing countries. In more recent years, China has moved away from a previous strategy of acquiring overseas oil assets, which carries technical and political risks, and started to guarantee control of oil flows by oil-backed loans "secured against state owned infrastructure, thus mitigating the risk of loan default and economic loss" (Taylor, 2021, p. 898). Additionally, Taylor argues that traditional overseas oil activities and China's political support for Chinese oil companies abroad are expected to be further integrated and coordinated with the broader objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In line with this view, Chen (2021, p. 15) shows that investments in BRI countries "initially highlighted China's shift away from acquisition of oil and gas fields around the world to a more holistic approach with attention to transit routes, integrated trade and investment frameworks, and diversified energy cooperation" focused on energy channels that have contributed to "diversify China's oil and gas import sources and reduce reliance on seaborne flows." As already pointed out, China's energy outlook in different scenarios suggest that reliance on fossil fuels will reduce drastically, at least after a decade for oil and two decades for gas, and eventually come to an end. Meidan (2021, p.13) argues that, due to China's need for imported oil, "just as demand peaks and begins to decline elsewhere, China's importance for [oil] producers will only rise, and with it, its ability to impact flows, price discovery, and benchmarks" and China's importance to oil markets "will only grow over the next two decade"; on the other hand, Meidan (2021, p. 13) foresees that, from the perspective of oil and gas producers countries, the possible future loss of revenues could "create political instability" and also "inhibit their ability to repay loans that China has issued." At the same

time, Chen (2021, p. 15) argues "the BRI will offer China new investment opportunities in renewable technologies and will be seen by the international community as a benchmark of China's commitment to its shift away from fossil fuels."

This section provides the background and setting for the following case studies. Energy transitions are ongoing and complex processes, driven by sustainability, economic, and security concerns, which shape not only national energy systems but also regional and global geopolitical landscapes. As the energy transformations unfold over the next decades, China's relations with its traditional oil and gas suppliers are likely to develop along China's evolving energy security and foreign policy priorities. The next section provides an empirical analysis of two Southern African Portuguese-speaking countries and their relations with China.

3. Case Studies

African Portuguese-speaking countries (APSCs) refer to six countries in Africa where the Portuguese language has official status: Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. These countries are very diverse, ranging from the southeast to the northwest of Africa, from the top to the bottom of the African GDP per capita ranking, from Angola's population of over 30 million to São Tomé and Príncipe's of slightly over 200,000. Apart from sharing a common official language, these African countries share other important traits. Excluding Equatorial Guinea, they have a common heritage and similar systems of governance and administration inherited from the colonial power, and they have experienced similar processes of resistance against Portuguese rule and fight for independence. Guinea-Bissau became independent in 1974, while Angola, Cabo Verde, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe gained their independence in 1975. Finally, they all share political dynamics and societal challenges shaped by an embedded colonial legacy: nation-state mismatch, economic dependency, indebtedness, poverty, institutional weakness, and state fragility. As of December 2018, except Cabo Verde, all the other APSCs were ranked among the world's least developed countries.

China cultivated relations with African countries by providing aid, technical expertise, investing, and making business, while gaining their support in international forums, and identified within those countries "one strategic group worth to invest and cooperate with, the Portuguese Speaking African Countries which are linked through a network of language and culture between themselves and also to other geostrategic economic spaces" (Ilhéu, 2010). Investment from China and African Portuguese-Speaking countries (APSCs) expanded rapidly in the last 20 years. This expansion was often enabled by credit lines from Chinese financial institutions, which today are the main lenders to the biggest of the five APSC economies, Angola and Mozambique.

Among the fossil-fuel producing APSCs, one case stands out in terms of its historic importance to China as an oil supplier — Angola — while the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CPNC) is a major investor in the development of the strategic natural gas sector in Mozambique.

Looking at these cases, we attempt to point to some implications of the ongoing changes in the energy sector in terms of these countries' relations with China.

3.1 Angola

In its financial ties, China's relations with Angola is unlike that with any other APSC. In fact, its relevance is, financially, much higher than those with other major African economies. As per a database on Chinese lending to Africa curated by the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Brautigam & Hwang, 2016), since 2000, China has committed USD 42.6 billion in 254 loans to Angola to date, which is by far the most with any African nation, ahead of Ethiopia (USD 13.7 billion, 52 loans), Zambia (USD 9.9 billion, 78 loans), or Kenya (USD 9.0 billion, 42 loans). However, after the figure peaked in 2016 (USD 18.8 billion), the loan amounts per year have been dwindling, falling to just USD 106 million in 2019, the lowest amount on record since 2003 (Brautigam & Hwang, 2016). The amount committed to date by China would be sufficient to argue for the strategic importance — given the Chinese financial sector's exposure — of economic relations with Angola.

Another factor adding to this strategic relevance is the loan model. Considering c. USD 25 billion and of loans granted by China to Angola (Figure 3), paid or guaranteed by oil supplies, most (a USD 15 billion line granted by the China Development Bank (CDB)) have remuneration terms that incorporate variations in the oil barrel price — valuing when the price rises in international markets and vice versa — according to Mihalyi et al. (2020). Some of the loans do not have a fixed deadline for settlement, but instead a model for calculating the value of each barrel of oil, with the credit ceasing when the revenue from exports to China totals the amount financed by Chinese banks. This type of agreement implies that the loan remuneration will be delayed for some years, when the oil price is low, and speed up when it is high. According to the same authors, other credits from Chinese banks to countries like Angola are settled by a specific amount of barrels of oil to be exported per day (10,000 bpd, or 300,000 per month, in one case) — so the sensitivity to price variation is less significant. According to Payne and Zhdannikov (2020), Angola's debt to China currently represents half of the total debt stock.

This exposure has become a political and diplomatic liability for Chinese relations with African countries in general, extensively explored by the former U.S. administration of Donald Trump, whose Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Beijing for creating "an unsustainable debt burden" in Africa, noting that China was "by far the largest bilateral creditor to African governments," while most U.S. foreign assistance was made in the form of grants rather than loans "to promote transparent, private sector-led economic growth that benefits all parties" (Reuters, 2020). The "debt trap" concept has, however, been disputed even by notable U.S. academics. Brautigam (2020) underlines information on more than 1,000 loans in Africa but does not produce any examples where it can be said that "the Chinese deliberately entangled another country in debt, and then used that debt to extract unfair or strategic advantages of some kind in Africa, including 'asset seizures'."

Figure 3 *Resource-backed loan flow between lenders and recipient governments (oil sector only)*



Source: Mihalyi, D., Adam, A., & Hwang, J. (2020)

Chinese loans enabled the reconstruction of vital and strategic infrastructure in post-war Angola (roads, railways, ports), with major construction projects. Angola has, therefore, become part of China's energy strategy. Between 2006 and 2014, Angola was China's second biggest oil supplier. In some years, such as 2006 and 2010, Angola was almost the top supplier. Since then, data has shown that China has diversified its oil suppliers, reducing reliance on Angola and Saudi Arabia, and increasing imports from Russia and Iraq (Figure 4).

Figure 4 *China's Top Crude Oil Suppliers by Market Share*



Source: China Customs and Refinitiv Eikon (2019 projection by Refinitiv Oil Research), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-china-oil-analysis-idUKKCN1NX0XZ

Chinese oil companies' penetration into the Angolan oil sector can be traced, according to Fernandes (2014) to two months after the USD 2 billion credit line granted by China's Eximbank to the Angolan government in March 2004, which coincided with the liberalization of the first half of that loan: Sinopec purchased a 50% stake for USD 725 million of Block 18 (operated by the multinational energy company BP) located 160 km northeast of Luanda. In February 2005, one year after Sinopec had accessed the Angolan equity oil, Deputy Prime Minister Zeng Peiyan visited Luanda, accompanied by the Deputy Minister of the Commission for Reform and Development and head of the National Energy Office Zhang Guobao, and signed nine cooperation agreements, of which five were intended to strengthen cooperation between the two governments and four cooperative projects between companies from the two countries in the energy sector (Fernandes, 2014). Among the four business agreements, the agreement between Sonangol and Sinopec to supply 40,000 b/d of oil for a period of seven years and the memorandum of understanding between the two companies for the joint study of Block 3/80.

Owing to the nature and centrality of oil in economic relations, Angolan supplies to China grew steadily and peaked in 2012 at USD 35 billion (Figure 5).

Figure 5 *Angolan exports to China, essentially oil, peaked at almost USD 35 Billion in 2012*



Angola exports to China	Value	Year
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products	$24.48B	2018
Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal	$13.77M	2018
Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and cement	$7.70M	2018

Source: Mihalyi, D., Adam, A., & Hwang, J. (2020)

Another evidence of this oil-centred relation is that Angolan exports to China are overwhelmingly oil shipments (Figure 5). Historical highs (2012) and lows (2015) in China-Angola trade are, essentially, highs and lows in international oil prices (Figure 6).

Figure 6 *Average annual Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries crude oil price from 1960 to 2021 (in U.S. dollars per barrel)*



Source: Statista, from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/262858/change-in-opec-crude-oil-prices-since-1960/

Yet another dimension of Angola's relevance to China is the technical nature of oil itself. According to Alves (2013), Angola and Brazil "have potentially the same strategic importance for China owing to the similarities of their respective hydrocarbons reserves in terms of size, grade (sweet) and location (deep and ultra-deep waters, a new technological frontier that China wishes to master)." The author adds that the extension of oil-backed loans should therefore be "expected to remain a useful positive economic statecraft tool for China in pursuing its energy goals in both regions," which, in fact, has not been proven true until recently. Fernandes (2014) underlines that Angola managed to be China's biggest oil supplier at a time when Chinese companies were looking to consolidate their stakes on oil from the Angolan offshore, which yields mainly the "light, sweet" variety, while Chinese refineries have been set up for domestic oil that tends to have lower sulfur content, making the high quality Angolan oil more attractive, although more expensive.

Other than Chinese state-owned banks being exposed to Angola, Chinese state-owned oil companies are also deeply involved in the country. Sinopec has acquired important, valuable oil producing assets in Angola (Figure 7). Floating production storage and offloading facility (FPSO) in Block 18 and partnership with BP resulted in oil production reaching 600 million barrels in 2020.

Figure 7 *Sinopec's Angolan Assets*

SSI assets	Estimated reserves (barrels)[a]	Production 2012 (barrels per day)	Estimated liquid quota of Sinopec (%)
50% Block 18 2004	1 billion	170,000[b]	27.5
20% Block 15/06 2006	1.5 billion	–	11.0
27.5% Block 17/06 2006	1 billion	–	15.3
40% Block 18/06 2006	700 million	–	22.0
Estimated Sinopec total share	972 million	47,000[c]	–

Note: [a] Refers to potential estimates of reserves by operators, Sonangol and others.
[b] Estimate by the Angolan Ministry of Petroleum.
[c] This value is a rough estimation, given that Sinopec's total share of petroleum varies according to the petroleum profit margin that is owed to the government, which in turn varies according to the petroleum price.

Source: Author's own compilation with data from Ministerio dos Petróleos 2012.

Source: Alves (2013)

From Angola's perspective, oil remains the country's main source of exports and foreign currency, as well as central to the strategic importance given to the country by global powers such as China. Nevertheless, oil production in Angola is fast declining (Figure 8).

Figure 8 *Angola Exports of mineral fuels, oils, distillation products*

Source: TradingEconomics, retrieved in October 2021 from: https://tradingeconomics.com/angola/exports/mineral-fuels-oils-distillation-products

Angola's oil production has been consistently declining from nearly 1.8 mb/d in 2015. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) forecasts (October 2020) that output will average 1.13 mb/d throughout 2021, down from an averaged 1.28 mb/d in 2020. Following the sharp drop in oil prices in 2020 at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many energy majors halted exploration and drilling activities as they sought to cut operational costs, and while the rebound in oil prices in 2021 allowed some activity to resume, "it will take time for

increased exploration activity to translate into higher output and reverse the current trend of falling volumes." (EIU, 2020). As oil production and exports fall, China has retained — or possibly even increased — the importance for Angola as a market, keeping its status as, by far, the top destination. Oil Exports to China are Angola's main income source (Figure 9).

Figure 9 *Angolan Crude Oil Exports Estimates*

	2020[a]	2021[b]	2022[b]	2023[b]	2024[b]	2025[b]
Real GDP growth	-4.0	-1.5	2.4	2.7	3.9	3.3
Crude oil production ('000 b/d)	1,279[c]	1,130	1,110	1,070	1,170	1,200

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2020)

3.2 Mozambique

While Angola has been an important actor in China's energy security, specifically in oil supplies, Mozambique is an emerging Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) producer, and Chinese state oil companies have already secured positions both upstream and downstream. Mozambique LNG exploration in the Rovuma is divided into three areas: Area 1, Area 4, and the Coral Floating Liquified Natural Gas facility (FLNG). In Area 4, located in waters ranging from shallow to ultra-deep depths of the Rovuma basin, Mozambique Rovuma Venture S.p.A. has a stake of 70% and is detained by ExxonMobil (operator of the onshore Rovuma LNG project) which holds a 40% stake, Eni (operator of the offshore Coral South FLNG) which holds a 40% stake, and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) which holds a 20% stake. Portugal's Galp Energia has a 10% stake in the Area (Galp Exploration & Production in Mozambique – Area 4, 2021).

The Mozambique LNG Area 1 Project, estimated to cost over USD 20 billion, is ranked as Africa's single largest foreign direct investment to date. It comprises a global team of energy developers and operators, led by Total alongside Mitsui, Oil India, ONGC Videsh Limited, Bharat Petroleum, PTT Exploration, as well as Mozambique's national oil and gas company, ENH. The project, which benefits from one of the world's largest natural gas reserves off the coast of northern Mozambique, will be the country's first liquefied natural gas development. It will initially consist of two LNG trains with a total capacity of around 13 million tons per annum. Security issues led to the project's suspension 'sine die', in 2021 (Bloomberg, April 2021).

According to Fitch Ratings (March 2022), significant security risks remain with the potential to adversely affect the LNG projects in the LNG producing region despite improvements, largely due to the deployment of military forces from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Cabo Delgado in June 2021 that have pushed islamist insurgents into remote areas. Total is likely to resume the construction of its LNG project in 2022, but production is now likely to start only in 2026, two years later than expected and ExxonMobil's final investment decision on its USD 30 billion project is expected in 2022 (Fitch, 2022). While persistent security challenges have left the project's timeline in

question, Mozambique is projected to become one of the top ten biggest LNG producers worldwide in the mid-2020s, with more than 30 mmtpa of LNG coming on stream, which is equal to Nigeria and Algeria. The country is expected to target countries across the Asia Pacific region including China, Japan, and South Korea (Figure 11), as well as various European countries (Africa Oil & Power, 2020).

Figure 11 *Mozambique LNG Long/Term Sales Overview, Million Mt./Year*

Companies	Sales in million mt/year	Period
Tokyo Gas & Centrica	2.6	Until the early 2040s
Shell	2	13 years
CNOOC	1.5	13 years
EDF	1.2	15 years
Tohoku	0.28	15 years
Bharat	1	15 years
Pertaminia	1	20 years
JERA & CPC Corporation	1.6	17 years
Total volume	11.18	

Source: Source: S&P Global, retrieved in October 2021 from: https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/051319-mozambique-lng-secures-long-term-supply-deal-with-asian-buyers

In 2019, CNOOC's Gas and Power Singapore Trading and Marketing unit (CNOOC LTD. is a Chinese state-owned offshore oil and gas producer) signed a long-term agreement with the Mozambique LNG1 Company, a jointly-owned sales entity of the Mozambique Area 1 co-venturers. The deal "gives China's largest LNG importer access to Mozambique LNG's world-class gas resources, which are strategically located off the East Coast of Africa, and will provide China with a clean source of energy for years to come," said Mitch Ingram, Executive Vice President of Anadarko's International's Deepwater and Exploration Division (Reuters, 2019). The sales and purchase agreement was for 1.5 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) for a period of 13 years.

4. Conclusion

This chapter presented an exploratory study to discuss the implications of China's pathway to decarbonization for the relations between China and its oil and gas suppliers. Energy transitions are ongoing and complex processes, driven by sustainability, economic, and security concerns, which shape not only national energy systems but also regional and global geopolitical landscapes. As energy transformations unfold over the next decades, China's relations with its traditional oil and gas suppliers are likely to develop along China's evolving energy security and foreign policy priorities.

The analysis of pre-defined China's energy supply and demand scenarios shows that China's reliance on oil imports will likely continue to be significant at least in the next decade, while gas imports will likely continue to be significant in the coming two decades. In combination with this scenario, empirical evidence from the two case studies — Angola and

Mozambique — suggest that the forecasted decrease in Angolan oil production and increase in gas exports from Mozambique will likely reverse current roles: that is, Angola will lose relevance and no longer be a major supplier of fossil fuels to China, while Mozambique will become an important supplier of natural gas, confirming its role as a transition fuel for China's economy. Given the higher strategic importance of key energy suppliers, the shifts in fossil-fuel supplies to China in both countries could have implications in the intensity of diplomatic relations: these could become less intense with Angola and more intense with Mozambique. This will be contingent on how China's decarbonization plans pan out along the existing timeline.

Considering the track record of Chinese development banks to finance infrastructure development in countries that are key suppliers of commodities to China, the fossil fuel supply patterns could lead to less Chinese financing in Angola and more in Mozambique. Given that this financing has supported infrastructure projects, and along with them the presence of state-owned enterprises and Chinese investment, another implication could be a loss of size in economic relations. In this regard, it is worth noting that other raw materials, namely critical minerals used for electric battery production, electronic equipment and renewable energy technology, could become an additional factor of attraction to both countries, which have extensive mineral reserves.

We must emphasize that scenario analysis should not be regarded as a deterministic prediction of future behavior, but rather as a range of possible outcomes and the impact of policy options. While the transition to 2030 can rely on a range of available technologies and policies, for the long-term transitions IEA (2021, pp. 59–60) foresees four additional "technology opportunities": further electrification of end-use sectors; deployment of carbon capture, utilization, and storage; use of low-carbon hydrogen and hydrogen-derived fuels; use of sustainable bioenergy especially in road and air transport.

For the above reason, although empirical data suggests that oil producers like Angola will become less strategically relevant to China, while Mozambique may benefit from China's energy transitions, caution is necessary for drawing any definite conclusions. Future research directions could include a further assessment of other factors such as: (1) new perspectives and opportunities for integrated trade and investment frameworks, and also diversified energy cooperation mechanisms between China and Africa that arise as the Belt and Road Initiative unfolds; (2) the role of Africa's critical mineral reserves in energy value chains (3) the role of the oil and gas industry in the energy transitions. These research directions could provide a broader understanding of how China's energy transitions can impact China's foreign policy priorities and China's relations with its traditional oil and gas suppliers.

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China and Guinea-Bissau: Prospects and Pathways for All-round Cooperation

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China, Guinea-Bissau, Belt and Road Initiative, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Forum Macao, political instability, cooperation, foreign aid, investment

Abstract

Guinea-Bissau is categorized among the least developed countries in the world, with economic and social development subjected to political instability. After China and Guinea-Bissau resumed diplomatic relations in 1998, their bilateral relationships have experienced an upswing, characterized by China's aid and investment across a range of areas. For decades, resilient economic cooperation and China's interactions with sub-Saharan African countries has strengthened its presence in Africa, which has also set up a mode of collaborative paths for both China and Africa. In view of this, the main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the extent to which the frameworks of the Belt and Road Initiative, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, and Forum Macao have promoted change to Guinea-Bissau. The chapter concludes that the bilateral cooperation between China and Guinea-Bissau has been bringing tangible benefits in terms of infrastructure, much-needed aid, and Chinese investment, but there is still a long way to go to produce a major development impact. The analysis suggests that a long-term bilateral relationship and mutual trust may contribute to deepening friendship and expanding cooperation in future.

1. Introduction

Guinea-Bissau is a small country on the west coast of Africa between Senegal to the north and Guinea-Conakry to the east and south. It is divided into eight regions and one autonomous region with a population of around 1.9 million in 2020. The Bijagós Archipelago and other islands lie off Guinea-Bissau's Atlantic coast. Approximately, one-fifth of the population lives in the capital city Bissau, and the remainder is mainly distributed across the rural regions. Guinea-Bissau was first discovered by the Portuguese in 15th century, when it primarily served

as a trading post. The region of today's Guinea-Bissau was once part of the Kaabu Empire, the Mandinka kingdom (1537–1867), and a former province of the Mali Empire (Countries and their culture, 2022). Until the 19th century the entire territory combined with the islands of Cabo Verde became a Portuguese colony known as Portuguese Guinea. According to the World Factbook (CIA, 2022), Guinea-Bissau became an "overseas province," which seemed to played a part in softening Portugal's colonial image at the United Nations. During the 1950s and 1960s, decolonization efforts were launched across African continent, including in Guinea-Bissau: after 13 years of guerrilla war against the Portuguese colonial army, Guinea-Bissau declared independence in September of 1973 (World Atlas, 2022), which, however, was not ratified until 1974. The contemporary relations between Guinea-Bissau and the People's Republic of China can be traced back to this liberalization movement.

This chapter aims to review and provide a comprehensive outlook of the relationship between China and Guinea-Bissau from the perspectives of different sectors. First, the bilateral cooperation and conditions in different domains will be reviewed. Second, three frameworks which have influenced bilateral socioeconomic cooperations will be introduced. Third, based on the status quo of Guinea-Bissau and collaboration mechanisms, the prospects and paths for practical cooperation between China and Guinea-Bissau will be discussed.

2. Overviews of China–Guinea-Bissau relations

2.1 Bilateral ties in history

China and Guinea-Bissau have had a solid political foundation since the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) was one of PAIGC (African Party for the Liberation of Guinea and Cabo Verde)'s enthusiastic supporters during the independence war of 1963–1974. In 1961, China trained PAIGC members and Chairman Mao met with them in Beijing. Back in the 1960s, Portuguese colonization was contested by African nationalist Amílcar Cabral who founded the PAIGC (Lopes & Barros, 2020). China supplied funds and trainees for the decolonization; some PAIGC members were even directly trained in China. Guinea-Bissau's guerrilla tactics drew upon China's pioneering model and China's impact on the revolution has been significant (Henriksen, 1976). In 1975, China and Guinea-Bissau established diplomatic relations, and the CPC and PAIGC maintained close ties with each other. The bilateral relations experienced difficulties in 1990 when Guinea-Bissau turned diplomacy towards Taiwan, which was partly due to the ending of the Cold War and influence from the Western countries. However, based on the principles of political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, and territorial integrity, China and Guinea-Bissau restored full diplomatic ties in 1998. Thereafter, China has been steadily expanding its presence and strengthening brotherhood relations with Guinea-Bissau. To expand common ground and mutual trust, China has been coordinating relationships with other influential political parties in Guinea-Bissau, such as PRS (Partido da Renovação Social) and MADEM-G15 (Movimento para a Alternância Democrática-Grupo dos 15). In 1991, Guinea-Bissau turned from a single-party state (led by the PAIGC ever since independence) into a multi-party state.

The interactions between China and Guinea-Bissau primarily encompassed high-level political visits and sharing of governance experience. China mainly sent ministers and special assistants of the president to visit Guinea-Bissau, while Guinea-Bissau mostly sent its president or ministers on state visits. Former president João Bernardo Vieira visited China several times in 1980, 2006, and 2008, and, most recently, in 2018, President José Maria Vaz met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and visited Chongqing municipality to learn from China's experience in socio-economic development. Interactions between the two parties' have consolidated mutual trust and brotherhood, stablizing the two countries' relations, where China offers much-needed foreign aid and investment to Guinea-Bissau.

2.2 Small-scale in bilateral trade

Between 1974 and 1990, China and Guinea-Bissau signed several bilateral agreements on economic and technological cooperation in the agricultural sector. After the restoration of diplomacy, bilateral cooperation accelerated and became relatively stable between two countries. The cooperation in economy was primarily supplied by China's stated-owned and private sectors, particularly in specific sectors like energy and infrastructure (Jayaram et al., 2017). According to the Minister of Commerce during 2012–2020, China was ranked within the top 5 countries that Guinea-Bissau imported from. China's foreign direct investment (FDI) amounted to a total of 26.7 million dollars by the end of 2019. According to the International Trade Database at the Product-Level (BACI), which provides yearly data on bilateral trade flows at the product level, in 2019, the main exports from China to Guinea-Bissau were rice (USD 9.09M), coated flat-rolled iron (USD 2.5M), and unglazed ceramics (USD 1.4M). In the past decades, China's exports have increased from USD 1.09 million in 1995 to USD 31.9 million in 2019, at an annualized rate of 15%. While exports from Guinea-Bissau to China increased at an annualized rate of 38.5% from 1995 to 2019 (OEC, 2021).

Table 1 *China's Export & Import Values with Guinea-Bissau (Unit: US$ thousand)*

	Total	Exports	Imports	Total Year-on-Year (±%)		
Year	1–12 Months			Total	Exports	Imports
2020	51,448	51,443	5.4	27.5	61.1	-99.9
2019	27,795	22,056	5,739	13	12.3	15.7
2018	24,593	19,635	4,958	6.8	-13.7	1710.5

Source: Statistics of China General Administration of Customs, 2020

The main products that Guinea-Bissau exported to China were rough wood (USD 7.4M) and sawn wood (USD 125k). In 2020, Guinea-Bissau's economy was undermined by COVID-19, and exports to China receded sharply, as Table 1 shows. In contrast, China's export sales to Guinea-Bissau increased dramatically. Given the volume of trade and merchandise categories, a trade deficit occurs inevitably between the two countries in accordance with trade imbalance.

2.3 Recipients of China's foreign aid

After reform and opening up in 1978 when China was itself one of the world's poorest countries, it provided foreign aid to some Africa countries. By 1984, China was the eighth largest bilateral donors to sub-Saharan Africa, ranking higher than many other members in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Chinese government explicitly rejected conditioning its aid and loan, offering instead government-sponsored aid and investment to African countries more than half in infrastructure (Grimm & Hackenesch, 2017). Guinea-Bissau has received various forms of aids from regional organizations, institutions, and countries after independence, including the United Nations, the European Union, Portugal, France, and China (USAID, 2021). Most of China's foreign aid in Guinea-Bissau is oriented towards agriculture, education, healthcare, and infrastructure, committing to reducing Guinea-Bissau's poverty and facilitating socioeconomic development.

Agriculture aid

China has launched various agricultural demonstration centres in Africa, and some potential drivers of agricultural reform which were suggested by China's own experience (Woetzel, 2021). The Chinese government puts priorities on agriculture, rural development, and poverty reduction in developing countries as the aim of its foreign aid (PRC Embassy to the U.S., 2011). Guinea-Bissau has a long history in rice planting which China deemed as the country's strategic foothold. According to a World Food Organization report, China signed rice cultivation cooperation with Guinea-Bissau in 1977. In 2008, Chinese agriculture experts in Guinea-Bissau were awarded a prize of technology development by the Agriculture Department of Guinea-Bissau for helping the locals enhance their production by 5 to 8 times. By 2021, China had sent over 18 teams of agricultural experts with a total of 246 personnel aiming to boost bilateral agro-technological cooperation. According to the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), in 2018, China's agriculture assistance under the China–Guinea-Bissau Agricultural Technical Cooperation Projects (ATCP) contributed to the development of agricultural technology, leading to an improvement in technological capacity and mechanization for Guinea-Bissau's farmers (UNDP, 2018).

Education and healthcare aid

China's provision of scholarships to Guinea-Bissau dates back to 1977. In 1982, China and Guinea-Bissau signed another culture protocol featuring people-to-people exchanges at the official level. Cultural delegations through people-to-people exchanges have helped Guinea-Bissau cultivate specialist personnel in critical roles such as in the government and official sectors. In addition, China has set scholarships on different levels and granted ambassador scholarships to local schools. By 2020, China had already granted 319 international scholarships (PRC Embassy to Guinea-Bissau, 2021).

The health sector is another area in which China has provided much-needed assistance to Guinea-Bissau. China signed a protocol to dispatch medical teams to Guinea-Bissau when the latter gained independence, and China restarted that protocol after 2000. From 1976 to 2020, China sent over 18 batches of medical teams consisting of 247 medical workers. In addition, medical supplies and equipment have been donated each year, which may have partially relieved Guinea-Bissau's weak healthcare system and supply shortages. According to statistics from the World Health Organization (WHO), China ranks fourth in medical aid after the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Germany. In 2020, with the outbreak of COVID-19, Chinese enterprises and civil organizations actively assisted Guinea-Bissau's fragile healthcare system to fight the virus. Since the first case appeared in Guinea-Bissau, the Chinese government has provided multiple rounds of highly demanded supplies. By October 2021, the second batch of Chinese state-sponsored coronavirus vaccines had been distributed to Guinea-Bissau (PRC Embassy to Guinea-Bissau, 2021).

Prime assistant projects

Guinea-Bissau's chronic political instability and mismanagement of institutions have affected the domestic investment atmosphere and socioeconomic conditions. Its infrastructure, which heavily depends on foreign aid, has either been damaged or construction has been halted due to unrest in the country (PRC Embassy to Guinea-Bissau, 2021). China has funded some iconic infrastructure projects which greatly contribute to enhancing Guinea-Bissau. China's foreign aids and construction projects cover a wide range of sectors. A number of projects with Chinese assistance have completed and have been handed over to Guinea-Bissau's government.

Table 2 *China's prime assistant projects in Guinea-Bissau*

Date	Project	Remarks
April, 1981	Canchungo Hospital	Comprehensive hospital in the northwest, upgraded in 2006
May, 1985	September the 24th	A sport stadium with a capacity of 15,000 seats
February, 2003	Veteran's apartments, parliamentary building	USD 18 million for the construction of parliamentary building
March, 2005	National assembly building	13,768 m^2, a symbol of the two countries' friendship
July, 2007	Agro-agriculture	Training 585 technicians in the regions of Bafatá, Gabú, and Oio
August, 2008	Guinea-Bissau government building	16,600 m^2 for 13 ministers' offices
August, 2010	China Guinea-Bissau friendship hospital	Largest general hospital in the region
December, 2013	Guinea-Bissau national medical school	6,000 m^2, with capacity for 500 students and 90 classrooms
October, 2014	Building of justice	Handover of the high court offices in 2016

Table 2 *China's prime assistant projects in Guinea-Bissau*		
Date	**Project**	**Remarks**
August, 2015	China and Guinea-Bissau friendship school	Capacity of 1000 students in the rural areas of Bissau, Bafatá, and Cachéu
October, 2018	Bandim fishing port	Promotion of the fishery industry
December, 2018	Digital satellite television for rural place program	Agreement of the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2015
January, 2021	Construction of Chinese-funded highway	14 km of highway linking Bissau to the suburb of Safim
Source: Retrieved and adapted - PRC Embassy to Guinea-Bissau, 2021		

Table 2 shows China's prime assistant projects in Guinea-Bissau, ranging from municipal utilities, civilian buildings, ports, and highways. For example, in 2021, the construction of a Chinese-funded highway along the west coast, linking the city of Bissau to the suburb of Safim, officially began construction, to be completed in 2023.

3. International Mechanisms for China and Guinea-Bissau's Cooperation

3.1 From South-South cooperation to Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

The People's Republic of China began engaging in Africa not long after its founding in 1949. Meanwhile, with the forum of Bandung Conference in 1955, developing countries were playing a leading role in international activities ranging from public and private-sector institutions to non-governmental organizations, which finally fell into the category of South-South cooperation (UNOSSC, 2021). Subsequently, China joined this non-aligned movement as a developing country and committed aid and support for the developing countries in Africa. The construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway was a landmark project in China's early assistance in Africa back in the 1970s. Since 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation begun operations as a new mechanism focused on trade between China and the African continent. The forum formed a comprehensive platform for cooperation in politics, economy, culture, security, and international affairs. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has since then become the main institutional framework that governs China-Africa relations (Hooijmaaijers, 2018). In 2018 during the Beijing Summit, China, together with 53 African countries restated that "FOCAC has become a propeller of Africa's leapfrogging development, a new symbol of South-South cooperation" (FOCAC, 2021). The Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021) reinforced stronger China-Africa ties with a shared future and agreed "to form a strong synergy between the Belt and Road Initiative,

and the 2030 Agenda."[1] The growing Sino-African relations present both opportunities and challenges for African states and corporations. FOCAC has become a new model of international cooperation framework among the African developing countries.

3.2 Transcontinental connectivity project of the Belt and Road Initiative

Emerging in 2003, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, full name: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road) is a major platform, and an interconnected development initiative for shared benefits through shared development and collaboration. The BRI offers a clear, centralized vision, and a platform for concerted effort in streamlining the infrastructural development in Africa (Farooq et al., 2019). The initiative helps address bottlenecks that limit private sector development and diversification (Yusuf et al., 2020). For more than a decade now, the BRI has supported ambitious African infrastructure developments, featuring mega construction projects such as railway, bridges, highways, and harbours. These projects facilitate regional integration and help increase cross-border trade in Africa continent (Asante, 2018). Trade and investment become the main function of the BRI according to Mckinsey Analysis (Jayaram et al., 2017), and, since 2014, under this mechanism, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flow to Africa has exceeded the United States' (China-Africa Research Initiative, 2021). A growing number of private sectors and multinational corporations from China have been engaging in overseas investments directly via this framework.

3.3 Forum Macao involving China and Portuguese-speaking Countries

Macau has the historical importance of being a hub of early transmissions of culture and trade between the East and the West. After the handover of Macau in 1999, the bond between China and Portuguese-speaking countries (PSCs) strengthened in many aspects via the platform of Macau. The Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao) was founded in October 2003. The platform highlights and plays a part in multi-lateral cooperations between China and the PSCs. China has conducted assistance cooperation with Portuguese-speaking developing countries, including Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Timor-Leste in the fields of culture, education, medicine, capacity building, and agriculture (China Foreign Aid, 2021). By 2016, Forum Macao had held five successful conferences. At present, three centres have been set up for commercial services for Chinese and PSC enterprises, plus a distribution centre for the food products of PSCs, and a convention and exhibition centre for economic and commercial cooperation. In line with the other two frameworks

[1] In September 2015, world leaders adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations aiming to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity. Retrieved in July 2022, from https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/

mentioned above, Forum Macao has been gaining worldwide prominence with the advent of Sino-Lusophone interactions. In 2010, China announced a USD 1 billion fund designated to increasing trade between China and PSCs. The trade volume between China and the PSCs has increased as much as 10 times, from 12.31 billion dollars in 2003 to 119.04 billion dollars in 2020 (FM, 2021).

4. Prospects and Paths for Deep Cooperation

4.1 Extending political trust and improve governance

Guinea-Bissau has experienced more than 40 years of failed economic policies in the face of on-going political and economic unrest (Brandon, 2015). Guinea-Bissau's institutional capacity for implementation is very low with respect to public services and operational skills. The judicial system remains vulnerable to political interference and corruption. Warf (2017) argues that corruption has numerous corrosive effects on an economy and society as a result of lowering public morale and distrusting of the state. Foreign investors may prefer relatively non-corruption environments with low costs of doing business. In terms of ease of doing business, Guinea-Bissau scored 43.2, ranking 174 out of 182 in 2020. Both, FOCAC and the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (FM) have provided platforms for deepening political trust and bilateral cooperation. In light of chronic political instability and weak governance practices, consolidation of high-level visits is advocated between CPC and PAIGC or dominant parties. The 2018 Ministerial Conference of FOCAC re-stressed the path to political cooperation and efforts in formulating national development strategies and improving state governance. From this perspective, maintaining the momentum of government visits and dialogues may be constructive and accommodating to Guinea-Bissau's domestic institutional reforms (CL Briefing, 2021). In addition, Guinea-Bissau's political instability has resulted in a lack of economic development and high levels of poverty. Guinea-Bissau's Human Development Index (UNDP, 2020) was in the low human development category of 0.480 in 2020, ranked 175 out of 189 countries and territories. According to the World Food Programme (WFP)'s country brief in 2022, 69% of Guinea-Bissau's population live below the poverty line and 25% of the people suffer from chronic malnutrition, with high infant and maternal mortality rates (WFP, 2021). In 2021, the State Council Information Office of China released a white paper entitled "Poverty Alleviation: China's Experience and Contribution" (State Council of PRC, 2021). This action plan encompassed sharing China's own experience in reducing poverty via personnel development with the African countries (Qin, 2020). In this regard, by sharing Chinese solutions in poverty reduction, it is favourable and instructive to cooperate with Guinea-Bissau's governance on poverty alleviation and social progress.

4.2 Launching direct investment and much-needed infrastructure

Promotion of foreign direct investment

Guinea-Bissau relies heavily on packages of aid and investments from foreigner investors and stakeholders, private donors, and commercial funds. The international communities and other development agencies have given generous aid, technical support, and educational grants, etc. (Ture, 2017). In recent years, Guinea-Bissau has attracted relatively substantial sums of foreign investment; foreign merchants have been fully integrated into the country's economy (Lundy, 2015). According to UNCTAD's (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 2020 World Investment Report, FDI inflows increased slightly from USD 21 million in 2018 to USD 31 million in 2019. The main investment countries are China, United States, Portugal, and India (World Investment Report, 2020). In light of data from the Foreign Ministry of China in 2019, Chinese FDI was around 2.96 million dollars in Guinea-Bissau and newly signed investment was up to USD 12.31 million. Yusuf et al. (2020) argued that the stable and sustainable political environment will facilitate the inflow of FDI into the west African economy. Despite Guinea-Bissau's several policy initiatives over the last decades, the majority was not implemented and many projects were discontinued (Havik et al., 2018). In view of these domestic conditions, Guinea-Bissau's government has planned to diversify the economy and improve key infrastructures such as electricity services, transportation, and rural road access to tribes. China has developed a network of domestic development banks (DDBs) that are quite active overseas in emerging and developing economies (Galán & Leandro, 2019). Since 2010, China's investments in Guinea-Bissau have increased (Doing Business, 2020), and China has signed several economic and technology agreements with Guinea-Bissau that aim to deal with its domestic economic and fiscal problems. The frameworks of FOCAC, the BRI, and Forum Macao are bound to become important mechanisms for functioning and facilitating investment and projects in Guinea-Bissau. During the 2018 FOCAC Summit, China signed a funding project with Guinea-Bissau as part of the summit agreement between the two countries.

Participation in the mineral sector

The Guinea-Bissau government has opened channels for exploiting untapped mineral resources and the much-needed offshore oil. The mineral sector has been part of Guinea-Bissau's potential revenue sources (Arvanitis & Weigert, 2017). Presently, the resource extraction for export plays a very small role in Guinea-Bissau. Explorations were conducted on bauxite, petroleum, and phosphate rock in 2015 (National Minerals Information Center, 2015). The mining of phosphate and bauxite constituted a lowest share of Guinea-Bissau's GDP in 2020,[2] but is on the rise for investment from prospective investors like Angola, Canada, Greece, Switzerland, and China. In light of China's huge import demands for natural resources, mining projects are needs in Guinea-Bissau in a manner designed to

[2] It's only 0.02% of Guinea-Bissau GDP. Retrieved in October 2021, from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1243014/value-added-of-mining-and-quarrying-as-share-of-gdp-in-west-africa/

attract China's funds, technology, and technicians. In addition, Guinea-Bissau's oil has been discovered in shallower waters, while the resource extraction for export plays a very small role in revenue. Guinea-Bissau's oil mining projects began in 2006 and involved companies from Switzerland, Austria, South Africa, and Norway (Oil Review Africa, 2021). Since 2007, a series of multiple drilling in Guinea-Bissau's offshore blocks has been made by Premier Oil (U.S.), OXY (Great Britain), Petrobras (Brazil), and Sonangol. In 2019, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the largest Chinese oil and gas group, obtained a majority stake in oil drilling licenses off the West African coast of Guinea-Bissau from the Australian oil and gas explorer FAR Ltd. (Oil Review Africa (2021). Energy is one of BRI's major drivers and focuses in West Africa with the development of trans-continental systems, which is in line with the BRI's vision of connectivity (Githaiga et al., 2019). There is vast room for China's involvement in the mineral sector, which is essential for Guinea-Bissau's development and diversification of its economy.

Investment in infrastructures

Chinese enterprises have been mutual advantageous to the African continent, offering services to help African countries improve connectivity, especially in coastal port projects and road facilities to the hinterlands. China's engagement emphasizes Africa's infrastructural needs, while transportation (i.e., roads, railroads, airports, harbours) is a top destination for China Eximbank loans (Eom et al., 2017). To improve its infrastructure is beneficial for Guinea-Bissau's inter-market connectivity and poverty alleviation. Additionally, China's cardinal objective of the BRI in Africa has been to enhance transport infrastructure and connectivity. Infrastructure investments are part of the follow-up actions of FOCAC and BRI. With the ongoing Chinese projects on highways and ports in Guinea-Bissau, further constructions may boost the ECOWAS integration.[3]

4.3 Promoting cooperation in agriculture and fishery

The Government of Guinea-Bissau established a strategic and operational plan for 2015–2025 entitled "Terra Ranka" ("fresh start"), which would guide government actions towards sustainable and supportive development. Guinea-Bissau's Terra Ranka states that the government will support private-sector investments, and prioritize agriculture, fisheries, as well as infrastructure to support those projects. Guinea-Bissau's international revenues primarily rely on raw cashew nut exports, fishery, and forestry, which account for 34% of GDP (UNDP, 2020). Cashew export has become the backbone of Guinea-Bissau's economy, which is exclusively based upon smallholder production and accounts for 80% of export (Hanusch, 2016). Consequently, a lack of crop diversity tends to make the households and the economy vulnerable to macro-economic shocks (Havik et al., 2018), such as falling cashew prices, harvest failures, natural disasters, and climate change. For example, there

[3] Established on May 28, 1975 via the treaty of Lagos, ECOWAS is a 15-member regional group with a mandate of promoting economic integration in all fields of activity of the constituting countries. Retrieved in October 2021, from https://www.ecowas.int/

were 154,000 tons of cashew nut exports in 2020 (20.9% less than 2019), which resulted in the reversal of GDP in 2020 (see Table 3).[4] There is large potential for the two countries to cooperate in cashew economy: either exporting to the Chinese market or to the value chain of processing raw cashew nut before being exported.

Table 3 *GDP index (Gross Domestic Product) 2015–2020*

Guinea-Bissau	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
GDP	6.1	6.3	5.9	3.8	4.6	-2.4
GDP per capita growth	3.4	3.6	3.3	-1.2	2.0	-4.7
Inflation rate(%)	1.4	1.6	1.4	0.5	0.7	2.0

Source: The World Band (annual %), 2020

Secondly, China has a long history in assisting Guinea-Bissau in rice production. Folger (2018) noted that China was much more involved in Guinea-Bissau's agriculture than in many other sub-Saharan African countries. The recent case by working with UNDP in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique shows that China's effective agricultural aid and experience through an agro-technical cooperation programme in Guinea-Bissau has been profitable to help improve its agriculture production (State Council of PRC, 2021). In 2018, the Action Plan of FOCAC (2019–2021) proclaimed that China will send 500 senior agriculture experts and train entrepreneurs in agro-business to the African countries. In this regard, the way of agriculture cooperation is continuing to serve as a prominent project between China and Guinea-Bissau.

Thirdly, Guinea-Bissau is one of the important fishing grounds in Atlantic and rich in all sorts of marine products. Its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) stretches for about 7000 km2, approximately twice its land surface. It is a member of the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program, which aims to increase the economic contribution of marine resources. The fisheries sector constitutes an important revenue for Guinea-Bissau and more than 15 thousand people work in fish processing and commercialization. Its annual fishing volume can reach 250,000 to 350,000 tons. The wealth of fisheries and its potential aquaculture constitute an important source of economic growth. Industrial fisheries are mainly done by foreign vessels by paying the corresponding quotas or license. China has already invested in some port projects and fishery in Guinea-Bissau. In 2006, Guinea-Bissau became the first country to sign a deep-water fisheries agreement with China, opening the door for a large number of Chinese fishing vessels to operate in its EEZ. Catches by legal fleets were dominated by Chinese fleets (20%) from 2011 to 2017 (Intchama et al., 2018). Further collaboration is expected to include offshore aquaculture, maritime transportation, marine resources development, and shipbuilding and repair.

[4] https://www.noticiasaominuto.com/economia/1773549/guine-bissau-preve-exportar-175-mil-toneladas-de-caju

4.4 Improving education and healthcare

Guinea-Bissau has made improvement in education but its level remains low. In 2010, the out-of-school rate for children of primary school age of both sexes was up to 27.3%, and the primary completion rate was 58.5% in the same year according to World Development Indicators (2014). Meanwhile, Guinea-Bissau has a severe shortage of higher education, and most of the students pursue higher education overseas, leading to talent being lost from the country. Low educational achievement poses a major obstacle against improving job employment, labour productivity, and generating income for the people (Word Bank, 2020). These shortcomings may increase inequality and deprive the country of the potential productivity of its human resources. The Terra Ranka (2015–2025) is a "blue-print for education" to cultivate human capital. In partnership and cooperation with Guinea-Bissau's education, China can provide long-term support to facility constructions, offering scholarships through mutual protocol. For example, based on the Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021), China will continue to provide Africa with 50,000 government scholarships and 50,000 training opportunities via seminars and workshops to train more professionals in different disciplines. In the healthcare sector, China's health assistance was generally involved with commitments to building clinics and sending Chinese medical personnel and medicine to specific countries. In the context of COVID-19, China has shared its anti-epidemic experience with Guinea-Bissau and donated anti-epidemic supplies. Further cooperation between China and Guinea-Bissau is inclined to encompass the dispatch of medical specialists, and training of medical staff, public health workers, and administrative personnel. Those collaborative projects are under the framework of the FOCAC, BRI, and south-south cooperation (Gao & Nkengasong, 2019).

4.5 Facilitating Forum Macao as Platform

In 2019, with the official launch of the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macau Greater Bay Area (GBA),[5] Macau as a trading platform amidst China and Lusophone countries has been strengthened (Greater Bay Area — Hong Kong Government, 2021). Macau thereby gains a significant geo-strategic site for Lusophone countries to generate impetus in cooperation and trading with China. In view of lower trade volume and trade imbalance between China and Guinea-Bissau as Table 1 has shown previously, Forum Macao and the GBA are expected to tap into the potential market of Guinea-Bissau in terms of the import of cashew products, tourism, and wood products. In view of the GBA's vitality and advantages in the supply chain, manufacturing, and financial services, the complementarity of Forum Macao and the GBA would provide favourable conditions for the two countries' cooperation in both breaddth and depth.

[5] GBA is an initiative to increase the Chinese economy's value adding capabilities and boosting internationalization in the Pearl River Delta of Guangdong Province along with Macau and Hong Kong (officially released in 2019). Retrieved on October 22, 2021, from: http://www.cnbayarea.org.cn/english/

5. Conclusion

The main purpose of this chapter has been to discuss the extent to which the frameworks of the Belt and Road Initiative, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, and Forum Macao have promoted significant changes to Guinea-Bissau. As the largest trading partner for decade, China has played a leading role in the economic growth for the African continent. By contrast, China's investment in Guinea-Bissau only accounts for a small percentage for the narrow domestic market and political instability. China and Guinea-Bissau's cooperation are still confined to the traditional sectors, but the prospects for the new growth points have great potential through the frameworks of FOCAC, BRI, and Forum Macao as discussed above. Moreover, the main pillars of these frameworks, including infrastructure investment, trading, energy, and agriculture are largely aligned with the strategic and operational plan of Guinea-Bissau's Terra Ranka, but have yet to deliver significant contribution. From this perspective, Guinea-Bissau should continue to implement the economic hubs of Terra Ranka, in the context of China's African strategies and cooperation frameworks. Most significantly, the COVID-19 pandemic has not only posed serious threats to the global economy but has induced large-scale recession. In addition to such challenging external economic environment, Guinea-Bissau's domestic development and cooperation with foreign countries are constrained by its own political instability. It is therefore requisite that Guinea-Bissau's government create a more dynamic economic environment to promote further cooperation with foreign investors.

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ONLINE SOURCES ON GUINEA-BISSAU AND MOZAMBIQUE

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Online Sources on Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique

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Modern information technology has transformed the ability of scholars everywhere to conduct serious research using primary and secondary sources of every kind from around the world. Major caches of archival materials and other data have been digitized, and many of them are freely available to anyone willing to take the time and effort needed to explore what exists. The restrictions on personal mobility imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic have made easy long-distance access to such materials even more crucial. Five or ten years in the future, many more such riches will undoubtedly have become available online, making this short introduction to what is already a treasure trove of materials for serious academic research only a work in progress.

This guide begins by providing information on websites related to Africa; moves on to general international websites, in some cases indicating approximately how much material on Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique these include; and then focuses on sites and pages bearing more particularly in some way on Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Users should bear in mind that additional materials may have been added to these sites since the compilation of this guide.

This guide to online sources is excerpted from a more extensive compilation, Online Sources for Research on Portuguese-Speaking Countries, available online at: **https://iropc.cityu.edu.mo/en/Publications/139.**

Comparable information on online sources on Cabo Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe is included in an earlier volume in this series: Francisco José Leandro, Pedro Paulo dos Santos, and Yichao Li, eds., *China and Portuguese-speaking Small Island States: From sporadic bilateral exchanges to a comprehensive multilateral platform* (Macau: City University of Macau, 2021), 509-526.

(A) General African Websites

Africa Portal

https://www.africaportal.org

This website offers access to thousands of publications related to Africa. It can be searched country by country.

African Activist Archive Project

https://africanactivist.msu.edu/index.php

The African Activist Archive at Michigan State University is preserving and making available online the records of activism in the United States to support the struggles of African peoples against colonialism, apartheid, and social injustice from the 1950s through the 1990s. The website includes over 10,000 items, collecting historical materials, such as pamphlets, newsletters, leaflets, buttons, posters, T-shirts, photographs, and audio and video recordings, oral histories, and personal remembrances of activists. Events in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique feature prominently in these collections.

African Journal Archive

https://journals.co.za/content/collection/african-journal-archive

The African Journal Archive is a retrospective open access journal service that preserves and makes available African journal literature dating as far back as 1906, originating from a wide base of publishers and societies on the African continent. The Carnegie Corporation of New York initiated and sponsored the Sabinet Gateway project.

African Newspapers Union List Project (Columbia University)

https://library.columbia.edu/subject-guides/africa/resources/ejournals.html

This portal offers access to a very wide range of open access electronic journals and newspapers on Africa.

African Studies Internet Resources

https://library.columbia.edu/locations/global/virtual-libraries/african_studies.html

This portal offers access to a huge range of internet resources related to Africa. They are organized by region, country, organization, and topic.

African Union Commission Documents

http://archive.au.int/browse.php

The African Union has digitized many of its records, including major speeches, the minutes of its meetings, reports, and other documents.

Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA)

https://www.codesria.org/

CODESRIA has, over the past 35 years established itself as the leading scholarly publisher in the social sciences on the African continent, with 90 per cent of what it publishes fed directly by the research and activities it sponsors among various social research networks in universities and research institutes throughout the continent and increasingly in the diaspora. It publishes a bulletin and a wide range of books, journals, reports, and working papers, some of which are accessible through its website.

South African History Online

http://www.sahistory.org.za/

A website that provides access to numerous primary and secondary sources on South Africa during and after the Cold War, especially materials on nationalist and left-wing movements, including those in both Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.

(B) International Websites Related to the African Portuguese-Speaking Countries: General

The American Presidency Project

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu

The American Presidency Project includes the text of all the public statements of U.S. presidents from George Washington onward, and also materials from all the presidential campaigns. These offer coverage of all presidential statements related to Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, including joint press conferences with visiting dignitaries and officials from each country.

Archives Portal Europe

https://www.archivesportaleurope.net/

The Archives Portal Europe provides access to information on archival material from different European countries as well as information on archival institutions throughout the continent. Accessible materials include many thousands of documents, publications, maps, photographs, audio-visual materials, and oral histories, from the fifteenth century up to the present. Over 100 of these are related to Guinea-Bissau, and a further 100 to Mozambique.

British Commonwealth Oral History Project

https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/

A collection of oral histories by significant figures in the British Commonwealth, compiled by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, London. Several of these discuss events in Angola and Mozambique.

British Diplomatic Oral History Programme

https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/bdohp/

The British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (BDOHP), established in 1996 with the approval and cooperation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FC), interviews former British diplomats or other officials who have played a significant role in events bearing on international relations. Interviewees include diplomats who served in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique during and after the Cold War.

Cold War International History Project

http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/

The Cold War International History Project, based at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, maintains a continuously expanding digital archive of original documents relating to the Cold War, gathered from archives around the world. A small number of documents are related to Guinea-Bissau and over 100 deal with Mozambique, which features prominently in the project collection Cuba and Southern Africa.

This archive forms part of the broader website of the Woodrow Wilson Center's History and Public Policy Program, which also includes a wide variety of publications, including the Cold War International History Project's Bulletin and Occasional Papers; transcripts of critical oral history conferences; and a project blog.

CPLP – Community of the Portuguese Language Speaking Countries

https://www.cplp.org/

CPLP is a multilateral forum intended to deepen mutual friendship and cooperation among its members, the Portuguese-speaking countries. It was created on July 17, 1996. CPLP has the following general objectives: the conservation of political diplomacy among its Member-States, reinforcing its international presence; cooperation in all areas, including education, health, science and technology, defense, agriculture, public administration, communication, justice, public security, culture, sports, and social communication; and the implementation of projects that promote and disseminate the Portuguese language. Its website includes reports and press releases related to these efforts in the various Portuguese-speaking countries, including Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.

Diário da República Electrónico

https://dre.pt/

This site offers access to official public decrees and statements of the government of Portugal, from 1603 to the present, including many related to Portuguese Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique.

Forum Macao

https://www.forumchinaplp.org.mo/

The Permanent Secretariat of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation Between China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Macao), established in 2003, is an intergovernmental and apolitical multilateral cooperation mechanism that is permanently based in Macao and focuses on economic and trade promotion and development. It seeks to consolidate economic and trade exchanges between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries, and promote Macao's role as a platform connecting China and Portuguese-speaking Countries. It publishes a bulletin, reports, investment guides, and trade data, all available on its website, together with news releases and updates on economic and business relations and cultural exchanges between China and the Portuguese-Speaking Countries.

George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum

https://www.bush41.org/

The Bush 41 Presidential Library website offers access to some significant materials relating to U.S. policy toward Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé e Príncipe.

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/collections.aspx

The Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library contains extensive documentary information on U.S. policy toward Portuguese colonies and former colonies in Africa. More than one hundred conversations, memoranda, documents, and photographs relating to Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique have been digitized.

Getulio Vargas Foundation CPDOC (Center for Research and Historical Documentation)

http://cpdoc.fgv.br/acervo/arquivospessoais

This Brazilian website includes several personal archives of important political figures of Brazil's history (such as former presidents and ministers for foreign affairs). Several of them have been fully digitized. The website also includes a wide range of publications and dissertations on aspects of the Portuguese-speaking African countries, including Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.

Historical Archives of the European Union

https://www.eui.eu/Research/HistoricalArchivesOfEU

The Historical Archives preserves and makes accessible in a central location the archival holdings of the European Union Institutions. In addition, the HAEU collects private papers of key European politicians, high-ranking EU officials and individuals involved in the process of European integration as well as the archives of pro-European movements and other organizations with a European scope. These materials include over 90 digitized files relating to Guinea-Bissau from the 1960s to the early 2000s, and more than 140 digitized files relating to Mozambique in the same period.

Human Rights Watch

https://www.hrw.org/

The website of the non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch includes over 50 reports and news releases relating to Guinea-Bissau, and more than 200 reports and news releases referring to Mozambique, from the early 1990s to the present.

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library

https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/collections

The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library has digitized portions of its archival collections of documents, audio-visual materials, photographs, oral histories, and other materials generated by the president and his associates, including significant materials related to former Portuguese colonies in Africa.

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library

https://www.jfklibrary.org/

The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library has digitized substantial portions of its archival holdings of documents, photographs, oral histories, and other materials generated by the president and his associates, including significant materials on U.S. relations with Portugal and developments in Portuguese Africa.

The Library of Congress: Frontline Diplomacy: The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training

https://www.loc.gov/collections/foreign-affairs-oral-history/

The Library of Congress website hosts online, searchable transcripts of oral history interviews conducted with over 1,700 U.S. diplomats of the later twentieth and twenty-first centuries. A number of these deal with U.S. policies toward and relations with Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.

Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library

https://www.discoverlbj.org/

The Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library has digitized the files of the president's daily diary and telephone conversations, National Security Histories, and oral histories. Some of these sources contain material on Portugal and its African colonies, including Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique.

Margaret Thatcher Foundation

http://www.margaretthatcher.org

The Margaret Thatcher Foundation has collected and made available online many thousands of documents relating to Margaret Thatcher, including not just all her public speeches and statements but also numerous documents from her personal and official papers, and from other archival collections around the world that relate to her career. Over 100 of these contain material related to Mozambique.

Mário Soares Foundation (Fundação Mário Soares): Archive and Library

http://www.fmsoares.pt/aeb/

The Archive and Library is a project that the Mário Soares Foundation has developed since its inception in 1996, using the latest information technologies for this purpose. Initially

consisting of materials from the personal archive of Dr. Mário Soares, it has been supplemented by numerous other documentary collections bearing on the modern history of Portugal and the Portuguese-speaking world, including, for example, materials from the collections of the Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa (INEP), Bissau, and the archives of Amílcar Cabral.

Marxists Internet Archive

https://www.marxists.org/

Marxists Internet Archive (MIA) is a non-profit website that hosts a multilingual library (created in 1990) of the works of Marxist, communist, socialist, and anarchist writers, such as Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Che Guevara, Mikhail Bakunin, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, as well as those of writers of related ideologies, and even unrelated ones (for instance, Sun Tzu and Adam Smith). It contains more than 53,000 documents from over 600 authors in 61 languages. It includes a substantial section devoted to Anti-Imperialism and Marxism in Africa, which offers a broad collection of writings by leaders of the Anti-Imperialist and Anti-apartheid movement and Marxists in Africa, and documents by and about all varieties of socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Among the writers featured are Amílcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau and Samora Machel of Mozambique.

Memories of Africa and Asia Portal (O Portal das Memórias de África e do Oriente)

http://memoria-africa.ua.pt/

The Portal of Memories of Africa and Asia is a project of the Portugal-Africa Foundation established in 1997, developed and maintained by the University of Aveiro and the Center for Studies on Africa and Development. It is a fundamental and pioneering instrument in an effort to enhance historical memory of the ties that unite Portugal and Lusophony, thus offering the peoples of all these countries a bridge to their common past in the construction of a collective identity. Its holdings include thousands of digitized periodicals, newspapers, books, pamphlets, images, and other materials, and major archival collections, including numerous items related to Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.

The Miller Center, University of Virginia

https://millercenter.org/

The Miller Center is a nonpartisan affiliate of the University of Virginia that specializes in presidential scholarship, public policy, and political history. Its website includes information on every U.S. president, transcripts and in many cases audio or video recordings of significant presidential speeches, oral histories relating to several presidencies from Jimmy Carter onward, and transcripts and recordings of secret presidential tapes made by Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard Nixon. Developments in Portuguese Africa and the Portuguese-speaking African countries feature in materials covering the more recent presidencies.

National Archives of Portugal (Arquivo Nacional: Torre do Tombo)

https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/

The National Archives of Portugal offers digital access to selected documents from its collections, many of them related to the history of Portugal and its former colonies, including a significant number dealing with Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé e Príncipe.

National Library of Portugal: National Digital Library

http://www.theeuropeanlibrary.org/tel4/collection/a0493

The National Digital Library of Portugal provides access to digitized documents relevant to Portuguese Culture, History and Science in Portugal and its former colonies, including Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé e Príncipe. Over 10,000 documents are currently available at the National Digital Library website. The NLP Collection of Digital Items is mainly composed of iconographic documents for preservation purposes. For the same reasons, cartographic material was also intensively digitized. The most relevant content available online is from textual documents encompassing old Portuguese books from the 16th and 17th Centuries, important for their uniqueness and heritage value, and Portuguese newspapers of the 19th Century, because of their richness of information and fragile nature.

National Security Archive

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/

The National Security Archive is a non-profit, non-governmental research and archival organization, located at George Washington University, Washington, DC, that focuses upon declassifying and disseminating archival materials relating to U.S. involvement in international affairs during and after the Cold War. Its website includes a virtual reading room of documents from a wide range of sources, selected publications, information on its numerous projects, and a blog. The website includes a few documents related to Guinea-Bissau and around 20 connected to Mozambique.

NATO Archives Online

http://archives.nato.int/

NATO provides access to committee documents and publications relating to the early history and operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Around 40 of these are related in some way to what was then Portuguese Guinea (later Guinea-Bissau), and a further 40 to Mozambique.

Richard Nixon Presidential Library

https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/national-security-memoranda

The Richard Nixon Presidential Library has digitized the National Security Subject Memoranda and National Security Decision Memoranda issued through the National Security Council during the Nixon presidency. Some of these relate to developments in Portugal's African colonies, including Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library

The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library has digitized portions of its archival collections of documents, audio-visual materials, photographs, and other materials generated by the president and his associates, including significant materials related to international affairs. Insurgencies and civil wars in the former Portuguese colonies, especially Angola and Mozambique, and other African states were a major preoccupation for the Reagan administration.

United Kingdom National Archives

http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/

The National Archives of the United Kingdom offers a wide range of archival and other materials relating to British foreign policy. Some files related to Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique have been digitized, and many of these are freely accessible.

UNESDOC Digital Library

https://unesdoc.unesco.org/

This digital library hosted by UNESCO contains thousands of publications from the 1950s onward, including books, journal articles, reports, and other materials, relating to developments in the Portuguese-speaking African countries, including Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Many though not all of these titles are available as digitized full-texts.

United Nations

http://www.un.org/en/databases/index.html

The United Nations maintains a range of databases giving access to official reports, resolutions, speeches, and archives. Many thousands of these files are in some way related to developments in Angola, Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, or São Tomé e Príncipe.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/crest-25-year-program-archive

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency maintains a large online archive of historical documents it has released for public use under the Freedom of Information Act and other initiatives. Several hundred of these relate to Guinea-Bissau, and over 3,000 to Mozambique, covering the period from the late 1940s to the early twenty-first century.

U.S. National Archives

https://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-list.jsp?cat=WR42

The U.S. National Archives has digitized the records of the U.S. State Department's Central Policy Files from mid-1973 to 1979. Several hundred of these telegrams refer to Guinea-Bissau, and around 10,000 to Mozambique. This site also provides extensive digital files on U.S. military assistance programs and defense spending in overseas countries throughout and beyond the Cold War.

U.S. State Department: Freedom of Information Act Website

https://foia.state.gov/#3

The U.S. State Department maintains an online archive of documents it has released under the Freedom of Information Act. Over 200 of these touch in some way on Guinea-Bissau from 1970 until at least 2009, and several hundred have some bearing on Mozambique during this timeframe.

U.S. State Department: Office of the Historian

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments

The Office of the Historian section of the State Department website offers access to a range of historical materials, including all volumes of the documentary series Foreign Relations of the United States published to date. These cover U.S. relations with other countries, including those in Africa, from 1861 onward, up to the administration of President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989).

William J. Clinton Presidential Library and Museum

https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/

The Digital Library of the William J. Clinton Presidential Library offers access to a growing number of documents, photographs, and audio-visual sources generated by President Clinton

and members of his administration, including significant material relating to Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé e Príncipe.

The World Digital Library

https://www.wdl.org/en/

The World Digital Library contains several items related to Guinea-Bissau, and at least one British Foreign Office report on Mozambique.

World Trade Organization and General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs

https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/res_e.htm

The World Trade Organization website, which includes the archives of its predecessor organization, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), provides extensive detailed information on the past and present economic and commercial situation of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, especially their involvement in the international trade system.

(C) Guinea-Bissau

Government of Guinea-Bissau: Official Website

http://www.guinebissaurepublic.com/

The official website of the government of Guinea-Bissau serves as a portal to the country's assorted ministries and agencies, and to other information on the country.

African Development Bank

https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/guinea-bissau/

The African Development Bank offers access to numerous data, reports, publications and other material related to Guinea-Bissau and its projects in that country.

Amnesty International

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/guinea-bissau/

The website of the leading human rights non-governmental organization Amnesty International includes over 60 reports and press releases related to Guinea-Bissau, from the 1990s to the present.

Freedom House

https://freedomhouse.org/country/guinea-bissau

The non-governmental organization Freedom House provides reports assessing the state of freedom and democracy in Guinea-Bissau since 1998.

International Monetary Fund

https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/GNB

The International Monetary Fund has published numerous reports and other documents dealing in whole or in part with Guinea-Bissau.

The Library of Congress Law Library Research and Reports: Guide to Law Online: Guinea-Bissau

https://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/nations/guineabissau.php

The Law Library's Guide to Law Online: Guinea-Bissau provides links to numerous online resources related in whole or in part to Guinea-Bissau's constitution, government, and legal system, history, and practices.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

http://www.oecd.org/countries/guinea-bissau/

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has published numerous reports and other materials concerning Guinea-Bissau.

Reporters Without Borders

https://rsf.org/en/guinea-bissau

The website of the non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders includes reports on the situation of the press and media in Guinea-Bissau since around 2010.

Stanford University Library: Guinea-Bissau

https://library.stanford.edu/africa-south-sahara/browse-country/guinea-bissau

Stanford University Library provides a portal to a wide range of online and digitized materials related to every aspect of Guinea-Bissau.

The U.S. Department of State: Country Page on Guinea-Bissau

https://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/pu/

The U.S. State Department maintains a country page on Guinea-Bissau, which gives a brief description of bilateral relations, and also includes links to other sites covering a wide range of economic matters, the human rights situation, developmental assistance, and humanitarian issues.

World Bank

http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guineabissau

Since the late 1990s, the World Bank has produced over 100 publications and reports related to the economic development of Guinea-Bissau. Its archives and oral histories, available elsewhere on the World Bank website, also contain information on its past and present dealings with and activities in Guinea-Bissau.

(D) Mozambique

Official Website: Government of Mozambique

http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/

The official website of the Government of Mozambique offers a portal providing access to websites of the different government ministries and officials, as well as information on Mozambique.

FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) Website

http://www.frelimo.org.mz/frelimo/

The official website of Mozambique's dominant political party, founded in 1962 to fight for independence from Portuguese rule.

Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) Website

http://www.renamo.org.mz/

The official website of another of Mozambique's leading political parties, founded in 1975.

African Development Bank

https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/southern-africa/mozambique/

The African Development Bank offers access to numerous data, reports, publications and other material related to Mozambique and its projects in that country.

Amnesty International

https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/mozambique/

The website of the leading human rights non-governmental organization Amnesty International includes around 80 reports and press releases related to Mozambique, from the 1990s to the present.

Freedom House

https://freedomhouse.org/country/mozambique

The non-governmental organization Freedom House provides reports assessing the state of freedom and democracy in Mozambique since 1999.

International Monetary Fund

https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/MOZ

The International Monetary Fund has published numerous reports and other documents dealing in whole or in part with Mozambique.

The Library of Congress Law Library Research and Reports: Guide to Law Online: Mozambique

https://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/nations/mozambique.php

The Law Library's Guide to Law Online: Mozambique provides links to numerous online resources related in whole or in part to Mozambique's constitution, government, and legal system, history, and practices.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

http://www.oecd.org/countries/mozambique/

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has published numerous reports and other materials concerning Mozambique.

Reporters Without Borders

https://rsf.org/en/mozambique

The website of the non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders includes over 15 reports on the situation of the press and media in Mozambique since the early twenty-first century.

Stanford University Library: Mozambique

https://library.stanford.edu/africa-south-sahara/browse-country/mozambique

Stanford University Library provides a portal to a wide range of online and digitized materials related to every aspect of Mozambique.

The U.S. Department of State: Country Page on Mozambique

https://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/mz/

The U.S. State Department maintains a country page on Mozambique, which gives a brief description of bilateral relations, and also includes links to other sites covering a wide range of economic matters, the human rights situation, developmental assistance, and humanitarian issues.

World Bank

http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique

Since the late 1990s, the World Bank has produced over 300 publications, reports, and other materials related to the economic development of Mozambique. Its archives and oral histories, available elsewhere on the World Bank website, also contain information on its past and present dealings with and activities in Mozambique.

African Portuguese-speaking countries (APSCs) are a relevant part of this "new relational era" being outlined for the near future. To add up the variety of "traditional" motivations and interests that has been providing ground to a stable relational status — from oil and gas to infrastructural strategic investments — one can expect significant developments in the years ahead, both in economic and financial terms and substance. […] this book makes sense of a variety of perspectives, thematic fields, and methodological approaches in a way that configures a highly valuable piece of literature to help scholars, independently of their experience and status, in their endeavours to grasp the complexity of a riveting research subject that is Africa and the APSCs and their burgeoning and far-reaching relations with China.

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Despite the old historical relationship with China, Portuguese foreign policy is constrained by belonging to the European Union […]. Nevertheless, the Lusophone link remains very important in the connection with China, whose interests in the Global South clearly include the Portuguese language countries.

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